SOCINIANISM AND ARMINIANISM

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Preface

Adolf von Harnack concludes his classic “Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte” with observations about the triple denouement of the history of dogmatism. He situates the transformation of dogmatism in anti-Trinitarianism and Socinianism between Trentarian Catholicism and reformed Protestantism. Harnack himself pleaded for a resolute development of Protestantism, eliminating the old dogmatism it still preserved. He credited the Socinians with having accomplished a relentless critique of this dogmatism. Harnack adapted from his teacher Albert Ritschl the idea that Socinianism grew out of nominalism and humanism; at the same time he regarded the Socinians as precursors of the Enlightenment. Hence it made sense to assert that the Middle Ages and Modernity joined in Socinianism, in part, beyond the Reformation.

Harnack saw the progress of Socinianism and its relation to the Enlightenment in four aspects: in the simplification of dogmatism, the orientation of religion according to ethics instead of metaphysics, the clarity and simplicity of religious propositions, and the emancipation of biblical exegesis from the spell of dogmatism. With his thesis that Socinianism was a crucial precursor of the Enlightenment, Harnack associated himself with the history of theology as it had been elaborated by the Hegelians David Friedrich Strauß and Ferdinand Christian Baur. To this Hegelian school also belongs Otto Fock’s great work on the role of Socinianism in the general evolution of the Christian spirit, in which Fock acknowledged that Socinianism was key in the transition from old Protestantism to new Protestantism.

After Harnack, however, German historians of theology neglected Socinianism. Now it was Italian and Polish historians of culture like Delio Cantimori and Stanilaus Kot, and American theologians like Earl Morse Wilbur and George Hunston Williams, who studied Socinianism in depth. Thus, today Socinian scholarship is highly differentiated. Yet often this scholarship follows the paths of national historiography and denominational church history. This volume, however, is especially interested in the “in-betweens”: the relationship of anti-Trinitarianism to “liberal” currents in reformed Protestantism, namely Dutch Remonstrants and some of the French Huguenots, as well as English Latitudinarians. This in-between also has a local aspect: we are
interested in the transformations which anti-Trinitarianism experienced in the complicated transition from its origins in Italy and its refuge in Poland, Moravia and Transylvania to Prussia, to the Netherlands and later to England. Socinianism was created by Italian Protestants in a humanistic milieu. It was then expelled to Switzerland, where it soon faced the opposition of Zwingli’s and Calvin’s supporters, and found refuge in eastern Central Europe, only to be pressured once again, in the second half of the 17th century, into an extreme change of context. When, between 1627 and 1647, the Counter-Reformation increasingly suppressed the Polish Socinians, many of them chose exile in Western Europe, the Republic of the Netherlands in particular. Through this migration, anti-Trinitarianism experienced a cultural transfer into a theoretically and culturally foreign environment.

What were the effects of this transfer on the dynamics of pluralization in the progressive Netherlands? How did the Socinians negotiate the shift from being a group of exiles with family ties to a diffuse movement organized in loose networks of sympathizers? How did these pan-European networks work? And, most importantly: how did Socinianism manage to associate within this new milieu of Arminians, Cartesians, Spinozists, Lockians, philologists and historians? How did it have to change to pursue its aims? How was the growing emphasis of its rationalist components at the expense of its biblicist components effected? By which means was this change of authority dealt with? How was the specifically juridic character of the Socinian notion of religion, which made obedience to the laws of the Lord the condition for salvation, transformed? How to analyze the multiple crossovers between Socinianism and Arminianism?

On the 12th and 13th of July 2003, the editors of the present volume organized the symposium “Socinianism and Cultural Exchange”. It took place in the rooms of the Seminar für Geistesgeschichte und Philosophie der Renaissance at the Ludwig-Maximilian University of Munich. The symposium was sponsored by the Center for Collaborative Research (Sonderforschungsbereich) “Pluralization and Authority in the Early Modern Era” (“Pluralisierung und Autorität in der Frühen Neuzeit”). Approaching the question of the dynamics of pluralization and authority, this interdisciplinary research project attempts to bring to the fore the competition of diverse traditions as well as the coexistence and interplay of new and old ideas. In this perspective, the symposium and the present volume establish a dialogue between recent studies on cultural transfer, research on the anti-trinitarian and lib-
eral Protestant traditions, and the reconstruction of pluralization in the Early Modern period.

Our thanks go to the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft for supporting this symposium, and we particularly thank Florian Mühlegger for his dedication in the arrangement of this volume.
PART I

INTRODUCTION
Religious pluralism, tracing its roots to the late Middle Ages, had been a characteristic of the Netherlands since the beginning of the Reformation. Erasmus of Rotterdam had left his mark there as did the followers of Luther, Zwingli and Calvin, as well as the Mennonites and Spiritualists. Following the battle against the absolutist pretensions of the Spanish crown, however, a new confessional situation arose. The Calvinist-inspired Reformed Church became pre-eminent in the North, which had made an actual split with Spain, since it was these Calvinists who had decisively supported and interpreted their liberation struggle as a war against Rome. Their broadly Calvinist orientation, however, nevertheless left room for differences of theological viewpoint, but this pluralism within the Church was tolerated less and less by those Calvinists of stricter observance the longer it persisted. As a result, conflict eventually arose between strict Calvinists and followers of Arminius, against whom the charge of Socinianism was soon levelled. In what follows, the development of this conflict will be presented up to the time of the Synod of Dort, which can be seen as marking a confessional parting of the ways between strict Calvinists on the one side, and Arminians and theologians similarly suspected of Socinianism on the other.

1. The States General, the Reformed Church and the University of Leiden

The relationship between Church, State and University differed in the Republic of the United Netherlands from those in other States. This was especially the case when one contrasts them with those in the German territories. In the German realm numerous territories were presided over either by a Prince or a Magistrate. Secondly, each of the territories—with few exceptions, such as Jülich-Kleve-Berg—tolerated only a single confession. They were confessionally exclusive, i.e., either

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Roman-Catholic or oriented towards the Confessio Augustana as the only Protestant confession recognised by federal law. Even territories which followed the model of the Palatinate and introduced Calvinism in the course of the so-called second Reformation, witnessing to it in confessions and catechisms, nevertheless held officially to the *Confessio Augustana*. Thirdly, this had the consequence in the case of the universities of binding them to the confession prevailing in their territories; only those new foundations which conformed to this condition received imperial privilege of university status.

In the Northern Netherlands, however, the relationships between Church, State and University were quite different. Firstly, the Northern Netherlands constituted a Republic which, in contrast with increasingly dominant centralising trends in Europe, had managed to preserve a federal structure. The provincial assemblies or Provincial States in the individual provinces originated from the period when the Netherlands still belonged to the Spanish monarchy, whilst foreign affairs were the responsibility of the ‘Generality’ or States General. Since 1588 the States General had met permanently in The Hague and its importance as a central political organ can be readily discerned from the fact that the Republic itself was called ‘States General’. The execution of central tasks by the States General, however, especially in foreign affairs, did not compromise the sovereignty guaranteed to the Provincial States. The States General only enjoyed a derivative sovereignty, and since consensus was required for important decisions, the representatives of the provincial assemblies could block the political decisions of the ‘Generality’. However, the authority of the provincial assemblies in its turn was limited by the powers of the city magistrates, so that, for example, the magistrate of Amsterdam could successfully block the decisions of the provincial assembly of Holland. But despite these inbuilt centrifugal powers the Republican form of government demonstrated an astonishing efficiency. The constitution of the seven United Provinces no longer made allowance for a Stadholder, since the Princes of the House of Orange-Nassau had been Stadholders of the Spanish King, whom they had separated from in the course of the rebellion. Thus there was no governor of the States General, but rather its office was subordinated to the individual provinces. However, the Stadholder of Holland—the most important and most densely populated province—along with its provincial assembly played a central role in the politics of the Republic. In the first place the Stadholder was captain-general, i.e., the military commander-in-chief; in addition, he was responsible
for overseeing justice and the protection of the true Christian religion as well as the formation of the city magistracy. Consequently, conflicts with the provincial assemblies and the city regents were foreseeable. The office of the Stadholder was mostly seen as a relic of monarchy, which was inconsistent with a Republican form of government and the sovereignty of the provincial assemblies. The conflict finally culminated in a clash between the Stadholder of Holland, Maurice of Orange, and the Grand Pensionary Johan Oldenbarnevelt, who held the presidency of the provincial assembly of Holland and consequently also had a central role in the States General.

The confessional character of the Northern Netherlands differed from that of the German territories in a similar way to how their respective forms of government differed. At the Congress of Dort in 1572 religious freedom for Reformed and Catholics alike was guaranteed by William of Orange. However, the Reformed Calvinists were in the more advantageous position since they had supported the rebellion against Spanish Absolutism and seized the larger Churches in the territories that had rebelled. The Calvinists’ situation improved still more when the prohibition of public Catholic services, decreed in Holland and Zeeland in 1575/76, was then accepted in 1587 by the remaining provinces. Freedom of belief and conscience, still officially permitted, was thus legally restricted, but in actual fact these restrictive measures could be circumvented. This was in no small way connected to the fear many magistrates had of Calvinist preachers gaining too much influence. In addition, the Reformed Church was an increasingly dominating force in religious life; however, the Netherlands were still very far from being a confessionally uniform territory. Only part of the population were confessing Calvinists; another part belonged to the Catholic Church; the rest were divided between Anabaptists, Lutherans and other groups. This confessional plurality was broadly, if not always in the same manner, tolerated by the city magistrates. Thus Oldenbarnevelt could declare that it had never been the view of the ‘Generality’ that war should be waged for the protection of this or that religion, but that each province—indeed, each city—should be free to accept or maintain that religion which they consider to be right and commendable. This relative religious tolerance was supported by the federal structure of the Republic, which allowed the city regents considerable political manoeuvring space.

Although, therefore, Calvinism could not establish its claim to exclusivity, the Reformed Church nevertheless enjoyed a status, if not quite
of state Church, then at least of public Church\(^2\). The members of the public Church, or Publieke Kerk, were privileged to the extent that they alone had access to public office. However, the relationship of the Reformed public Church to the organs of state, from the state magistrate to the regional assemblies and the States General, was not at all unambiguous. At the synod of Emden in 1571 the Dutch emigrants and representatives of the religious communities in exile adopted the Confessio Belgica as the confession of the Dutch Reformed Church. Only two years later it was also adopted by the synod of North Holland, and the Confessio Belgica, authored by Guy de Bray, soon became the confession of the Dutch Reformed Church. Alternatively, the Heidelberg Catechism was adopted. The Church itself was ordered in accordance with the model also put forward at Emden: at the lowest level was the local Church congregation, which was guided by the Church council. The council—after the Geneva model—consisted of pastors, presbyters, and deacons. The local Church congregations were brought together into a classis, or regional assembly of neighbouring Churches, which consisted of representatives from the local Church councils. Above the classis was the provincial and finally the National Synod. Not only was it incumbent on the organs of the Church from the local Church councils to the provincial and National Synod to exercise Church discipline against any violation of their accepted confession but also the confession itself attributed to the secular powers the task, as servant of God, of protecting the Church—i.e., the Reformed public Church—and propagating the Gospel message.

Whilst the Church believed that the protection of the secular powers meant the latter’s executing the former’s demands, the secular authorities themselves interpreted it in the sense of their having an influence in Church matters. This ran up against the bitter resistance of those representatives of the Church who stressed, following Calvin, the independence of the Church over against secular authority. Thus, for example, the 1574 provincial synod of South Holland in Dordrecht stipulated that the nomination of the pastors and elders of the local Church council was to be carried out with the agreement of the classis, whereas the magistrate merely needed to be informed. In contrast, the plans for Church government of the provincial assemblies of Holland in 1576 intended that pastors, after being examined theologically by the

\(^2\) Schilling 1980, Religion.
Church council, would actually be employed by the town authorities. In addition, the elders would also be nominated by the town magistrates, and with the employment equally of the professors and teachers by the town authorities it was assured that only Calvinists held office. A clear and binding resolution, however, despite several attempts, was never arrived at, since the secular authorities feared that they would be manipulated by the Church, whilst the Church regarded the authorities’ efforts at protection as insufficient. In particular, the political commissioners, initially seen as on the side of the Church, paid particular attention that the Church did not interfere with the innermost concerns of the secular authorities.

What position did the Universities adopt towards the tense relations between Church and State? Amongst the universities Leiden, which was both the first and the largest university of the young Republic, played a particularly important role. Leiden took over the international significance which Louvain, as the only university in the whole of the Dutch provinces, had once possessed. But although Louvain had remained the most important university in the Spanish Netherlands and had served as a bulwark of the Counter-Reformation, the founding of Leiden sparked the foundation in the Republic of a series of further universities after it. The founding of Leiden in 1574 was initiated by William of Orange and carried through by the provincial assemblies of Holland. William himself declared to the assemblies that the founding of the university would serve the cause of freedom and lawful government, since at Leiden the youth of Holland and Zeeland, but also of other provinces and countries, could be educated in the true religion and in the various liberal arts and sciences to the benefit of their rulers. At the university theology, jurisprudence, medicine and philosophy were to be freely and publicly taught. The word ‘free’, however, was to court trouble when the Reformed Church strove to gain control over teaching, whereas the town magistrate, appealing to the aforementioned freedom, refused any attempt by the Church to determine what people should think or say. This stubborn commitment to the freedom to teach what one sees fit distinguished Leiden from the next university to be founded by the Frisian provincial assemblies in Franeker. The professors of latter university, founded in 1585, were formally bound to the Heidelberg Catechism. Thus the relative openness of Leiden showed itself from the outset when contrasted with the other universities of the young Republic, which sought a stricter obedience to the Reformed confessions.
conflict between Reformed Church and secular power, from the town magistrate to the assemblies, thus also penetrated the universities.

2. Jacobus Arminius

The first great conflict between the Reformed Church and the secular authorities at the level of the universities was sparked off around the issue of predestination and was bound up with the question of the right relation between Church and state. Jacobus Arminius, who in 1603 was appointed to a post in Leiden after having served as a Reformed pastor since 1588 in the Oude Kerk in Amsterdam, found himself at the centre of this conflict. In 1578, the Reformed in Amsterdam had finally gained the upper hand. They did not, however, make up a homogeneous group, but were rather divided into the broader minded rekkelijken and the less broad minded preciezen. The rekkelijken, to whom the majority of the old-established merchant families belonged, characteristically showed a relative tolerance and were in favour of Christian magistrates having an influence on the appointment of pastors and elders. On the whole, those of the merchant class who had fled from the Spanish from Antwerp and the South oriented themselves more strongly to the Geneva model and insisted on the independence of the Church from secular authority. Conflicts quickly arose between the two parties. The opposition between the two can be clearly made out by looking at two figures in Amsterdam public life who exemplify it. Petrus Plancius was the first strict Calvinist who was appointed as pastor in Amsterdam. He himself came originally from Flanders, and it was refugees from the South and rigid Calvinists like himself who had appointed him. This form of Calvinist was altogether new in the town and ran into opposition from the old merchant class, who were distinguishable from the religious refugees from the South by their having a certain religious tolerance. The mayor, Cornelis Pietersz. Hooft, numbered amongst this Oude Geuzen group, who turned energetically against the ‘clericalisation’ of public life and equally energetically defended freedom of belief and conscience. The persecution of heretics by the magistrate which the strict Calvinists were demanding would, he considered, lead merely to a new Papism.

3 Cf. C. Bangs 1971, Arminius.
The accusation of a new Papism was levelled above all by Dirck Volckertsz. Coornhert, who in 1582 published his *Synodus of van der Conscientien vryheit*, in which he devoted himself to criticising the suppression of conscience both by the Roman and the Reformed Church and confessional inflexibility. Out of all the Calvinist doctrine of predestination came in for particular criticism. Coornhert did not contest the prevenient grace of God, but only suggested this worked not necessarily and by force, but rather as free gift, which the sinful individual could either accept or reject in an act of free will. Under no circumstances did God create or determine individual persons for salvation or reprobation, since in that case He Himself would ultimately be the cause of sin. Rather, human beings sin of their own free will, and can also freely accept the universal, graceful offer of a merciful God made available through Christ to all people. It was naturally unavoidable that the Calvinists, gaining in strength, would turn against Coornhert and challenge him to disputations. In 1578 two pastors from Delft, Arent Cornelisz. and Reynier Donteklok had already engaged in disputation with him in Leiden on the topic of predestination and tried to refute him in their *Responsiones ad argumenta quaedam Bezae et Calvini ex extractatu de praedestinatione in cap. IX ad Romanos*. In the latter, however, they toned down Beza’s strict supralapsarian doctrine of predestination and replaced it with an infralapsarian version. The Amsterdam consistory also summoned Arminius to refute Coornhert, who seemed particularly well suited to the task, since he himself had studied not only with Danaeus in Leiden and Grynaeus in Basle but also with Beza in Geneva. Beza expounded a supralapsarian position in his pamphlet *De praedestinationis doctrina et vero usu* of 1583 and defended it against the Lutherans at the Mömpelgard conference in 1586. In his engagement with Coornhert, however, Arminius did not stick to the latter position, but rather—from 1593 onwards, when he reached the ninth chapter of the epistle to the Romans in his sermons at Amsterdam—came to find the doctrine of predestination fundamentally problematic, both in its supra- as well as in its infralapsarian form. Indeed he had already clashed with his colleague Plancius some time before, and in 1591 he wrote to Grynaeus in Basle to tell him that controversies had arisen in Amsterdam over predestination, original sin and free will, and that the Church council had arranged a disputation between himself and

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Plancius, in which each had to defend themselves against the accusation of Pelagianism. He was further strengthened in his criticism of the doctrine of absolute predestination by a publication of the Frisian theologian Jelle Hotze—in Latin, Gellius Snecanus—and his interpretation of the classical biblical references for the doctrine of predestination in Romans 9. Arminius communicated his agreement with Snecanus in a letter to him, and agreeing that the respective references referred not to the predestination of individuals, but of classes of people. Where it says that God had already condemned Esau and elected Jacob from before their birth, that by no means meant that God had predetermined Esau to reprobation and Jacob to salvation from all eternity; rather, it meant that Esau and Jacob served as representatives of particular classes of people. Esau represented the children of the flesh, and Jacob the promised children, the children of the flesh being those who wanted to attain justice through works, whereas the promised children were those who sought justice through faith. Paul therefore intended to say that God had elected from eternity those who seek justice through faith, just as He had from eternity excluded the others from salvation. Arminius thus connected the doctrine of predestination with the doctrine of justification by faith: those who believe in Christ were elected and therefore predetermined to salvation from eternity.

The controversy over the doctrine of predestination was by no means one restricted to the Netherlands. In the Reformed Churches themselves there existed no unanimous view with regard to predestination, and disputes relating to the latter had taken place since Castellio’s objections to Calvin’s doctrine and the Strasbourg debates with Zanchi. In Zurich it was preferred to speak simply of the election of the faithful in Christ, the Heidelberg Catechism passed over the doctrine of predestination in silence, and it was hardly to be expected from the students of Melanchthon who had gone over to the Reformed camp that (given the critical position of their teacher towards Luther’s revival of the Augustinian understanding of predestination) they would change into eager advocates of unconditional predetermination. In the German territories, which switched over to the Reformed faith in the con-

text of the so-called second Reformation, the doctrine of predestination played a different role from the outset than the one it had in Beza’s Geneva and in those regions under Genevan influence. In other territories the Genevan doctrine met with resistance, since in those areas older theological conceptions dominated in which the doctrine of election was differently understood. This was the case in the States General, in which the Genevan position only gained ground with the arrival of the refugees from the South, and also in England, where the conflict among the refugees from Queen Mary’s rule between the Calvinist Genevan and the Prayer Book party lived on. This conflict also impacted on the Dutch controversy, since Arminius entered into critical dispute with William Perkins who in 1598 had defended Beza’s supralapsarian form of the doctrine of predestination in his work *De praedestinationis modo et ordine*. Perkins was a theologian in Cambridge, the centre of English Calvinism, and supported through his expositions the position of the then Archbishop of Canterbury, John Whitgift, under whose direction in 1595 the *Lambeth articles* were composed, in which the supralapsarian doctrine of predestination was to be included into the confession of the English Church. In the first two of these articles it is explicitly written that God from all eternity has predetermined some to life and condemned others to death. The moving or effective cause of predestination is neither foreseen faith nor steadfastness in faith nor good works nor any other thing in the person who has been preordained to life, but rather God and His will alone. In his dispute with Perkins, which on account of the English theologian’s death in 1602 was published posthumously, Arminius clarified his counterposition. Perkins was of the view that election did not depend on God’s foreseeing that a person would have faith, since—according to his argument—the reason why God foresees faith in a person is because He freely willed to endow one person with faith and withhold it from another. Foreknowing or foreseeing—praescientia—depends on predestination—praedestinatio. In contrast Arminius distinguished between the predestination of classes of people, which is unconditional and independent of foreknowledge, and the predestination of individuals, which is conditional and dependent on foreknowledge. It was of course the case that the faithful would be saved and the unfaithful damned, but an individual person would only be saved under the condition, foreseen by God, that he believed.

In 1603 the conflict smouldering in Amsterdam over the doctrine of predestination exploded in Leiden after Arminius accepted an appoint-
ment at the university as professor of theology. His main opponent in Leiden was Francois Gomaer—Franciscus Gomarus—a Flemish Calvinist born in Bruges who had studied in Strasbourg, Neustadt, Oxford, Cambridge and Heidelberg, thereafter served as preacher to the Walloon congregation in exile in Frankfurt am Main, and in 1594 accepted an appointment in Leiden. Open conflict between Arminius and Gomarus began in 1604. At the beginning of the year in accordance with academic custom Arminius held a public disputation about predestination. He defined it as a decree of God’s mercy through Christ, in which He had decided from all eternity to justify the faithful and grant them everlasting life. Divine reprobation, on the other hand, consisted in God’s decree in which He had decided from all eternity to punish the unfaithful, who through their own free will did not want to believe, with eternal death. Thus, according to Arminius predestination to salvation referred to those sinners who had converted to faith. Against this position Gomarus represented the extreme supralapsarian one of Beza, according to which the subject of predestination is the yet to be created person, i.e., the person before his or her creation and fall. God from eternity had predetermined to salvation to His greater glory a certain number of yet to be created persons and similarly predetermined others to reprobation. Thus, the opposing positions in the dispute were marked out.

3. Arminius and Gomarus

News of the quarrels at Leiden spread quickly across the United Provinces. The severity of the conflict between Calvinists of the Plancius and Gomarus type and Arminius and his followers can only properly be appreciated against the background of the religious and political situation. Since only shortly before in neighbouring Louvain, the academic stronghold of the counter-reformation, Robert Bellarmin had combated the Calvinist doctrine of predestination, the latter needed to be that much more fiercely defended in Leiden. Those Reformed in particular who came from the South and whose faith had been shaped

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by their confrontation with the Jesuits suspected that true Calvinism was being betrayed. On 30th June 1605 five synod members from the provincial synods of North and South Holland, all of them pastors, went to Arminius in order to examine him about the orthodoxy of his teaching. As justification for this initiative they claimed that theological candidates who had answered contrary to the usual teaching in their examinations before the classis had made reference in their answers to Arminius. Since however the pastors had no official authorisation from their synods for this Arminius declined their request. Instead, he proposed that in future, if any theology candidates who had studied under him were found to be saying anything contradictory to the Confessio Belgica or the Heidelberg Catechism, he could be consulted in general conversation with the classis and candidates in question, in order to dispel any misunderstandings. In any case, however, he indicated that he was not answerable in the first instance to the Church synods but to the trustees of the University of Leiden, without whose permission he could not submit to the authority of the synods. Arminius thus appealed—against the synod members—to his academic freedom and the independence of the university, which was protected by its trustees. Moreover, he claimed that he contradicted none of the recognised authorities—neither Scripture, nor the Confessio Belgica nor the Heidelberg Catechism—with his teaching.

On 28th July 1605 Arminius received another visit, this time from two members of the Leiden consistory. They were not, like the previous time, pastors, but elders of the Church, who requested that Arminius speak with his professorial colleagues before the Church council. When Arminius also declined this request by reference to the need for them first to win the agreement of the university trustees, the two elders abandoned their plan. Shortly afterwards the classis of Dordrecht began to complain about the new Arminian teaching and requested the provincial synod of South Holland to become more active against it. This, however, alerted the university trustees to the threat of an illegitimate intervention by the Church synods into the inner affairs of the university. When on the 9th November two synod members on the orders of the provincial synod of South Holland requested the trustees to hand their professors of theology a set of questions for them to answer, they also met with refusal. The University of Leiden was not inclined to force their theological teaching staff to undergo an inspection by the provincial synods of the Reformed Church. Since a solution to the conflict was not possible at the level of the provincial synods, the
convening of a National Synod was taken into consideration, both by the Church and by the University.

On 30th November 1605 the provincial synods of South and North Holland asked the States General to convene a National Synod. Arminius supported the proposal, and the States General also came close to actually calling it, but on a condition which must have seemed unacceptable to strict Calvinists: the National Synod also proposed that the *Confessio Belgica* and the *Heidelberg Catechism* be revised. The authority of the two confessional documents were not unquestioned in the Dutch Church: both were accepted by the synods in Wesel and Emden but at both synods not all provinces were represented, so that in the eyes of many the latter two synods had not been National Synods in the strict sense. The two synods held at home in Middelburg 1581 and The Hague 1586 were also not recognised by many as National Synods strictly speaking, since they were not called by the States General. The strict Calvinists had wanted for a long time to have the two confessional documents recognised by a proper National Synod, whereas their opponents pleaded for a revision of the confessions. When in 1597 the provincial synods of North and South Holland had demanded the convening of a National Synod, the States General declined. The reason for this refusal was the fear that the Synod might introduce the Genevan model of a self-governing Church and curtail the participation of the secular powers in Church matters. When the provincial synods then turned to the Provincial States of Holland, these latter consented to the National Synod, but only on the condition that they subject the confessional documents and Church government to a revision. In addition the remaining provinces were an obstacle, since the states of Holland by itself did not represent the States General, which alone could convene such a Synod. Against the background of the events of 1597 the attempt to convene the National Synod in 1606 by the States General met with the resistance of the Calvinists, who saw the whole teaching basis of the Reformed Church—in the shape of the *Confessio Belgica* and the *Heidelberg Catechism*—put into question. The provincial synods of South Holland decided on account of that to demand not only of their pastors but also their theology professors and heads of the theological colleges—i.e., the Dutch theological seminar or Staten College and the French-Walloon theological seminar in Leiden—an examination of the confessional documents, the aim being to show that a revision of the confessional basis of the Dutch Church was unnecessary.
In 1607 the States General allowed a convention to make preparations for the National Synod, to which the provincial assemblies were to send pastors. This convention met in spring of the same year in The Hague. Holland was amongst others represented by Gomarus, Arminius and Wtenbogaert, and Friesland by the strict Calvinists Sibbrandus Lubbertus and Johannes Bogerman, Pastor in Leuwaarden. Firstly, the States General required that questions be answered concerning the organisation of the Synod. It was decided to hold the Synod in 1608 in Utrecht. Appeals were to be forwarded to the provincial synods, which were each expected to send four pastors and two elders to the National Synod. The States General were also to be represented by delegates, and invitations were to go out to the professors of theology. The decisive question was whether the delegates’ votes were to be bound exclusively to the Scriptures. This question split the convention: a minority with Arminius and Wtenbogaert answered in the affirmative, whereas the majority shared the position of the strict Calvinists, that commitment to the Confessio Belgica and the Heidelberg Catechism had to complement that to the Scriptures. Thus any attempt at a revision of the fundamentals of the confessions was to be excluded in advance: confession and catechism were regarded as agreeing unanimously with Scripture, and therefore not revisable. The minority at the convention, however, took exception that the two documents did not represent genuine, official confessions of the Dutch Church recognised by a previous National Synod; moreover, they argued, confessional revisions were normal procedure in the Reformed faith. Finally, the majority managed to push its request through that the States General should remove reference to the revision of confession and catechism from the invitation to the National Synod. Both the majority and the minority continued on with a defence of their respective positions to the States General. At the request of Arminius the provincial assemblies of Holland and Westfriesland suggested that Arminius and Gomarus meet with the rest of the representatives from Holland at the conference. The meeting led the assemblies to form the opinion that no fundamental difference existed between the two, a view which Gomarus vehemently denied, whilst Arminius stressed his own orthodoxy. Shortly after the Synod of South Holland had demanded from all pastors a written declaration concerning the confession and catechism, the provincial assemblies summoned Arminius on the 30th October 1608 for him to declare his position. In the Inner Court of The Hague he gave his Verklaring before the assemblies of Holland and West-
friesland, in which he also addressed the question of the revision of confessions\(^9\). In principle, he claimed, confessions needed to be measured against Scripture as the highest criterion of faith and are to that extent constantly revisable. It is plainly the task of a National Synod constantly to examine its confessions to see whether they agree with Scripture. Moreover, confessions should be limited to those articles which are necessary to be believed for salvation. Since the provincial assemblies saw the demand of the synod of South Holland to pastors that they submit a statement on confession and catechism as an intrusion into state matters, they requested the pastors to address their critical objections to the provincial assemblies, which they would then put forward to a National Synod. Thus the conflict between Arminius and Gomarus grew from one over predestination into a conflict between Church and state. When on the 12\(^{th}\) December 1608 Gomarus appeared before the provincial assemblies of Holland and gave his counter-position, he not only accused Arminius of Pelagian and Jesuitical notions in his doctrine of grace, but also attacked the Arminian understanding of the relationship between Church and state. A conversation arranged the following year by the provincial assemblies of Holland between Arminius and Gomarus, once again in The Hague, under the presidency of Oldenbarnevelt, resulted in no solution to the two intertwined problems, and only shortly after the aforementioned fruitless meeting Arminius himself died.

Arminius had outlined his own position one last time before his death in the \textit{Verklaring}, which takes its starting-point from a presentation of the opposing position. Thus at the beginning of the \textit{Verklaring} he outlines God’s decree that certain people shall be saved and certain others damned. In order to realise His decree, God had created humanity through Adam and decided it to sin, as well as provided means for the elect to be saved whilst withholding these from the damned. Arminius discarded this supralapsarian doctrine of predestination as contradicting the Bible and the confession, and contrasted it against his own position. According to this latter, God had decided from all eternity to elect those sinners who believe in Christ, and supply efficacious means for them to arrive at such belief. The decision to elect certain people took place conditionally on God foreseeing the faith of these people, while rejecting those whom He foresees will not remain in

\(^9\) Cf. Arminius 1960, \textit{Verklaring}. 
faith. Arminius thus distinguished between the unconditional election of Christ as Saviour of sinful humanity, the equally unconditional election of those who have faith in Christ, the unconditional election of the efficacious means of attaining the faith, and the conditioned election of individual persons. Thus he rejected the totally unconditional nature of predestination implicit in supra-lapsarianism.

4. Remonstrants and Contra-Remonstrants

In 1610 Arminius’ followers reacted against the request by the provincial assemblies to have them send the possible objections against the Confessio Belgica and the Heidelberg Catechism with a Remonstrance. The Remonstrance was written by Wtenbogaert and leaned for support on Arminius’ Verklaring. It was signed in its original, longer version by 44 pastors and handed to the states of Holland and Westfriesland in an abbreviated form. Added to this was an extract from the Admonitio Neostadiensis of Zacharias Ursinus, published in 1581, in which he thoroughly relativises the validity of the confessions in comparison with the Lutheran Book of Concord. According to the latter, a Church confession is not a norm or rule in accordance with which one judges what is to be believed and what discarded, or what is true and what heretical. For that which is in accordance with the confession of the Church is not always true, and that which is not is not always false. Thus the confessions are revisable; indeed, the Churches themselves should constantly examine them to see whether they accord with Holy Scripture and the ecumenical symbols. When something worthy of improvement is found in the confessions, it should be improved or explained with general consent and Church authority. The Remonstrants saw in these expositions of Ursinus a legitimation of their own wishes for a revision of the Confessio Belgica and the Heidelberg Catechism. Indeed, they believed that such a revision of the confessional documents was necessary, since their own theological position was branded by the strict Calvinists as heretical because they thought it contradicted the confessions. The Remonstrants not only resisted formally signing up to the confessions and the prohibition on submitting them to examination, but also objected that the strict Calvinists turned to the confessions to

introduce teachings which, in the view of the Remonstrants, were to be found neither in the Confessio Belgica nor in the Heidelberg Catechism. Moreover, they objected that these teachings were not only not in the confessional documents, but also contradicted the Word of God.

The Remonstrance contained five points enumerated individually. Firstly, supralapsarianism was presented as a position held by certain Calvinists. According to the latter, God had determined for humanity that some of them would enjoy life everlasting and others be damned through His eternal and immutable decree irrespective of their creation or their fall, simply because it so pleased Him to manifest the glory of His mercy and justice without consideration of the justice or sinfulness of the human beings in question. Secondly, as an equally unacceptable position, infralapsarianism was presented. It was argued that some Calvinists weaken the doctrine of predestination in that they make God’s decree of election or damnation refer to already created humanity, fallen through Adam and therefore worthy of reprobation. According to this, out of the mass of fallen and condemned humanity God through His grace subsequently decreed that some should be saved as a mark of His mercy, whilst the rest should be damned as a testimony to His justice. Amongst the damned were also, according to this view, children who had been baptised in the name of Jesus. In order to carry out this eternal decree God made use of such means as necessarily saved the elect and condemned the damned. Following from the former as a third, unacceptable teaching is the implication that Christ did not die for all humanity, but only for the elect, so as to save them as Mediator. Therefore—as the fourth unacceptable teaching—the Holy Spirit and Christ can only work in the elect in such an irresistible way that they cannot but be converted, believing, and saved. In the case of the non-elect, on the contrary, the irresistible grace is withheld from them and that which is needed for conversion is not granted. Although they may have been called externally by the revealed will of God, they are not equipped by His hidden will with inner grace. The person, however—the fifth, and final unacceptable point—who has once received justifying faith can never totally and finally lose it due to the irresistible power of grace, however great his or her sins might be.

Against these five points, where they summarised the position of their opponents, the Remonstrants set five of their own. In the first article

they sketched out the relation between election and faith, according to which the eternal and immutable decree of election took place before the creation of the world in Christ and meant that those sinners who had faith through God’s grace in Christ and stayed firm in that faith would be saved in, on account of and through Christ. The decree of reprobation, on the other hand, relates to the unconvertible and unbelieving sinners, who are left to their sins and God’s wrath. The second article clarifies the relation between the universality of God’s offer of salvation, and the particularity of the gift of the atonement and the forgiveness of sins: Christ died for all so that the sins of all could be forgiven, but in fact only those who believe finally benefit from this. The remainder of the article deals with the relationship between grace and faith. In the third article stress is laid on the fact that human beings do not have saving faith from themselves and through their own free will but rather have it through regeneration and are thus indebted for it to Divine grace. Postlapsarian humanity can neither think nor will nor do anything genuinely good from itself without necessarily being regenerated from God in Christ through the Holy Spirit in its understanding, will and all other capacities. The fourth article explains that the regenerated person, although he or she can only resist evil and think, will or do the good thanks to prior, prevenient, and assisting grace, can nevertheless resist grace so that grace is therefore not irresistible. Fifthly, it is finally emphasised that Christ stands by all believers in their times of temptation, but that it would have to be more precisely clarified by reference to Scripture whether they could forfeit grace through negligence.

The five articles of the Remonstrants were anything other than clear. The irresistibility of grace was disputed; however, the indispensability of grace was at the same time so strongly emphasised, not only for those sinners yet to be born but also for those already regenerated, that the precondition for the resistibility of grace from the human side was not clearly identified. The Remonstrants presupposed free will, which could either accept God’s universal offer of salvation or reject it. Wtenbogaert, however, was not satisfied to leave matters at the composition of the Remonstrance, but published in the same year a treatise on the relation between secular authority and the Church: Tractaet von t’ Amt ende Authoriteyt eener Hoogher Christlicker Overheyt in

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Kerkelijke Saecken. In this treatise he defended the thesis that the secular authority was superior to the Church assemblies and it was part of its office to decide on internal Church matters (presuming that the community in question and its secular authorities were Christian) whether it be the town magistrates, the Provincial States, or the States General. The states of Holland reacted to the Remonstrants’ proposal by consenting to the representation of the position they had laid out by preachers of the Reformed Church. This toleration of what the strict Calvinists saw as heretical teaching ran up against the bitter resistance of the strictly Calvinist party. The States summoned a conference at The Hague to take place on the 11th March, to which six of the signatories, among them Wtenbogaert and Simon Episcopius, and six opponents, including Petrus Plancius, Johannes Bogerman and Festus Hommius, were invited. However, the conference did not lead to the desired agreement, but only deepened the already existing rift in the Dutch Church due to the submission of a Contra-Remonstrance by the opponents of the Arminian faction. The Contra-Remonstrance divided up into seven articles. In the first article unconditional predestination was asserted, according to which God in His eternal and immutable decree had elected certain human beings to be rescued from eternal damnation and led through Christ to salvation, whilst He abandoned the rest to their just punishment for the sins they had committed. According to the second article, the elected included not only believing adults but also their children. The third article determined the relation between predestination and foreknowledge in an anti-Arminian manner, according to which foreknowledge of faith was not the reason for election, but on the contrary God had decided to send His elect faith and the ability to hold fast in their faith, i.e., perseverance. The fourth article dealt with the relation between the universal power and the particular effect of Christ’s atoning sacrifice through which the forgiveness of sins was made possible. It was alleged that Christ’s sacrifice possessed the power to forgive the sins of all humanity, but according to God’s decree it was only efficacious with regard to the elect. The fifth article asserted that the Holy Spirit also worked through external preaching and inner illuminating grace, but only so that the elect could come to receive faith. The elect—according to the sixth article—can never fully forfeit their faith once they have gained it, and thus—the seventh article—they bring forth necessarily as true believers fruits of thankfulness to their God. In 1612 Wtenbogaert answered the Contra-Remonstrance with his
Bericht en Opening van de Proceduren by den kerkendienern Remonstranten gehouden in de tegenwoordige geschillen. Thus the opposing positions were marked out.

5. Conrad Vorstius

The conflict between Remonstrants and Contra-Remonstrants was not only contained within the Church, and it had ramifications not only for the actually existing relations between Church and the secular authorities; it also triggered conflicts between opposing understandings of that relationship. In particular, the conflict had repercussions on the University of Leiden. When in 1611 at Wtenbogaert’s request the theologian Conrad Vorstius, who had up to then taught at the Gymnasium Academicum of the Count of Bentheim at Steinfurt, was nominated as the successor to the late Arminius, Gomarus resigned from his professorship and became pastor in Middelburg, refusing to work beside a Remonstrant. Thus the conflict between the two theological streams within the Reformed Church became linked with the conflict over who should succeed Arminius, i.e., the Vorstius affair, and with that, a third theological force came into the picture: Socinianism. When in 1597/98 the German theologian Christophorus Osterodt and the Polish nobleman Andreas Voidovius visited Amsterdam and Leiden, they were the first Socinians who came to the Netherlands, very soon watched critically by the Dutch authorities. The books they brought with them were sent to the university of Leiden, and the General States asked the Faculty of Divinity for an official statement. The theologians came to the conclusion that the books contained a number of heretical doctrines which were close to Turcismus, i.e. Islam. First of all, the doctrine of the Trinity was no longer upheld. The true and eternal Godhead of Christ, the Son of God, and of the Holy Spirit was denied. Christ was not regarded as eternal God and eternal creator. Moreover, the doctrine of atonement was heavily attacked. The theologians of Leiden referred to the main work of Fausto Sozzini De Jesu Christo servatore which was published in 1578. In this work Sozzini had brought forward rational arguments against the Anselmian doctrine of atonement. He denied that God by his justice wants to punish us because of our sins. And so he also rejected Anselm’s claim that Christ died instead of us for our sins in order to satisfy God’s justice. But even if God were to punish us for our sins it would be totally unjust to punish Christ
instead of us. The faculty of Leiden published its statement on the 12th of August 1598, and almost a month later the General States decided that the Socinian books the faculty had censured should be burnt at The Hague in the presence of Osterodt and Voidovius. Afterwards both men, who were regarded as a danger for the Church as well as for the state, should be compelled to leave the Republic. The visit of Osterodt and Voidovius was, however, the beginning of the Socinian debate in the Dutch Republic. It was but a few years after the two had left Holland that Vorstius was accused of Socinianism.

Vorstius, born in Cologne, had studied under Piscator in Herborn and received a doctorate in theology at Heidelberg in 1594. Subsequently he had taken part in disputations at Basle, and, on the advice of Beza, given lectures in Geneva before finally accepting in 1595 an appointment at the newly founded academic Gymnasium in Steinfurt. By 1596 Vorstius had already published in Siegen his *Idea totius theologiae* in which there was as yet no trace of a critical stance towards Calvin and Beza’s doctrine of predestination. Rather, the real stumbling block here was not the Calvinist doctrine of predestination but the orthodox doctrine of satisfaction. When in 1598 he sent several theses to the Heidelberg theologian Tossanus, David Pareus replied to him that many in Heidelberg felt confirmed in their suspicion that Vorstius was tending in the direction of Socinianism: firstly, because he denied the essential justice of God by which He willed evil for the bad and goodness for the good; secondly, because he denied that Christ had suffered in its entirety the punishment destined for humanity, i.e., eternal death (thus he was seen as putting the doctrine of satisfaction into question); finally, this had consequences for the doctrine of justification, because Vorstius understood by justifying faith not our belief that Christ had suffered eternal death and all the punishments of the damned for us, but rather our trustful obedience to Christ and God. Vorstius also saw conversion as prior rather than posterior to the forgiveness of sins. Pareus saw here the foundation of orthodox soteriology undermined, since not only the satisfaction, but also the eternal sinfulness of humanity and the eternal nature of Christ stood or fell with the unending, eternal death which Christ suffered for our sake, so that if this was all swept away Christ would finally only remain Saviour by His example. But thus Vorstius’ position overlapped with

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that of Fausto Sozzini, according to whom God by His grace decreed that all contrite and obedient sinners would be granted eternal life, made this manifest through Christ, and alleviated it through His example. For Sozzini, believing in Christ meant converting to Him out of free will in obedience to His commands and doing good works. Christ here loses His Divine nature, and sin its harshness. Thus at the same time Divine grace is limited and the capacity of humanity is increased. Pareus claims that Vorstius effectively comes over to Sozzini’s position when he understands the satisfaction as something founded not in the essential justice of God, but rather in His free decree, and when moreover he argues that Christ did not suffer eternal death. The eternal death, which according to Pareus Christ suffers, is the eternal, godforsaken agony of hell. When Vorstius finally declares that the doctrine of satisfaction implies an anti-Scriptural notion that our sins would be forgiven without the need for our contrition, this is by no means anti-Scriptural. Moreover, faith is as necessary for achieving salvation as love is for thankfulness.\textsuperscript{15}

In his response to the Heidelberg theologians Vorstius defended himself vehemently against the charge of Socinianism, without, however, denying that his study of Sozzini’s writings had induced him to think more thoroughly about several points of theology. The fact that he did not regard the satisfaction as being absolutely necessary for the forgiveness of sins by no means led to his abolishing the divinity of Christ. However, that Christ is both God and man is, for him, like the satisfaction itself, founded solely in the Divine decree, since God could ultimately have forgiven our sins in some other way. Vorstius rightly referred back to tradition to justify this argumentation, which operates with a distinction between absolute and ordered power, and absolute and hypothetical necessity. By recourse to such argumentation he saw himself as justified in holding the thesis that the satisfaction was not the expression of essential but rather of arbitrary justice. Concerning satisfaction itself, its form is fully sufficient, namely on account of the Divine dignity of Christ and His exemplification of the highest form of love in agonising obedience. It is also fully sufficient on account of the gracious will of the Father, Who accepts the death of Christ as recompense. It is not sufficient, however, on account of the nature of the subject itself and the nature of justice, because Christ had precisely not suffered eter-

\textsuperscript{15} Schweizer 1857, \textit{Vorstius}, pp. 155ff.
nal death and all the sufferings of the damned, but only a temporary death not resulting in total despair. Christ had thus conquered eternal death through a temporal one thanks to the grateful acceptance of the Father. Vorstius also wanted to avoid divergence from teaching which was faithful to Scripture with respect to justification. Certainly, according to Vorstius the fruit of satisfaction was the forgiveness of sins and eternal salvation. However, this was only bestowed on condition of a person’s having true faith, and true faith involved conversion and obedience to God, which cannot be earned, but nevertheless was necessary, since Christ was given to us not only for forgiveness, but also for sanctification. Therefore the efficacious call to faith, contrition, conversion and obedience precedes justification.

Vorstius also defended himself decisively against the charge of Socinianism and distanced himself explicitly from Sozzini’s views concerning the person and works of Christ, faith and justification in a further letter correspondence not only with Heidelberg theologians, but also with the Basle theologians Grynaeus and Polanus. Finally, he himself travelled to Heidelberg, where he was examined over his orthodoxy by Pareus, Tossanus and Pezel. After he had regretted his earlier acceptance of Socinian thinking he was made to promise in future not to have any dealings with Socinian ideas but to keep to the Heidelberg Cathecism. Thus the Heidelberg theologians declared him to be orthodox. The Vorstius affair, however, was far from over; rather, it reached its height with the Steinfurt professor’s appointment through the influence of Wtenbogaert at Leiden. Around the time of his appointment Vorstius published several disputations, which he had held ten years previously in Steinfurt, under the title Tractatus theologicus de Deo, sive de natura et attributis Dei. Likewise, while he was still in Steinfurt he re-published the pseudonymous tractate De auctoritate sanctae scripturae written by Fausto Sozzini in 1580. Although he was later to deny that he knew the identity of the author, he admitted that he found nothing heretical in it, and that its author was only trying to show that the Old and New Testament were the Word of God. Sozzini, however, departed decisively here from the Calvinist understanding that the Scripture is the result of verbal inspiration and thus bestowed with Divine authority. Both publications only confirmed the Contra-Remonstrants in their rejection of Vorstius’ appointment. In particular,

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16 Schweizer 1857, Vorstius, pp. 159ff.
they believed that they detected Socinian thinking in Vorstius’ tractate concerning God’s essence and attributes. For Vorstius, the distinction between what God wills and does according to His essence, and what He wills and does arbitrarily—as can already be glimpsed in his criticism of the doctrine of satisfaction—is of fundamental importance. God essentially wills Himself, but everything outside Himself is only willed by Him arbitrarily, i.e., contingently. Thus in Vorstius’ opinion all of God’s relationships to what is external to Himself do not belong to His essence. Since he begins from the premise that nothing can be said of God except what Scripture teaches us, he therefore arrives at a modification of the traditional teaching about God’s attributes. Thus the attribute of simplicity is not found in the Scriptures, and if God’s decrees about what is external to Him are contingent, a distinction between His essence and His will must be allowed for. The traditional characterisation of God’s eternity also does not agree with the witness of Scripture, which does not grasp eternity as an indivisible, enduring present moment but rather sees it as a succession, a before and after with regard to God’s relations with what is external to Him. Therefore, the eternity of God cannot be entirely separated from this idea of successive duration. Vorstius also criticised the traditional definition of God’s ubiquity, and in particular the traditional version of God’s will in a similar way. According to him, a distinction has to be made between God’s efficacious and His approving, prescriptive will. Nothing can take place without His authorising and governing will, but many things can happen without the approving, prescriptive will of God. Thus God wishes our piety and approves of our conversion, but His grace does not work with physical necessity. Vorstius also distinguishes between a prior, a conditioned, and a posterior will. According to the prior will, God wants the salvation of all humanity, but only on the condition of faith and contrition. Since however not all human beings come to have faith, he wills with His posterior will that only some, namely the faithful, are led to salvation, whereas the others are damned. Therefore criticism of the traditional teaching about God’s attributes led Vorstius to the Remonstrants’ position with respect to the doctrine of predestination. 

17 Schweizer 1857, Vorstius, pp. 171ff.
6. Vorstius, Grotius and the Contra-Remonstrants

In order to back up their charge of Socinianism against Vorstius, the Contra-Remonstrants asked the theologians at Heidelberg for a judgement concerning the *Tractatus theologicus de Deo*, who responded by urgently advising against the appointment of their erstwhile doctoral student at Leiden, in particular because of his suspected Socinianism and Pelagianism. When among others former students of Vorstius published an anonymous treatise at Franeker in 1611 entitled *De officio Christiani hominis*, in which the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity and Christology were attacked, Sibrandus Lubbertus, professor of theology at the university of Franker, levelled the charge of Socinianism against them, and naturally Vorstius was also affected by the accusation. Writing to the trustees of the University of Leiden, Vorstius distanced himself from the Socinian views represented in the treatise, but he admitted at the same time that he himself like Sozzini abstained from the use of scholastic terminology in his doctrine of the Trinity, that he did not teach so harshly and absurdly on predestination as the Contra-Remonstrants, and that he allowed greater room for tolerance outside the fundamentals of the faith. However, the conflict was not resolved as a result of this, but rather escalated. The English king James I, informed by Lubbertus friend George Abbot, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and his ambassador in The Hague let it be known that they disagreed with the appointment of Vorstius and that the relationship between England and the States General would without doubt come under strain, since Vorstius represented Socinian theses and therefore was a heretic. In London, Oxford and Cambridge the *Tractatus theologicus de Deo* was burnt by order of the king. As formerly with the Heidelberg theologians Vorstius addressed the English king with an apologia, and in 1612 he gave his *Oratio apologetica* in The Hague before the States of Holland, in which he disputed the accusations brought against him. He once more stressed that in the teaching concerning God’s attributes he had striven to orient himself strictly to the Scriptures so as to refute in such a way Luther’s doctrine of the ubiquity of God and the Contra-Remonstrants’ doctrine of predestination. Further, he claimed that he had no more brought the infinity and essential omnipresence, the eternity and immutability, the omnipotence and the omniscience of God

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18 Cf. van der Woude 1963, *Lubbertus*. 
into question than His incorporeality. Rather, it had been his concern to exclude certain philosophically conditioned interpretations of these attributes which conflicted with faith; thus, for example, one should not make God the Author of sin. But according to Vorstius this does indeed happen when in the manner of Calvin, Beza and Zanchi one seeks the reason for God’s foreknowledge of all future events in the fact that God predetermines them. This was exactly the accusation brought forward by Bellarmin and the Jesuits in Louvain, which Vorstius tried to refute in his *Anti-Bellarminus contractus* 1610. In particular respect to the charge of Socinianism, Vorstius resisted it with reference to the Heidelberg disputes. He also held fast to the view that the satisfaction of Christ for the forgiveness of sins was not absolutely necessary, since God could also have saved fallen humanity in some other way. Christ had indeed saved us through His death, but that death had not been the eternal death which the damned suffer in hell. Rather, God had accepted the death of Christ as equivalent to the punishment of the damned on account of the dignity of His human-Divine Person and the perfection of His love and obedience. Vorstius thus modified the orthodox doctrine of satisfaction through the assumption that God with respect to the satisfaction of Christ had shown a certain mildness and yielded a little in the strictness of His justice. He disputed, however, the charge that this was already effectively Socinian, since he defends the doctrine of satisfaction against the criticism of Sozzini himself, even if he does not keep to the specific form of the doctrine as represented by Contra-Remonstrants like Lubbertus. In a letter to Pareus he explained that in distinction to Sozzini he did not see Christ as the mere revealer of the salvation decreed by God for us, but rather as the God-Man, who earned us our salvation through His obedience. In still other respects Vorstius did not deny that he had also learned valuable theological lessons from Socinian writings, especially with regard to practical piety and the criticism of the orthodox doctrines of predestination and free will.

On account of the resistance not only of the Contra-Remonstrants, but also particularly of the English king, Oldenbarnevelt, who had up until that point favoured Vorstius, felt forced to persuade him to return to Gouda, although the trustees of the university protested against the

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move. In his apologia before the States of Holland he announced his resignation from the professorship at Leiden. The two vacant chairs at Leiden were now filled with a Remonstrant, Simon Episcopius, and a Contra-Ramonstrant, Johannes Polyander, after the appointment of Pierre du Moulin to Gomarus’ chair had previously failed. However, the dispute between Vorstius and his Contra-Ramonstrant opponents was by no means resolved as a result of this. In 1612 Vorstius’ teacher from Herborn, Piscator, interceded in the conflict, taking up a critical position vis-à-vis the former’s perceived softening of the doctrine of predestination. In the Parasceueae ad Amicam collationem cum Joh. Piscator and later treatises Vorstius defended his position and attacked Piscator with the argument that the latter attributed a tyrannical and unjust power to God, since it was surely to be regarded as an injustice that God had condemned most of humanity to eternal damnation, i.e., had determined them to sin and to punishment for sin. This latter understanding of predestination, which ultimately refers back to Luther’s De servo arbitrio, was strictly rejected by Vorstius. By this alone he provoked the disagreement of the Contra-Ramonstrants, and he responded to the attacks of the Franeker theologian Lubbertus in the period between 1611 and 1614 with several treatises. However, Vorstius was by now not the only one who opposed Lubbertus. When in 1613 the latter published his Commentarii ad nonaginta novem errores Conradi Vorstii, Hugo Grotius entered the fray in the same year with his work Ordinum Hollandiae Westfrisiaeque pietas in order to support the political authorities who stood by the Remonstrants. Shortly beforehand James I had advised the States General by letter that any further discussion of disputed points between the Remonstrants and Contra-Ramonstrants being aired in the pulpits should be prevented, since—as the English king proclaimed—both positions were compatible with the truth which was necessary for salvation. In addition to the Vorstius affair Grotius, in his abovementioned work—written with James I in mind—also entered into the disagreements over predestination and into the question—equally disputed by Remonstrants and Contra-Ramonstrants—of the relation between Church and state. Since he saw that there were effectively two different forms of the doctrine of predestination represented by Remonstrants and Contra-Ramonstrants in the Netherlands, he wanted to try to order things so that neither party characterised the

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22 Schweizer 1857, Vorstius, p. 475.
other one as heretical, but rather tolerated each other. As a model of such tolerance, Grotius pointed to Calvin, who on the question of predestination had held a totally different position to that of Melanchthon, but had nevertheless respected him, rather than characterised him as a heretic. The manner, however, in which the question of predestination was dealt with between Remonstrants and Contra-Remonstants led necessarily to the question of the authority of the State vis-à-vis the Reformed Church, which was effectively the public Church in the Netherlands. Whilst Lubbertus on the basis of the Calvinist model voted for the greatest possible independence of the Church in the government of its own affairs, Grotius defended the Erastian model according to which the state authorities have the right to judge over the state religion.

With these expositions Grotius had made himself known publicly as a supporter of the Remonstrant cause. In 1614, against the background of the English king’s plea for a tolerant religious politics, the states of Holland issued an edict drawn up by Grotius himself. According to this, every person was to be tolerated who taught that our salvation comes from God alone, and that left to ourselves we can do no good; that salvation and also faith was due to the undeserved grace of God in Christ alone; that God had created no human being for damnation and forced nobody to sin; and that He had invited nobody to salvation to whom He had firmly decreed not to grant it. Finally, the tolerance edict enjoined theologians to avoid all public dispute in their future theological investigations. The edict represented the last attempt by the states of Holland to stop the predestination dispute escalating to such a degree that it would lead to a schism in the public Reformed Church. It was an attempt to stick to a Church which on the basis of certain fundamental articles of faith allowed a plurality of teaching positions, and not only on the topic of predestination. However, the attempt failed due to the tough line of the Contra-Remonstrants, who saw the edict as a concession to their Remonstrant opponents. Amsterdam, at that time majority Contra-Remonstrant, made the running for others in the context of the opposition to the edict and thus the pacification of the states of Holland. In 1615 numerous disputations were published, which took up a position for and against the edict, and in 1616 the states sent a delegation to Amsterdam to persuade the town to yield ground.

Grotius, as spokesman for the delegation, was first to address the council and defended the Erastian standpoint according to which the secular authorities also held the highest authority in Church affairs. Thus, it was argued, a synod was not necessary, particularly since the Reformation itself had been ushered in not through synods but by state powers. Moreover, it was pointed out that the conflict over predestination did not touch the foundations of faith, and that the disputed questions were answered differently by each party to the dispute, with the result that only a politics of mutual tolerance could serve in the interest of a general peace. In addition, the convocation of a National Synod, much coveted by the Contra-Remonstrants, could, it was suggested, result in the province of Holland being outvoted and hence forced into a position which was to its disadvantage. If, however, the option of mutual tolerance was declined, only three possibilities lay open: either all teachers had to be brought to accept one and the same teaching, which was impossible, or one party had to condemn the other, which would be unchristian, or the Church had to split, which would damage the state. Since the Amsterdam council, despite Grotius’ speech, did not change its position, but demanded a general synod and stood by the right to their own Contra-Remonstrant Church services in those places where a Remonstrant pastor was in charge of the congregation, the politics of toleration of the states of Holland collapsed. In 1617 an assembly of Contra-Remonstrants declared their separation from the Remonstrants, who were given the title of enemies of the Church until such a time as a decision on the matter was made by a properly convened National Synod.

Since Grotius had identified himself in print as a Remonstrant supporter, the Contra-Remonstrant accusation of Socinianism and Pelagianism, generally directed against the Remonstrants, was also now directed at him. For this reason he sought to demonstrate publicly that this charge did not apply to him or to his Remonstrant friends. Since the doctrine of satisfaction had from the time of the Vorstius affair been the teaching to which above all the accusation of Socinianism in the Dutch Republic had attached, he selected this one to prove his anti-Socinian credentials. Thus in 1617, on the eve of the National Synod of Dort, Grotius published his *Defensio fidei catholicae de*

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satisfactione Christi, in which he engaged critically with Fausto Sozzini’s
1594 work De Iesu Christo servatore. In the preface, written by Gerhard
Vossius, the Remonstrant head of the Staten College at the University
of Leiden, the heretical character of Socinianism is laid out, and
Grotius, although not a theologian but a jurist, presented as particu-
larly qualified to refute Socinian criticism of the doctrine of satisfac-
tion. Grotius defended a version of the doctrine of satisfaction accord-
ing to which God decreed that Christ was to pay the price for the
punishment of humanity’s sinfulness by suffering a cruel death so that
we could be freed from the punishment of eternal death. Whereas
for Sozzini Christ was only the Saviour of humanity in so far as He
proclaimed the way to eternal life which all could attain who believed
in and followed Him, Grotius stood up for the version of the doctrine
of satisfaction rejected by Sozzini as contradictory. He envisaged God
as the head of a political community, who had re-established its politi-
cal order, distorted through sinfulness, by making an example with the
death of Christ in order to reveal His Justice, and who showed His love
in forgiving the sins of all who believed in Christ. Thus, contrary to
Sozzini, Grotius associates the forgiveness of sins with a satisfactory act
in the sense of a representative punishment. Grotius agreed, however,
with Vorstius’ account of the doctrine of satisfaction in so far as he
also set out from the assumption that Christ had not suffered the same
punishment as the unbelieving sinners would suffer; ultimately, He did
not suffer eternal death, i.e., the satisfactory character of Christ’s death
extended only to the fact that God accepted this death as a substitute
act. Thus, although Grotius had wished to refute Sozzini’s doctrine of
the satisfaction with his own interpretation of it, this interpretation was
not traditional either, with the result that Grotius could nevertheless
be accused of having Socinian tendencies. Hermannus Ravensperger, a
former professor in Steinfurt, then teaching in Groningen, attempted to
show in his Judicium de libro H. Grotii adversus F. Socinus, which appeared
in 1617, that Grotius, although apparently refuting Sozzini, in fact
ends up lending support to the latter’s criticism of the doctrine of satisfac-
tion through his own version. Thus Grotius was no more suc-
cessful than Vorstius had been before him in dispelling the Contra-

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26 Grotius 1990, Defensio, pp. 84–89.
27 Grotius 1990, Defensio, p. 90.
Remonstrant suspicion of Socinianism which clung to him and his friends. But the time for discussions and disputations was in any case over, since in the ever deepening conflict between Remonstrants and Contra-Remonstrants Maurice of Orange was to take the side of the Contra-Remonstrants, which shifted things decisively in the latter’s favour.

7. The preparations for the National Synod at Dort

The reason for the failure of a politics of toleration on the part of the states of Holland lay less in the matter itself than in Amsterdam’s opposition to Oldenbarnevelt, who was seen as opposing its own economic politics of expansion. Amsterdam thus formed an alliance with the Stadholder Maurice of Orange, who was equally opposed to the Grand Pensionary’s conciliatory foreign policy, and who came onto the side of the Contra-Remonstrants along with the most powerful members of the Amsterdam town council. In addition, a quarrel broke out between England and the States General over maritime laws which led to James I distancing himself from the politics of toleration represented by Oldenbarnevelt and consequently from the Remonstrant party; the English king thus sided likewise with the Contra-Remonstrants. On the 23rd July 1617 the Stadholder demonstratively took part in a Church service in The Hague which had shortly before been seized by Contra-Remonstrants without the permission of the states of Holland. Meanwhile the theological disagreements between the two parties within the Reformed Church became more and more apparent. Reacting to an open letter from the Contra-Remonstrant classis of the island of Walcheren to Reformed Christians abroad, the Remonstrants responded with an exposition of their own doctrine written by the young Episcopius and directed likewise abroad. In 1617 this latter exposition, *Epistola ecclesiarum quos in Belgio Remonstrantes vocantur ad externarum ecclesiarum Reformatae doctores* was printed in Leiden. At the very beginning it was stated that not only in pre-Augustinian times but also after the Reformation the doctrine of predestination had been taught in various different ways without these differences seriously threatening fraternal concord. However, the Contra-Remonstrants had falsely accused Arminius and his followers of Pelagianism and Socinianism, refusing the Remonstrants’ appeal to secular authority as well as their request for mutual tolerance with the remark that only a National
Synod could decide on Church matters. In order to correct the distorted presentation of Remonstrant doctrine by the Reformed classis of Walcheren, the Remonstrants henceforth also addressed the Reformed faith abroad.

In the open letter of the Contra-Remonstrants of Walcheren the Remonstrant position seems be presented in such a way that predestination is made to seem conditioned by Divine foreknowledge of faith and unfaithfulness. In contrast, the Contra-Remonstrants formulated their infralapsarian teaching in such a way that God elected some in Christ out of the mass of fallen humanity to grant them faith and salvation, whilst he abandoned the others to sin and damned them for their sinfulness. The Remonstrants raised no objection to the thesis that they were said to make God’s eternal decree conditional on His foreknowledge, but they stressed that one needed to distinguish in this decree four acts. Firstly, God out of His grace decrees the possibility of salvation through Christ’s death, which is made available to all. Secondly, he decrees that only those are to be saved who have faith in Christ and remain in their faith. Thirdly, he decrees that the means sufficient to the attainment of faith will be provided, so that God’s will to convert His elect to faith becomes manifest and ignorance of it hence inexcusable. Finally, God decrees that he will save those whose faithfulness he foresees, and exclude those from salvation whose enduring unfaithfulness he also foresees. The Remonstrants claimed to be able to refer to the Confessio Belgica here for backing, since in its 16th Article no mention was made of reprobation and the subject of election was not accurately defined, but only excluded the possibility that election was determined by works. Thus the confession was claimed to leave open the precise definition of how election happened, so that it could also cover the Remonstrant position. Indeed, the Remonstrants themselves wanted to stress that they also believed God’s will alone was the cause of predestination, even when His foreknowledge of faith preceded it in logical order, since it was by God’s will alone that a believing person would be saved and a stubborn unbeliever damned. However, the difference between their position and the absolute predestination of the Contra-Remonstrants lay in the fact that contrary to the latter they saw the decision of the absolute will of God as relating not to the

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29 Epistola 1617, pp. 13ff.
30 Epistola 1617, p. 33.
individual soul as such but *qua* believer or non-believer\textsuperscript{31}. Episcopius represented the remonstrant version as a uniform one stretching back to and including the pre-Augustinian Church Fathers, Melanchthon, Sohnius, Arminius, and others, whereas on the Contra-Remonstrant side he claimed to identify a number of positions ranging from supra- to infralapsarianism\textsuperscript{32}. The deeper reason, however, why the Remonstrants taught that predestination was conditioned had to do with their stressing the role of free will in the acquisition or non-acquisition of faith, since a person’s failure to have faith is only inexcusable on the presupposition that he or she has free will, however weakened it may be\textsuperscript{33}. Human beings certainly cannot just have faith in and from themselves, since grace must first come to them; however, at the same time the role of free will must also not be excluded as an element in the conversion to faith. The will was thus not understood merely passively, but as co-operating in conversion\textsuperscript{34}. It was presumed that Christ had died for all, and had obtained forgiveness for them. Therefore, God had also offered forgiveness to all human beings. Although, however, He had sent all humanity sufficient help so that all could believe, He did not treat them as dumb objects but left them the freedom to accept or reject His forgiveness\textsuperscript{35}.

However, it was not only the strictly Arminian departure from the strict Calvinist doctrine of predestination which the Contra-Remonstrants objected to; they were additionally suspected of having Socinian views, amongst others concerning satisfaction, justification, and original sin. Episcopius defended Vorstius against the charge of Socinianism, particularly with respect to his doctrine of satisfaction. The Contra-Remonstrants were criticised for their assumption of an absolute reprobation, the necessity of the fall, and their high esteem—characterised as papal—for symbols, which was regarded as contradicting Scripture and the confessions\textsuperscript{36}. Still in the same year as the open letter to the Reformed abroad the *Secunda Remonstrantia* appeared, which the Remonstrant pastors from the Churches of Holland and Westfriesland sent to the states of Holland together with the *Secunda Contraremonstrantia* of their orthodox opponents. The Remonstrants pointed out that their

\textsuperscript{31} Epistola 1617, p. 41.
\textsuperscript{32} Epistola 1617, p. 43.
\textsuperscript{33} Epistola 1617, p. 58.
\textsuperscript{34} Epistola 1617, p. 65.
\textsuperscript{35} Epistola 1617, p. 71.
\textsuperscript{36} Epistola 1617, p. 102.
own teaching was not excluded by the *Confessio Belgica* and the *Heidelberg Catechism*, since these confessions spoke so generally about predestination that both the Remonstrant as well as the Contra-Remonstrant position could be accommodated to them. Also, there was nothing in the confessions which explicitly spoke against the Remonstrant understanding of the death of Christ, the operation of grace, and perseverance. Moreover, the Remonstrants regarded it as an innovation that the Contra-Remonstrants henceforth declared the confession and catechism to be the criterion of truth, whereas Scripture had hitherto been the only measure against which the confessional documents themselves were to be examined. It was not the Remonstrants, but the Contra-Remonstrants who departed from the confessional documents when they declared that God had created some human beings for reprobation, that after the fall the will was incapable of attempting good, and that Christ had only died for the elect. The Contra-Remonstrants, on the other hand, appealed not only to Calvin and Beza, but also to Zwingli and Luther, even though the majority of Lutherans had meanwhile deviated from Luther’s own position. They attempted to show in detail that even Melanchthon and other theologians who were presented by the Remonstrants as witnesses did not contradict their own teaching, so that they could then conclude that Luther, the Swiss, the Palatines, the Hessians, Nassauvians, those from Bremen, the French, the English and the Scottish had all taught good Contra-Remonstrant doctrine.

The second *Contra-Remonstrance* also did not go unanswered, and in the first half of the year 1618 numerous disputations appeared in print from both the Remonstrant and the Contra-Remonstrant side. Festus Hommius wanted to expose Episcopius through a collection he had diligently made of his citations as a follower of Vorstius and Sozzini. Meanwhile, the conflict between Remonstrants and Contra-Remonstrants had grown into one between Oldenbarnevelt and Maurice of Orange, i.e., the states of Holland and the Stadholder, the political and military heads of the republic. Oldenbarnevelt had attempted to draw up his own troops and gain control of the military situation through the authorisation of the town magistrates; he had also prohibited the convening of a provincial or National Synod in order to preserve the sovereignty of the secular authorities in Church matters. How-

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37 *Remonstratio* 1617, pp. 1ff.
38 *Remonstratio* 1617, pp. 11ff.
ever, on 6\textsuperscript{th} October 1617 the opposition not only of the other provincial assemblies in the Republic but also the resistance of important towns in Holland, in particular Amsterdam, to Oldenbarnevelt’s politics finally led to the States General appointing a committee charged with making preparations for convening a National Synod against the votes of the States of Holland, Utrecht and Overijssel. The Synod was convened on the 25\textsuperscript{th} July of the following year by the States General, with those invited to the Synod being asked to submit their objections to the five articles of the Remonstrance. Each provincial synod was to name six people to attend, half of whom had to be pastors. In addition, theologians from abroad were to be invited so as to avoid a split within the Reformed Church over a key point of doctrine. Thus letters went out to the English king, the Reformed Churches in France, the Elector Palatine and Elector of Brandenburg, the Count of Hesse, and the Reformed towns of Switzerland, Geneva, Bremen, and Emden, as well as Nassau-Wetterau. In addition, the theology professors of the Dutch universities and academies were also invited. Finally, individual provinces were to nominate Reformed persons who would then be authorised by the States General as political commissioners to take over the administration of the Synod. Dordrecht in Holland had already been selected on the 20\textsuperscript{th} November 1617 as a convening place. The resistance of Overijssel, Utrecht and finally also Holland, the centre of Remonstrant activity, was gradually broken through the intimidation strategies of the prince Stadholder. From that point on Maurice of Orange had things firmly in hand, and on the 28\textsuperscript{th} August 1618 he had the representatives of the States of Holland, Oldenbarnevelt, Grotius and several other Remonstrant politicians arrested. Wtenbogaert, the former court chaplain of the prince Stadholder and the theological head of the Remonstrant movement, escaped arrest through his timely flight abroad, but at the price of being permanently banished from the Republic and having all his goods confiscated.

The reaction of the Reformed Churches abroad who had been requested in writing to participate in the National Synod was mixed. Since the Church of Anhalt had not been invited the Elector of Brandenburg bowed out with the excuse that his preferred deputies were too old. The four delegates chosen by the French National Synod were hindered from participating at the Synod by Louis XIII. The most important one of them, however, Pierre Du Moulin, sent the Synod a letter in which he expressly condemned the Arminian position on the doctrine of predestination and held strictly to an understanding of predetermi-
nation which was not conditioned by God’s foreknowledge of faith. The English delegation was instructed by James I to vote against the Remonstrants, so that from the English side support for the idea of the co-operation of free will in achieving salvation could be excluded. The position of the Hessians, those from Bremen and the Palatines was the same. The Heidelberg theologian Pareus sent a refutation of the five points of the Remonstrance, in which he rejected as Pelagian its understanding that faith and perseverance were products of the human will and not of God’s unconditional decree. The Swiss towns connected their criticism of the five points of the Remonstrance with a criticism of the views of Vorstius—branded as Socinian—since they also characterised the Arminians as Vorstian. Thus the charge of Socinianism levelled against the Remonstrants was strengthened all the more, despite Grotius’s having attempted to clarify the distinctions between Remonstrant and Socinian doctrine. The Vorstians were blamed firstly for holding that the Son had not paid a full satisfaction with His recompense for the sins of humanity but rather the Father out of grace had accepted the Son’s death alone as sufficient; secondly, that Christ was our Saviour not so much because He saves us from our sins by His death but because He is a model of virtue; thirdly, that our justification is not grounded in the perfect satisfaction of Christ but in God’s graceful acceptance and thus in His forgiveness without demanding full satisfaction; fourthly, that our faith is a part of our justification; fifthly, that congenital original sin is not the sufficient reason for our reprobation, and finally—sixthly—that the regenerate person can keep God’s law with perfect works. The statements of the Reformed Churches abroad consequently strengthened the Contra-Remonstrants in their theological position, and thus the doctrines of the Remonstrants already from the beginning of the Synod, including by the Reformed faithful abroad, were seen as reprehensible.

39 Schweizer 1856, Centraldogmen, pp. 130ff.
40 Schweizer 1856, Centraldogmen, pp. 138f.
41 Schweizer 1856, Centraldogmen, pp. 125ff.
42 Schweizer 1856, Centraldogmen, pp. 119ff.
43 Schweizer 1856, Centraldogmen, p. 121.
The Synod of Dort

The National Synod at Dort, which was convened by the States General, opened on the 13th November 1618 and ended on the 9th May of the following year. The internationally represented assembly was made up of 84 members, of which 61 were Dutch pastors, Church elders and professors, and 23 English, Scots, Germans and Swiss. In addition 18 official representatives of the States General were present, the political commissioners with their secretary, Daniel Heinsius. Bogerman, on account of his hard-line Contra-Remonstrant stance, was elected to the position of Moderator of the Synod, and Hommius to the position of first secretary. The Synod decided to summon 13 Remonstrants from each of the provinces, with the exception of Utrecht, whose Provincial synod had sent three Remonstrants as official members to the Synod, who were henceforth given the choice either to give up defending the Arminian cause or to change to the side of those summoned. These latter were finally replaced by three Contra-Ramonstrants. So far as the manner of handling the dispute between Remonstrants and Contra-Ramonstrants was concerned, the Synod was effectively a tribunal whose aim was clear from the outset: the Remonstrants were to be convicted and their doctrines anathematised as heretical. This was already reflected in the seating order: the Remonstrants were to sit at a table which was positioned in the middle of the assembly room, whilst the Dutch and foreign delegates in charge of the prosecution under the direction of the Contra-Ramonstrant Bogerman were to sit grouped around them. The Remonstrants, who were not even allowed to appoint their own representatives to the Synod, found themselves from the very beginning in the role of the accused after the Contra-Ramonstrants had declared themselves as their judges, and although they attempted at first to defend themselves against such treatment, they eventually had to realise that the Synod had no other aim than to refute as heterodox their teachings, which they were challenged to elucidate through the five articles of the Remonstrance.

Those present at the Synod were divided into committees, so that the Dutch and foreign delegates formed separate committees, with the professors also forming a committee of their own. The committees were first obliged to draw up their own statements with respect

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44 Cf. van Dooren 1970, Tekst; Glasius 1860–1861, Geschiedenis; Kaajan 1914, Pro-acta; Kaajan 1918, Synode; Kuyper 1899, Post-acta; van ’t Spijker 1987, Dordrecht.
to the Remonstrance. The summoned Remonstrants had Episcopius as their spokesman, who had been chosen in a previous consultation of Remonstrants in Rotterdam to elucidate at the Synod the relation between Arminius’ theses, the five Articles and the fundamentals of the confessions. After the summoned Remonstrants arrived at Dordrecht on the 6th December, Episcopius delivered his speech, in which he distinguished between the fundamental teachings of faith, whose neglect posed a danger to salvation, and other teachings, knowledge of which was not salvific and with respect to which error would not result in the loss of salvation. In view of the situation brought about by the Contra-Remonstrants Episcopius saw three ways in which peace might be achieved: a verdict on the conflict by the National Synod, the voluntary withdrawal of the Remonstrants from the process, or the decision to tolerate one another. He regarded the latter as the only safe way forward and defended himself against the suspicion that tolerance was a cover for all forms of heresy. According to Episcopius, however, the questions which were in dispute were those which had always been disputed in Christendom without it having ever damaged the foundations of faith. In addition to the conflict over the doctrine of predestination, the conflict over the rights of the secular authorities was raised in connection with which the Remonstrants resisted the Contra-Remonstrant conception that the secular authorities had merely to carry out the dogmatic demands of the theologians without examination. In an appeal to Scripture and Reason Episcopius concluded his speech with the words: ‘Amicus Socrates, amicus Plato, amica Synodus, sed magis amica veritas’.

In the next step, the Synod challenged the Remonstrants to present their own interpretation of the five Articles of the Remonstrance in order to provide a basis for deliberations. In their statement concerning the first Article the Remonstrants rejected the Contra-Remonstrant assumption of an absolute election and condemnation which was not conditional on God’s foreknowledge of faith or the lack of it. God had neither decided on the creation and the fall of humanity through Adam nor the death of Christ as a means to the execution of His absolute decree. Rather, Christ was the foundation of God’s decree of election in so far as He was the atonement for the sins of all humanity and God had decided to save all those who believed in Him. Christ is therefore

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the foundation of election for the Remonstrants for the reason that God only elects those who have faith in Christ and remain in that faith. The rejection of the doctrine of unconditional predestination led the Remonstrants to corresponding divergences from the Contra-Remonstrants in their explanations of the remaining four Articles of the Remonstrance. Since no human being was excluded by an absolute decree from the possibility of gaining faith in Christ, every sinner could accept the salvation offered by Christ. Indeed, the Remonstrants stressed that human beings did not have faith through their own free will, but rather were dependent for it on prevenient, posterior and cooperative grace. However, this in no way meant that all effort to gain salvation was in vain. Rather, it was serviceable to hear the Word of God, repent of one’s sins and pray for God’s grace; God would then work on the will in such a way that He would grant it the capacity to have faith, even though human beings could then reject that faith. In the same way a believer could lose faith, so that remaining in one’s faith—perseverance—was by no means the consequence of an absolute decree.

The statements of the Remonstrants concerning the five Articles were not accepted by the Synod. From the outset the explanation of the first article read by Episcopius met with the decisive rejection of the Synod, since it had not restricted itself to expounding its own position, but also criticised that of the Contra-Remonstrants. This was viewed by those present as putting the legitimacy of the Synod into question and the orthodoxy which it represented. When all attempts to let the Remonstrants themselves formulate an interpretation of the five Articles of the Remonstrance according to the rules of the Synod failed, the Synod turned to the States General, which finally decided that in this case the doctrines of the Remonstrants should be drawn together from their writings. In addition, the Remonstrants were to be forbidden to leave Dordrecht without permission. With the Remonstrants excluded from the process the individual Articles of the Remonstrance were eventually gone through, accompanied by statements from the Dutch and other theologians on individual questions of fact. After having examined the individual Articles one by one the doctrines of the Remonstrants were compiled together along with a refutation. Afterwards, the judgements of the individual committees were collected

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46 Schweizer 1856, Centraldogmen, pp. 198ff.
in, and an editorial committee, with the participation of the Monitor and several theologians from home and abroad, elaborated the Canons with their corresponding refutations. On the 28th April 1619 the Synod attendants signed a written presentation of the orthodox teaching on the disputed points together with the refutation of the Remonstrant counter-position. Following that, the original was sent to the States General, which approved the decisions of the Synod on the 3rd July.

Although, however, those at the Synod were united in rejecting the Remonstrant Articles, there were nevertheless theological differences which led to tensions in spite of their fundamental unanimity; the relationship of Christ to God’s decree of election in particular permitted various interpretations. The Remonstrants defended the view that Christ was the foundation of this decree and not merely its performer, which was vehemently disputed by the Contra-Remonstrants. For them God’s decree that certain persons were to be elected stood at the beginning, whereas He decided on the incarnation and Christ’s meritorious death only in order to carry out this decree. Christ was thus not the foundation, but the means to the realisation of God’s eternal decree of election. Therefore the thesis—proposed especially by Matthias Martini, the Bremen representative—that Christ was the foundation of election was bound to awaken the resistance of Contra-Remonstrants like Gomarus. The Bremen representative was accused of Arminianism, which almost led to a rift in the Synod. Even the Bremen representative, however, would not have been inclined to construe the interpretation of Christ as the foundation of election, based on Eph. 1,4 as having the meaning that the meritorious death of Christ alone had moved God to make His decree of election. Additionally, there was the further question of whether Christ, as more universalist sounding passages of Scripture suggested, had died for all or only for the elect. Once again it was from the Bremen side, but this time supported by the English, Nassauvians, Hessians and even Lubbertus, who as an addition to the sentence that the efficacy of Christ’s merit only relates to the elect insisted further that the merit of Christ was sufficient in itself for all of humanity. They also sought to integrate the more universalist sounding passages, declaring that Christ wanted the salvation of all believers, whilst nevertheless referring faith back to the decree of election unlike the Remonstrants who made it dependent on free will. Finally, amongst the attenders were supporters of supralapsarianism as well as infralapsarianism, of whom the supralapsarians were in the minority.
and whose most important representative, Gomarus, ultimately abandoned the attempt to establish supralapsarian doctrine in the Synod. The Canons of the Synod started from the assumption that the subject of predestination was human beings after the fall rather than before their creation. According to this, before His creation of the world God had elected from sinful humanity a certain number of persons to be saved in Christ and predestined Christ Himself to be the mediator and head of all the elect as well as the foundation of salvation. The decree of reprobation likewise referred to sinful humanity and consisted in the fact that God had passed over certain people for election and abandoned them to depravity. With that a number of statements of the Remonstrants were simultaneously rejected. Neither was the decree of predestination exhausted in God’s decree to save all believers. Election was also not conditioned by God’s foreknowledge of faith, and nor was it reversible, since God’s gift of grace could not be forfeited. As the mercy of God was manifest in election, so God’s justice was manifest in reprobation. Just as in the case of the Contra-Remonstrant doctrine of predestination, which was established in its infralapsarian version, the doctrine of satisfaction was similarly established by the Synod: the justice of God requires—if He wills in His mercy to free us from the temporal and eternal punishment for sin—a satisfaction for sinfulness, which Christ effects through His death. Since Christ is not only man but also the Son of God, His death is sufficient for the salvation of all, but its efficacy only relates to the elect. In contrast, that view is rejected according to which God had willed to save all through Christ, as also is the view that some do not attain salvation because of their own actions. Rather, the fact that fallen individuals convert is not attributable to their free will but to their election by God, Who calls them efficaciously and grants them faith and contrition. To this end God not only allows them to hear His Gospel externally, but illuminates them through the Holy Spirit and thus effects their regeneration and recreation. Regeneration, therefore, does not happen through a process of moral persuasion, so that it is up to human beings whether to convert or not, but rather through God’s influence. As a result, that view is rejected according to which human beings have not totally lost their free will to seek the good through sin and faith is not merely a gift of grace infused into the individual by God. But even when the gift of grace was seen

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47 Schweizer 1856, Centraldogmen, pp. 170ff.
as attributable to God’s immutable decree of election, there was still inevitably the resulting question concerning perseverance in faith. On the one hand, it was not disputed that the elect can commit grave sins, as, for example, in the case of David and Peter. However, God never allowed His elect to fall so far from grace that they would be guilty of the deadly sin against the Holy Spirit and thus go to ruin. Therefore, the view was also rejected according to which perseverance in faith was a condition to be achieved by humanity for the sake of election, with the result that it depended on the free will of human beings whether they would fall again from grace and finally suffer reprobation

Conclusion

The Synod of Dort spelled the end of the concept, favoured by the Remonstrants, of a Reformed Public Church, which on the basis of a consensus concerning a few fundamental doctrines regarded as necessary for salvation permitted a theological pluralism, in particular in the case of predestination. Henceforth the five Canons of the Synod were to count as the confessional foundation—approved by the States General—of the Reformed Church. The Remonstrant preachers were dismissed from their positions and those who would not promise to abstain from Remonstrant teachings in the future were sent into exile. On the 16th July 1619 a prohibition was introduced on all Remonstrant gatherings. The Synod of Dort marked the splitting of the Dutch Reformed Church, since the Remonstrants immediately regrouped themselves, in particular in Antwerp, where Wtenbogaert and Episcopius took up the charge of the Remonstrant Brotherhood under the protection of the Spanish. As early as 1621 Episcopius formulated a Confessio sive declaratio sententiae pastorum, qui in foederato Belgio Remonstrantes vocantur, super praecepis articulis religionis christianae, which Wtenbogaert translated into Dutch, and which was not so much to be a binding rule of faith as contain what was solely necessary for salvation and what was useful or helpful, since everything should be directed to the practical exercise of piety. The believer was to stay close to Scripture, which contained the Divine Truth, and Scripture for its part

48 Schweizer 1856, Centraldogmen, pp. 187ff.
was to be interpreted through itself and not through the confessions of the church. The Remonstrant confession naturally rejected absolute predestination and taught in its place that God’s decree of election was conditioned by living faith, which manifested itself in good works. When in 1624 Nicolaas Bodecherus, a former Remonstrant who had changed to the Contra-Remonstrant side, also levelled the charge of Socinianism against the new Remonstrant confession in his book Sociniano-Remonstrantismus, Episcopius felt once again compelled to distinguish Arminianism from Socinianism.

The Synod of Dort also took measures against Vorstius. As early as the beginning of May 1619 the concluding verdict of the Synod had been formulated by the States General. Notwithstanding his consent to the five Articles of the Remonstrance Vorstius was nevertheless accused of holding divergent views on most of the main doctrines of the Reformed Church, approaching the position of Sozzini, and giving the latter’s views a point of entry into the Reformed Church. Vorstius objected to the manner of the Synod’s proceedings and declared his agreement with the Remonstrants in rejecting absolute predetermination as fatalism. He went still further, however, in suggesting that those attending the Synod held doctrines which were not to be found in the Scripture, including the identification of God’s decree with God Himself, the assumption that God can make no exceptions to His justice, and that Christ had suffered eternal death, which is the price appropriate for our sins. Certainly this was not all Socinian, as the Contra-Remonstrants liked to claim. However, it was clear that Vorstius had nevertheless gone beyond Arminian criticism of Contra-Remonstrance doctrine. After the States General had sentenced him to exile he sought asylum with other Remonstrants in Sleswig, where Duke Frederick IV had the town of Friedrichstadt built for them. In 1622, however, Vorstius died on the journey there in Toenningen.

Grotius was also affected by the more dogmatic rendering of the traditional doctrine of satisfaction. Although his own work which was composed shortly before the Synod of Dort was intended as a defence of the aforementioned doctrine against Sozzini’s criticism, it was nevertheless anything other than a simple re-statement of the Anselmian

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49 Schweizer 1856, Centraldogmen, pp. 203f.
50 Tideman 1871, Stichting.
51 Schweizer 1856, Centraldogmen, pp. 48off.
52 Schnoor 1976, Organisation.
Reformed doctrine of satisfaction and could thus be seen by the Contra-Remonstrants as a step in the direction of the latter’s abandonment and thus potentially Socinian. This suspicion was not dispelled when in 1623 the Socinian Johann Crell published in Rakow his work entitled *Ad librum Hugonis Grotii, quem de Satisfacione Christi adversus Fæustum Socinum Sensem scrispsit, responsio*, in which he defended Sozinni against Grotius. Grotius himself considered that differences over the doctrine of atonement were not so essential when they did not impede the exercise of general piety and morality. Accordingly, Grotius shared the Arminian distinction between the few fundamental Articles and the numerous non-fundamental Articles over which dissent was possible without serious threat to the unity of the church. During his imprisonment at the fortress of Loevestein, which permanently put an end to his political career in Holland, and from which he succeeded in escaping—hidden in a box for transporting books—to Antwerp and Paris, he wrote the first version of his didactic poem, originally written in Dutch, *De veritate religionis christianae*, which was intended to be given to Dutch sailors so that they would have an apologetic aid to argumentation ready to hand when they encountered non-Christians. The whole of Christianity was divided up in the aforementioned work into three teachings: firstly, faith in the Creator and His foreknowledge; secondly, faith in Jesus, who brings all human beings to salvation who obey His will and that of His Father; thirdly, faith in the Holy Scripture as the rule of life and faith as well as the Mediator of the Holy Spirit and the payment for future salvation. In his *De dogmatis utilibus et gubernatione Ecclesiae Christianae*, first published posthumously, Grotius only treated those doctrines as fundamental for the Christian faith which contain the commands and promises of Christ, whilst those doctrines came in second place which emphasised the dignity of Christ as Teacher. On the other hand, he regarded the doctrine of the Trinity put forward by the Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan Creed as no more fundamental than the doctrine of the Two Natures elaborated at the Council of Chalcedon. After the Synod of Dort the Remonstrant pastors where not the only ones to be suspended and in many cases forced into exile. The University of Leiden, where the Arminian disputes had started, was also stripped of its Remonstrant teachers, the head of the Staten Col-

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lege, Bertius, suspended from his position, and academic teaching regulated. In 1625, however, when Maurice’s brother Frederik Henrik following the latter’s death assumed the office of Stadholder, the persecutions were finally brought to an end and Arminian gatherings tolerated. In 1627 even in Amsterdam the opponents of the Contra-Remonstrants succeeded in coming to power, and the magistrate appointed a Remonstrant as Captain of the town militia. Opponents of this move within the town militia inquired of the provincial synod of Holland whether it was permitted for an enemy of the church to swear an oath; the synod consulted the theological faculty in Leiden, which responded in the negative. Thus the question of the relationship between church and state was once again on the agenda. The magistrate dismissed the objectors from the town militia, and when they turned to the States General and the Stadholder they found to their dismay that the governor joined in opposing them. In 1630 a Remonstrant church had started to be built, and one year later the edict of the States General concerning the execution of the decisions of the Synod of Dort was finally abolished. In 1634 a Remonstrant seminar was established in Amsterdam with Episcopius as its first professor, two years after the founding of the Athenaeum where, however, no theology was taught. Generally the political relationships which had prevailed at the time of Oldenbarnevelt were re-established, and the Remonstrants excluded from the Dutch Church were tolerated by the state, although the organs of state were occupied by members of the Publieke Kerk. Thus Calvinism in the Republic had led to a pluralism which resulted in the establishment of two Reformed Churches, the Contra-Remonstrant public church, which grounded itself in the Confessio Belgica, the Heidelberg Catechism and the Canons of Dort, and the Arminian church, which rested on the Remonstrance and Episcopius’ confession. Although the public church still wanted to put the orthodoxy of the Remonstrants strongly into question through reference to Scripture and the confessions, the state was on longer concerned about the pluralism within Calvinism and the co-existence of the two Reformed Churches. Even the state measures against Socinianism were by no means as strict as the Contra-Remonstrants wished. In 1628 the synods of North and South Holland appealed to the provincial assemblies of Holland and Westfriesland not to tolerate Socinians, and after the Counter-Reformation in Poland in 1638 had led to the closure of the school at Rakow the synods again became active and received the support of the English ambassador. In the following years some further measures were taken
against Socianians, and here and there Socianian books were put to the flames. This did not alter the basic fact, however, that the religious politics of the Contra-Remonstrants had failed, and that the Netherlands had come to be characterised by a confessional pluralism—including Contra-Remonstrants, Remonstrants, as well as Catholics, Mennonites and Socinians—which was not at all permitted by secular authorities elsewhere.

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THE ‘NEW SOCINIANS’:
INTERTEXTUALITY AND CULTURAL
EXCHANGE IN LATE SOCINIANISM

MARTIN MULSOW

1. Change of identity: the ‘new Socinians’

In the second half of the seventeenth-century, it became increasingly
difficult to call the phenomenon “Socinianism” by that name. This
semantic uncertainty is seen in designations such as that of the “new
Socinians”, which one comes across in Brandenburg in the 1690s. In
this region lived numerous Reformed pastors, with whom one could
not be certain that they did not secretly share Socinian views. In 1668,
Christoph Sand the elder was dismissed after being accused of “Arian”
convictions; the sympathies of the court chaplain Bartholomäus Stosch
were inscrutable and he was occasionally connected with the Socinian
Johann Preuß. Daniel Zwicker, who went from Danzig to the Nether-
lands, refused to let himself be called a “Socinian”, even though he
vehemently defended the unity of God against Comenius. In Frankfurt
an der Oder, Jeremias Felbinger had been associated with Socinian cir-
cles, but when he emigrated to Holland he developed his own style of
Antitrinitarianism. Samuel Crell wrote in his letters that on several the-
ological points, such as the doctrine of atonement, he was more of an
Arminian than a Socinian. Later he called himself an “Artemonian”, in
order to find a historically precise term. So then, how can students of
Socinianism in this period be certain of the description of somebody as
a “Socinian”? The concept of the “new Socinians” occurs in the indictments
against Friedrich Wilhelm Stosch, the son of Bartholomäus Stosch, who
went from Socinian and Arminian influences to becoming a Spinozist,

* I am grateful to Christopher Lundgren for the translation and to Stephen Snobe-
len for numerous corrections.

1 On Socinianism in Brandenburg, see Wotschke 1911, Geschichte. Biographical infor-
mation on many Socinians is provided by Bock 1774–1784, Historia; Fock 1847, Socinian-
ismus; on Zwicker see Bietenholz 1997, Zwicker; on Crell see footnotes 41ff. below.
and who had published a *Concordia rationis et fidei* in 1692. In these indictments one finds casual mention of “the writings of one of those New Socinians, Samuelis Przypocovii, from the year 1692 in Folio.” This refers to the Limborch edition of Przypkowski’s works, and thus the convergence of moderate Socinianism and Arminianism. Stosch defended himself, however, against these terms: “What you mean by your distinction between old and new Socinianism, I have no idea …” Apparently, he feared that those would be counted among those “new” Socinians who confessed a “docta ignorantia” with respect to the Trinity. In that case, one decisive characteristic of the “new” Socinians would have been their sceptical *epoché* with respect to traditional theology, and not an aggressive denial of it.

In other places, on exactly this point, Stosch referred to Johann Berg and a certain “Liberius de Sancto Amore”, which was the pseudonym of the young Jean Le Clerc in his earliest work, to whom we shall presently turn. In the introduction to that work, the fictitious publisher emphasises that the author was fully aware of the human frailty, that is, the tendency to err, and that these convictions of his were made clear in each of the letters in this book.

However, the appeal to ignorance in the questions of theological speculation and biblical interpretation is certainly not the only characteristic of the Socinians of the late seventeenth century. It is not easy to define this ‘new’ type of Socinian, particularly if one wishes to set up

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2 On this charge and its contexts see Döring 1995, *Frühaufklärung*.

3 Przypkowski 1692, *Cogitationes*. On this edition see the contribution of Luisa Simoni in this volume.


criteria in regards to content. There are Socinians who have adopted the Cartesian body of thought; there are those who have associated with Locke’s epistemology, those with connections with the historical argumentation about the development of dogma in the style of Denis Petau, and even some with connections with Spinoza, such as with the Dutch Collegiants. As a result, it is perhaps easiest to define formally the “new Socinians”, namely, as a product of cultural exchanges and transfers which, for the sake of clarity I shall henceforth call “Transferprodukt” [transfer product]. In other words, the ‘new’ Socinians, as a Transferprodukt, are the result of the frequent mixing which arose from the migration of Socinian people and ideas to western Europe, and into a completely different intellectual milieu.

Even so, one must also maintain that this Transferprodukt is not the result only of the plurality of philosophical-theological trends, but that at the same time many modern views crystallized around their Antitrinitarian convictions. The new Socinians not only consist of a mixture of identities, they also illustrate the tendency towards a new unity and commonality. The grounds for this lie in the appeal to reason on the issue of interpretation of Scripture, and are tied together with the appeal to one’s own conscience. To the extent to which the concept of reason was uniformly understood (which was certainly not always the case—one needs only to reflect on the differences between Descartes, Locke, and Spinoza), the group of New Socinians was also in a sense uniform. From them came many deists and so-called early-Enlightenment philosophers shortly thereafter.

When I speak of a “Transferprodukt,” I am picking up on the concept of “cultural exchange” [Kulturtransfer] which comes out of recent historical research. Its usefulness and fruitfulness in the case of Socinianism seems to me to be evident; this migration and transfer through cultures is characterized to an extent matched by few other examples: origination in the Protestantism of the Italian Cinquecento, then the emigration to Poland, Moravia, and Transylvania around the mid-and late sixteenth century, concluding in the successive expulsions from eastern Europe in the 1640s and 1650s, and the emigration of many Socinians to Brandenburg-Prussia, England, and the Netherlands. Yet, until now, it has been overlooked by scholars who are concerned with cultural exchange, that the Socinians present a phenomenon par excel-

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7 See Fix 1991, Prophecy.
8 See e.g. Espagne 1988, Transfers.
lence for this model. This could be because transfer theories were con-
ceived primarily for national-state cultures which developed since the
eighteenth century. In the meantime, however, the concepts—with cer-
tain modifications—have proved themselves useful for early modernity
as well.⁹

The point of concepts of cultural exchange and transfer is to get
away from a too simplistic conception of “influences”. Transfer de-
notes, rather, the decontextualization and recontextualization of a cul-
tural object; the taking of a cultural object out of its original culture and
the adaptations that evolve in the destination culture, with all the result-
ing questions as to what actually happened to it, and if there remains
an thoroughgoing identity of that cultural object.

Therefore, one can ask: does Socinianism really remain the same
when it is transferred from Poland to the Netherlands? Is it not a
symptom that after 1650, many Antitrinitarians ceased to refer to them-
selves as Socinians, and chose new titles such as “Arians”, “Unitarians”,
or “Artemonians”? Or that Huguenots and Arminians, who harbour
doubts about the Trinity, Christology, or the doctrine of atonement, still
did not want to be counted as Socinian sectarians?

In the discussion that follows, I would like to advance a series of
considerations about the profile of the “new” Socinians in the sense
that they are Transferprodukte, and to develop these considerations
employing several case examples. I will begin with a very external form
of cultural transfer—the insertion of texts from one culture into the
tradition of another. Then I will come to speak of the mingling of
Arminian, Huguenot, and Socinian impulses in the narrower sense,
namely, in the ‘melting pot’ of the Netherlands, in the journeys of
some Socinians to England, and in attempts to form contacts with
Islam. Such mingling often surrounded translation activity, and I will
therefore call especial attention to the role of cultural translation. In
the conclusion, I will then pose the question as to whether the “New
Socinians” also developed specific writing techniques in which they
reflected the pluralization out of which they were born. These questions
contain the problem of distinguishing between dialogical, concealed,
and esoteric forms of the “Art of Writing”.

⁹ See esp. Schmale 2003, Kulturtransfer; Burke 2000, Austausch. Forthcoming are
the papers of the Munich 2002 conference “Renaissance go-betweens”, ed. Andreas
Höfele.
In 1637 a book appeared in Amsterdam with the fictitious place of publication, “Eleutheropolis”, and with the title *Vindiciae pro religionis libertate*. The book called for toleration of the Socinians—a call that was directed squarely at the Catholic church. The author gave himself an obvious pseudonym, in that he called himself “Junius Brutus”, with the small addition “Polonus”. This was a name that awakened memories for every Protestant in all of Europe. “Stephanus Junius Brutus” had been the pseudonym of a Monarchomach author, who in 1579 had published the famous, and infamous, essay, *Vindiciae contra tyrannos*. In it, the right of resistance of the Huguenots against the French King had been established: must the subjects of a ruler follow an order that violates the commandments of God? The answer was “no”, and the choice of the pseudonym “Brutus” made it clear that here again the topic was active resistance against a tyrant.

It was through the pseudonymous reference that the 1637 book included this message. Now, however, it was a Polish “Brutus” who demanded freedom of religion. The unspoken, though alluded to, “contra tyrannos” gave this demand a militant aftertaste. As in the 1579 work, which was probably written by Languet and Duplessis-Mornay, four points were made here, above all that of the innocuousness of the heretics for the Catholic Church.

The author of the “Polish” *Vindiciae* was Johann Crell, one of the leading Socinians in Raków, and recently, in 1633, deceased. It remains unknown whether it was his idea, or that of the publisher in Amsterdam to present the pamphlet in the tradition of the Monarchomachs; but it made no importance for its reception. The important thing was that, even though Crell’s concrete demand to tolerate Socinians was addressed to the Polish Catholics, the argument was also found to be suitable for Huguenot and Arminian issues, since both Catholicism and Calvinism possessed, above all, an international dimension at this, the time of the Thirty Years’ War. It was therefore legitimate to transfer this request for toleration with the help of a “marker” in the title, and through the choice of pseudonym, to refer to the situation in western Europe. “Marker” is a term taken from the lit-

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erary theory of intertextuality. In fact, the theory of intertextuality stems from the field of modern literature, and has become especially loaded in the context of the structuralist debate surrounding the “death of the author”. However, it is also a theory that, in modified form, is suitable for use in research on the early modern period. Markers, in this connection, refer readers to another text and another author. In this case: Crell, or his publisher, ties himself to the Monarchomachs.

With the example of Crell’s Vindiciae, one can well study how successful this transfer has been, and how this transfer provoked yet more. In July of 1639, the twenty-three-year-old Samuel Sorbière read the book. He was so impressed with this librum aureum, that he drew up a French translation on the spot. Sorbière was a Huguenot, and as a student he moved in scholarly circles in Paris; not much later he came into contact with Gassendi and Grotius, Mersenne and Hobbes, and also with the small circles of Socinian sympathizers who gathered around the priest Edmond Mercier, with whom the young Andreas Wissowaty had run into while serving as steward to a Polish nobleman making his grand tour.

Translations are an even more blatant form of cultural transfer than a mere marker. They enable the apparently smooth embedding of a text into another national context. While Sorbière’s translation evidently circulated only in handwritten form amongst circles of friends, the translation by Charles Le Cène was completed a half-century later, and was printed in 1687 as an appendix to his Conversations sur diverses matières de religion. This text deals with toleration—specifically, for the Huguenots in France, of course—and these conversations were anonymously coupled with Crell’s writing under the title De la tolérance dans la religion ou de la liberté de conscience—as if it was a contemporary contribution to the Huguenot debate. Here, intertextuality is accomplished in the opposite manner, since there are no markers, but rather

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12 See Broich 1985, Formen.
13 See Kühlmann/Neuber 1994, Intertextualität.
14 See Chmaj 1957, Propaganda; Chmaj 1928, Sorbière. On Sorbière’s sympathies towards Socinianism see also Pintard 1943, Libertinage, pp. 335ff.
15 See Vercruyse 1973, Crellius.
16 Le Cène 1687, Conversations. Le Cène’s manuscript contained also a dialogue on the Remonstrants’ tolerance towards heretics, which was not printed. See the Ms. Le Cène, tom IV., in the Library of the London Huguenot Society, fols. 831–842.
a smoothing over of differences in order better to be able to adapt to the new situation. The Socinian subtext is obscured, as was the case in many other early-Enlightenment texts.

This strategy continued into the eighteenth century under other circumstances. Jacques André Naigeon, a friend of d’Holbach, and a master of intertextuality by creating atheising editions of earlier works, published Crell’s tract once more in the French language, but this time he put it into a High Enlightenment context in which revelation was no longer viewed seriously.17 Continuing this discussion would bring us well beyond the scope of this paper. For now, let it suffice to have pointed out how intertextual phenomena through markers can signify the first step toward cultural transfer, even before the actual migratory movements begin, producing types such as the “New Socinian”; and how intertextuality, subsequently, once again obscures the heir of the Socinians through anonymising.

3. Journeys to England (I): Christoph Sand

Perhaps one of the most promising possibilities in which to observe “New Socinians” in their function as mediators between cultures, and at the same time as a product of cultural exchange, comes in studying a few trips to England. I will use the journeys to England of Christoph Sand, Noel Aubert de Versé and Samuel Crell as an opportunity to throw out a series of questions.

Christoph Sand was in England in 1664 as a twenty-year-old man. Influenced by his father, he worked on his annalistic collection of testimonies of those church fathers, to whom he ascribed Arian thoughts.18 Four years later, the collection would appear as Nucleus historiae ecclesiasticae. For the most part he lingered in Oxford, lived in a house near Queen’s College, and worked in Bodleian Library and the College libraries.19 When in 1697 Samuel Crell was in Oxford with the same purpose, the librarian of Bodleian, John Hudson, recalled with resentment how Sand had abused the treasury of books for “such a horrible

18 On Sand a monograph is lacking. But see the contributions by Sarah Hutton and Stephen Snobelen in this volume.
19 Wood 1691, Athenae, p. 159. See also Mc Lachlan 1951, Socinianism, p. 290.
thing”, and this time he made sure that the Socinian Crell “had to steer well clear of the bookshelves”.\(^{20}\)

In any case, Sand had at that time learned English and made himself well-known in the contemporary debates in England. Later he translated the *Philosophical Transactions* of the Royal Society and essays of Robert Boyle for a publisher in Amsterdam. However, he was not only interested in current natural science, but probably also in the philosophical debates, especially those of the Cambridge Platonists. Indeed, in his writings Sand shows many Platonistic streaks that recall the Platonism of Cambridge. These include most importantly the pre-existence of Christ and the pre-existence of the soul. The convergence of an “Arian” early Christian theology and Platonising views were, for Sand, justified by the conviction that Plato had been a “Moses Atticus”, and had thus drawn his teachings from Judaism. In this way, Sand was able to set what he believed to be Paul’s doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul in relation to that of Plato and Philo\(^{21}\), and recognized in the Johannine Logos the Logos concept “of the Rabbis and the Platonistic philosophers, who had borrowed the doctrine of the Logos from the Jews”.\(^{22}\) Now, the interest in the teachings of Philo and Origen, which is evident from such interpretations, can be brought together with the subordinationist tendencies of some Cambridge Platonists.\(^{23}\) Sarah Hutton has spoken of an “Origenist moment” in England in the years 1658–1662.\(^{24}\) Then it was Anne Conway who identified the Christian Logos with that of Philo, and these together with the Adam Kadmon of the Lurianic Kabbalah of Abraham Cohen Herrera, and thereby intertwined the model of “Hellenization of Christianity” with the on of the Hebraic origins of Platonism.\(^{25}\)

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23 In Colie 1957, *Light*, Sand is not mentioned. Sand’s platonic-arian convictions were not typical for the Socinian milieu, they even contradicted partly Socinain opinions. When Benedikt Wissowaty prepared the “Nuclaus” for a new edition, he annotated the book according to his own views and formulated his countervision in a separate writing, which is extant only in a manuscript version. See Szczucki 1979, *Historiography*.
The question—and the research problem—that arises goes like this: was there reciprocal influence between Sand’s Arianism and the subordinationist tendencies in the circles of More and Conway? Does perhaps the Quaker George Keith, who had established a connection between Philo and Herrera, play any role here?26 Were one to know more about these relationships, it would also be clearer as to why Sand’s Nucleus could have so great an impact on Newton, some of whose philosophical concepts had been taken from of the Cambridge Platonists.27

4. Journeys to England (II): Noel Aubert de Versé

We now turn to the next journey to England. Noel Aubert de Versé was a French-born Catholic, and after his conversion to Calvinism he came into contact with Socinian ideas for the first time during his theology studies in Sedan.28 In 1668/9 he was dismissed as a Huguenot pastor because copies of Crell’s and Völkel’s books, written in his own hand, had been found in his suitcase. On the other hand, Aubert had had close ties to the Oratorians since his school days, and whenever he found himself under pressure, it did not trouble him much to reconvert to Catholicism. Evidently—in addition to a healthy dose of opportunism—he preferred to see the similarities, rather than the differences, between a modern Catholicism in the style of Oratorians such as Malebranche and Simon on the one hand, and a Unitarian Protestantism on the other. As he took up residence in Holland as a refugee
in 1679 he translated Simon’s *Histoire critique du Vieux Testament*, and at the same time befriended the Arian (and perhaps Spinozist) Christoph Sand.  

Aubert was later in possession of a document, which he apparently stumbled across in the years around 1680, that spoke of a secret discussion about religion between Moritz of Nassau, the Catholic Eugen of Portugal, and the Moroccan ambassador Ahmet ben Abdalla in the year 1612. The document was a letter from Ahmet, which he had written to Moritz after his return home, in which he displayed all of the commonalities in their monotheistic convictions. In the eyes of a ‘new’ Socinian like Aubert, who was also able to argue historically, this was an interesting text in that scholars had so long ago established connections between the Judeo-Christian Nazarenes, or Ebionites, the Monarchian theologians like Paul of Samosata and Marcellus of Ankyra, and the Syrian Christians, all the way to Islam, and on further to the Socinians. As far back as 1570, one could remember, the antitrinitarian Adam Neuser had reached Constantinople, and there became a Muslim.

This document became politically interesting for Aubert at the moment when, in 1682, he heard from England that the current Moroccan ambassador from the court of Charles II, Ahmet ben Ahmet, had arrived there in order to discuss the ownership rights of the harbour of Tangier. Was this not a chance to form political ties with Islam, in order for the Socinian minority to obtain powerful allies? In the early seventeenth century, some hard-pressed Calvinists had come across the idea, even if based on other—millenarian—theological grounds together to overthrow the Antichrist in Rome. At that time it had been called “Calvinoturcismus”. Now, however, it was a “Socinianoturcismus” which Aubert had in mind; he produced a handwritten copy of the 1612 manuscript and ferried over to England, in order to seek access to the Moroccan ambassador. We do not exactly know what happened next, though Aubert must have visited a Socinian friend who was prepared to undertake this explosive endeavour with him: the texts speak of “two philosophers” who were behind the action. The plan was indeed explo-

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29 Simon 1680, *Historia*.
31 On Neuser see Burchill 1989, *Antitrinitarians*.
32 See Mout 1988, *Calvinoturcismus*. 
sive to the highest order, since, if it had been discovered, they could have been charged with high treason.

So then, what happened? To the document of 1612, Aubert and his friend quickly drafted two of their own writings to add, *Animadversiones in praecedentem epistolam* and a letter from “Theognis Irenaeus,” in the same manner that Jean Le Clerc, in the previous year, had published letters under fictitious pseudonyms such as “Ambrosius Theographus” and “Paulus Theosebius”. Later we will also come to discuss these letters. They tied these three short texts into one packet and topped it off with a letter of introduction to the ambassador in which they described and defended their actions. On account of the relationship between the Unitarians (spokesmen of which they styled themselves to be), and Islam, would they be permitted to elaborate on the common monotheistic history of their “noble sect,” and to request that he convey these tidings to the learned men of his kingdom.

The plan, however, went awry. The ambassador refused the petition for an audience when he found out that the subject was a religious discussion, since he was in London with political purposes and did not want to get involved in any such debates. So the request of the two Socinians reached the hands of the master of ceremonies, and from there it made its way to the Archbishop Tenison. This was not a comfortable situation for Aubert.33

What the texts to the ambassador, which are still extant, display, is the over-arching gesture typical of these types of writing. Not only that the antitrinitarian monotheism was considered a true religion of humankind since Adam and Moses, an allusion to the Qur’anic Suras 2:130 ff.34—it is also mentioned the term “Unitarianism”, a word which, at that time, was quite new, and it is used of God as a depersonalized divinity: “We, who with our Unitarian brethren were in all ages exer-

33 See Gordon 1895, Heads; McLachlan 1951, Socinianism, pp. 318f.; Champion 1992, Pillars, pp. 110f. The original manuscript of the writing to the ambassador is today in the Lambeth Palace Library of the Church of England, London, Mss. Tenesoniani P. 673; a part of it was printed by Charles Leslie: Leslie 1708, Controversy, and reprinted in Leslie 1721, Works, vol. 1, pp. 207–211. I prepare an edition of parts of the manuscript and a larger study on the affair. In Morman 1987, Aubert, the event is not mentioned, in Champion 1992, Pillars, the name Aubert is not mentioned in this context.

34 2: 130 [136]: “Say ye: We have believed in Allah and what has been sent down to us, and what has been sent down to Abraham and Ishmael and Isaac and Jacob and the Patriarchs and what has been given to Moses and Jesus and what has been given to the prophets from their Lord, making no distinction between any of them.” Bell 1937, Qu’ran, vol. 1, p. 18.
cis’d to defend with our pens the Faith of one supreme God, (without personalities or pluralities) as he hath rais’d your Mahomet to do the same with the sword.” A few years later, in 1687, this would be exactly the language of Stephen Nye, who has first set the term “Unitarian” in the title of his *Brief History of the Unitarians*, and who is also known for emphasizing the non-personality of God.\(^{35}\)

This story also raises questions. Who was the second “philosopher” with Aubert? Was it Nye, or had Nye merely taken similar thoughts from circulating rumours and manuscripts? One could, if one needed to hang a “Wanted” poster, point to the fact that Aubert’s companion was possibly educated as an Arabist, and had concerned himself with the early history of the Qur’ān. Since in the letter to Ahmet ben Ahmet it was suggested—an affront to every Muslim—to free the Qur’ān of contradictions, which had been produced through early textual insertions.

For we do […] strive to prove that such faults and irregularities, not cohering with the fashion of the rest of the Alcoran building, nor with the undoubted sayings of your Prophet, nor with the Gospel or Christ […] that therefore […] those contradictions were foisted into the scatter’d papers found after Mahomet’s death, of which in truth the Alcoran was made up […]. We do then in these our papers endeavour to clear by whom, and in what time such alterations were made in the first setting out of the Alcoran […].\(^{36}\)

By the way: modern philology also works from the supposition that the Qur’ān developed through additions made to an earlier “corpus”,\(^ {37}\) and English Arabists of the seventeenth century like Edward Pococke had dealt with the question of how the early development of Islam might have proceeded.\(^ {38}\)

I have mentioned this curious case here, not only because it presents us with one of the founding documents of “Unitarianism”, but also because, above all, it makes quite clear the complex structure of cultural transfer in the “new”, open, and opportunistic Socinianism: a Frenchman living in Holland picked himself up and went to England in order, with the help of a companion who was possibly an Arabist, to develop an alliance with the Moroccan ambassador. Unitarianism thus evidently had an integrative, connective potential, which—at least

\(^{35}\) Nye 1687, *History*. See also the contribution by Douglas Hedley to this volume.


\(^{37}\) See e.g. Nöldecke 1860, *Geschichte*.

according to the plan—was able to connect cultures. One important reason for this were the constructed historical legitimizations and traditions put forward by the antitrinitarians. Therefore, the connective transfer could reach across nations and also across time. In other words, it was horizontal and vertical—in the sense of being orientated towards the reclaiming of an original, and uncorrupt commonality.

In hard reality, massive and disintegrative difficulties certainly opposed to the connection: the politics of the seventeenth century, if they were to function, had just learned to bracket exactly such questions of religion instead of solving them, in order to remain autonomous, rather than unified, and as a result condemned such attempts as those by Aubert and his friend to failure.

5. Journeys to England (III): Samuel Crell

With that, I come to the third example of a journey to England. Samuel Crell, the last significant Socinian theologian, was often in England during his life. At least, every time he needed money in order get his books printed in Holland and England, he used his English connections in order to obtain financial support. This is demonstrated by the trip taken shortly before the *Fides primorum christianorum* was published in 1697, as well as the one taken in the run-up to *Initium Evangelii S. Johannis* in 1726. Crell, from a Polish-German family, grew up in Amsterdam and had lived in Brandenburg until 1725, until he emigrated back to Amsterdam for good. His family—as a result of their emigration history—had numerous ties to England: the father Christopher had in London, in 1666, become acquainted with Alice Stuckey, a wealthy widow, whose house was a centre of the London Socinians. Samuel’s brother Christopher, Jr., was raised by Alice Stuckey as if by a foster mother, and had later lingered in the circles of Shaftesbury, Sydenham, Locke and Bayle. Through this family history it is made clear why Crell could make use of such good connections within circles of Socinians and Cryptosocinians during his trips to England. He

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had conversed with John Spencer, Gilbert Burnet, John Locke, and Isaac Newton, and men such as John Tindal and Anthony Collins were among those who had helped finance the publication of his books.

This glance at Crell as a figure of cultural exchange, then, helps to shed light on the complicated web of Cryptosocinianism in London. These relationships remain obscured to this day. What did the contacts between the Cryptosocinian French in the London Huguenot circles, the English Socinians near Firmin, Nye, and Hedworth, the free-thinkers such as Toland, Trenchard, and Collins, and finally the Nicodemite scholars like John Locke and Isaac Newton, look like? These connections play a large role in understanding precisely the avant-garde development of ideas around 1700. The constant transfer from Holland to England (and back) is in this respect of decisive importance.

In order to give an example of how the figure of Crell can be useful for the illumination of contacts, I refer to the year 1698/99. At that time, Crell was once again in London; perhaps he was looking for support for his book *Cogitationes novae de primo et secundo Adamo*, which attempted a synthesis between Locke’s *Reasonableness*, Pufendorf’s *Jus fæciale* and Socinian Thoughts, and which in 1700 appeared in Amsterdam, of course under a pseudonym, and without naming the two great men. In London at that time, Crell’s Socinian friends entrusted him with a manuscript of the work *Platonisme devoilé* by the recently deceased Jacques Souverain. Souverain was a Huguenot Cryptosocinian, and a friend of the still-living Londoner, Charles Le Cène. Thus, there were contacts between Crell’s Socinian acquaintances and these Huguenots, who could not openly confess their Socinian ideas, because Socinian-
ism was excluded from the Toleration Act, because they would have lost the connection with their French community, and perhaps because they remained more Arminian than Socinian on some points. As we will yet see, however, Le Cène constituted a connecting member between the circle of Le Clerc and Locke, and the Socinians. Crell, on the other hand, visited Locke, whom he admired so much. Then back in Holland in 1700, Crell pleaded to his Unitarian friend, Sebastian Petzold, to print the Souverain manuscript; a friend of Le Clerc took over the corrections. Another text by Souverain, a treatise on the beginning of the Gospel of St. John, made its way into the notebooks of John Locke, perhaps by mediation of William Popple, Thomas Firmin or Crell.

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46 See Marshall 1994, Locke, p. D. in Mulsow 2002, Moderne, I had dated the visit as having taken place in 1697; in fact is was in 1698. In a letter to Limborch in October of 1701, Crell passed on Locke’s greetings to Limborch, which Crell had received from his cousin Daniel. Daniel had stayed in the house of Locke and Lady Masham in Oates during the summer. See Crell to Limborch, Mülrosae 14. 10. 1701: “Fuit apud me Daniel C大理ius patruelis meus qui hac adeste ex Anglia dcessurus saluatit Illustri-
simurn Virum D.num Locke in aedibus Nobilissimi Baronetti D.ni Francisci Mashami,
mihiqome nomine Nobilissimae nuper familieae et viri Illustrii. D.ni Locke plurimum
dixit salutem. Quaeo Vir Cebilerrime ut si quando literas eo dirigis plurimam vicis-
sim Nobiliis. et humanissimae Matrones D.na Mashamiae, Viri Ill. Dn. Locke et toti
ill familieae adscribere salutem non graveris meo nomine, etiam testari velis me insig-
nis humanitatis et aliquot dierum suassisime ibi transactisimum semper esse memorem,
licit cum absit peculiaris scribendi materia, literis meis Illustrii. virum non compelles.
Cui Deus vitam quam longissimam et valetudinem non infirmam largiri velit. Viro
quoque famigeratissimo Dno Clerico faustissima quaeque preor, valetudinem imprimis
etiam in posterum continuandis studiis literarisi exquisissimis parem. Te etiam Vir cele-
berrime cum familia tua Deus Opt. max. quam diutissime servet incolumem! Tuo
nomini addictissimus / Samuel Crellius.” Universiteitsbibliotheek Amsterdam, Ms. J.
210.

47 See Pierre Coste to John Locke: Locke 1981, Correspondence, Nr. 2601, p. 650:
“Mr. Crel[nius] a enfin reçu le MS. de Mr. Souverain, dont il étoit en peine, intitulé
le Platonisme devo[i][lé. Il] s’imprime actuellement chez le mème Mr. Petso.” I owe
Mulsow 2000, Souverain, and Mulsow 2002, Moderne, I had suggested Reinier Leers as a
possible printer.

48 Samuel Crell in: Das Neue Gelehrte Europa, 1. Theil, Wolfenbüttel 1752, p. 212f: “Ein
allzugroßer Freund, Johannes Clerici, ein Franzose, hat die Correctur der Druckfehler
nicht auf sich nehmen wollen, bis man einen und anderen Ort, darinnen Clericus
refutiert wurde, ausgelassen hatte.”

49 Some General Reflections on the Beginning of St. John’s Gospel, Ms. Locke e17, pp. 175–
223. The identification of this text as originating from Souverain was achieved by John
Marshall: Marshall 2000, Locke, pp. 127f. Thus also this text, which was believed to be
lost, is now been found, similar to to finding of another text by Souverain, the “Lettre
touchant l’apostasie”, which was discovered ad edited by Sylvain Matton: Souverain
2000, Lettre.
Many questions remain open, and I have only selected the three journeys to England in order to make it clear to what extent the research on Socinianism has to take the complex phenomena of cultural transfer into account. Overstepping the boundaries was the fate and prospect of the Socinians, and only because of their overstepping of bounds did they find themselves in the middle of the ferment of the *Crise de la conscience européenne*. That is why it makes little sense to conduct research on the Socinians from the point of view of national-state cultures, or to restrict our views to “Socinianism in England” (McLachlan), “Socinianism in the Netherlands” (Kühler, van Slee), in Germany or in Poland. The research must now take on the international character of its subject matter.

6. *Translations and manuscript transfer: Charles Le Cène*

We will remain a little longer with Charles Le Cène, who emerged in the last example. Le Cène was a go-between *par excellence*, since he developed a vast talent for translation, which has only been discovered in the last decades. This brings to our awareness the fact that one obstacle to Socinian internationality was naturally language. Yet next to French, Latin continued to be considered the language of the learned, but as soon as one hoped to reach a wider audience, and not just the scholars, translations became necessary. For this reason, John Biddle (Bidle) had begun a translation campaign in England around the early 1650s and translated into English the Racovian Catechism, Stegmann’s *Brevis disquisitio*, and the *Vita Socini*, as well as *De pace et concordia ecclesia* by Przypkowski. Similarly, and even more extensively, Charles Le Cène appears to have heeded the call. Le Cène was an Arminian and Cryptosocinian, a Huguenot who had lived mostly in Holland as a co-worker with Le Clerc until going to London in 1703. There, he belonged to the just-mentioned Cryptosocinian Huguenot milieu. He was a passionate translator as far back as his time in Holland (most importantly he translated the Bible), and he published the first French translation of a Socinian text. This was the aforementioned essay from Johann Crell, the *Vindiciae pro religionis libertate*.

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51 See McLachlan 1951, *Socinianism*. 
As if that weren’t enough, his unpublished works and notes, which still exist in the library of the “Huguenot Society” in London, contain several volumes of French translations of Socinian texts. Among these are Johann Völkel’s De vera religione, Wissowaty’s Religio naturalis, the Racovian Catechism, and several essays from Fausto Sozzini. In 1973 Jerome Ver Cruysse for the first time pointed out the full dimensions of these handwritten translations, and in 1977 Briggs provided a list of the titles. But even his inventory left some texts unidentified.

Le Cène’s translations include, for example, the tract Deux considérations sur les termes et sur les façons de parler que des théologiens employent pour expliquer la doctrine de la Trinité. This is the French version of the work Duae considerationes vocum, terminorum ac phrasium, which was probably printed by Johann Preuß in 1684 in Guben in the Mark Brandenburg. The work contains two texts: primarily the Duae considerationes themselves, which possibly originated from Preuß, and also the essay Progressus in studio cognitionis Dei, which was translated by Le Cène as Progrez dans la connoissance de Dieu. In it, the Socinian “Cautiones” of the first essay were examined from an external, non-Socinian viewpoint. The “Cautiones” argued that the terminology of the Trinitarian “Persons” and “Substances” is so confusing and unclear, that one would have done well to keep one’s distance from the whole doctrine. Possibly it was Preuß’ friend, Bartholomäus Stosch, the Reformed court-chaplain, who had written this critical, but benevolent examination. At least, this can be presumed according to a note in Le Cène’s translation. Preuß and Stosch’s Son, Friedrich Wilhelm, were probably acquainted. As he referred to the “docta ignorantia” as one basis for the “New Socinianism”, Friedrich Wilhelm Stosch did so with reference to exactly the passage out of Johann Berg’s Apostolischer Regell, which had been quoted in the Considerationes.

53 Huguenot Society London (see footnote 16), Mss. Le Cène.
55 Duae considerationes Vocum, Terminorum ac Phrasium, quae in doctrina Trinitatis a Theologis usurpantur, s.l.1684. In Ms. Le Cène fol. 315–345.
56 See Briggs 1977, Manuscrits.
57 See above footnote 5, Berg 1641, Regell, p. 87: “Wann sie [die Sozinianer und Arianer] in solchen hohen unbegriefflichen Geheimnifs / bey den Worten der Schriftt unverrückt und ungestümmelt ohne Zanck und Streit verblieben / und ihre eigene Auslegungen oder Folgereyen ihrer Vernunft / außer oder wider die Artikel des Glaubens / nicht hinzuthäten / so würden wir Sie dergestalt zu richten nicht ursach
At the end of this short volume, yet two more letters were published which are apparently replies from Preuß to Bartholomäus Stosch’s examination. In this way, the work reflects an “amica collatio” between Reformed and Socinians in Brandenburg, a tolerant divergence of opinion, just as had occurred the year previous between Philipp of Limborch and the Jew, Orobio da Castro, and just, we will come to see in the early work of Le Clerc.

Yet another text translated by Le Cène is entitled: *La Foy des Premiers Chrètiens, Martyrs et Ancient Pères*. At the end, Jonas Schlichting is named, but it was probably a mistake to ascribe this text to Schlichting. In actuality, it seems to be a translation of seven pages out of the essay *Fides primorum Christianorum*, which had pseudonymously appeared in 1697 under the name Lucas Mellier. Its author is no other than the son-in-law of Preuß, Samuel Crell. Thus, here again, we see Brandenburg Socinianism.

This brings us to the question of whether the go-between activities of Crell had played any role in the case of Le Cène. He was certainly capable of transmitting rare writings from Brandenburg, such as that of Preuß, as well as his own, to Le Cène, possibly without allowing his authorship to shine through. In any case, his extensive travel activities would have made it possible.

Personal transmissions through journeys, with Socinian manuscripts under one’s coat, were indispensable in this milieu. They were essential to the continued survival of the Antitrinitarians, and the basis for their cultural exchange. Such personal transmissions also form the basis of Limborch’s Przypkowski edition from 1692, which was only made possible through contacts, above all with Andreas Wiszowaty’s son Benedict. In addition, the other Dutch editions of Socinian writings, most importantly the *Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum* from 1665–1668, which Frans Kuyper organized, were received through personal manuscript transmission. Indeed, the international contacts of the Socinians functioned quite well. For example, with regard to the Johann-Crell volumes, there were some students, like Jeremias Felbinger, sitting in Frankfurt an der Oder who were occupied with “copying out, for

habe / wan sie schon alle unsere Aufflegungen oder Menschliche Redens-arten nicht annehmen oder gebrauchen wolten.”

58 Printed as Limborch 1687, *Veritate*.
59 Crell, S. 1697, *Fides*.
60 See Simonutti 1984, *Arminianesimo*. 
the Faculty, some manuscripts that had been left behind by Crell and preparing them for print.” Andreas Wissowaty had travelled through Hungary and Siebenbürgen in order to collect manuscripts, and then in Calvinist Mannhein he prepared the edition of the Sozzini volumes. In 1668, Daniel Markos was on the way from London to Siebenbürgen, and he took with him one of the very few remaining copies of Servet’s *Restitutio Christianismi*, which, while underway, he left to be copied out while staying, as a guest, with Johann Preuß in the Neu- mark.

What begins as a simple copy is often the beginning of a complex cultural transmission, out of one milieu and into another. This was already shown by Le Cène’s insertion of Johann Crell’s *Vindiciae* into his dialogical *Entretiens*, and, in a similar way, one can also imagine the use of yet other translated texts, when they were then circulated in Holland or London.

### 7. Dialogical Reasoning in Le Clerc and Aubert de Versé

We have said that the ‘New Socinians’ were Transferprodukte, and in travels, text exchanges, and translations they mastered the international character of Socinianism and Arminianism. Did this transfer mentality also find expression in their writings? I am not speaking about content, which is naturally the result of the diverse stimuli and impulses which existed, nor from the ‘markers’, which bridged the traditions. I would like to direct the attention, rather, to a formal aspect. Did the pluralities of all Socinian and semi-Socinian positions express themselves in a pluralistic writing style? The term “Dialogizität” has established itself in recent research on Renaissance literature, as a literature which reflected the proliferation of discourse and ideas since the fifteenth century. This term does not only refer to the splitting of arguments into their different positions and putting them into the mouths of different speakers, but virtually the abolition of fundamental categories like “true” and “false” in favour of

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61 See Lucà 1854, *Chronist*: Felbinger had “für die Fakultät des Theologen Crellii hinterlassene Manuskripte abzuschreiben und zum Druck vorzubereiten”.


63 This episode is missing (like many others) in Goldstone/Goldstone 2002, *Flames*.

a portrayal of the variety of discourse and a new arrangement of ideas. So: can one also find “Dialogizität” amongst the “New Socinians”? Yes, one finds it, and without having to look very hard. In the first work of Jean Le Clerc, the *Epistolae theologicae* which appeared in 1781, which had allegedly created a certain “Liberus de Sancto Amore” and which was the fruit of his student days in Geneva and Saumur, the treatments of the Trinity, original sin, and Christology are arranged in an elaborate arrangement of letters. It is worthwhile to examine these compositions more closely, particularly if one reflects upon the significance such arrangements might have had with later authors such as Kierkegaard. With Le Clerc, as well, the work as a whole is already set into distancing brackets, in that not the pseudonymous Liberius himself is the editor, but rather a fictitious “friend” of Liberius, a theologian from “Eleutheropolis”, a “free city” like the one in which Johann Crell’s *Vindiciae* were printed. This editor posits that the texts in the work had been first written as “Adversaria”, as reflections on the reading matter, and then were formulated as letters. Many of the views, he emphasized, might also have had an experimental status, and they had been expressed in personal conversations (“*saepe se expertum in familiaribus confabulationibus*”).

The “letters”, which were published in this framework, all stem from Liberius, it is true, but they are addressed to various persons. The first letter, form August of 1679, is written to one “Firminius Parrhasius” and is based on the assumption that Christ is a God co-eternal with the Father. He develops a theory of the hypostatic union of both natures of Christ which works with Cartesian concepts. Then, however, comes the second letter, which exactly undermines this assumption. This letter purports to have been written on New Year’s Eve of 1678 to “Ambrosius Theographus”, but distances itself yet further from the context, in that it only speaks of a “Ludovicus Solinus”, a friend of Theographus’ uncle, who has had a discussion, a comparison (a “collatio”), with two nephews to whom he has posed questions. This “Solinus” is presented

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66 See the fictuous place of publication in Crell, J. *Vindiciae*. Possibly Le Clerc with the name of the fictuous editor has alluded to his friend Jacques Lenfant, who in a letter from 15.7.1684 has described himself as “Eleutheropolitanus”. See Barnes 1968, *Le Clerc*, p. 60.

as someone who has had to leave his homeland, and has now found a new place to live.  

In is not clear if one should here imagine a Socinian who has been expelled from Poland. In any case, cultural exchange is incorporated into this framework. The discussion between Solinus and his nephews is nothing less than a theological experiment in vivo: he had sent both nephews far away from each other to be educated of the theological debates in Hebrew, Greek, and Latin, and then to read the Bible without any commentaries. They studied for three years so isolated from each other. And now the question was: to what conclusion about the Trinity would they come? The one had come to a Reformed, and the other to a Socinian, position. A dispute between the two brought no solution; three friends conscripted for the cause could not determine a winner. The moral of the story goes like this: if Holy Scripture so equivocates, and is so unclear on this matter, it means then that people have to tolerate differing opinions, and consequently also those of the Socinians. The common ground in other questions—that God possesses all perfection, that he will redeem humankind, and for this reason did Christ die—is, together with an identical moral code, sufficient for a mutual acceptance. In this way, the demands of Crell’s Vindiciae were fulfilled.

The following third letter, to one “Coelius Optatianus,” is supposed to have been written shortly thereafter in February of 1679. This Coelius had, according to the story, read the first two letters from “Liberius” while with “Amicus”, and desired a “detailed explanation of the three modes of thought in the Godhead”. Now, Liberius had to concede a discrepancy between his starting positions with respect to the first two letters: “Before I had read the discussion, I had meant that the mystery of the Holy Trinity can be explained in this way, in that I presupposed that it could be demonstrated from Scripture, and so I meant that is was therefore not necessary to write about these things to my Solinus …”  

Now, however, was the fact that, the accordance of Scripture with the notion of the Holy Trinity was not at all guaranteed. The rational reconstruction of the Trinity which now followed had thus only hypothetical character.

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68 Le Clerc 1679, Liberii, p. 14f.
69 Le Clerc 1679, Liberii, p. 95f.: “Priusquam legissem Collationem illam, S. Trinitatis mysterium (supponendo illud ex scriptura probari posse) ea ratione explicari videram, itaque non opus esse ut ad Solinum meum ea de re scriberem, putavi.”
I cannot go into the content of Liberius’ theory at this point; I only want to mention that the hypothetical theory portrays a type of psychological doctrine of the Trinity: “Even though [God] is one, He can produce numerous different sequences of thought simultaneously, and therefore the Persons in Him can also be different. God is called Father according to a certain manner of thinking, Son according to another, and to another, Holy Spirit”.

This, it comes down to the “modi cognoscendi” in the “series cogitationum” (Spinoza’s Ethics had appeared in 1677): the “modus” of the judge (Father), the mediator (Son), and the comforter (Holy Spirit).

Liberius extols this theory as not succumbing to the accusation of Sabellianism (since in this modalistic view the three Persons come one after the other, not next to each other) and insofar as a possible alternative to Socinianism: the stance is “equally probable with the Socinian” and is “in agreement with right reason”. In this way it is in accordance with the situation of uncertainty regarding the content of revelation, a situation which Stosch had viewed as constituent to the “new” Socinianism.

The further progress of the Epistolae theologicae can be neglected at this point; they continue this complex construction and in this manner they formulate considerations of original sin, the creation of man, and the problem of miracles. The impression remains, however, that the author produces an ingenious dialogical situation with letters, letters which, in part neutralise each other. How did he manage this? Le Clerc’s model was, as Annie Barnes has already recognized, the Saumur philologist Tanneguy Lefebvre and his Epistolae of 1665/1674. Lefebvre had introduced the gallant French conversational culture to philology, and had formulated his philological observations on the classical authors and the Bible in fictitious letters to friends in a loose and unforced tone. He was a part of the libertine-philological culture of France and the Netherlands. A culture to which Patin, Ménage, and,
in a sense, already Scaliger belonged, whose table discussions (the Prima Scaligeriana) he had published. Philology offered in the form of an epistolary novel, so to speak, which Le Clerc wanted to adopt for theology. For him, it was the suitable form of expression for an uncertain epistemological situation with respect to the revelatory texts, and insofar the use of “Dialogizität” in the sense of a hypothetical abolition of the true/false-discrepancy, and the recognition of plurality.

Aubert de Versé, in his Tombeau du Socinianisme, which appeared anonymously in 1687, had quite obviously let himself be prompted by Le Clerc’s epistolary form and complex construction. There is a letter at the end of the book from a “Basilius of Ankyra” to an “Eudoxus”.\footnote{Aubert de Versé 1687, Tombeau.} Once again, Patristic-sounding names were chosen, which were variations on real names, or parts of names, without concretely referencing anyone in particular\footnote{Though there was a real Basilius of Ankyra (mentioned by Christoph Sand) there seems to be no specific allusion to him.}, so that the search for intertextual markers falls into a void. This “Basilius” in Aubert’s text expresses a textual-critical view of the Bible, just as “Solinius” in Le Clerc’s book. “In order to fully conclude this work”, writes the author, “I would like here to add a letter that was written to me from a friend of mine, whom I would like to call Basilius of Ankyra, a letter that deals with the subject of the Trinity … Here, one finds yet another completely new hypothesis about the prologue of the Gospel of John, one completely contrary to my own, which is thereby so completely destroyed, that I am bubbling with enthusiasm; a new hypothesis which, when I take it into consideration, forces me, so to speak, to see that this is not a hypothesis, but a truth, which appears to me to be inspired by God”\footnote{Aubert de Versé 1687, Tombeau, p. 169.}. The sentences burst at the seams with irony, if one reflects that it was probably Aubert himself, whose ideas formed the background of Le Clerc’s notorious insertions about the doctrine of inspiration in the Sentimens de quelque Théologiens sur l’histoire critique du Vieux Testament, which had appeared two years previous\footnote{Le Clerc 1685, Sentimens, p. 212ff. On the discussions about the authorship see Pitassi 1987, Croire.}. There the possibility of any inspiration was denied. Thus, when the author of the Tombeau says that it appears to him that the theses were inspired by God, then it can only be a joke.

Beyond all of that, the utilization of Le Clerc’s epistolary form of the Epistolae theologicae by Aubert makes it possible, that Le Clerc is
also Aubert’s inspiration for the opinions of the previously-mentioned “Basilius”. At the very least, the text refers to the “Critici”, the modern philologists, when Basilius says that “our youngest and most-famous critics (nos derniers et plus fameux Critiques)” have brought the possibility to our attention, that in the Biblical text, substitutions by the advocates of the eternal Godliness of Jesus Christ could have been made, in which the name of “Jesus” or “Christ” in each case could have been replaced with that of “God”. Basilius works through these possibilities extensively. He continues: “What deceit, what trick, what depth of the enemy of humanity, to have deliberately, through the changing of a single word, introduced such a disastrous and deadly error into the religion!” In contrast to “Solinus”, we are no longer dealing with the obscurity of the Bible, but with its corruptness.

Now, if the reader of the Tombeau, with “Basilius”, truly accepts the Trinitarian and Christological passages as corrupt, then the previously voiced hypotheses become untenable. Similarly to those of Le Clerc, they had utilized Cartesian (or Malebranchian) concepts, in order to think about something like the hypostatical union in a non-anthropomorphic way: the Logos as the idea which God has about his perfections, and about the effects which they are able to create. In this respect, Christ was the “extraordinary manifestation” of God’s abilities and characteristics.

77 Aubert de Versé 1687, Tombeau, p. 179: “Et pour vous faire mieux comprendre ma pensée, & ou je veux venir, souvenez vous de ce que nos derniers & plus fameux Critiques nous ont fait remarquer, scâvoir que par tout ou les premiers auteurs & défenseurs de la divinité éternelle de J.C. ont pû ôter le nom sacré & auguste de Jesus, ou de Christ, & y mettre celuy de Dieu, & tout au contraire par tout où ils ont pû ôter le mot de Dieu pour y mettre celuy de Christ afin d’y faire nécessairement envisager J.C. comme Dieu, ils l’ont fait.”

78 Aubert de Versé 1687, Tombeau, p. 189: “Quel artifice, quelle ruse, quelle profondeur de l’ennemy du genre humain d’avoir scû par le Changement d’un seul mot introduire une erreur si funeste & si mortelle à la religion!”

79 Aubert de Versé 1687, Tombeau, p. 99f: “Au commencement et avant toutes choses le dessein de Dieu de se manifester au dehors, et de decouvrir ses divines perfections suivant l’idée et la pensee qu’il en avoit formée, subsistoit en luy même, et c’étoit Dieu même, mais consideré comme ayant resolu de se faire connoitre. Toutes choses ont été faites sur le plan de ce projet, et voilà comme Dieu s’est decouvert et manifesté d’abord ou au commencement. Mais cela n’a rien été en comparaison de cette revelation et de cette manifestation extraordinaire de ses vertuz et de ses proprietez faite en Jesus Christ, quoyqu’il ait été d’abord un homme mortel comme nous. Car Dieu s’est si sensiblement et si visiblement manifesté aux hommes en sa personne tout fragile et mortelle qu’elle fust, que l’on peut dire que Dieu même étoit devenu chair, tant cet homme representoit les traits et les Caracteres de la divinité.”
Now, since the thesis from “Basilius” is merely a hypothesis, and not a proof, the “Cartesian” doctrine of the Trinity is not rendered fully obsolete, but only hypothetical—even when radicalized with respect to Le Clerc. The author explains that “if the eternal creation of the Word, his consubstantiality, and equality with the Father, are eternal truths, then they are essential”. In this way, the textual construction of the book represents the tension between two poles: on the one hand the Cartesian-inspired rationalism of some Oratorians, in that the book rationally reconstructs the Trinity, and on the other hand the Antitrinitarian scepticism over the validity of the textual tradition to the Trinity, which stems from Biblical criticism à la Simon and historical criticism à la Sand. These are exactly the poles between which the multiple-convert, Aubert, fluctuated during his entire life.

The *Tombeau du Socinianisme* is certainly not merely a “dialogical” depiction of the tension between rationalism and Biblical criticism, but also camouflage with respect to those orthodox who suspected him, at the head of whom sits Pierre Jurieu. This makes his textual construction twice as confusing. The book was apparently begun as a refutation of the Protestant pacifique of a certain Seigneur de la Guytonnière from the year 1684. However, the name La Guytonnière had been the pseudonym of Aubert, who had written this work himself. In this way, despite all of the initial rhetoric, the seeming refutation also turned out more and more to be a confirmation of the Socinian position of the Protestant pacifique. However, as with Christoph Sand, the creation of the Son before the beginning of time is considered essential, even though the co-eternity of the Son with the Father is not called necessary for the Christian religion. Only this Arian position remains as opposition to the Protestant pacifique.

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80 Aubert de Versé 1687, *Tombeau*, p. 6: “Ma première proposition est que si la generation éternelle du Verbe, la Consubstantialité, & son égalité au Pere étoient des veritez revelées, elles seroient capitales.”

81 Aubert de Versé 1684, *Protestant*.

82 Aubert de Versé 1687, *Tombeau*, p. 4f.: “Je confesse encore avec luy que le dogme de la generation éternelle du Fils de Dieu, precisement comme éternelle, c’est à dire conçue, s’est possible de la concevoir ainsi, sans commencement ni fin, n’est d’aucune necessité dans la Religion Chretienne. Le Saint Esprit ne m’aprend nulle part que Dieu l’a engendré de toute eternité, ni que ce fils n’ayt eu aucun commencement. Puisque ce Fils depend entierement de Dieu son Pere, Dieu assurement l’a engendré quand il luy a plu. Mais pour le dogme de la generation du Fils conçue comme faite avant les siecles, avant la creation de l’Univers, je soutiens qu’il est capital; & je le prouveray plus bas d’une maniere irrefutable a toutes les subtilitez rafinées du Protestant pacifique. J’avoüe
Admittedly, we have before us a case of “Persecution and the Art of Writing” (Leo Strauss\textsuperscript{83}), which was not scarce at this time. It was also put into practice by intellectuals like Pierre Bayle, who in his *Commentaire philosophique* explicitly pronounces himself to be against using reason as the guiding principle in Biblical interpretation, but then implicitly proceeds to do exactly that.\textsuperscript{84} It is a matter for discussion, however, as to whether this art of writing self-contradictorily, for the sake of protecting oneself from persecution, and allowing only the attentive reader to come to the conclusions actually intended, is the same thing as or rather something else like the “Dialogizität” of authors like Bruni, Valla, or Speroni in the Renaissance. This problem is quite tangled, because occasionally both aspects, the recognition of plurality, and the concealing of one’s views, weave seamlessly together. I mean that one should carefully distinguish between the two elements. In his time, the hypothetical “dialogical” constructions of Aubert, as well as his multiple conversions, gave rise only to suspicions of dissimulation and opportunism; his enemies perceived such texts as “dissimulative writings”, but this has hidden and displaced the other possible interpretation, as “hypothetical writings”. There was indeed, from libertine philology to Le Clerc to Aubert, this hypothetical attitude, this acceptance of meanwhile living with the uncertainty brought out by textual criticism. Perhaps we need to dust this hypothetical attitude off, through a sensibility for the pluralistic situation of the Transferprodukt, “New Socinians”.

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{83} Strauss 1952, *Persecution*.
\item \textsuperscript{84} See \textsuperscript{84} See Mc Kenna 2002, *Histories*.
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enfin avec luy que le dogme de la Consubstantialité du Fils, comme l’explique l’Ecole n’est ni necessaire ni fondamental.”
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PART II

FRENCH CONNECTIONS
BETWEEN ALCHEMY AND ANTITRINITARIANISM: NICOLAS BARNAUD
(ca. 1539–1604?)

Didier Kahn, Paris

Although we do not know a great deal about the life of Nicolas Barnaud, it seems, if we trust the dates provided by the best historians, that he was an exact contemporary of Fausto Sozzini (1539–1604). His name is well-known by scholars in two distinct fields of knowledge: alchemy and Protestant polemics. Between 1597 and 1601, Barnaud published, as a matter of fact, five small collections of alchemical treatises, and there is much evidence for his activities in this domain. He has been otherwise considered as the author of four Protestant pamphlets, published between 1573 and 1581 under diverse pseudonyms, including the famous Reveille-matin des François. His antitrinitarian ideas, on the other hand, are far less well-known, though not completely ignored. In the present article, I will do my best to clarify his biography and bibliography, which will provide an opportunity to show a curious example of the occasional links between theology and alchemy.

1. Biography

Nicolas Barnaud, the son of an attorney in Crest (Dauphiné) named Libert Barnaud, was born in this very place in 1539.1 From the preface to one of his works we know that in 1559 he was travelling in Spain.2 Two years later, he was integrated enough into the French Calvinist community to write from Paris, in the name of all the delegates of the reformed Churches of France, to the ministers of the Church of Geneva.3 He was accepted, gratis, together with his son Calec, as burgher of Geneva on April 29, 1567, having been recognized as “cap-

1 Arnaud 1894, Bibliographie, pp. 15–19. Barnaud’s assumed date of birth is derived from his father’s date of marriage, «qui se maria vers 1538 et était mort en 1567» (ibid., p. 15).
2 Barnaud 1599b, Quadriga aurifera, p. 8 («Candido Lectori», dated from July 1599): «Parce Hispane, cujus regnum & vidi; & ante quadraginta annos lustravi […]»
itaine de bonne volonté qui désire faire service, aimant Dieu et cette ville. Toward the end of the year 1567 or the beginning of 1568, he attends, in Lyon, the trial of the false alchemist Jean Des Gallans, sieur de Pézerolles, who was guilty of having deceived the young King Charles IX and his brother. To these meager details we can add that it is very unlikely that Barnaud was among the small number of men who accompanied the Admiral Coligny when he was shot in the arm near the Louvre on August 22, 1572, even if it proved true that Barnaud is the real author of Le Reveille-matin des Français (1573–1574)—I will come back to this point later.

Enrolled at the university of Basle in 1575 (before April 30), he is still in the Rhine city in 1576, where he serves, as demonstrated by a letter written at the beginning of February, as an intermediary between the jurist Basile Amerbach (1535–1591) and the alchemist and paracelsian physician Joseph Du Chesne (1546–1609). He is probably dwelling as soon as these times in the circle of Theodore Zwinger (1533–1588), and it was to Zwinger that he addressed medico-alchemist letters from Zurich and Wert (1582), Bern (1583), Venice and Padua (1586). Toward the end of 1576, we see him as a resident of Pay-

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4 Haag 1877–1888, La France protestante, I, col. 842.
5 Secret 1989, De quelques traités, here p. 323, where is cited the Apologia of Bernard Gilles Penot 1600, p. 168: «Hanc vero historiam Doctori Nicolao Bernardo Delphinti elucidendam relinquo, qui cum dictus Pesseroles a judicibus examinaretur, praesens erat.» On this affair see my article: Kahn 2005, Paracelsisme et alchimie sous le règne de Henri III.
6 In Le Reveille-matin 1574 (p. 48), the person called «l'historiographe» recounts this assassination attempt as follows: «[…] l'Amiral en sortit pour s'en aller disner à son logis, accompagné de douze ou quinze gentilshommes, entre lesquels j'estoy». This detail is original in the Reveille-matin, to the contrary of the rest of the narration, which—like Henri Hauser has shown: Hauser 1912, Les Sources, p. 259—repeats the treatise by Ernestus Varamundus Frisius [F. Hotman?] 1573, De furoribus Gallicis, p. XXIX. But without going into the question of the exact identity of the author of the Reveille-matin here, one would be right in thinking that this detail, far from being necessarily autobiographical, serves mainly the purpose to increase the impression of authenticity produced by the narration of the historiographer. Despite these difficulties, the regretted Michel Simonin (1995) has boldly counted Barnaud in his Charles IX (p. 308), without any doubts or reference, among the «gentilshommes» who accompanied Coligny, as if the fact would be self-evident and perfectly established.
8 Basle, Öffentliche Bibl. der Universität, MS. C. VIa 33, fol. 33°.
9 Basle, Öffentliche Bibl. der Universität, MS. Fr. Gr. I.13, n° 48; MS. Fr. Gr. II.281, n° 13; MS. Fr. Gr. II.5, n° 4; MS. Fr. Gr. II.8, n° 78 and 79.
erne, where he seeks mineral sources, water currents containing “sel, vitriol et alun”, and, in the territories of the lordship of Bern, mines of all kinds of metal, with the license of exploitation for thirty years (a license which he seems not to have utilized). After his journey in Italy (1586), we meet him in Prague where he has continued contact with Guillaume Ancel (ca. 1540?-1615), the ambassador resident of Henry IV, but also with Mikołaj Wolski, one of the advocates of the Habsburgs’ Polish ambitions; he is also close to one of the great patrons of alchemy, Wilhelm Vok von Rosenberg (†1592), one of the most powerful personalities of Bohemia, and a faithful supporter of Emperor Rudolf II, but also well-known for his religious tolerance. As a guest in the house of the astronomer and imperial physician Thaddeus Hájek (1525–1600), he meets his countryman, the physician and alchemist Bernard Gilles Penot. At Vok von Rosenberg’s house he also makes the acquaintance of the Dutch physician Anselme de Boodt (1550–1632), who is on the quest for transmutation, too. Between 1597 and 1599 he is established in Leiden. In 1598, he is in Utrecht, from where he writes, on August 5, to Johannes Heurnius (Jan van Heurne, 1543–1601), a professor of philosophy and medicine in Leiden with an interest in alchemy. In 1601, we meet him as a resident of Gouda. Around 1604 he pays a visit to the Protestant minister Jean Bansilion (1575–1637) in Aigues-Mortes, whom he teaches alchemy; then he returns to Crest; he is nearly excommunicated on the occasion of the synod of the Dauphiné in 1604. He sells his house in June, writes his will in favor of his wife Anne Ollivier, and probably dies shortly thereafter.

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13 As shown by his forewords and dedicatory letters of 1597 and 1599, which both are dated from Leiden.
15 It is from Gouda, «e museolo nostro chemico», that all his dedicatory letters of 1601 are dated.
16 If we can believe an anti-Protestant pamphlet in this point, *Le Magot genevois* (1612). See the text below, already cited in my article: Kahn 2000, *Une recette*, p. 185, n. 33.
Barnaud’s authentic and alleged literary activities revolve around three poles: alchemy, theology, and, perhaps, Calvinist polemics.

Let us begin with his five alchemical collections. In the first of them, Barnaud presents an alchemical interpretation of his own of the “Bologna enigma”, a mysterious epitaph discovered on a marble block which begins with the words “Ælia Lælia Crispis”, that had raised the curiosity of many scholars before him, out of the field of alchemy. In the rest of the work, Barnaud edits five “proceedings” (processus), brief alchemical texts of obscure origin. The strangest among them is an alchemical mass by Melchior of Sibiu (†1531), a curious specimen of religious alchemy from the very beginning of the sixteenth century. I will return to this text below. Two years later (1599), Barnaud publishes in quick succession his second and third collections, in which we notably find—besides his interesting yet barely-studied dedicatory epistles—Latin translations, partly by himself, of English and German fifteenth-century alchemical treatises. Finally, after two more years (1601), his last two works look rather like appendices to the preceding ones; their value resides not so much in the anonymous, fragmentary, brief and obscure texts which are edited in them, as in the prefaces and political dedications which make them real propaganda pamphlets, at the same time Calvinist, alchemical, and quasi-millenarian.

Beginning with his 1599 Quadriga aurifera, Barnaud had shown himself anxious, in the interest “non seulement [de] la France, mais même [de] toute l’Europe”, to watch over the health of Henry IV. He resolved then to elaborate a panacea reliable enough to “préserver durablement”, as he wrote to the ambassador Guillaume Ancel, “la santé d’un si grand roi”. Two years later, without having achieved this aim, he appeals to the community of the French alchemists, publicly exhorting them to follow his example to consecrate their alchemical knowledge to the

19 Cf. n. 12.
20 On this epitaph see Muschitiello 1989, Aelia Laelia. A student of the Catholic University of Louvain (Louvain-la-Neuve), Sébastien Moureau, presently prepares a commented translation of Barnaud’s interpretation in the context of his «mémoire de licence en philologie classique», under the direction of Prof. Anne Tihon (Institut orientaliste) and myself.
21 Barnaud 1599a, Triga Chemica; Barnaud 1599b, Quadriga aurifera.
22 Barnaud 1601a, Tractatulus chemicus; Barnaud 1601b, De Occulta Philosophia.
service of the most Christian King, the restorer of the freedom of conscience and of public and religious peace: “Comme il favorisera cet art divin!” Barnaud exclaims. “Combien de ressources enfouies il libérera! Que de choses royales et remarquables il entreprendra de jour en jour à la gloire de Dieu! Enfin (et je sais ce que j’annonce) que de paix, de splendeur et—ce qui est le plus haut—que de piété viendra de par toute la terre sous son règne!”

And in a second open letter, addressed, two months later, to the alchemists of the United Provinces, he invites them to offer the same services to Maurice of Nassau as their French colleagues should render to Henry IV. It was about eternalizing the golden age which had been recently instituted thanks to these two princes, a golden age of peace and of religious freedom. “Ce sera l’Aumône chrétienne”, Barnaud concluded, “dont jamais la pareille ne fut accordée depuis la fondation du monde, et dont profiteront tant de myriades d’âmes!” This dream of Barnaud seems to prefigure the “Christian unions” about which, barely fifteen years later, the advocates of the brotherhood of the Rosy Cross dreamed.

What should we think, now, about Barnaud’s activities as a pamphleteer?

As I said earlier: four works of Protestant polemic are often attributed to him: *Le Reveille-matin des Français* (1573–1574), *Le Cabinet du roy de France* (1581), *Le Secret des thésors de France* (1581) and *Le Miroir des Français* (1581). But these attributions are quite recent, and interdependent; it seems possible to show that if the attribution of the *Reveille-matin* falls down, the others will collapse with it. Now, in *Le Reveille-matin*, there is, as the brothers Haag write with good reason, “pas un seul
mot qui puisse faire soupçonner un écrivain adonné à la médecine et encore moins à l’alchimie, tandis que le jurisconsulte ou le théologien s’y montre dans une foule d’endroits”.

Moreover, the opinion of the brothers Haag, who had an obvious penchant for the authorship of jurist Hugues Doneau (thus conforming to the earliest known testimony, that is, with Cujas’s from 1575), seems most reasonable: the better acquainted one becomes with the writings published under Barnaud’s name, the more the political pamphlets attributed to him appear alien to his universe. Now, if we eliminate Barnaud, Doneau remains the only candidate, at least, if we trust the contemporary testimonies; however, it is equally admissible to merely consider *Le Reveille-matin* as the work of an unknown author.

3. Barnaud, Socinus and Socinianism

In contrast, there is good evidence for Barnaud’s connections with Fausto Sozzini. These connections, pointed out by Christoph Sandius, were noticed, studied and emphasized by Prosper Marchand, who suggested (perhaps without believing it much) that these relations did not necessarily imply that Barnaud adhered to Socinus’s ideas, but explained why Barnaud could have been charged with Arianism, as we can read in a 1612 pamphlet of Catholic origin, titled *Le Magot genevois*.

In this pamphlet, the author made the following statement, included in an insulting report about the national synod of Privas (1612), destined to discredit the Calvinist party:

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28 Haag (cf. n. 4), I, col. 851. One could object to this with the description of Coligny’s wound, which is written with medical technical terms: «de l’autre balle, il fut blessé au bras gauche pres du carpe, & sortit la balle par l’olecrane» (*Le Reveille-matin*, ed. of 1574, Premier dialogue, p. 48). But two technical terms, which may well have been taken from a previous narration, are not enough to justify the attribution of a book of nearly 400 pages. One could also object that Barnaud was not the only one who both conducted an alchemical quest and acted at the same time as a Calvinist pamphleteer: François Hotman did this as well (on him, see my Ph.D. thesis). But Hotman was one of the leading jurists of his time, which Barnaud was not (he not even possessed, so it seems, the title of a doctor of medicine, for, if he had, he never would have omitted to make it appear on the title pages of his works).

29 This hypothesis is accepted e.g. by Skinner 1978, *The Foundations*, II, 3, chap. 9 (French translation *Les Fondements*, p. 764, n. 2).


“Il falut en fin juger l'affaire de Bansillon contre lequel le Capitaine Gautier Gouverneur de Peccais avoit escript au Synode des lettres par lesquelles il l’accusoit d’avoir affronté de quatre mil escus un Medecin Papiste de Lion nommé Richardson, luy vendant une recepte pour la ter-recture des Metaux, laquelle estoit fausse: Item de travailler tout les jours à l’alchimie, empoisonner plusieurs personnes par ses sublimez, antimoines & autres drogues venimeuses, faire mesme la fausse mon-nyce: mestiers qu’il auroit appris d’un Medecin dict Barnaud, lequel il avoit retiré en sa maison, nonobstant qu’il fust excommunié pour estre convaincu d’Arrianisme, & avoir faict un livre abominable, duquel le tiltre seul faisoit dresser les cheveux de la teste, l’ayant intitulé, De rebus [sic] orbis impostoribus, Mose, christo & Mahumede.”

Various testimonies appear to indicate that Bansillon really was guilty of such action. Blaming everything on Barnaud is certainly an exaggeration, but this is typical of the kind of accusations alchemists have always been exposed to. Above all, we have to make a note of the accusation of “Arianism”, unwittingly amplified by the carelessness of the author of the *Magot genevois*, who, hastening to discredit Barnaud as well as any other member of the Reformed Church he evokes, obviously confuses the negation of the trinitarian dogma with the atheist myth of the *Traité des trois imposteurs*. This leads Prosper Marchand to refute him as “manifestement contradictoire, vû l’opposition formelle d’Arianisme & d’Incroyabilité”.

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32 *Sic* (for «teinture»).
34 See indeed an extract of the official acts of the synod in question (which took place at Privas from May 23 to July 4, 1612), which sheds some light on and confirms the text of the *Magot genevois*: « Le sieur Gautier s’étant porté pour Apellant, par des Lettres renduës à cette Assemblée, par le Capitaine Pascal, du Jugement rendu au Synode de Bagnols, pretendant qu’il n’a pas censuré assés fortement le sieur Bensillon Pasteur d’Aiguemortes, attendu ce qui paroissoit de ses fautes; La Compagnie a jugé ledit Synodeigne de Reprimande pour avoir trop doucement censuré ledit Sieur Bensillon, lequel pour ce sujet, & ensemble pour ce qui s’est passé devant cette Compagnie, où il a nié très-expressément ce qu’il a depuis avoûé, en donnant de bons Témoignages de sa Repentance, est suspendu de son Ministere pour trois Mois seulement » (Aymon 1710, *Tous les Synodes*, I, 2nd part, p. 412). Note that in the writings of some of the numerous adversaries of Bansillon (himself being a fiery controversist, especially in his quarrels with the fathers Coton and Richeome), the accusation to be an adept of alchemy and to abuse others by this activity is frequent (Haag 1877–1888, *La France protestante*, 2nd ed., I, col. 744–751, esp. 744 and 749).
36 Marchand (cf. n. 31), I, p. 85a–b, Rem. (E).
What, then, were Barnaud’s ties with Socinus? Marchand points out two:

“Fauste Socin [...] lui dédia ou adressa sa Defensio Disputationis sue de Loco VII. Capitis Epistolae ad Romanos, sub Nomi Prosperi Dysidei, ante annos 12 ab se editæ, adversus Reprehensiones N.N. Ministri (ut vocant) Evangelici nuper scriptas, & ab Amico (Barnaudo) ad se missas, anno a Christo nato 1595: imprimée, ou réimprimée, Racovie, typis Sebastiani Sternacii, anno 1618, in 8°, 118. pagg. Voici pour preuve l’Inscription de cette Dédicace, Faustus Socinus ad Nicolaum Barnaudum, Medicum ac Philosophe prætantissime, ... Disputationem meam adversus Amici tui cujus ad me [scriptum] miseræs, Reprehensiones ... [Vale quam optime & quam diutissime in Christo Jesu. Cracoviae.]37 Absoluta est hæc Defensio die 14. Novembris 1595.

Pour peu qu’on connoisse le monde & sa manière indiscrète & précipitée de juger de tout par les apparences extérieures, on ne sait que trop, qu’en voilà plus qu’il n’en faut pour croire un Homme Socinien ou nouvel Arien, comme d’autres s’expliquent: & ce faux & téméraire jugement, une fois conçu, n’a pu que s’accroître, chez de pareilles Gens, par ce que je vais ajouter.

En effet, Barnaud avait déjà traduit en François un Ouvrage du même Socin, que Sandius nous propose sous ce titre, le Livre de l’Autorité de la Sainte Escriture, traduit par Nicolas Barnaud, Gentilhomme Dauphinois, avec l’Advertisement de Messieurs les Théologiens de Basle sur quelques endroits du dit Escrit; & l’avait fait imprimer dès 1592. C. Vorstius, dans une Préface, que je citerai ci-dessous, & Bayle probablement d’après lui, disent que ce fut anonymement. Le premier original de cette traduction avoit été composé en Italien par F. Socin, vers l’an 1570, pour l’instruction d’un grand Seigneur de cette nation, & publié ainsi sans nom d’Auteur.”38

The work Socinus addressed to Barnaud in 1595 deserves a closer examination, for Barnaud’s implication proves more profound than was stated by Marchand. Here is what Socinus wrote to “Nicolas Barnaud, excellent médecin et philosophe”:

“Being unwilling and unable to dismiss your insistent and repeated requests, each time that my ceaseless occupations leave me some rare free hours, I undertake to respond to the treatise you sent me, which is against my Disputation about a passage of chapter seven of the Epistle to the Romans, edited a long time ago under the name Prosperus Dysideus. That is, I will say enough to defend my words against the attacks of this

37 Prosper Marchand has omitted the words between brackets. I have supplemented for the sake of precision, according to Socinus’s text (cf. n. 39), pp. 117–118.
38 Ibid., I, pp. 85–86, Rem. (E).
writing. May the author of this treatise find my work good enough, [...] and may he practice and show in this case the modesty and piety which I know that he has, from the letters you have written to me.”

This is not simply, then, a matter of a dedication from Socinus to a friend who had provided him with a controversial writing; we see here that Barnaud, a quite close friend of Socinus, had repeatedly pressed him to defend his work against a detractor: he did not play the role of intermediary but of instigator, taking sides in this theologic quarrel.

The second example given by Prosper Marchand is no less significant, yet more embarrassing: I have not succeeded in finding a single copy of the French version of Socinus’s *De Sacre Scripturæ auctoritate* which is attributed to Barnaud. The attribution of this translation to Barnaud appeared quite late: it does not appear in the reedition of Socinus’s treatise (1611) procured by Conrad Vorstius, in which Vorstius, yet, makes the first mention of this French version. We must wait for

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39 Socinus 1618, *Fausti Socini Senensis Defensio Disputationis Suae*, pp. 3–4: «Precibus tuis & accuratis & repetitis deesse cum nec velim, nec possim; ut primum mihi ab aliis perpetuis meiosis occupationibus aliquot vacue sunt, ad scriptum quod ad me transmisisti, contra disputationem meam de loco 7. cap. epist. ad Rom. sub nomine Prosperi Dysidei jam diu editam, aliquid respondere aggrederi; quantum, videlicet, satis esse possit ad verba mea ab istius scripti impugnationibus defendenda. Utinam ipsi scripti auctor hunc meum laborem, qualiscumque is fuerit, boni consulat [...]. hacque in re eam modestiam ac pietatem servet, atque ostendat, qua illum praeditum esse, ex tuis ad me litteris cognovi.» A few lines later, Socinus refers again (p. 4) to the insistence with which Barnaud had urged him to respond to his opponent: «Libens nihilominus tuis precibus sum obsecutus, sperans hanc defendension meam quidquid ipse scripti auctor de ea sit sensurus, plerisque divinæ veritatis solidaeque pietatis studiose non inutilem futuram.»


41 *De Auctoritate S. Scripturae: Opusculum his temporibus nostris utilissimum: Quemadmodum*
Sandius to see its association with Barnaud. This is not enough to cast a doubt upon this attribution: Sandius had access to many manuscripts, to information which would have been lost without him. What is lacking, above all, is a copy of this French version. However, the very fact that Sandius attributed it to Barnaud sufficiently demonstrates the part the latter played among Socinus’s friends. We must add, moreover, to these elements a detail which had escaped Prosper Marchand: Sandius also mentions a letter, apparently lost now, addressed to Barnaud in 1603 by an eminent member of the antitrinitarian movement, Christoph Ostorodt. Since Sandius drew on a letter (which has come down to us) from Socinus to Valentin Radeck, it can be verified that there was an entire correspondence between Barnaud and Ostorodt which was circulating among Socinus and his friends:

“J’aimerais que tu rendes très ponctuellement son salut à M. Ostorodt de ma part; je lui envoie des lettres de M. Barnaud reçues il n’y a guère de temps, par lesquelles il répond à celles qu’il lui a écrites. Elles lui seront, j’espère, très agréables, d’autant que, si je ne me trompe, elles contiennent des remèdes pour sa si pénible maladie, dont je prie Dieu très ardemment qu’il soit enfin délivré […] au moins pour une grande part.”

The fact that part of this correspondence was of a medical nature does not at all exclude the possibility that Barnaud was also able to exchange
theological opinions, as is well demonstrated, in 1595, by the example of Socinus himself. So Barnaud appears as a person familiar with the whole Polish antitrinitarian group. Thus we can see clearly that the accusations of the Magot genevois were not made randomly. Would there any doubt remain about the origin of these accusations, it would be sufficient to refer to an extract of the provincial synod of Die (June 15, 1604): the company had been warned, we read, that there was in Crest a certain Nicolas Barnaud, a physician, who spread

“de tout son pouvoir plusieurs horribles heresies, a esté trouvé bon que quelques-uns soient depputez pour fere extrait de ses blasphemes et y joindre responce; que s’il recognoit ses fautes, il fasse imprimer les adveux de ses erreurs, sinon que l’église de Crest appelle deux ou trois pasteurs lesquels procederont à l’excommunication et retranchement d’un membre pourri, afin que l’église de Crest soit deschargée d’une telle peste.”

Taking into account what we know about Barnaud, it is difficult to see in these “horrible heresies” anything but his antitrinitarian ideas. And one must have this entire dossier in mind while turning to the most curious of Barnaud’s publications: his edition of the alchemical mass by Melchior of Sibiu.

4. Barnaud and the Edition of Melchior’s Alchemical Mass

Little is known about this Melchior, court chaplain to the Hungarian kings, convicted of false coining by Emperor Ferdinand I in 1531, who addressed his mass to the Hungarian King Władislaw II (who died in 1516, which allows an approximate dating of the text). It is one of the most unique texts of alchemical literature, deserving a critical edi-

[Palatinat of Cracow], November 23, 1603): «D. Ostorodum diligentissime meis verbis resalutes velim, ad quem mitto literas D. Bernaudi non ita pridem acceptas, quibus respondet iis quas ad ipsum scripti. Erunt, spero, illi gratissimæ, præsertim, cum, nisi fallor, in illis inclusa sint medicamenta pro ejus tam difficili morbo, a quo ut aliquando, quemadmodum spero habere coeperamus, magna solum ex parte liberetur, Deum ardentissime oro.»

45 J. Brun-Durand (cf. n. 18), I, p. 68a, already cited in a modernized form by E. Arnaud (cf. n. 17), pp. 41–42.

tion and an in-depth study. Barnaud’s edition was the first, but not the only one: soon afterwards the text was edited by the Paracelsian Benedictus Figulus, one of the foremost personalities of early modern alchemical and Paracelsian spirituality. There are also extant a Latin manuscript, written in 1588 or 1589 by the book and manuscript collector Karl Widemann, a confidant of Figulus, as well as a Hungarian manuscript which I have not been able to consult, and one cannot exclude the possibility that more manuscripts are extant in various Central European libraries. It is interesting to know that this mass was transmitted by men like Figulus and Widemann, because both were partisans of a spirituality strongly inspired by Paracelsus, a proponent of an interior church, radically aloof from all dogmatism, to which was added a sort of “magical Christianity” based on the reactivation, by means of meditation and prayer, of the divine seed infused by the creative Word in every believer. It thus becomes easier to situate these two personalities in relation to Barnaud’s own spirituality.

Each of these three versions of the mass (by Barnaud, Widemann, and Figulus) is characterized by diverse variants, indicating that Barnaud’s and Figulus’s were “arranged” (Figulus’s clearly in an even more alchemical sense). One of these variants is particularly significant: in the version edited by Barnaud, the “Preface” by the end of the mass is omitted. In the other two versions it appears, written in black and white:

“Præfatio. De sancta Trinitate dicitur.”

Hence, through the elimination of a phrase that neither Figulus nor Widemann had any reason to reject, Melchior’s alchemical mass, edited by Barnaud, tacitly turns antitrinitarian. And it was not Widemann’s version, which was never printed, nor Figulus’s, but Barnaud’s, which

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47 This will be the main subject of my forthcoming article cited supra, n. 27.
48 Barnaud, Commentariolum (cf. n. 12), pp. 37–41: Addam et Processum sub forma Missæ, a Nicolao Melchiori, Cibinensi, Transsilvano, ad Ladislaum Ungarie, & Bohemie Regem olim missum.
transmitted, thanks to its reedition in the *Theatrum Chemicum*, a mass revised and corrected by antitrinitarian hands, although it went unnoticed by anybody—including C.G. Jung. One can just wonder what an alchemist like Heinrich Khunrath would have said if he had been aware of that, for in his *Amphitheatrum Sapientiae Æternae, solius verae* [...] *Tertrium, Catholicon* (1595, 2nd ed. 1609), he not only used extensively the symbolism of the Trinity, but assumed that the “science of fire” itself provided “an irrefutable argument, macro- and microcosmically extracted out of the Book of Nature, against all Antitrinitarians.”

*(Translated from the French by Robert Folger)*

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53 That is, the Paracelsian alchemy, according to which the philosophers’ stone, although homogeneous, contained in itself the three principles of all things: salt, sulphur and mercury.

54 Khunrath 1609, *Amphitheatrum*, Annot. 156.


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PART III

ARMINIANISM AND RELIGIOUS PLURALITY
This paper takes up the theme of Hugo Grotius, and his early works as a theologian. Grotius was born in 1583, and died in 1645, at the age of 62. He is best known as a jurist and statesman. It was exactly in his work as *advocaat-fiscaal* for the States of Holland that he had to take up the theological debate of predestination, as understood within the frame of the Arminian debates. In this paper I would like to address two works of Grotius, which developed out of the concern of this statesman for the unity of the community. These two works are the *Meletius* from 1611, and the *Ordinum Pietas* from 1613. I would like first to demonstrate Grotius’ theological position using the arguments in the train of thought of the *Meletius*. I would then like to build on this theological basis by using *Ordinum Pietas* to explain how Grotius defended the teaching of the Remonstrants as not heretical against the charges of the Orthodox. In connection to the interpretation of each text, I would like to reflect shortly upon the relationship of our notions of pluralization and authority to Grotius’ theological comments.

By the term pluralization I understand the increase of representations of reality that are known and relevant to a cultural field, and, beyond that, the emergence of ‘new’, or rather alternative, knowledge and the origination of competitive parts of reality. Authority refers to different forms of normative claims. Among these come instances of political and religious power, which are able to execute their statutes, in the same way that processes of canonization, as well as all informal claims of validity, are already inherent in the Latin notion of *auctoritas*. Authority functions as power of validity, which drives and legitimates decision-making. Authority is not only the counter to processes of pluralization, which it brings under control, but it can also drive out contradiction and thereby open new space for liberty.
1. Meletius

Let us first turn to the *Meletius*. This early work of Grotius was first rediscovered in 1984 by Posthumus Meyjes, and edited with a commentary in 1988. Therefore the existing endeavors to portray Grotius’ theology—a 1904 work by Krogh-Tonning,¹ a 1919 work by Schlüter,² and a 1956 dissertation by Haentjens³—did not take the *Meletius* into account. Grotius composed this work in the summer of 1611, at the age of 28. At this time, he was *advocaat-fiscaal* for the states of Holland, and in this capacity he was often occupied with the theological disputes between the Remonstrants and the counter-Remonstrants. He was aware of the potential danger, whereby the split over the question of faith might also begin to rock the unity of the state.⁴ This concern found expression in the introduction to the *Meletius* where he opposed his university friend Johannes Boreel, and argued that the original Christian unity was destroyed and an alienation occurred which even led to war; a reaction to the truce with Spain which had been reached three years earlier.⁵ At the same time, he also argued that Christians are especially obliged to be unified in light of the commandments of their founder, Jesus Christ. He further postulated, however, that the most important aspects of Christianity remain those things which are believed by all. With this emphasis, the split and conflict would be surmountable. To support this argument, Grotius summoned Meletius Pegas (1549–1601), a patriarch of the Eastern Church, whose efforts for a unified church were at that time widely known in Holland. As was reported to Grotius by the eyewitness Boreel,⁶ Pegas’ arguments always emphasized the commonality of all Christians, and would even include the best teachings of all of the philosophical schools and of all nations. Grotius set himself the goal of showing this commonality.⁷ We should

¹ Krogh-Tonning 1904, *Hugo Grotius.*
² Schlüter 1919, *Theologie.*
³ Haentjens 1946, *Huigh de Groot.*
⁴ For the dating of the *Meletius* and the political and religious background cf. Posthumus Meyjes 1988, *Introduction.*
⁵ Grotius 1988, *Meletius*, §2, introductio, ll. 23–26, p. 75: *Non enim frigus animorum nec simultates modo, sed odia iraeque implacabiles et, quod vix ante auditum, bella haud alio magis obtentu sumta, quam religionis eius, cuius propositionem pax est.*
⁷ Grotius 1988, *Meletius*, §5, introductio, ll. 66–72, p. 76: *Urgebat autem praecipue τὰ τοῖς χριστιανοῖς ὡμολογημένα (ea de quibus inter Christianos consentitur), quae et plura esse dicebat et maioris multo momenti quam vulgo putarentur, una opera ostendens*
note that he selected the title of this work, the *Meletius*, fully knowing
that the name also played on the Greek verb μελετάω—to take care of,
to see to. In addition to being alluded to through the choice of Meletius’
name, Grotius’ concern, and surely also that of the Patriarch, namely
the concern for the unity of the Church, is further emphasized, above
all in light of the subtitle: *de iis quae inter Christianos conveniunt epistola*.

The body of the *Meletius* is arranged into four chapters. In the first he
designates Christianity as a religion, and in the second he describes the
goal of religion generally. In the third and fourth chapters he explains
Christianity with respect to its doctrine and its ethical regulations,
respectively.

Contrary to expectations, Grotius does not begin the explanation
of the commonality of all Christians with a confession of faith in
which all Christians could confess, but rather orients his argument
around a concept of religion based on Hebrews 11:6. This concept is
comprised of a belief in the existence of God, and that God rewards all
those who strive after Him. Based upon this supposition, his argument
should be true for believers of all religions, not just for Christians. He
thought that the existence of God was sufficiently shown through the
traditional proofs, and that the properties of God as a rewarer are
verified by defining God as a rational legislator with a free will, who
provides commandments to mankind, which is likewise rational and
possesses a free will. God attempts to affect the observance of these
commandments through future rewards. Grotius regarded this as the
common element of all religions. Under this definition he understood
the true, as well as the untrue, religions, including less perfect religions
such as Judaism and paganism, to be included in his description of
natural religions.

After this proof of religion, Grotius outlines the goal of religion. For
Christianity he defines this goal as the enjoyment of God as the highest

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esse in iis quaecunque in ulla philosophorum schola aut populorum institutis optima
haberentur, et praeter haec propria multa coeteris omnibus incognita, quae ille quidem
singulare facundia ornabat, nos autem qua possimus diligentia persequemur.

quae ad Hebraeos apostolus commemorat, ut credatur esse Deus, deinde remunerari
eos, qui ipsi placere studeant.

communia habet christianae religio et cum falsis omnibus, et cum veris quidem, sed
minus perfectis, qualis est primum naturalis religio, inde mosaica.
good. He locates the instrument of this enjoyment in the intellect, under which all other parts of the body must be subjugated. However, because the enjoyment of God is both an act for the whole human being, and necessitated by the absence of evil, he concludes that there is a life after death with a resurrection of the body. In everlasting life in the enjoyment of God, he further sees as included everything which pagan philosophy defines as the highest good.

Next, Grotius develops the content of religion. He divides this into theoretical and practical components. Before he progresses to the elucidation of the theoretical component, he points out that doctrine and dogma are only elements of a *scientia activa* insofar as they motivate and dictate what is to be done.\(^\text{10}\) This orientation of theory towards practice is an element that can consistently be found in Grotius’ writings.

The theoretical content of religion is organized by Grotius in the following way: First he deals with God in relationship to Himself, and then God’s relationship with His creation, before turning to mankind and describing both how mankind was created by God, and how it exists in the world. Afterwards he concludes with some comments about the forgiveness of sins and the restoration of man.

In his doctrine of God, Grotius establishes the uniqueness and unity of God, in addition to God’s infiniteness and goodness. Even though he avoids the term itself, the Trinity was formulated as far back as Plato and Aristotle, and comprehensible through analogies with the human mind and the sun. These explanations of dogma based on reason are therefore possible, because Grotius could follow early Christian apologetics and tie directly into ancient philosophy without any problems. On later occasions he would additionally indicate that the revelation of God in Scripture must also have been known, more or less, to the Greeks.\(^\text{11}\) He is convinced that revelation is the continuation, confirmation, and correction of that which can be known through reason, as represented by the philosophers and the poets.\(^\text{12}\) The agreement

\(^{10}\) Grotius 1988, *Meletius*, §19, cap. III, ll. 6–9, p. 80: Decreta in omni scientia activa nec extra rem esse debent nec supervacua, sed quae aut ad agendum incitent aut quid agendum sit et quomodo, aliquatenus praemonstrent.


\(^{12}\) Grotius 1988, *Prolegomena*, p. 168: Sicut ergo a poetis ad philosophos, hoc est ad Prophetas et Apostolos, nobis provocandum est; atque ea demum dicta rata habenda quae in hoc auditorio stare possunt.
with a verifiable fact is made all the easier by the existence of Scripture.\footnote{Grotius 1988, \textit{Meletius}, §61, cap. IV, ll. 32–34, p. 93: Et credere quidem Deo difficile sane est aliis quid Deus dicat nescientibus; Christianis ipsam Dei vocem asservantibus id facile est …} With Grotius, this harmonious proportion between reason and revelation had its foundations in the conviction that the world itself is rationally structured. It is beyond the scope of this paper to determine what role the appeal to \textit{prisca sapientia} played in Grotius’ collected works. However, this is an important question for future work.

We now turn back to Grotius’ doctrine of God, which he concludes with the unique properties of being omnipotent and omniscient. The reasons for which these are necessary elements of dogma for a doctrine of God are supplied by Grotius himself: “God should be wondered at because of his perfection, honored because of his wisdom, and loved because of his goodness.”\footnote{Grotius 1988, \textit{Meletius}, §25, cap. III, ll. 84–87, p. 82: Omnia autem quae de Deo dicta sunt in unum collecta hoc efficiunt, ut ipsum ob naturam perfectissimam admirari, ob mentem sapientissimam honorare, ob bonitatem denote eximiam amare ante omnia debeamus.} Through this formulation, the ethical expression of Grotius’ dogma is made so much the clearer. Additionally, the doctrine that God is the creator and active guide of the world is structured around the ethic that these things bring honor to God and contribute to religiousness. It is conspicuous here how Grotius incorporates the philosophical authority of Plato and Aristotle. Aristotle’s statement that the world is eternal is combined with Plato’s teachings regarding the birth of the world, so that neither Aristotle, who taught that the world is not born, nor Plato, who denied the eternity of the world, are completely wrong. Grotius sees the result of this to be that the world was made,\footnote{Grotius 1988, \textit{Meletius}, §26, cap. III, ll. 93–97, p. 82: Cum igitur Plato genitum vult mundum, Aristoteles aeternum, errant sane, at ipsorum argumenta hoc ipsum probant, quod Christiani credimus. Nam et Plato recte colligit coepisse aliquando mundum, nec minus recte Aristoteles non esse genitum; sequitur ergo ut factus sit.} and that mankind is its final cause.

As the cornerstone of his doctrine of mankind, as it results from God’s creation thereof, Grotius specifies the composition out of body and soul, the freedom of the will, dominion over the world, and mankind’s creation in God’s image, all of which he also recognized to be present in ancient philosophy. He circumscribes mankind’s role in the world with the worship of God, which consists of loving, admiring, and fearing Him, wishing to please Him, fearing not to please Him,
and hating everything which is contrary to His commandments. Here again, we see clearly the orientation towards the ethical. Since in Grotius’ thought the consanguinity of all people with each other is one of the pillars of his ethics, this system is also supported by the doctrine that all mankind is descended from a single source, namely, Adam.

Grotius contrasts this notion of the way mankind is intended to be, with that of the way it actually is in the world. This practical situation is taken as the hallmark of ungratefulness toward God, and of hate and conflict amongst people. Consequently, since everything which is not absolutely good is designated by Grotius as evil, no human action can be seen as good. Grotius further sees this as verified by the well-recognized human history of falling into temptation. God would not allow such a life for mankind if he did not already consider them guilty, since the human being is enslaved through sin and earns the damnation. As a result God withdraws his help from mankind since they have abandoned Him. The evil is then continued through inheritance, education, and by example. Grotius calls these doctrines the most salutary, since they also bring mankind humility, wherein they are distinguished from virtually all philosophical teachings. The Pharisees and—though he does not call them by name—the Pelagians, who do not concede such strength to sin, are seen by Grotius to be refuted through this doctrine. Out of this situation of mankind, namely that we are fallen to punishment, there must, for Grotius, be a path to the forgiveness of sins and the restoration of mankind, since in his eyes, a human being who will be punished cannot rest his hopes on a reward. From this, Grotius concludes that without the necessity of forgiveness and restoration, religion would be meaningless, and that the goal of

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16 Grotius 1988, Meletius, §33, cap. III, ll. 166–170, p. 84: Colere autem Deum haec omnia complectitur: ipsum amare, admirari, vereri, cupere ipsi placere, timere ne displiceas, odisse quae ipsius legi sunt contraria; quae omnia, cum παθων sint nomina, hoc ipsum quod ante dictum est probant, non debere ea ex homine evelli.


mankind—which is the worship of God—would be missing. That the forgiveness of sins is a characteristic of Christianity is a belief that Grotius shares with Zosimos, a non-Christian witness who is above suspicion.

Grotius subsequently inquires as to what this belief is grounded in. He presupposes that it was revealed by God, since otherwise mankind would never have been able to attain it. Through the history of religion, certainly some had come close to the truth. Grotius thinks that these cases are seen in the practice of human sacrifice, which could not, however, bring atonement, and in the faith in a mediator between God and man. From Porphyrius he was aware of the discussions regarding a fatherly spirit for the redemption of ignorance. Similar to the doctrine of the Trinity he also sees here a continuation and completion of what was already known through reason. For him the God-man is given as a mediator, who atones for mankind through the shedding of his blood; he is God in the fact that he can make life, and man in that he can die. With respect to its utility, Grotius judged this doctrine of the atoning death of the God-man to be a true assessment of sin, especially in that the sins could only be atoned for through the death of God’s Son, and navigated away from the other side of human despair wherein sins can not at all be atoned for. Even when it could not be explained how Christ was God’s Son, Grotius saw the miracles he performed and the fulfillment of related prophecy as proof, that he was. Now this forgiveness was seen by Grotius to be required from faith and repentance. Repentance is necessary, because otherwise sin goes unpunished. In comparison, the trust in the forgiveness is, in Grotius’ view, the best way to God’s love, since it is the best way to change mankind. So Grotius vehemently stresses a forgiveness as over and above the law, not next to or against it.

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this formulation of Theodoret from Pseudo-Justin. So once again his endeavor to anchor Christian doctrine in ancient philosophy shows up.

Along with the forgiveness of sins, Grotius accentuates the restoration of man. He does this in a threefold manner. First, the cognitive capacity of man through godly revelation in Scripture is re-established. For him, its truth did not only stem from its measured discussion of God nor from its usefulness with respect to moral instruction, but rather from its inner-coherence and its age. To support this, he cites the fact that it also contains the history of time, to which Varro ascribed the term “mythical”. Even the Greeks admit that their letters derive from the Hebrew letters and recognize Moses as the most ancient law-giver. Grotius sees yet another criterion for the truthfulness of Scripture in its style, which is at once straightforward and grandiose, wherein all of God’s revelations are accessible.

As the second element of the restoration of man, Grotius cites the example of Christ, who as a reward for following him promises participation in his glory; a reward which no other religion can offer. However, Grotius also identifies the Holy Spirit as the third remedy of depraved man. He stresses the fact that even pagan philosophers such as Seneca recognized that man can only become good with the help of God. In Grotius’ view, this doctrine ensures the best co-operation between God and mankind, and so acts against despair, and even against arrogance and carelessness.22

Grotius judges all other questions as adiaphora, and as unanswerable, and with that he concludes the section on dogma with respect to mankind.23 That he includes in this category Christology and Soteriology is explainable by his aforementioned, so-called, derivation of the truth of Christianity from all available reason.

Grotius ties the treatment of dogma together with the description of Christianity with respect to its ethical instruction. He subdivides this

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22 Grotius 1988, Meletius, §57, cap. III, ll. 464–468, p. 91: Unde factum est, ut homines minus serio a Deo expeterent id quod ipsis maxime erat necessarium, at christiana religio saluberrima moderatione Deo solidam laudem hominis reparati, ita tamen ut non sentiat invitus quemquam bonum fieri, sed volentem.

into duties: duty to God, duty to mankind, duty to the community, and duty to oneself. At this point, we will not go into the Christian doctrine of virtue, which Grotius proceeds to outline, since for our concerns of grounding pluralization in authority, Grotius’ positions on dogmatic questions are more relevant.

In the epilogue, Grotius falls back once again on the figure of Meletius, the Patriarch. As reason for the fact that, despite so many agreements, there are always conflicts amongst Christians, he argues that dogma is made out to be the most important aspect of religion, when really dogma should only serve ethics. He warrants this with the fact that human beings would rather struggle with each other than with themselves, which is what ethics demands. When, on the other hand, ethical rules are argued about, then it is mostly about less important questions which each person should decide for themselves. As a negative example, Grotius cites the Spartans and Athenians, who went to war in order to force their own political systems on other states. He sees a similar case with Christians and the calendrical date of Easter. In Grotius’ view, however, Irenaeus of Lyon rightly pointed out that because of differing opinions in such cases the unity of Church will not be negatively affected. Many quarrels are only the result of semantic confusion anyway; if such problems were resolved, then consensus would return. In future quarrels regarding ethical matters, one should be careful only to address necessary concerns.

As a cure for this illness, Grotius recommends the reduction of necessary articles of faith to those, which are self-evident. Research which deals with this should take Christian love into account, and work under the guidance of the Holy Scripture. In case someone should be mistaken about an important point, Grotius advises that he or she should not be accused of such, but rather that their ignorance should be removed through friendly explanation. Grotius concludes his text, the

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24 Grotius 1988, Meletius, §89, epilogus, ll. 4–8, p. 101: Cuius mali causam inquirens, mihi, inquit, una haec esse videtur maxima, quod praecipit posthabitis, maxima pars religionis circa decreta statuitur, perverse admodum, cum decreta ferme praecipit inserviant et eo ducant.


26 Grotius 1988, Meletius, §90, epilogus, ll. 27–28, p. 102: Siqua est ulterior pugna, videamus, ne sit in rebus scitu non admodum necessariis.

27 Grotius 1988, Meletius, §91, epilogus, ll. 38–44, p. 102: Huic ergo morbo reme-
Meletius, with a long citation of the fifth-century anti-Arian Salvianus, who brought understanding to the heretics and advised against condemning them.

Now, how does Grotius develop the relationship between authority and pluralization in the Meletius? Just by his title selection, Grotius summons an authority, namely, the respected Patriarch Meletius Pegas, whose opinion Grotius professes to be reporting. In this way he steers clear of the reproach that he himself is calling the dogma into question. This is probably best explained by considering the quarrels over the doctrine of predestination. Even in a paper presenting the alleged opinions of Meletius, Grotius continues to fall back on authorities in order to support his own point of view. It is therefore conspicuous that he seldom cites Christian authors, but prioritizes pagan philosophers first. For the most part he emphasizes those who agree with him, however, he also knows to distinguish himself from them when it comes to describing Christianity as superior. On the one hand, he wants to establish that every belief held by all Christians agrees with reason as presented by the philosophers. On the other hand, he chases the goal of elucidating Christianity not just for Christians, but for all believers, and thereby to explain for everyone who finds himself or herself in Grotius’ concept of religion.

The apologetic character of Grotius’ work is clear, even if he does not explicitly call it so. That Grotius has a broad notion of Christianity is shown by the role he allots to the dogmas. For him, they are only important insofar as they justify moral activities. Everything which goes beyond this is, for him, less important, and should only be enjoyed with caution, since the very quarrels which he hopes to resolve came about as a result of an over-emphasis on dogma. Correspondingly, he also suggests a reduction of dogma. Though he does not specifically deal with actual controversial dogmas such as the doctrine of predestination, the way in which he builds up the acquisition of salvation of mankind, such as man believes with the help of God, does indeed strongly resem-
ble the position of the Remonstrants. Through this role which he allots to dogma, it is shown that he openly claims a pluralization of the notion of Christianity.

It is interesting to note how Grotius suppresses the criticism of dogma as stated in the *Meletius* when it comes to his bestseller, *De veritate religionis christianae*. Without here going more precisely into the numerous revisions and enlargements of this work, we can nonetheless suggest one topic to which I will return later in the text. The theoretical support for the criticism of dogma, as he lays it out in the *Meletius*, is missing in *De veritate*. This can probably be explained in that the *Meletius* tries expressly to emphasize those things under which all Christians stand in agreement. Therefore, Grotius needs here also to establish the status and functions of dogma, or rather, why he ignores certain dogmas such as that of predestination, especially just when he addresses fellow Christians. *De veritate*, in contrast, is specifically written as an apologia, as a work meant to represent the basis for the missionizing of the Dutch mariners. Therefore, it is not necessary to determine the role and function of dogmas more precisely, or to explain the absence of certain dogmas. This relationship could be so described *cum grano salis*, that, in the *Meletius*, the theoretical support is provided for that which Grotius in *De veritate* puts into practice—namely, the radical reduction of dogmas.

The transfer of the program of the reduction of dogmas is best explained by using the doctrine of the Trinity as an example. While Grotius makes an effort in the *Meletius* to defend the doctrine of the Trinity as in accordance with reason and Scripture, he does not mention it at all in *De veritate*. We can only speculate as to why this is so. However, it is possible that in *De veritate*, Grotius further widens the concept of Christianity, in that he yet further reduces the number of dogmas. While the Socinians, specifically, could not consider themselves within the framework of Christianity in light of the *Meletius*, they could not have found anything in *De veritate* which contradicted their Trinitarian and Christological formulations.

A further indication that in *De veritate* Grotius also considered the Socinians to be Christians is the fact that for the second and third books...
of *De veritate* he probably utilized Fausto Socini’s *De auctoritate Sacrae Scripturae*. Whether this was done knowingly is left open to question, if not made certain, in that he was not disturbed by the content - namely the proof of the truth of Christianity and the credibility of Scripture.

2. *Ordinum Pietas*

The relationship between Grotius and the Socinianism is also a topic which I would now like to address. It is a topic which Grotius deals with in the second main work mentioned in the introduction, since the occasion which drove the completion of the *Ordinum Pietas* was the accusation that the states of Holland promoted Socinianism. As previously mentioned, here we will deal with how Grotius describes the doctrine of the Remonstrants as not heretical with reference to the authorities. In the full title, *Ordinum Hollandiae ac Westfriesiae pietas ab improbissimis multorum calumniis, præsertim vero a nupera Sibrandi Lubberti epistula quam ad reverendissimum archiepiscopum Cantuariensem scripsit, vindicata per Hugonem Grotium, eorum Ordinum fisci advocatum*, we can see the concrete occasion which led to the writing of the work. That is, Grotius wrote the *Ordinum Pietas* by commission of the states of Holland, for whom he was *advocat-fiscaal*, in order to clear it of the charge of adhering to Socinianism. Sibrandus Lubbertus, a theology professor from Franeker, had accused the states of Holland of having opened the way for the heresy of Socinianism in Holland through the appointment of Conrad Vorstius, whose theological points of view had already been fought over, as theology professor in Steinfurt. Grotius used this opportunity not only to defend the appointment politics of the states of Holland, but also for the justification of its liberal politics of religion. The addressee of Lubbertus’ tract, the Archbishop of Canterbury, is significant as far as the composition of the *Ordinum Pietas* goes, since Grotius had secretly traveled to England in early 1613 under the orders of Oldenbarnevelt, the political leader of the Netherlands, in order to ensure the support of the English King, James I, for the religious politics of the states of Holland. There he had also worked towards the equating of the counter-Remonstrants with the English Puritans. This could have been the reason why, in the third part of the *Ordinum Pietas*, Grotius deals with the relationship between Church and State, wherein he wants to portray the position of the states of Holland as identical to that of the English
plurality and authority in Grotius’ early works

crown. However, I would like to discuss only the second section, in which Grotius defends the religious politics of the states.

So, now we turn to the text itself. After an introduction in which Grotius alleges that his opponent Sibrandus Lubbertus only attacks the states of Holland because of their tolerant stance with regard to the Arminians, he then begins the main arguments as follows:

In this matter, however, the States will easily defend themselves on the authority of the ancient and the more recent Church. This controversy has always given rise to many intricate questions. It has always been indisputable, that two extremes had to be avoided: first, that we do not ascribe the causes of sin to God, or damnation to fatal necessity, second, that we do not trace back the origin of salutary good to powers of our depraved nature. The ancients anxiously avoided the former, even those who had a high opinion of predestination.

Grotius safeguards against this extreme position, which was later described as stoic, with citations from Prosper and Augustine, as well as from the records of the Council of Orange, which aimed at refuting the Pelagians. According to Grotius, these judgements clearly disprove the Manichaeans. Additionally, the early church condemnations of the first view are verified using citations from Sigebert and Gerson.

On the other hand, Grotius designates those extreme positions which are to be avoided in the following way: “Now this Scylla should certainly be dreaded, but no less dangerous is the Charybdis on the other side, such as with Pelagianism or Semi-Pelagianism, to which these dogmas pertain”. Here, Grotius cites some passages from the Councils of Carthage and Orange. With regard to that, he continues:

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Various synods have condemned these errors, of which now those of Milevi (Here, Grotius confuses Milevi with Carthage; FM\textsuperscript{33}) and the latter of Orange are extant. However, Antiquitas in its modesty, did not proceed any further and did not condemn other opinions concerning this matter.

As an example of this, Grotius cites Caelestius, the Bishop of Rome, who, after having outlined the Catholic position, establishes:\textsuperscript{34}

Although we do not venture to despise the more profound and difficult parts of questions that occur, which have been treated more fully by those, who have opposed the heretics (he especially refers to Augustine), nevertheless it is not essential to add them, because we believe that what the writings of the Apostolic See have taught us in accordance with the above-mentioned rules suffices to reveal God’s grace, to whose working and honor nothing should be denied; therefore we judge everything that appears to be contrary to the above notions (the formulation of the Catholic doctrine is meant) altogether not Catholic.

It is made clear by the formulation which authorities’ judgements Grotius recognizes as valid with regard to dogmatic disputes: specifically, the resolutions of the ancient Church Councils, comments from respected Orthodox church fathers, and declarations from the Apostolic See, which, as far as argumentation goes, is certainly quite remarkable for a Protestant.

Now, how does Grotius apply these fundamental ideas, which are, in his eyes, orthodox doctrines, to the current quarrels?\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{33} Cf. Rabbie 1995, Commentary, p. 286.

\textsuperscript{34} Grotius 1995, \textit{Ordinum}, §38, S. 134, Z. 17–23: \textit{profundiores vero difficilioresque partes intercurrentium quaestionum quas latius pertractarunt qui haereticis restiterunt} (Augustinum imprimis indicans) \textit{sicut non audemus contemnere, ita non nesse habemus adstruere, quia ad confitendum gratiam Dei, cuius operi ac dignationi nihil penitus subtrahendum est, satis sufficere credimus quidquid secundum praedictas regulas apostolicae sedis nos scripta docuerunt, ut prorsus non opinemur catholicum quod apparenter praefixis sententiis esse contrarium.}

\textsuperscript{35} Grotius 1995, \textit{Ordinum}, §§39–40, p. 134, ll. 25–34; p. 136, ll. 1–3: \textit{Aptemus haec ad nostras controversias. Duae sunt apud nos de praelocatione et ii quae eo pertinent sententiae; altera est, quam Franciscus Gomarus […] proponit; […]}. Hanc […] sententiam quin tolerabilem iudicet Sibrandus dubium non est, neque nos negamus, dummodo illa Manichaica quae ante posuimus satis vitentur. Altera sententia eorum est, quos nunc remonstrantes ideo vocare coepimus […]. Horum sententiam tolerari Sibrando dolet neque veretur eam Socianismi nomine infamare, quia scilicet Socinus eandem probat; quae consequentia si admititur iam quicumque Deum esse credunt, Christum vera et salutaria docuisses affirmant, erunt Sociniani.
Let us apply this to our controversies. Here there are two opinions on predestination and all that appertains to it. The former is stated by the very learned Franciscus Gomarus, [...] There is no doubt that Sibrandus (that is, the defender of orthodoxy; FM) judges this opinion [...] to be acceptable, nor do we deny it, provided that those Manichaean aspects that we have stated above are sufficiently avoided.

The other opinion is of those whom we have now started to call Remonstrants [...]. Sibrandus regrets that their opinion is tolerated and does not shrink from smearing it with the name of Socinianism, no doubt because Socinus approves of it; if this consequence is admitted, everyone who believes in God and who asserts that Christ’s teaching is true and salutary is a Socinian.

Through these simple conclusions, Grotius had thereby rejected the accusations of Socinianism—at least, at first glance. We should take note of how he differentiates between the person Socini on the one hand, and on the other hand the doctrine that is labeled Socinianism. He would come to a similar differentiation with regard to the next accusation, namely that of Pelagianism. He saw the position of the Remonstrants to be summarized in the Remonstrance written by Wtenbogaert, the content of which he now begins to interpret:

Others prefer to brand this opinion with the mark of Pelagianism. However, the Remonstrants acknowledge nothing as theirs that has been condemned as Pelagian by the ancient Church, for the third of their five articles is as follows … (Grotius inserts here a citation of the third article of the Remonstrance, the only, that has not been censored by the Counter-Remonstrants; FM). This acknowledgment demolishes Pelagianism; all the more so if you add what they themselves added in the explanation of their opinion.

Immediately following this comes a citation from Remonstrant theologians. Thereafter, Grotius turns to examine the remaining four articles of the Remonstrance. With regard to the first article, which concerns God’s decree to save believers, Grotius establishes that, on this point,
the Remonstrants and counter-Remonstrants are in agreement. Grotius sees the accusations of the counter-Remonstrants as follows:37

But, you will say, they do not say enough. Now since when it has been a heresy to say less, especially in such a difficult matter? Not even you set forth your whole opinion, especially not before the people. Augustine expresses reservation when he treats the same subject.

Thereupon follow two quotations from Augustine, which advise restraint in the public discussion of controversial issues. Grotius continues, by tracing the election of individuals back to the fact that God possesses foreknowledge of their faith, as was taught by the Remonstrants; thereafter he delimits the line of inquiry:38

I do not yet ask what is true; I ask whether it is Pelagian or Socinian to think thus, whether it is intolerable. So did none of the ancients think or speak thus? What if many did? What if almost all did before Saint Augustine?

He underscores the point that, before Augustine, such choice was traced back to previously seen faith with many quotations from the pre-Augustine church fathers Chrysostom and Ambrose. The consequence, as he sees it, is as follows:39

Dozens of such sayings could be produced, perhaps some phrased more conveniently than others. But there is no need at all for us to do so, for we are not using these authorities to attack anyone. They were men and could blunder. There are others, well-known too, who disagree, especially Augustine. I say only this: was Chrysostom a Socinian, was Ambrose, were so many other ancient Fathers? If they lived now, would they not be acceptable in our Church? These are the questions I would

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like to see answered. If someone says that they are not to be tolerated, his arrogance will be intolerable to all pious people; if he thinks that they should be tolerated, let him not be a respecter of persons; let there be equity, which requires equal treatment of equal cases.

The line of logic that Grotius here follows goes like this: He begins with the point that Chrysostom and Ambrose would have been condemned as Pelagians, if the ancient Church had judged their opinions to be unbearable. Therefore, for Grotius, it is plain to see that the opinions of the Remonstrants, who were in agreement with the pre-Augustinian fathers, can not be Pelagian. As we have just seen, he disables the accusations of being Socinian with a simple syllogism, and here, once more, he rejects it with the point that it would be inappropriate to label as Socinians such respected church fathers as Chrysostom and Ambrose; as we have already seen, one should differentiate between the actual persons and the doctrines which represent them. Even the three remaining points of the Remonstrants, the death of Christ, the irresistibility of grace and the perseverance in faith, are defended with a similar ‘historical’ line of argument, wherein this time, however, not with pre-Augustinian fathers, but rather Augustine and Prosper, as the exponents of Antipelagianism, bear the brunt of the burden, since they can hardly be suspected of being Pelagian.⁴⁰

There are three different patterns of argumentation to be established with the explanation of Grotius’ theological positions, namely: first, that of the negative formulation of doctrine, that is, the emphasis on what does not agree with a doctrine condemned as heretical; second, that of the emphasis on the identity of his own doctrine with that of authorities who have not been condemned; and finally, the establishing of the identity of his own doctrine with the doctrine of those who specifically oppose the accused heresies. Nevertheless, we must also establish that Grotius does not outline an independent doctrine of predestination and those articles to go with it, but only defends the doctrine as held by the Remonstrants. He remains far enough behind the Remonstrance, however, that he is able to do without repeating its listed catalogue of doctrines which could not be adopted, as well as to attack those doctrines as formulated by the counter-Remonstrants. Instead, he calls those other viewpoints which, in his opinion, also exist, as tolerable. It

is also noteworthy that he only expressly cites the third article of the Remonstrance, the only one which was not censored by the counter-Remonstrants.

With this proof, that the doctrine representative of the Remonstrants is not affected by those accusations directed at the Socinians and the Pelagians, Grotius tries to demonstrate that the doctrine of predestination had always been controversial. Above all, Melanchthon is here drafted into service, to show that even in the camp of the churches of the Reformation, there was no standard and binding formulation of the doctrine of predestination, and that the derivations therein did not necessitate a division in the Church, as is shown by the relationship between Calvin and Melanchthon, as well as the differing confessions of faith. It is also interesting to observe how Melanchthon is established as an authority. Specifically, he is placed in the company of Calvin, Beza, Martyr, Bucer, and others. In this way, Grotius tries to establish a kind of canon of Reformed theologians, for whom there can be no doubt of their correct beliefs. He tries here to make Melanchthon, as one of the Reformed ‘church fathers’, into a kind of ‘Protoremonstrant’, in that he tries to show that Melanchthon’s doctrine of predestination agrees with that of the Remonstrants. It is noteworthy that he repeats Melanchthon’s citation of the church fathers in order to introduce his doctrine as one which agrees with the ancient church. However, he ignores the fact that even in the Lutheran camp, Melanchthon’s doctrine of the freedom of the will was not uncontroversial.

Hereafter, Grotius pursues a new direction of argumentation, and prepares his appeal for tolerance at the end of the second part of the *Ordinum Pietas*. Whereas before he had cited authorities from the ancient Church, now he deals more or less with contemporary authorities such as Calvin and Melanchthon, and the confessions of faith which represent the foundations of orthodoxy, in order to show that, even now, differences in doctrines of predestination do not necessarily need to lead to a division in the Church, and that both doctrines are really acceptable.

It is further interesting how Grotius explains the history of the conflict over the doctrine of predestination in the Netherlands. As the true Dutch doctrine of predestination, and the debates that go along

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with it, especially that over the freedom of the will, he propounds that of Erasmus as it was formulated in his clash with Luther. Only later, and from the outside, did another view of this problem come to the Netherlands. With this, Grotius hopes to qualify the doctrine of the counter-Remonstrants as something foreign, something that is not really Dutch, and therefore destroys the equilibrium that earlier had reigned. Grotius does not particularly want to attack the doctrine of the counter-Remonstrants with this argument, but rather much more to provide an example of the tolerance with respect to this problem which had long been practiced in the Netherlands—a tolerance which, with respect to this problem, was also safeguarded by the restraint of the *Confessio Belgica*. After the outbreak of the arguments over Arminius, this tolerance was even practiced through the authority of the professors from Leyden, the supreme court of Holland, the assembly of the states of Holland, and the verdict of the states on this question, that on this point, neither the Remonstrants nor the counter-Remonstrants were more right. That this occurred is taken by Grotius to show that the course of this argument itself reveals that all quarrels have been settled. However, he certainly ignores the fact that the resolutions of the government authorities were not consistently observed.

The conclusion of the argument of the second part of the *Ordinum Pietas* recommends tolerance as a method of healing the schism. This tolerance is justifiable on pragmatic grounds alone, in order to avoid a further splitting of the Church. As examples of this attitude, Con-

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45 Grotius 1995, *Ordinum*, §63, p. 152, ll. 7–9: Ordines Hollandiae neutros fecere victores, sed utrosque iusserunt christianam ac fraternam caritatem colere, omnia ad pacem dirigere, apud plebem iis de rebus sobrie ac moderate disserere.

46 Grotius 1995, *Ordinum*, §90, p. 168, ll. 12–15: Illud quaeritur, ad augendas an ad minuendas ecclesiae scissuras pertineat ut quidque in controversiam venerit de eo statuere vel it ov, non obtemperantes aut ab ecclesiae corpore aut a ministerio segregare.
stantine, Melanchthon, Beza, and the Polish Protestants are referred to; the theoretical grounds follow with citations from Erasmus, Junius, and James I, or really, Casaubon. There he also deals with the difference between doctrines which are necessary for salvation, and those which are not, a difference which had already played a role in the characterization of the other Protestant Churches and in the declaration of the four professors of theology from Leyden. According to Casaubon, only those articles are necessary, which Scripture labels as such or which the ancient Church deduced from Scripture to be necessary for salvation. In this way, the unity of the Church can be restored in two steps namely: first, through faith in the thing itself and not in the manner, in which it is done, and second, through the creation of a visible community. However, Grotius does not carry these thoughts any further, but rather refers again to the outcome that a split in the Church would entail. One could call it an irony of history that in the aftermath of the *Ordinum Pietas*, Grotius lost his reputation with the counter-Remonstrants, and as a result could no longer act as a mediator between the parties. The tragedy of Hugo Grotius began with a calculated appeal to tolerance, and ended with his arrest in the autumn of 1618. In the arena of dogmatics, the split was reinforced and finally led to the Synod of Dordt, where it was not tolerance, but dogmatic orthodoxy, which decided the matter.

3. Conclusions

I began with Grotius’ lamentation over the split in the Church, and I would like to conclude this paper with his warning of a further split. Finally, I would like to emphasize the following theses:

1. Grotius troubles himself to lay out the notion of Christianity, as well as that of the non-heretical within Christianity, as open as possible.

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2. As a means to doing this in the *Meletius* he uses the reduction of dogmas, and in the *Ordinum Pietas* he wants to show that the controversial doctrine is at the very least not heretical.

3. To this end, he refers to the pagan philosophers as authorities in the *Meletius*, in order to prove that the Christian religion is rational.

4. In the *Ordinum Pietas*, however, he cites councils, church fathers, and confessions of faith as authorities, in order to characterize a pluralizing within Christianity as nothing new.

5. While Grotius introduces thoughts of tolerance primarily on pragmatic grounds, without deriving in detail from Scripture and tradition, he tries in both texts to prove that pluralization within Christianity is something genuinely Christian through reference to authorities, and thereby to respond to the accusations of heresy which were raised against the Remonstrants.

6. Through the subordination of dogma to ethical concerns, and the reduction of dogma, Grotius is considered a forerunner to the Enlightenment criticism of dogma.

7. By renouncing the Trinitarian and Christological dogmas in *De veritate*, Grotius comes closer to the Socinians and, understandably so, is suspected of being one. As such, he is then depicted as being part of the Socinian family-tree, such as is printed on the program for these proceedings.

**Bibliography**


*illae quoque sectae tandem in novas partes discendant atque ita passim nihil nisi lacera membra, nusquam autem iusti corporis forma uma compareat?*


Translated by Christopher Lundgren
God’s government of the world was of special importance for the Dutch in the second half of their War of Liberation from the Papist Oppressors from Spain. Across the board they were convinced that God had delivered them from the Spanish tyranny, and they were afraid to forsake God’s benevolence by sinning. Immediately, however, these Dutch Reformed parted company with each other. Some were going to maintain that God had decided upon who will be saved and who won’t, in his unfathomable and eternal Edict. God will punish the sins of the unbelievers, the heterodox and heretics, the schismatics and apostates. ‘Evil is the rod of His wrath’, in the in no way original words of Jacobus Trigland.¹ Others in the Reformed Church maintained—and they considered this to be the original Christian position—that Christ died for all humans, even though not all are justified. Therefore, the latter were in need of a different understanding of evil in the world. To consider sinful man, in the injudicious use of his free will, to be himself the author of evil seemed the obvious choice, however, creating the need for an appropriate notion of redemption that unveils the causal nexus between Christ’s sufferance and justification. The Socinians believed they had found the logical thing to say: there is no way in which Christ’s passion can be proportional to man’s sins, while it is absurd to suppose that Christ (the innocent Lamb) might have been punished for our sins. Hence man’s justification must have followed from God’s free and unmerited liberation from punishment. Hereby, however, the person of Christ was greatly reduced in importance, a process to be brought to its logical conclusion by denying Christ to be an independent persona of God. When Sybrandus Lubbertus started to attack Socinianism in the Low Countries, in the first decade of the seventeenth century, there was as yet no such a Socinian position at hand. His attacks went accompanied by a full exposition of the Socinian doctrine in the form of his Franeker edition of Socinus’ own De Iesu Christo servatore in 1611.² While we may surmise that his anti-Socinian project

¹ Triglandius 1616, Aemysinge, pp. 31ff.
² Cf. Rabbie 1990, Introduction, pp. 7ff, where he refers to the visit of the Polish
was maybe to counter early developments towards rational Christianity, or maybe because he considered it to be a more radical version of the Arminian threat, in any case, Lubbertus was well served by the attempted appointment of the (not so cryptic) Socinian from Steinfurt (Germany), Conradus Vorstius, to Arminius’ chair. It is there that the momentous debates of the 1610s started. Grotius stepped in with his *Ordinum pietas* of 1613 and he contributed a few years later with the *De satisfactione Christi* (1617) in which he attacked Faustus Socinus himself on the subject of man’s justification by Christ.

In this article I will discuss the position of this anti-Socinian tract of Grotius within the context of his early writings, as well as its reception. In due course it will become evident that the opinion of the modern editor of this text that *De satisfactione* is essentially a work in theology is misguided. Not only does Grotius take issue with the deeper dimensions of Dutch theological politics, but also we do find here the origins of that radical Grotian politics that one is now wont to identify with radical Enlightenment. In a restricted sense the issue at hand is that of the nature of punishment. However, as punishment presupposes a theory of justice, in a concealed way if one likes, the whole debate on predestination is on the table. Grotius conceals and feigns to discuss only matters of abstruse theological nature. Having fought the predestinarians for many years, in collaboration with Johannes Wtenbogaert whose history of religious appeasement goes back to the great debates of the 1590s, Grotius had no problem in understanding their zeal and aim. By fearing God’s wrath if soft on heresy, these True Reformed made the fight against heresy a reason of state. Even while the conscience of individual man should not be forced (and here the Dutch Reformed agreed across the board) we should not easily forsake God’s benevolence by not fighting heresy. Grotius sets out to undermine this conception of the private-public distinction which makes belief a public affair, and would give a spectacular meaning to the very conception of the ‘public church’.

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Socinians Christoph Ostorodt and Andrezj Woidowski to Franeker in 1598, and argues the general absence of knowledge of and interest in Socinus in the early seventeenth century Netherlands. Apparently Lubbertus had to create such an interest (by his edition) before he could fight it.

3 Actually, Gerardus Vossius had been its contemporary editor. See *infra*.

4 There is a straight development from the Coornhert debates in the 1580s to the Arminianism debates in the 1600s. The history of church politics *Kerkelyke geschiedenissen*
The late eighteenth-century Dutch philosopher and theologian Dionysius van den Wijnpersse is being reported to have remarked that Grotius treats punishment differently in *De satisfactione Christi* and *De jure belli ac pacis* (*DJB&P*). The context of that remark is a discussion between the Leiden literati Meinardus Tydeman and Willem Bilderdijk on the nature of grace, the principles of Protestantism, natural theology and natural law. Tydeman wrote to Bilderdijk: “D. van den Wijnpersse praised the anti-Socinian book of Grotius *De Satisfactione.*”

The two correspondents—Orangists, Calvinists, and conservatists—shared a disapproving attitude towards the Arminian-Loevesteinian-Aristocrat writers ‘who were more successful in their literary activities than in politics’. It did not deter them from receiving Grotius as one of their own in the fight against the English Unitarians that was so important in the Dutch Christian Enlightenment at the end of the eighteenth century. Dionysius van den Wijnpersse had been involved in the *Haagsche Genootschap* for the defence of the faith against Priestley and his Unitarian influence in the Netherlands in the 1780s. And indeed, while in the seventeenth century Grotius was generally believed to be a Socinian himself, and suspected of a hidden political agenda, the eighteenth-century attitude towards Grotius seems to be primarily a positive one, against the background of a general ‘Dutch’ understanding of natural law. The interest of these intellectuals—defining their relationship to the endeavours of the Dutch Republic that no longer was—is apparently the interface between theology and natural law.

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5 Bilderdijk, Tydeman, Tydeman 1866, *Briefwisseling*, vol. I, p. 55, MT to WB (25 March 1808): “D. v.d. Wijnpersse prees het Anti-Socinianaansch boek van Grotius *de Satisfactione*; maar verwonderde zich, dat hij, daarin, een ander denkbeeld van de straf voorstelde, dan in zijn *Jus Belli ac Pacis*, en eene andere, en betere, verklaring van Jesai. 53, dan in zijn Comment. ad ill. loc., daar hij ’t op Jeremias past.” Cf. van de Wijnpersse 1778, *Verhandeling*; van de Wynpersse 1794, *Demonstration [= Translation of van der Wynpersse 1793, *Betoog*]. Dionysius van den(?) Wynpersse (1724–1808) was a professor of philosophy in Leiden. For the Jesaia reference see: *De satisfactione* X, 38: “consider that part of the covenant in which Christ stipulated that, if he submitted to death, it would happen that to those who believed in him remission for sins would be granted, and God made this promise, as appears from Esai. 53.10”. Cf. Grotius 1679, *Annotationes in VT*, p. 323b, ll. 16ff. The correspondents owned a negative appreciation of Pufendorf, and estimated the Leiden natural law thinker Pestel above Immanuel Kant, as transpires from the same correspondence.
more precisely the concordance between a theological and a natural-law conception of punishment. Correctly, they understand that Hugo Grotius was precisely engaged in a similar enterprise, and the remark of van den Wijnpersse on an apparent inconsistency between the two in Grotius is telling. No surprise he studied Grotius, and came to his observation.

Van de Wijnpersse was referring here to an overlooked aspect of Grotius’ theory of punishment that is particularly relevant from a theological perspective: is God acting for a purpose when he punishes or is he punishing for his own sake? If for a purpose then God’s punishment is on a par with that of other rulers: punishment is undertaken for the sake of justice. If not, then a problem arises in the theory of satisfaction.

It has been remarked that Socinianism has much in common with Arminianism, in particular a rationalist approach to the Bible, an emphasis on the practical moral value of religion and an abhorrence of theoretical subtleties. Rationalism in theology is about method rather than substance and in the issues at hand, the nature of God’s saving grace, Arminianism was mostly concerned with the election to and resistibility of grace, while Socinus concentrated on grace as the completely free gift of God. Grotius had become involved in these issues along both fronts. Not only within the context of the Remonstrant-Counterremonstrant debates on predestination, but also on the Socinian-Calvinist front, as a consequence of the alleged Socinianism of Conradus Vorstius (1569–1622) appointed to the chair of Arminius in Leiden. Grotius’ Pietas (1613)—an outright defence of the Remonstrance and toleration—was occasioned by what finally would turn out to be an insurmountable opposition against Vorstius’ appointment. A few years later, he wrote his Defensio fidei catholicae de satisfactione Christi adversus Faustum Socinum Senensem (1617) to deal with the question of the nature of sin and its redemption. By singling out this issue, he skilfully combines a critique of Socinianism with a defence of his own Remon-

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6 Cf. Kühler 1912, Socianisme.
7 See his justification before the Senate of Heidelberg in 1599: Vorstius 1611, Confessio.
8 The attack was led by Sybrandus Lubbertus, a Calvinist minister from Leeuwarden (Frisia), who had made the persecution of Socinianism his pet project. First he edited a Socinian text, then he orchestrated the attack on Vorstius’ appointment, see Lubbertus 1611, Iesu, and Lubbertus 1613, Commentarii. From there, Socinianism quickly became the kind of contagion that was actively shunned notwithstanding the famous Dutch toleration that made the publication of Socinian writings plainly possible.
strant position, without however being forced to tread into the well-worn paths of the arguments ‘de gratia et praedestinatione’ (well-worn, as exemplified e.g. by the summarizing treatments by Polyander and Grevinchovius9). And then, when Grotius writes his De veritate religiosis Christianae, published in 1627 after some delay, he again returns to Vorstius by taking Vorstius’ anonymous edition of Socinus’ book on bible interpretation as the basis of its third and fourth chapters. The De Satisfactione hence is in between the Ordinum pietas of 1613 and the De veritate of 1627, all of which taken together with some justification made him liable to the suspicion of Socinianism as well as political schemes. As the argument went, Grotius was coming to the rescue of Socinianism because he did not explicitly condemn its central tenets, and hence tacitly condoned it.

There is another lineage, however. That one follows the road of the notion of punishment, from De jure praedae commentarius, written between 1604 and 1607, to De satisfactione and to the book mentioned in reference by Van de Wynpersse, De jure belli ac pacis, published in Paris in 1625. This lineage spans a slightly larger period, but it is a lineage by hindsight because De jure praedae remained a manuscript till 1864 when it was rediscovered to be published in 1868 by H.G. Hamaker on the instigation of Robert Fruin. Punishment plays a complicated role in the Grotian oeuvre. We will see punishment’s importance in the theory of just war (no surprise, evidently), and in the understanding of the doctrine of redemption (a bit more of a surprise), and, lastly, in the construction of man’s sociability. To reduce this to one phrase: punishment is the linchpin of the bringing about of justice, as in just war, justification, and social justice. It remains to be seen what this second lineage for the De satisfactione has to do with Faustus Socinus, as that requires us to understand the interdependencies of the second lineage, from De jure praedae to De jure belli ac pacis.10

At issue in this development ultimately is the reordering of reason and revelation, a process which takes place against the Calvinists’ history of salvation, and against the dogmatic conception of justice. The nature of God’s justice being at stake, the humanist demands a coher-

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9 Polyander à Kerckhoven 1616, Staet.
10 Among the earlier literature on Grotius attention is paid to the doctrine of punishment by Haggenmacher 1984, Grotius; see also Besselink 1989, Faith. On the relationship between Grotius and later philosophy of penal law, see Hüning 2000, Potestas.
ent view of the world including both divine and human justice under one simple concept. The long discourses on punishment are therefore to be seen as the disquisition of the practical side of justice (punishment is the essence of the execution of justice, which is nothing else but the bringing about of a situation of justice ("justice done")). *De veritate* is about the reasonableness of Christianity, it is apologetic, and in a way all of Grotius’ Christianity is apologetic: he believes that revelation brings certainty (*assensus*) to truth, established by way of consensus among men. Compare this with J. Trigland, in his acerbic criticism of Arminianism, as he derides the interest in political order among the *politijcken*, praising the trust in God’s eternal plan of the *kerkelijcken*. “But since they have no certainty in religion, or more correctly don’t have a religion at all (*Omnis Religio nulla religio*, All Religion is no religion), they expect their salvation from a civil life, and thus aim to dissolve other people’s hearts from the creed, put on quicksand and make rely on a political life.”¹¹ The Calvinists (or: ‘Gereformeerden’, Reformed, as they preferred to be called) emphasised the undeserved aspect of grace: God’s grace is not a consequence of man’s belief, but belief is rather a consequence of grace. Where the Socinians agree with them in seeing grace as undeserved (free gift of God), Calvinists should not suffer the Socinian conclusion that deprives Christ of his divine nature.

We must therefore first analyse what is meant by the biblical ‘Christ died for our sins’, and Grotius’ answer is that man is punished for his sins because Christ, the son of God, has freely accepted to be punished in our place by the greatest punishment of all, i.e. death. In order to defend this interpretation, Grotius develops a notion of punishment, which is essentially that the final cause of punishment is the prevention of sin, and the promotion of justice. In this way, Grotius expounds the practical moral value of the Bible and the central place in it of the coming of Christ, while preventing the dismal conclusion that God is the author of sin or evil, and underlining the importance of human freedom.

No doubt, ever since Grotius had started writing on just war, he had stressed the importance of punishment for the establishment of

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¹¹ Trigland 1615, *Christen*: “Maer alsoo sy selfs gheen vasticheyt inde religie/ Ja om recht te seggen gheen religie hebbende (want Omnis Religio nulla religio, Alle Religie is gheen religie) haer salicheydt stellen in een Borgherlijck leven/ soo soecken sy oock ander menschen herten met haer vande Religie los te maecken/ op een drif-sant setten/ ende op een polityck leven te doen vertrouwen.”
justice. The argument in *De jure praedae* is straightforward. In what must be regarded as a classical *oikeiosis*-argument, Grotius states that man’s first duty is to himself, and that self-preservation and appropriation of goods are precepts of the law of nature. But there is also the perspective of ‘universal concord’, and the typical challenge of *oikeiosis* as we find it e.g. in Cicero is to understand the process by which this universal concord and humanity comes about. This ‘justice properly so called’, to ‘have a care for the welfare of others’, ‘that brotherhood of man’, that ‘certain kinship established among us by nature’ makes it ‘sinful that man should lie in ambush for his fellow man, a precept which Cicero very properly ascribes to the law of nations’.

The foregoing observations show how erroneously the Academics—those masters of ignorance—have argued in refutation of justice, that the kind derived from nature looks solely to personal advantage, while civil justice is based not upon nature but merely upon opinion; for they have overlooked that intermediate aspect of justice which is characteristic of humankind.\(^\text{12}\)

In addition to the law of self-preservation and the law of acquisition thus arise the law of inoffensiveness and the law of abstinence. ‘Consequently, we feel the need of that form of justice properly known as ἀρετή κομικρινική or social virtue (*virtus socialis*).’\(^\text{13}\) In passing we should mention that Grotius considers his first law to follow from necessity. ‘As we read in Seneca, necessity, which breaks all law, is a great support of this great human weakness. Indeed necessity is the first law of nature, as we said in the beginning.’

Of the two forms of justice then distinguished, compensatory justice (*justitia compensatrix*) has a twofold function: in regard to good, the preservation thereof; in regard to evil, its correction. The law of obligation deals with these matters, but also that of reward and punishment. It may well be asked why two approaches to compensatory justice are proposed. If indeed the subjective rights to life, liberty, and estate in a social setting imply the corresponding duty to respect those of others, it might seem that obligation would be sufficient. Grotius notices that obligations can arise from contract and from offence (*delictum*), and that obligations have to be fulfilled.

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\(^{12}\) Grotius 1868, *DJP*, II [6’, 7].

\(^{13}\) Grotius 1868, *DJP*, II [8].
Such justice requires that the thing taken shall be returned in the case of a theft just as in the case of a loan, and that, even as payment is made of a purchase price or of a revenue from a contract, so also reparation for loss inflicted and restitution for injuries should be provided.

Thus one may ask, if a wrongdoer incurs an obligation to be fulfilled, why should a wrongdoer in addition be punished? Indeed, to inflict punishment upon a person is to harm him, which seems to run counter to the laws of nature developed so far. In other words, if the ‘equality’ of the subjective rights is all that is at stake in society, it must be sufficient to have a concept of obligation and its fulfillment. Naturally, the issue arises how people are made to perform their obligations, and its regulation being the interest of all would have to be allotted to magistrates. From this perspective Grotius maintains that evil has to be punished, just as good deeds have to be rewarded. The reason for this is that punishment and reward do not pertain to the fulfillment of a debt incurred, but to prevent evil and promote good deeds. Punishment is a ‘curative procedure’, and also functions by example—as says Aristotle; punishment is not imposed ‘because sin has been committed but in order that its commission may be prevented’ (Plato). However, we still fail to have a straightforward connection between the argument of rights and duties on the one hand and that of reward-punishment.

Grotius in fact is using two kinds of argument to defend punishment. Both are part of a possible *oikeiosis* process. On the one hand, he follows the well-established republican argument for public virtue. From the classical Pericles exhortation, Platonist arguments that the whole is crucial to the parts, and Livius’ statement that ‘in no way will you be able to protect your own interests by betraying the public interest’, it is followed that in addition to the rights and duties between individuals, the individual has duties towards the community to which a right of the community corresponds. This right takes the form of punishment because

owing to the fact that men (repeatedly carried away not by true self-love but by a false and inordinate form of that sentiment [*non vero sed falso atque inordinate sui amore*], the root of all evil) were mistaking for equality that which was in point of fact disproportionate ownership, and because this false conception was giving rise to dissension and tumult, evils which

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It was important to avoid for the sake of concord and public tranquillity, the state (respublica) intervened in the role of arbiter (mediā) among the contending parties, and divided the various portions equitably.\textsuperscript{15}

Here Grotius explains that the republic contributes to the establishment of justice by rewarding/punishing according to the distinction between \textit{verum} / \textit{falsum sui amor}. This move is part of the ascending order that leads to universal concord and humanity. Although Grotius emphasises in the next line that the origin of these judgements (\textit{judicia}) of the republic is the same as the origin of laws (and that consequently all authority is by consent only), the theory of punishment is made coextensive with the republic: its role is to rule out \textit{amour propre} and promote \textit{amour de soi}. That is to say that the republic must impose upon the citizens a moral attitude towards the enjoyments of one’s rights coherent with some higher good, the preservation of the commonwealth itself. Indeed, within the \textit{oikeiosis} perspective, one would require an order expanding from self-preservation to commonwealth and finally to universal humanity and concord.\textsuperscript{16}

We find an indication of how to understand this process in Grotius’ discussion of the moral vengeance that the first two laws—of self-preservation and appropriation—have in the offering. In the passage that Richard Tuck presents as his core exhibit for an Epicurean interpretation of Grotius, that God created man \textit{αὐτε)ksi)omikronύσι)omikronν}, ‘free and \textit{sui juris},’ I understand Grotius—in contradistinction to Tuck—to indicate a first step in the process towards social justice.\textsuperscript{17} That is, precisely from man’s freedom he deduces the \textit{fidei regula}, the rule of good faith, truth and trustworthiness. Being true to one’s own free self, man is morally bound to be true to others. Lying and cheating thus become actions of a different category than incurring a debt, even while normally as a consequence these actions do create debts in their trail. Hence, when good


\textsuperscript{16} This argument is developed by Grotius in close reference to Cicero, \textit{De finibus}, III, and Seneca, \textit{De beneficiis}, V.

\textsuperscript{17} Trigland mentions that the term \textit{αὐτε)ksi)omikronύσι)omikronν} is discussed by Augustine, \textit{Twee brieven tegen de Pelagianen}, \textit{[= Contra duas epistolae pelagianorum libri IV. Patrologia Latina, vol 44, 549ff.], bk 3, c. 4; c. 9.} If Trigland referred to a Dutch translation, I did not find this publication. See for an early orthodox use of Augustine on this point Adriaan Smout: \textit{Bode, met twee seyndt-brieven, Prosperi ende Hilarii, aen Avgvstinvm; van de over-blijfselen vande ketterij de pelagianen. Rotterdam 1608: Waesberghe.} See for the argument Trigland 1650, \textit{Geschiedenissen}, pp. 17ff. A.J. Smout was a great fighter against the Remonstrants and a first-class muckraker, who would be thrown out of Amsterdam in 1630 for that reason.
faith develops, Cicero is right in calling it ‘the foundation of justice’, says Grotius. Failing the rule of good faith is thus the kind of evil that deserves punishment.\textsuperscript{18}

Thus we have to distinguish two ways of introducing just punishment: one on the basis of the priority of the commonwealth over \textit{amour propre}, and another on the basis of the moral value of faithfulness. The former entails what nowadays is called end-state principles, the latter is a procedural principle, emphasizing the necessity of commitment and self-obligation. \textit{Oikeiosis} demands of man to be in harmony with nature, i.e. with the larger whole of which he forms part. \textit{Oikeiosis} starts from the awareness of self and the interests of self, and shows the ways in which the individual is re-connected (in the sense of \textit{re-ligio}) to the totality of nature, either by accepting laws (civil law, law of nations, God’s law), or by developing behaviour that will produce this harmony (\textit{fides}).\textsuperscript{19}

The prevention of unjust actions can be done by demonstrating that the transgression of laws will not be permitted (i.e. be punished), or by punishing breaches of \textit{fides}. The former is about the subjection to laws, while the latter is about the establishment of laws, in communities of faithfulness. From the former perspective punishment is the prerogative of authority, from the latter perspective punishment is everyone’s business.

It is my contention in this paper that while Grotius combined both perspectives in \textit{De Jure Praeadae (DJP)} (for obvious reasons, since he wanted to allow the right of punishment to individuals in the absence of authority (i.e. enforcing the law of nations by default), as well as for reason of breach of contract (everyone has the right to punish unfaith-

\textsuperscript{18} The term \textit{regula} is used in the Digests to indicate general principles of law, in distinction to specific rulings. In Roman oratory, \textit{regulae} are the principles inherent in language and language use. E.g. in Quintillian, \textit{Inst Orat} X.2.13; Cicero, \textit{Acad.} 140 has: “hanc normam, hanc regulam, hanc praescriptionem esse naturae, a qua qui aberravisset eum numquam quid in vita sequeretur habiturum”. Grotius’ reference to Cicero, \textit{Off.}, I, 23: “Fundamentum autem est iustitiae fides, id est dictorum conventorumque constantia et veritas. Ex quo, quamquam hoc videbitur fortasse cuipiam durius, tamen audeamus initari Stoicos, qui studiose exquirunt, unde verba sint ducta, credamusque, quia fiat, quod dictum est appellatam fidem.” Cf. also Fikentscher 1979, \textit{Fide}.

\textsuperscript{19} Spinoza will take \textit{fides} as the core concept in the ‘contract’-chapter—chapter 16—(Spinoza 1670, \textit{Tractatus}), although he wants to underline that \textit{fides} is still purely utilitarian as people (rulers and citizens alike) are shamed into \textit{fides}. A comparison between Grotius and Spinoza on this score is highly illuminative of both thinkers, but is to be presented elsewhere.
fulness, even if not part of the contract). Next, he emphasised the first approach in *De satisfactione Christi*, and the second one in *DJB&P*. I will now present these two in historical order.

1. Defensio fidei catholicae de satisfactione Christi adversus Faustum Socinum Senensem

In 1617 was published Grotius’s *De satisfactione Christi*, a defence of the ‘catholic’ creed against Faustus Socinus from Siena. It has been convincingly argued that Grotius, with the intellectual support of his friends, and in particular that of Gerardus Vossius, set out to write this critique of Socinian ideas about atonement as an attempt to counter the animosity he had earned among Counter-Remonstrants with his defence of the Remonstrant minister Conradus Vorstius in his *Pietas* of 1613. Grotius expected that a critique of Socinianism on an issue far away from contested concepts like predestination and free will would re-establish his orthodoxy, and hence his credibility as a political leader and leading intellectual. How wrong he was!

As Hermannus Ravensperger, the author of a small tract against the *Satisfactione* remarked:

> I am wholly convinced that under the pretext of religion the cause of a region [viz. Holland] is being promoted; that a political schism is sought by means of a religious one; that under the cover of the five articles [the so-called five fundamental articles of faith of the Remonstrants] are hidden the monsters of errors and the idols of a Socinian brain.

And to sum up:

> I have noticed that he [Grotius] refutes ‘Socinus’s opinion’ on satisfaction and snatches the arms taken from jurisprudence, from the adversary of the catholic faith in such a way that time and again he comes to the assistance of that same adversary.

In other words, says Ravensperger, Grotius is not only using a pretended refutation of Socinus as a stealthy means to political ends, but even devilishly promotes Socinianism itself.

A few years later the German Socinian Johannes Crellius replied to Grotius. Although pressed to do so, Grotius did not answer this book,

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arguing that by responding he would as a matter of fact promote the case of Socinianism rather than defy it. Apparently he had learnt his lesson. However, that was not the end of it. Within a few years, the whole affair fired back upon Grotius who was in the end generally regarded by his Counterremonstrant opponents to be a real Socinian himself. “What happened to Mr. Grotius is the same as what happened to all Remonstrants: … as long as they had hope to retain the town hall and the church they showed Christian countenance, but when those were lost, they lost at the same moment the divine truth and conscience”, writes the devoted Voetian spokesman Martinus Schoockius in 1638.22

*De satisfactione* essentially sets out its case along the following lines:

1. Punishment is not an act which falls within the competence of the offended party as such (II, 5).23
2. The offended party has no right to punishment (II, 8), but only restitution (II, 9) [the cause of debt is not the moral wrongness of the act, but that I lack something, II, 10]
3. The right of punishment in the ruler is neither the right of absolute ownership nor a personal right (II, 16)

Therefore, and as a consequence, Christ’s redemption of our sins is a ‘dispensation’, i.e. ‘an act by a superior, by which the obligation imposed by a law remaining in force is removed with regard to certain persons or things’ (III, 2). Punishment is not necessarily proportional to the sin (III, 10). Socinus’ claim that ‘no one can take upon himself the punishment for the delict of another’ is countered by Grotius, by showing examples of the opposite. (IV, 21) This is clearly sufficient for his purpose, which apparently is to further stress that punishment is not based on a contractual relation, nor on a creditor-debtor relation: ‘but the real question is this, whether an act which is within the power of a superior can, even without consideration of another’s delict, be appointed by the superior for the punishment of another’s crime’ (IV, 22).

For punishment, therefore to be just, it is required that the act of punishing itself is within the power of him who punishes, which holds true in three cases, either by the previous right of him who punishes, or by the

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23 References are to the chapter and paragraph numbering of the Rabbie edition.
just and valid consent of him whose punishment is concerned, or by a delict of the same (IV, 12). There must be a certain connection between him who has sinned and him who is to be punished: ‘This connection, then, is either natural, as between father and son, or mystical, as between king and people, or voluntary, as between defendant and surety’ (IV, 11).

And in further proof Grotius adduces some telling examples:

who would regard as unjust the decimation usual in the Roman legions …? Who would regard it as unjust, if, when the highest power relaxes the law, some man who is useful to the state but deserving of exile because he is guilty of some crime is retained in the state while someone else of his own free will takes upon himself the obligation to go into exile, in order to furnish the required example? Who would regard it as unjust, if the highest ruler of the state refuses public offices, for the fulfillment of which others equally competent are found, to children of public enemies, even though they are not otherwise unworthy? Indeed, there is nothing unjust in this. For in the first case the crime of him who is punished, in the second case the valid consent of him whose case is concerned, and in the third the liberty of the ruler, permitted the occurrence of the thing which the ruler used as punishment’ (IV, 22).

The conclusion, in the next paragraph, is that God used the ‘sufferings and death of Christ in order to set a serious example against the immense guilt of us all’. Clearly, just as the ancients said about forgiveness that it was ‘neither according to the law, nor against the law, but above the law and for the law’, this is completely true of his divine grace. It is above the law, because we are not punished; it is for the law, because the punishment is not omitted, and remission is granted in order that we may in the future live according to the divine law’ (V, 11). A precise discussion of the distinction between debtor-creditor and sinner-punisher relationships then follows, in particular as it appears in the procedures of the discharge of debt and punishment. Thus Grotius is going to achieve his threefold refutation of Socinus, i.e. ‘Now that two questions have been answered, whether God could justly punish the willing Christ for our sins, and whether there was some sufficient cause for God to do so, a third remains, whether God did this in reality, or, what amounts to the same thing, whether he intended to do so’ (VI, 1).

The real issue of De satisfactione thus has become whether God has done justice to man by promising redemption of the sins. In De jure praedae the question was whether certain actions of punishment were just (war, the taking of prise or booty), in De satisfactione the question is whether full justice has been done by a certain (limited) act of punish-
ment. In order to answer this question, (again) the theory of punishment has to be elaborated in relation to justice.

Grotius definitely had reasons of a theological nature to construct this theory. On the one hand, he was bound by the opinions of Socinus he was refuting. In this respect he had to take issue with various publicly decried Socinian positions, such as on the nature of God. Other matters relate to God’s will and power in relation to the law. The integration between theological and legal arguments is achieved by describing God as a king in the execution of justice. Hence the series of metaphorical names: superior, princeps, rector. The conception of punishment itself is the same as in DJP, the right to punish is limited to ‘superiors’ only. It is remarkable that so to say the sole responsibility for the rectification of injustice is in the hands of superiors. It is also remarkable that the notion of sin is not elaborated upon. Good reasons for this may be found in the Ordinum pietas, where Grotius claimed the freedom of prophesising, and derides the claims to exclusivity on the part of the ministers of the Orthodox Church. No doubt, God gives the last judgement, and original sin is not to be disputed (even while it does not figure in the five fundamental articles of the Remonstrants). Moreover, a discussion of the contents of sin was irrelevant to the Socianian refutation, so not even the question how we know God’s justice was at stake.

2. De poenis

In chapter xx of book II of De jure belli ac pacis, Grotius retakes his whole discussion of punishment. The exposition is much more extensive, various authors are presented in a new light, and the tenor of the argument is different. As the exposition in De jure praedae was in chapter II, which was not published until 1868, his readers will not have remarked any chances, except when putting the De satisfactione next to it. This was noted by Van den Wijnpersse at the end of the eighteenth century, preceded in the seventeenth century only by Lambertus van Velthuyesen, theologian and lawyer, and in the continuing anti-Socinian climate drawn to reconsider Grotius’ book. Thus, in paragraph iii.1 of DJB&P II.xx, Grotius explained:

But the subject of this right (of punishment), that is, he to whom the right is due, has not been determined by nature itself. She indicates indeed the reason why a wrongdoer can be punished, not, however, who should
punish, even though she indicates sufficiently that it is most convenient to nature if this is undertaken by him who is superior. Not, however, because this is proven to be necessarily so, except in so far as the word ‘superior’ is taken in that sense that he who acts wrongly thereby is seen to make himself inferior to any other and lowers himself from the ranks of man into that of the animals.

The competence to this right belongs by nature to everybody; … even while in the republic one must understand these to be indicated by the laws. (ix, 2)

Grotius thus gives a somewhat unusual interpretation to the dictum ‘he who is without sins, let him cast the first stone’, by indeed presupposing the moral rectitude of he who punishes him who is punished. Moreover, the purpose of punishment—as we have seen before—in the words of Seneca: Nemo prudens punit, quia peccatum est, sed ne peccetur. This implies a certain lenitude in punishment, as indeed we find among men, ‘because man is to such an extent bound to another by bounds of blood, that he must not hurt him unless for the purpose of some further good. In God it is a different matter.’ (iv; 2)

For the actions of God can be based upon the right of the Supreme Power (ipso summi dominii iure), particularly where a man’s special desert is concerned (praesertim ubi meritum hominis speciale accedit), even if they have in view no end outside themselves. … That is, even then when He punishes a wicked man, He does so with no other purpose than of punishing him.

Nevertheless, even if we follow the more generally accepted interpretation it comes to the same thing, so that God is said to have made all things for His own sake, that by right of the highest freedom, not seeking or regarding any perfection outside Himself; just as God is said to be ‘self-existent’ (αὐτοκράτωρ) because He is not born of any. Assuredly, Holy Writ bears witness that the punishments of those that are irretrievably lost are not exacted by God for any purpose, when it is said that He derives pleasure from their woe, and that the impious are derided and mocked by God.

Human punishment, on the other hand is not dependent on any other notion of superiority than that of moral superiority. Moreover, human punishment is for a goal. This differs from both the argument in De jure praedae and in De satisfactione. In a double sense Grotius has been changing his position.

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1. Any honest man can punish an evil, with the purpose of preventing further evil, correcting the wrongdoer, or putting an example.

2. Moreover, even after judges have been appointed to whom the power to punish has been allotted, the old natural liberty remains, especially in places where there are no courts, as, for example, on the sea. In this respect, all reference to the ranks and order of society is lost.

3. **The inconsistency explained**

Against the background of two strands of thought in Grotius: a theological one from the *Ordinum Pietas* to *De veritate*; and a development in his theory of justice from *De aequitate* to *DJB&P*. After a period of fruitfully combining the theological and legal-political perspectives, Grotius is seen to separate these again. God’s teaching of justice now has become independent from his control of the world. It is here that the difference between *De satisfactione* and *DJB&P* comes to the fore. This difference consequently has to do with the relationship between divine justice and human justice. Two moves are made. On the one hand, the purpose of punishment in human affairs is even more clearly defined as justice and the punishment is available to all righteous persons, that is, no longer is maintained that punishment is only available to rulers. On the other hand, the similarity between God the ruler and human rulers has been severed. God does not punish for a purpose. Here Grotius is apparently tempted to follow ‘the more generally accepted’ interpretation, i.e.—I would argue—more generally accepted than the interpretation he gave in *De satisfactione*.

Grotius’ concept of justice is the connecting thread between DJP, *De satisfactione* and *DJB&P*. In the process, the theory of punishment is secularized, by relegating Christ’s redemption to the mysteries of God again. The responsibility in punishment, furthermore, is emphasized, in order to stress the frailty of human life. Punishment is a judgment about circumstances and consequences, rather than a command, or the application of power. This is underwritten by the Gospel.

We have seen how Grotius developed his theory of justice around the idea of just punishment. He was therefore definitely not inclined to accept Socinus’ interpretation of man’s justification through Christ, as it hinged on omitting punishment, rather than its execution. Like Socinus, however, Grotius strongly believed in the coherence of reason
and revelation, even while many subtleties of Scripture must necessarily escape us. The continuity of natural religion, natural theology, and revelation is what Grotius shared with Socinus, rather than anything like Unitarianism. The Socinian emphasis on religion as a help for the practical conduct of life is reflected in Grotius as well. In his zeal, however, to reject Socinus, Grotius identified divine and human punishment as the right of the sovereign for the promotion of the common good. This position did not satisfy him in the end. Not only did he defy from answering Crellius, but he retracted his steps in the *De jure belli ac pacis*. The development from just war to justification and from there to justice implied in the end a more radical opposition to Socinus: the justice obtainable among men is the result of the human capacity of self-justification. Thereby Grotius prepared the way for the Enlightenment. This significant change was recognized at the end of the eighteenth century, and at the same time earned Grotius a place of honour in the gallery of anti-Unitarians.

4. Reception

The first defence of the *Satisfactione* against Crellius\(^{26}\) will only appear in 1648, when Lambertus van Velthuysen writes his *Specimen refutationis libri Crellii de satisfactione Christi*. There is no evidence why Velthuysen (1622–1685) undertook to write this book. He was trained as a minister and doctor in the late 1630s and 1640s, in Utrecht and Leiden. His attempts to obtain a minister’s position failed on the accusation of unorthodoxy. It might seem that he wanted, as Grotius had, to rehabilitate himself. However, in the dedication of the book to Johannes Jacobus du Bois, minister of the Walloon Church in Utrecht, he expresses his gratitude to belong to this church.\(^{27}\) A refuge this was no doubt, since all of

\(^{26}\) Actually, *Antwoord van Joannes Krellius Frankus [...] op het boek van Hugo de Groot aangaande de genoegdoening van Christus tegen Faustus Socinus van Sena geschreven* (S.l.: s.n., 1623) is the Dutch translation of Johannes Crellius’ *Ad librum Hugonis Grotii quem de satisfactione Christi adversus Faustum Socinum Senensem scripsit responsio* (Rakow, 1623). A year after Velthuysen’s critique, a Dutch translation of Crellius’ defence of religious freedom was to be published: *Verdediginge vande vryheyt der religie. Door Joannis Crellius Polack. In ’t Latij beschreven en wytyhegeven in ’t jaer 1637. En nu in ’t Nederlandsch getrouwelijck overgheset.* s.l.: s.n. 1649.

\(^{27}\) Velthuysen 1648, *Specimen*, dedication: “Denique toto illo tempore, quo post peregrinationes meas familiaritas mihi tecum intercessit, tot tantaque effusa erga me benevolentiae testimonia edidisti.”
his family had been and remained members of the Dutch Reformed Church. In what would become his usual style, Velthuysen emphasizes that his only aim in writing the book is to find out the truth about the matter: no polemics. Apart from Crellius (and his stand-in Martinus Ruarus), we find only a reference to unnamed *adversarii* of his position. Only one other name appears explicitly: that of the *Clarissimus Grotius*, as the author of the *Satisfactione* of 1617. And indeed, the general line of the argument is in many respects based on Grotius’s exposition. However, Velthuysen had also read *De Cive* at that point in time. In his reconstruction of the juridical analysis of punishment, which was one of the important elements in Grotius’s contribution, he brings up the Hobbesian formula that according to pristine law (*jus primaeum*) each is free to everything against everyone (*cuique licet omnia in omnes*). He stresses more strongly than Grotius did, the ‘right by which everyone has access to all means that he considers necessary to his conservation’. But, interestingly, Velthuysen does not follow Hobbes any further. Like Grotius he prepares the field for his critique of Socinian atonement by elaborating on the private-public distinction in establishing that punishment should agree with public well-being. On that basis, both Grotius and Velthuysen argue that indeed Christ must be said to have died for our sins, which as a matter of fact was denied by Socinus and Crellius.

Here, in the process of an essentially theological debate the outlines of a political theory were developed, and the support of some Hobbesian positions was invoked. Like Grotius, Velthuysen did not escape the suspicion of supporting Socinianism by using bad arguments against it. No doubt, for all their novelty, these arguments must have been considered bad ones. Juridico-political arguments in a theological debate were anathema to the orthodox theologians anyhow. Since Velthuysen in this, his first book had begun to connect Hobbes with Grotius and hence with Remonstrantism and, being a Cartesian, with free thought as well, the ‘Scylla and Charibdes that threaten the real Christian, the *Cartesiana theologia* and the *Hobbesiana pietas*’ had taken shape.28 The counter-Remonstrant suspicions about Cartesianism had been connected to the disrepute of Hobbes among their pietist brethren in England. As such it would acquire a momentum of its own, not to

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28 These are the sarcastic words of an anonymous critic of Velthuysen in [Anonymous] 1666, *Theologia*. See the connection between Hobbes and the *Pietas*. 
be checked by careful scrutiny of either Hobbes’s political theory or its (limited) use in what later would be known as Dutch republican political theory, let alone the combination of both.

But as it was, Velthuysen had hit upon the basic principles of the political theory he was going to develop in more detail in his *Disser-tatio epistolica de principiis justi et decr* of 1651, which he was advised to publicize by adding to the title that it was meant as a defense of Hobbes’s *De Cive*. This was neither wise nor correct. I don’t agree with Noel Malcolm’s description of Velthuysen and the republicans of the 1660s and 1670s, De la Court and Spinoza, as Hobbesian-republicans. Malcolm seems to see our intellectual task as one of finding out how Dutch Hobbesians managed to develop Hobbes’s political theory into the basis of republicanism. As I will continue to argue, the matter is slightly different. It is rather the question why Dutch republicans did see no harm in considering Hobbes a useful addition to their argument. The short answer to this question naturally is that they understood Hobbes as a pupil of Grotius, and believed to have sufficiently harnessed their theories against Hobbesian positions they did not accept. Moreover, indeed, they understood Dutch politics as strongly different from that of other nations. Even absolutists like the later Grotius, and his pupil Dirk Graswinkel, pointed out that in a constitutional state like the Dutch, the magistrate was not *legibus solutus*. They could maintain this exceptional position because they believed that problems of morality were different from those of politics, as other republicans would argue more profusely.

Let us pursue Lambertus van Velthuysen in his political use of the *satisfactio Christi*: In order to decide on the issue of the atonement, Velthuysen puts forward a version of Grotius’ theory of punishment. This theory is meant to show that punishment is not a pay-off or retribution by the transgressor of the damage done. Punishment aims at prevention, by setting examples and inculcating fear. Punishment is neither retribution nor an act of anger. Its final cause is obedience to the law, as is the purpose of the Gospel anyhow.

Velthuysen is self-conscious about his adherence to a modern style of philosophy: “while abstaining from an appeal to whatever human authority, and freeing my mind of all prejudices, I go after the truth by

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way of first principles, whom no one in all sanity will oppose.”

This process will lead to dogmata that can be accepted, or else: ‘suspendo judicium’.

He starts off with what he considers to be the Sententia orthodoxorum, that God the Father, out of his immense mercy and love towards mankind, sent his only son into the world, who by his obedience, death, and other foregoing sufferings redeemed from eternal death mankind, who by and because of their sins is subject to eternal damnation, and thereby really satisfying their sins. This starting point is, like the first chapter of Grotius De satisfacione, about the prima facie meaning of Scripture, a meaning that has to be elucidated by further analysis.

Then, he introduces a long quote from Martinus Ruarus, to present the Socinian position. This is an interesting move, since he thereby continues not so much the Grotius-Crellius debate, but rather the discussion between Grotius and his Dutch correspondents among whom Ruarus was one. The letter in question was not (yet) published, but paucorum manibus versetur. Ruarus argues that God’s acceptatio has not occurred on the basis of some price or merit, but out of God’s love.

The long passage ends with remarking that it would go against God’s justice to require of an innocent the punishment due to the culpable.

30 Velthuysen 1648, Specimen, dedication: “abdicata quorumlibet hominum authoritate, animoque omnibus praefacudiciis … denudato, mihi aditum ad veritatem faciam per prima principia, quorum nemo sanus probationem postulaverit.”

31 Velthuysen 1648, Specimen, 2: “Deum patrem, pro immensa sua misericordia, & amore erga genus humanum misisse in mundum filium suum unigenitum, qui homines per & propter peccata aeternae damnnationi obnoxios, per obedientiam, mortem, & reliquias passiones, quae eam praecepsse, vere pro eorum peccatis satisfaciendo, redimeret à perdizione aeterna.”

32 Velthuysen 1648, Specimen, 3–5: “utar verbis Ruari cujustudam, viri inter adversarios imprimis docti, & magni nominis, qui in Epistola quadam familiari ad amicum, suam, & in ea communem Socinianorum fidem super hoc articulo sic exponet.”

33 Cf. Ruarus 1677, Martini. Martinus Ruarus (1588–1657) explained in a letter to Grotius his close connection to Crellius: Ruarus to Hugo Grotius, 12 dec 1631: “Quocirca facere non potui, quin cum amicissimus mihi Johannes Crellis & literas & librum tibi quendam suum per meas manus destinaret, illius literis meas instar umbrae socia adjungerem, quibus hunc in te affectu erga me pro virili foverem. His tu, si quid ad nos rescribere fortasse dignaberis, tuto committere poteris: sin illi minus tibi erunt praecho, vir praestantissimus Franciscus Limburgius Amstelodamensis mercator, mihi jam pridem amicus, & tibi quoque ut opinor non ignotus, hanc nobis operam lubenter praestabit.” (161–162).

34 Ruarus 1677, Martini, pp. 147–149, Martini to Frederic Schosser, 3 April 1630: “meritum stricte dictum satisfacione excludo … non ex proportione operum, sed ex Dei, aut beneplacito, aut promissio mensuratum … [and finally:] nec justitia Dei permittat, ut poena nocenti debita, innocenti irrogetur.”
And indeed, Velthuysen is going to structure his argument on the basis of this challenge: to safeguard the traditional and common-sense meaning of this central article of creed in the light of the rationalist considerations of the Socinians. Interestingly, he seems to accept a large part of Ruarus’ analysis—though without acknowledging so—as he concentrates on the last bit: the punishment of an innocent. Indeed, he sets off on a deeply philosophical adventure, to demonstrate that man cannot trade or contract with God; and that God’s transcendence implies a much more complicated relationship between God and His creation than either Grotius, or the Counter-Remonstrants may have believed. Equally interesting, he integrates essential Grotian doctrine of natural law into his theology. It will be very helpful to our understanding of Grotius’ intervention in the Socinian debate to follow this further development. Essentially, that Velthuysen denies that God punishes the innocent, and at the same time proves that he still can uphold that justification is not a recompense for fides & bona opera.

Velthuysen maintains that even while God is the highest authority and absolute ruler of the universe, nevertheless there is a ‘right by which to everyone belongs everything that he judges necessary to his existence; in such a way that, although nobody lords over other people except by explicit or implicit pact, a ruler can nonetheless prescribe laws to the citizens and force them if they do not obey’. (p. 9) This right of the ruler is the very same right of all men in the first of times, and the ruler acts similarly for the conservation of society as individual men for their own preservation. These natural rights in extreme cases justify war, although ‘non nisi extrema est necessitas. Et si in bellum erumpat contentio, ab utraque parte fit justum’ (p. 10).

If indeed rule is based on contract, then God’s rule can be regarded as based on contract as well: even while God does not really contract with men, he grants men certain rights, because like other rulers, God wants men to obey out of their own free will. So God obtains men’s obedience by promises rather than punishment, licet pactum fuerit gratuïtum (pp. 13–14). Velthuysen wants us to distinguish between a privilege based on a contract, and hence a right that must be respected justitiâ salvâ, and a pure liberalitas in which the subjects are no party. It is the former that wise rulers prefer. A similar argument applies to God’s norms of justice. God’s justice must be understandable by man: the norms of justice should be ea ut justa, secundum certas regulas justitiae, quae inter homines in usu sunt, ab hominibus judicari possit: quorsum enim alioquin Deus toties ad suae justitiae contemplationem homines invitaret Ier 9:24. 2 Chr. 19.v. 7. &
in aliis locis infinitis’. We see Velthuysen here continuing the rationalist project Grotius presented in his De satisfactione: a strict parallelism between God as a ruler and human rulers, between God’s justice and human justice.

Also, in respect to the concept of punishment, Velthuysen sides with the early Grotius. Punishment is not a ‘compensation of suffering’, as Crellius wants it. “The aim of punishment is not quite a recompense for the suffering received from the injustice, but a removal of future suffering. Such suffering would, however, follow previous injustice and the suffering following from that, if it were perpetrated unpunished”. This argument fits into the previous: only if the norms of justice are clear, can prevention have a chance of success. This also helps explain that punishment does not involve an element of joy (which it would have had, if it were a recompense for endured suffering). Punishment is a careful judgment of negative and positive utilities, considered from the perspective of the “pax & reipublicae incolunmitas” (p. 29). Thus, it is easily understood, that evil that does not noticeably damage the state can remain unpunished.

Along these lines, Velthuysen further expounds the irrelevance to try to forbid what cannot depend on law, but only on the good will of the people (we don’t ask the merchants a promise never to cheat, p. 29). In this sense we should read the old saying: salutem reipublicae summam legem esse. (p. 30) Moreover, it is not in debitum that we find the formal cause of punishment. Debit follows contract (or delictum), punishment is founded “in illo jure pramaevo, quo cuique licet in proximum, quod sano judicio existimat conducere” (p. 35). This is most evident in the fact that rulers also punish outside their own territory. This also coheres with the Scriptural admonishment that we should forgive our wrongdoers, because “if that is done what induces fear in men, the laws will be satisfied”. We do not punish because we want revenge, or want to see people suffer, “sed quia nos jus habemus nosmet conservandi” (p. 45).

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35 Velthuysen 1648, Specimen, pp. 25–26: “Finem poenarum non esse proprie satisfactionem pro damno accepto per injuriam: sed propulsationem damni futuri: quod tamen ex priori injuria, & damno per eam accepto, si impune transmitteretur, ad nos rediret”.

36 This evidently is one of the early formulations of the Dutch practice of ‘gedogen’ or permissiveness, like ‘no war on soft drugs, as that might lead to an awkwardly repressive structure’.

37 Velthuysen 1648, Specimen, p. 40: “si itaque id praestetur, quo hominibus terror incutitur, legibus satisfactum est”. p. 40.
In consecutive steps Velthuysen demonstrates that Christ’s satisfaction is independent from original sin, that punishment is also independent from the actual sinner, and that ultimately the very notion of justice is crucial to understand punishment. Like Grotius, Velthuysen deploys a humanist Christianity on its way to the Enlightenment: Christ’s redemption is not independent from man’s actions, but requires the establishment of justice on earth. A strong anti-Augustinian tendency united Grotius and Velthuysen, even if they both fall short of a perfectionist position like that of Dirk Coornhert. They have arrived at their position from the opposite end: by taking the challenge of reason of state serious. In Grotius this is represented in the crucial notion of *fides*, in Velthuysen it is the reliance on the right of self-defense. For Grotius *fides* is the fountain of morality. Velthuysen will attempt a derivation of benevolence from the love of self.\(^{38}\) Their realism in politics is always contained in a framework of justice.\(^{39}\)

Velthuysen eventually will sharply distinguish God’s rule from that of man. As Creator of the World and *dominus mundi* God has absolute rule, whereas among men, where this *dominium* is absent, rule can only be based on contract. God’s rule is evident from the decrees he has issued. These decrees are freely declared. Contract is a set of mutual obligations, which can exist among men, but not between man and God. We cannot contract with God since, even where the Scripture speaks of contract, it must be understood as a free and arbitrary gift by God.

The central distinction for both Grotius and Velthuysen is the one between contractual relations on the one hand, and the function of

\(^{38}\) See Blom 1995, *Causality*, chapters 4 and 5. Essentially, Velthuysen will argue that the *efficient cause* of benevolence is ‘the law of self-preservation’, while the *efficient cause* of property is benevolence, i.e. an other-regarding attitude (the latter holds, because property is always the recognition of others’ rights).

\(^{39}\) Velthuysen, e.g. argues, that when a state *necessitate coacta* starts a war against another country, *propter rerum necessariorum penuriam* outside the control of this other country, then this war even if *ab utraque parte justum*, cannot be called a punishment, not because the other country has not acted against us or did not hurt our rights, but because the formal reason of punishment is absent; i.e. the application of harm after a harm has been done to our society that, if unpunished, will produce further harm. Velthuysen 1648, *Specimen*, p. 47: “non vocatur vindicta, neque poena; non ideo, quia illa societas, quam armis aggressimur, nihil in nos commissit, aut jus non violavit: sed quia deest formalis ratio poenae, quae est inflicto mali propter malum, quo laesa est societas, quod malum sua natura aptum est, ni vindicetur, post se trahere aliud malum”.

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law on the other. Contracts define mutual obligations, the mine and thine in social relations. Here the relationship is one of creditor and debtor. And while the *neminem laedere* and the *pacta sunt servanda* are the basic principles of contractual relations, even while necessity and self-preservation may sometimes lead to conflicting outcomes, punishment is not and cannot be part of contract.

Matters are different from the perspective of law: the intention of law is obedience. This obedience—as Velthuysen stresses time and again—is best obtained if performed voluntarily. Nevertheless, the magistrate has to employ means to secure obedience. Punishment is the instrument to obtain obedience in the future. In an interesting evocation of *De jure belli ac pacis*, Velthuysen argues that it is not the contract that produces the grounds for obedience, but the intention of the lawgiver to have the laws obeyed. The only reason, he says—repeating Grotius’ argument in *De satisfactione*—that a transgression of laws by people living in other countries is not generally punished by the magistrates, is to be found in the fact that these transgressions do not normally harm the interests of the magistrates’ own country. But if they do, then there is a just cause for war.

By this distinction between private, contractual relations and public law, Velthuysen enhances his definition of punishment as an instrument to ensure future obedience to the law and thereby to promote the end of laws themselves, the *salus populi*. Thus the magistrates may very well exempt a wrong-doer from punishment, or even punish innocent people, as e.g. they might punish a son for what his father did. The public well-being may dictate so. The same goes for just war: here many innocent people are punished (in passing, Velthuysen denies the notion of a collective responsibility of a people for their magistrates’ wrongs). War indeed is a deterrent rather than a retribution, and even where presented as a retribution it really is a deterrent.

By stressing the interdependence of law enforcement and a self-reliant social morality, we can better understand the contractual origins of the state. The state is not a precondition for moral norms in society, but rather the precondition for the private-public distinction. As Velthuysen already had pointed out in 1648: the political contract is something *naturae superveniens*, and its purpose is to give the magistrate the monopoly of punishment, on the basis of which the magistrate proclaims laws. Since the pristine right to punish looked at self-preservation, the laws should look at the conservation and the *salus populi* of the community. There are many things, however, that a magis-
trate should not prescribe. They might, in one of Velthuysen’s examples, consider to require from merchants a solemn pledge that they will never give underweight, as if by bringing in the force of religion many evils might be prevented. But the magistrate should realize that the commonwealth does not require at all such a constriction of conscience. It will simply not be an expedient thing to do.

In this attempt to integrate the different theories of punishment in *De satisfactione* and *DJB&P*, Velthuysen directs the attention to one of the main reasons that Grotius may have had at changing his perspective from the former to the latter book. In *De satisfactione* he had reached the limits of his rationalist theology. Pursuing that line would have forced him either to accept a naturalist position (which is that of Velthuysen) or a theocratic one. The solution he chose was to separate God’s justice from that of man. This allowed him to make justice the business of all, even if this meant a loss of certainty in the application of punishment. However, it implied at the same time a great opportunity for the truth of justice, resulting from the social process of justification that goes with it.

Van den Wijnpersse and his friends in the *Haagsche Genootschap* were remarkably favorable of Grotius. They accepted his conception of the redemption through Christ, as much as they knew him as the father of modern natural law. They may have just noticed the inconsistency between the two theories of punishment, but they were unaware of the difficulties that had marked Grotius’ quest for a satisfactory theory of sociability. In their time, religion and natural law had long ended their disputes.

Looking for the place of the Socinian theme in the writings of Hugo Grotius, we combined two research strategies: the theological and the juridico-political lines. We showed how Grotius developed his ideas on punishment and at the same time further detailed his ideas about God’s command of the world. From the Aristotelian position in *De aequitate*, to that in *DJP* and from there onwards to *De satisfactione* and *DJB&P*, a natural connection between offence and punishment is left behind, and is replaced by the punishing rector of society first, and the punishing righteous individuals later on. The implied continuity between God-Rector and magistrate-rector makes for a continuity between godly and worldly justice, or rather, seems to organize God’s rectorial punishment according to human conceptions. So Grotius was happy to argue reasonably against Socinus’ idea that the whole idea of Christ suffering
to satisfy for our sins is against reason: as a wise Rector He has both accepted Christ’s satisfaction and dispensed the believers from the punishment by eternal death, precisely because He wanted to impress upon man the need to follow Christ.

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At the beginning of his defense of faith *De veritate religionis Christianae*, Hugo Grotius recommends the work as a sort of pocket dogmatic for sojourners in the everyday world. Grotius wants to instruct his readers in the Christian faith, in order to make Christianity known to the wider world of the Dutch sea traders.\(^1\) Despite this address to the general laity, the work was nonetheless soon discussed within theological circles. In this way, Grotius’ *De Veritate*, much like his defense of the doctrine of Atonement, was, among other things, suspected of being “Socinian.”\(^2\) It is questionable whether this accusation of Socinianism has any basis in fact. Grotius himself names three theologians who already before him had written comparable apologetic works, and who served as models: Raimund von Sabunde, Juan Luis Vives, and Philippe Duplessis-Mornay.\(^3\) Actually, in volumes three through six of *De veritate*, Grotius makes clear references to Vives and Duplessis-Mornay, and in this manner, Grotius’ argumentation against Islam relies especially on Vives’ *De veritate fidei Christianae* of 1543. However, volumes one and two of *De veritate religionis Christianae* do not rely on the authors that Grotius calls by name. These books rely much more on an established pattern of argumentation which is found in Fausto Sozzini’s *De auctoritate sacrae scripturae* of 1568.\(^4\) Here it is made clear that the accusation of Socinianism against Grotius, at least this far, is not unfounded, since Grotius did not take part in the general condemnation of the Socinian minority in

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\(^1\) Grotius 1972, *De veritate*, p. 3.
\(^3\) Grotius 1972, *De veritate*, p. 3.
Europe. Rather, he tacitly used Socinianism as a source for his theological work, thereby guarding himself against all too open confessions.

The work *De veritate religionis Christianae*, which developed further through different versions, culminating in 1640 in an academic Latin version with an extensive footnote apparatus, rapidly circulated throughout Europe, and was translated into many European languages. In addition to this, the Oxford Orientalist Edward Pocock, Sr., produced an Arabic translation of *De veritate* in 1660. With this translation, Pocock addressed himself to Muslims in the entire Arabian world, who perhaps interested him as the newest development within Christianity. In addition, Pocock also had the Christian minority of the Orient in mind, for whom, through *De veritate*, the connection to the actual theological discussions in Europe might be made possible.\(^5\) Little is known, unfortunately, about the reception of *De veritate* in the Orient. It is only certain that the sixth book in Pocock’s translation was used as a successful refutation of Islam for missionary purposes in the Pietism of Halle.\(^6\)

2. *The State of Christian Study of Islam at the Beginning of the 17th Century*

It goes without saying that Hugo Grotius was not the first Christian theologian to deal with Islam. At the beginning of the 17th Century, Grotius could already look back on a long tradition of Christian analysis of Islam. As Islam developed in the 7th Century, the Arabian areas were filled with a multitude of religions, so it is not strange that Muhammad was confronted with, among other things, Christianity, and developed his own view of Jesus. To the Christians who were first confronted with Islam, it seemed to be one among many Christian heresies which one combated through religious dialogue. This approach to the problem was decisive for the first century of Christian-Muslim dialogue. At first, it was only the Eastern Church that dialogued with Islam. Theologians such as John of Damascus and his student Abu Qurra lived in the Arabic world and spoke Arabic. They criticized the Qur’an and Muhammad’s view of Jesus, whereby they especially emphasized the meaning of Soteriology. The 9th Century dialogue of Niketas the theologian, as the Byzantine Empire was being threatened militarily by the Abbasides


\(^6\) Callenberg 1731, *Praefatio*, p. 2.
was one of the first polemical intensifications in the Christian-Muslim confrontation. Niketas refuted Islam with rational arguments and came to the conclusion that the Muslims did not yet worship the true God. In this way, Islam was no longer understood by him as a mere heresy, but rather as a freestanding, false religion next to Christianity, which he regarded as something to be fought against. In the course of the military confrontation, even the style of the theological debate grew steadily more aggressive. However, the theological level could not be further improved. Rather, Arabic religious philosophy from the 9th Century improved through the teaching of rhetorical skills to Islamic theologians. A comparable developmental push did not take place on the side of the Eastern Church. Many of the later works of Byzantine theologians are, in light of more detailed analysis, revealed to be reworkings of the writings of John of Damascus, Abu Qurra, and Niketas. An example of this is Euthymius Zigabenus’s *Panoplia*. Euthymius took over the arguments of Niketas, and used them against the Turks in accordance with the new political situation.\footnote{Gauß 1963, *Glaubensdiskussionen zwischen Ostkirche und Islam im 8.-11. Jahrhundert*.}

Whereas the Eastern Church was confronted with Islam from the beginning, it only later became a theme for discussion in the Western Church. The beginnings of confrontation with the new religion of the Orient arose out of the Arabian occupation of Spain, the Crusades, and the resulting missionary troubles of the Dominicans and the Franciscans. In the time of the Crusades, it was Peter the Venerable, who, in contrast to Bernard of Clairvaux, prioritized the spiritual victory of Islam over the military one, and who was the first theologian to enter into dialogue with Islam. The translation of the Qur’an of 1143 that he initiated remained one of the few that existed until early modernity.\footnote{For Qur’anic translations, Kritzeck 1964, *Peter the Venerable and Islam*, pp. 62–65 and 97–100.}

Even the Dominican and Franciscan missionaries of the 13th and 14th Centuries contributed to the dialogue with Islam through their writings. As important writers of this time, one could name Wilhelm of Tripolis, Thomas Aquinas, and Raimundus Lullus. Especially noteworthy is Riccoldo da Monte Croce, because of his historical influence. Through his *Confutatio Alcorani*, the Dominican missionary created an important foundation for the understanding of Islam in the Occident.\footnote{Altaner 1936, *Zur Geschichte der anti-islamischen Polemik während des 13. und 14. Jahrhunderts*, pp. 229–230.}
From the 15th Century on, the Christian world saw Islam in the context of a real threat because of the expanding Ottoman Empire. Already in the 14th Century, Serbia and Bulgaria were under the control of the Turks. Constantinople fell in 1453, and soon thereafter, Venice concluded a peace agreement with the new power on the Bosphorus in the interest of trade. As a result, even the rulers of the Christian Occident were forced to regard the Turks as a new political and military power in Europe. In this early period of the Turkish threat, Nicolaus of Cusa wrote the text *Cribratio Alkorani*, which was closely related to the attempt of Pope Pius II, through a letter, to convert the Sultan. Nicolaus’ program of an examination of the Qur’an resulted from the thought that the truth of the Gospel could even be found behind the external appearance of other religions. In this sense, *Cribratio Alkorani* laid bare everything Christian in the Qur’an, and explained the central Christian dogmas in a philosophical manner. The substantial and influential idea of Nicolaus of Cusa to convert the Sultan and integrate him into the Christian world through this text was, in any case, unsuccessful.\(^\text{10}\) The opposite approach, namely, that of confrontation, proved to be just as pointless. Every attempt of the Pope to revive the ideas of the Crusades, and in this way to unify all Christendom and mobilize it against the Sultan, more or less failed.

In this situation, it was Martin Luther who rigorously tried to trace the theological dialogue with Islam, and who distanced himself from the thoughts of the Crusades. In his opinion, the Emperor alone must oppose the Turks by means of a defensive war. In the interest of a theological treatment of the Turkish threat, Luther attempted to get the most detailed knowledge of Islam possible, and characterized it above all as a danger that must be opposed within Christendom. In the framework of his salvation history doctrine, Luther interpreted the two eschatological tyrants, under which Christianity must suffer in Daniel 7, as the Turks and the Papacy. In light of this eschatological interpretation, coping with the military aspect of the Turkish threat appeared less important to Luther, since, according to his beliefs, the last adversary of Christ could not be defeated by human hand, but only from heaven. According to Luther, Christians should view this Turkish threat above all as a catalyst for repentance, and the Church should

preserve itself internally from false beliefs.\textsuperscript{11} It was in this spirit that the term “Turk” was used by many theologians even against theological opponents within Christianity. Indeed, there were even isolated cases in which Christian Socinians, with a view to their own dogmatic affinity with Islam, hoped quietly for support from the political powers of the Orient; therefore the polemical appellation of the Socinians as “Turks” did not appear wholly out of thin air.\textsuperscript{12}

Since the beginning of the Turkish threat in the 15\textsuperscript{th} Century, neither the Pope nor the Emperor had successfully built a unified front against the Turks. Many princes at the beginning of the 16\textsuperscript{th} Century were more interested in finding a peaceful cooperation with the Turks rather than a war, and offered assistance to the Emperor only in exchange for religious freedom. As the Turkish troops under Suliman the Magnificent moved forward through the Balkan states during the 1520’s, the military forces of Christian Europe were incapable of successfully countering the advance. At this time, fear of the Turks also reached its peak, a fear which during the entire 16\textsuperscript{th} Century precipitated from an abundance of Turkish pressure. Through the publication of mercenary tales, reports from prisoners of war, travelogues and Turkish songs, printers served the quickened public demand for news about the Turks, mostly in the local languages.\textsuperscript{13} Although the number of Turkish publications which circulated in the 16\textsuperscript{th} Century in Europe is quite large, dependable reports about the Turks remain a rarity. It is therefore not strange, that, at that time, reports based on the author’s authentic experiences enjoyed an especially great popularity. Even within these relatively objective accounts of the Turks, however, clear tendencies can be seen. On the strength of credible eyewitness reports, very negative descriptions of the Turks could be composed, in which the Turks were above all seen as a military threat.\textsuperscript{14} However, some authors attempted to bring the priority of Turkish culture of the Turks to the foreground, as is best observed in the second half of the 16\textsuperscript{th} Century. The external military threat of the Turks, which had put Europe in a state of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12} On this point to the contribution in this volume by Mulsow, \textit{The “New Socinians”: Intertextuality and Cultural Exchange in Late Socinism} or the chapter about the Unitarian, Adam Neuser, who converted to Islam, by Prinát 1961, \textit{Die Ideologie der Siebenbürger Antitrinitarier in den 1570er Jahren}, pp. 122–123.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Göllner 1978, \textit{Turcica III}, pp. 17–20.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Göllner 1978, \textit{Turcica III}, p. 27.
\end{itemize}
fear through the 1520’s and 1530’s, diminished, and the internal climate became more favorable for favorable attitudes to Turkish culture. One example of this is the French author, Guillaume Postel. France, to the disadvantage of Charles V, had since the 1530’s been well positioned with respect to the Turks, and had good diplomatic relations with Constantinople. In 1536, under the French ambassador Jean de la Forest, an expedition was dispatched to research the Ottoman Empire and Islam, as well as to collect Oriental and classical manuscripts. The scientific leadership of this expedition was taken over by the Orientalist and mathematician Postel. In the text that Postel wrote at the conclusion of his research expedition, he confronted the Christian world with an extremely positive view of Turkish culture. In the first volume of the work, *De Orbis terrae concordia libri quattuor*, Postel praised in detail the advantages of the Ottoman Empire, which he saw especially in their educational system, in their care for the poor, in the uniformity of the Arabic language across the whole Orient, and in the Turkish justice system. Postel also described Islam from a comparative-religions perspective, wherein he merely valued it as relatively weaker than Christianity. Therefore, Postel can be regarded as an exponent of an unusually open-minded stance regarding the Turks and Islam.

At the same time as the new cultural interest in the Ottoman Empire, European scholars also undertook an improvement of the knowledge of Arabic. At the Universities of Paris, Oxford, Cambridge, and Leiden, influential philologists promoted Arabic studies. In addition to the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, the young University of Leiden achieved a good reputation in this area. In 1613, the unusually gifted philologist Thomas Erpenius was called to be the first professor of Arabic studies there. With such pointed support for Arabic studies, the University of Leiden in no way followed the individual interests of its philologists. The Orient and the Arabic language were just beginning to be an issue in the Netherlands at the beginning of the 17th Century through the merchants of the East India Company. The shipping

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Hugo Grotius’ position on Islam

Trade of the Netherlands was urgently ordered to safer ports on the North African coast and could not have made the change without the knowledge of Arabic. Moreover, since 1614 the traders of the East India Company had directed their attention to the Arabian Peninsula and began to examine the trade possibilities in the region. In addition to a good knowledge of Arabic, this also required clever dealings with the Ottomans, who governed Arabia at this time.\(^\text{17}\) The diplomatic contact between the General States of the Netherlands and the Morroccan Sultan against Catholic Spain should also be mentioned as another ground of the new interest for Arabic Studies.\(^\text{18}\) In light of these political and economic relationships, in the sixth book of De veritate, Grotius dealt with the theological side of this extensive theme, which at the beginning of the 17th Century was becoming a topic of broad interest.

3. Grotius’ Argumentation against Islam

The discussion of the non-Christian religions, which Grotius carries out in the last three volumes of De veritate, is ordered chronologically. In a way, Paganism and Judaism were dealt with as preliminary stages of the Christian religion, after which Islam followed in the last volume. It is wholly in keeping with this chronological construction that Grotius began his study historically, with the advent of Islam. Grotius examined the emergence of Islam as a date within church history, and understood it within the framework of historical theology.

Since the time of Constantine, the Christian church had been increasingly embroiled in worldly affairs. Additionally, doctrinal debates and the system of external rites began to overshadow honest piety and inner conviction. God opposed this decline of the young church, in that he sent warring people against Christendom as a punishment, so that it might reform itself. In the framework of this purifying punishment of God, Grotius can also explain the appearance of Islam. God allowed Muhammad to found in Arabia a new religion which opposed Christianity, which, to some extent, would reflect Christianity’s depravity back to itself, and in the course of dialogue with Islam, mend its

\(^{17}\) Brugman and Schröder 1979, Arabic Studies in the Netherlands, p. 17 and Beckingham 1951, Dutch Travellers in Arabia in the Seventeenth Century, pp. 66 and 172.

\(^{18}\) García-Arenal / Wiegers 2003, A Man of Three Worlds, pp. 53–82.
ways. Like Luther, Grotius also understood Islam to be a punishment from God; unlike Luther, however, he did not interpret this eschatologically. Grotius focused his gaze much more upon God’s pedagogical goal within time, which God pursued with His punishment, and this goal, according to Grotius, is the improvement of dilapidated Christianity. It is remarkable that in Grotius’ portrayal of the emergence of Islam he also continually looks at the connection between Islam and the people of the Orient. Islam, which spread quickly in the Orient after the appearance of Muhammad, was adopted first by the Saracens, and later by the militarily successful Turks, whose customs went well together with those of Islam.

As the two most important foundations of Islam, Grotius named the performance of external rites, and the blind obedience of faith, which prohibited Muslims from developing their own opinions about Islam through independent reading of the holy books. From this standpoint, Islam appeared to Grotius as a “… specta merx …,” which one ought to ‘buy’ without first being allowed to test it for oneself. Grotius rejected the reserve of Islamic doctrine, but not only as bad business methods. He insisted that God had equipped humanity with an ability to judge religious questions, which enabled people to form for themselves independent opinions exactly here, in questions of salvation.

From the Old and New Testaments, Grotius arrives at a further devaluation of Islam. It is true that Muhammad himself acknowledged both Moses and Jesus as holy men, but his reports about them, in part, contradict the Bible. Muhammad taught that Jesus was carried secretly into heaven and that he was not crucified first, but rather that instead of him, one merely resembling him died in his place. Grotius rejected this view of Jesus and insisted on the credibility of the Biblical tradition. Grotius also denied the assertion that the Paraclete from John’s gospel had originally been identical to Muhammad, and that the name Muhammad was later erased from the text. He pointed out the extensive temporal and geographical scattering of the Biblical manuscripts which excluded such forgeries, particularly since on the Christian side, before the appearance of Muhammad, no interest

19 Grotius 1972, *De veritate*, p. 90.
20 Grotius 1972, *De veritate*, p. 90.
21 Grotius 1972, *De veritate*, p. 90.
22 Grotius 1972, *De veritate*, p. 91.
could have existed to distance itself from that name.\textsuperscript{23} For Grotius, the superiority of Christianity over Islam was also evident in the comparison of the two founders of the respective religions and their lifestyles. As Muhammad himself recognized, Jesus is the Messiah who is named in the Old Testament, who would give God’s word, intellect and wisdom,\textsuperscript{24} and who had no living father, whereas Muhammad descended from human parents. Additionally, Jesus lived an ethically perfect life, while Muhammad had been a thief and a womanizer. The last remaining difference is that Jesus ascended into heaven, in contrast to Muhammad, who still lies in the grave. That which Grotius says here about the two founders can also analogously be ascribed to the first disciples of Christianity and Islam. The first Christians were God-fearing men, whereby the first Muslims were thieves.\textsuperscript{25}

Additionally, with a comparison of the expansion of both religions, Grotius showed the superiority of Christianity. Christendom owed its expansion to the miracles of Jesus and the steadfastness of the Christian martyrs. In contrast, both of these things are foreign to Islam. As the Pagans before them, the Muslims praised the military expansion of their religion, which, however, did not always go forward without setbacks. Grotius held the military expansion of the religion to be worthless, since in this manner the voluntary nature of worship cannot be guaranteed. Any worship that is motivated by external compulsion might, under the circumstances, be feigned.\textsuperscript{26} At this point, Grotius adds to the section yet another argument, which in this context seems to be quite strange. Since he has emphasized the importance of freedom of religion, it is somewhat unexpected that he remarks that in the war that the followers of Islam wage in order to expand their religion they have ultimately not achieved their goal, since Islam holds itself to be tolerant of other religions and even permits the subjugated Christians to practice their religion.\textsuperscript{27} With this, Grotius makes reference to an aspect of Islam which to him appeared to be attractive to many Western thinkers as early as the 16\textsuperscript{th} Century. Grotius apparently considered himself obliged to point out the tolerance of Islam, although

\textsuperscript{23} Grotius 1972, \textit{De veritate}, p. 91.
\textsuperscript{24} Grotius 1972, \textit{De veritate}, p. 91.
\textsuperscript{25} Grotius 1972, \textit{De veritate}, p. 92.
\textsuperscript{26} Grotius 1972, \textit{De veritate}, p. 92.
\textsuperscript{27} Grotius 1972, \textit{De veritate}, p. 92. “Rursus autem hunc ipsum obtentum religionis ipsi destruunt, cum subactos sub imperium patiantur uti qua velint religione, imo & palam agnoscent interdum, Christianos in sua lege servari posse.”
he had to admit that Islam, on this point, was ahead of Christianity. In fact, he inserted this concession in such a way that it functioned as an argument against the military expansion of Islam. The attentive reader of the work could hardly escape the fact that here, in a subtle way, Grotius calls to mind the tolerance of Islam, and in this way reproaches Christianity, to show that, on the question of tolerance, it had something to learn from Islam. After the comparison of the expansions of both religions Grotius turns to the teachings of Christianity and Islam. Christianity teaches love of one’s enemies, lifelong marriage, religion of the heart, which bears fruit in the affairs of the world, and moderate eating and drinking. Islam, in contrast, teaches revenge in place of love of enemies, divorce and multiple marriages, emphasizes externality such as circumcision and forbids the enjoyment of wine and pork.28

In the following section Grotius deals with a dogmatic issue that is continually discussed in the Christian dialogue with Islam. Although Muhammad himself speaks about God in all manner of anthropomorphic images, he does not confess that God might be able to have a son, because this necessitates that God have a wife, which is not the case. Without thereby going more thoroughly into the particulars of orthodox Christology, Grotius here offers a short explanation as to why Christ can just as well be called the Son of God. It is noteworthy here that in his explanation, Grotius exclusively uses statements that are also recognized as true by Muslims. Grotius argues that that Christian hallmark of Jesus as the Son of God has the same meaning as that which Muhammad himself meant when he called him the Word of God. Namely, a Word was, in a way, begotten from the intellect. In addition to this, it is decreed that he was born of a virgin, wherein God’s actions replace fatherly fertility, and that, on the basis of God’s power, he is raised into heaven, which the Muslims also acknowledge, and so one can rightly call Jesus the Son of God.29 Actually, Grotius here touches on two fundamental dates of the Christological tradition: namely, that of the begetting of the Son, and his birth by Mary. Traditionally, the Son is identical to the Father with respect to his substance,

29 Grotius 1972, De veritate, p. 93. “Nos vero cum Iesum Dei Filium dicimus, hoc significamus quod ipse cum eum Verbum Dei dicit: verbum enim ex mente suo quodam modo gignitur. Adde jam, quod ex virgine, sola Dei opera vim paternam supplente natus est, quod in coelum evectus Dei potestate; quae & ipsa Mahumeti confessa osten-
dunt Iesum singulari quodam jure Dei Filium appellari posse, & debere.”
because he is eternally begotten by the Father, and at the same time, he is identical in substance to humankind, because he is born from the flesh and blood of Mary. However, out of consideration for the Muslims, Grotius replaced the begetting of Christ through the Holy Spirit with a direct intervention from God, a move that the Socinians also make.

In the same way, he also diverges from the orthodox doctrine in his explanation of the conception of the Son, and by suggesting a begetting of the Son as the Word of God, *ex mente*, takes away from Christology that aspect wherein the Son is viewed as an uncreated, eternally existing person of the Trinitarian God. In this way, he avoids the traditional conception of the eternally begotten Son. Through his reference to the begetting and birth of Jesus, Grotius roughly depicts those lines of argumentation which, if taken differently, could have been continued along the lines of the Chalcedonian declarations. However, in consideration of the Muslims, Grotius distances himself from the orthodox confessions that Christ is identical with true man and true God, and that he consists of two natures. Additionally, the Trinitarian dimension of the theology of the title ‘Son’ was not at all discussed. Instead, Grotius stressed the ascension of Christ, which in this context was not traditionally discussed. Since this was not yet recognized by the Muslims, he likewise cited it as a unique aspect of Christ, which was to establish his title, Son. Further, in keeping with the Socinian doctrine, Grotius attached a greater value to the ascension of Christ as the beginning date of his kingly duties than orthodoxy did. Similarly, orthodoxy treats the Ascension as the beginning date of the exaltation of Christ, but is able to understand it from the standpoint of the eternally-established divinity of Christ, and therefore does not need to use the Ascension as the ground for the Son-title, or the divinity of Christ which the title implies.

In his explanation of the title Son Grotius reacted to Islam in the same way that he recommended for dealing with the heterodox minority of Christianity near the end of the book. This is intended to emphasize that which can be commonly ascertained, while not sacrificing the unity of the Church on the altar of doctrinal differences. The section about the Son-title for Christ leads to the conjecture that Grotius,

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30 As early as 1638, Schoockius expressed doubts about the orthodoxy of this passage, Heering 2004, *Hugo Grotius as Apologist for the Christian Religion*, p. 211.

31 Grotius 1972, *De veritate*, p. 95.
according to his Christian dogma, deals with Islam and the Socinians on an equal plane, since the Socinian Christology and its criticism of the doctrine of the Trinity demonstrate some similarities to those of Islam.\footnote{The footnotes of the sixth volume show that, according to Grotius, the Qur’\textacuted{a}n is the most important pillar for any argument, just as the Bible is for Christianity. For a comparison of Qur’\textacuted{a}nic and Socinian Christology, see, Schumann 1975, \textit{Der Christus der Muslime}, pp. 25–47 and Fock 1970, \textit{Der Sozinianismus}, pp. 509–651.} However, there was a fundamental difference between the Christology of the Qur’an and that of the Socinians, in that the Qur’an focuses on the preservation of God’s singularity, while the Socinians were interested in Soteriological issues. A systematic comparison shows, however, some agreement, especially concerning the prophetic duties of Christ. As far as the special qualities and godly signs of the coming of Jesus, one finds in both traditions Jesus’ virgin birth, life and miracles. Additionally, the understanding of the revelation as the Word and plan of God, and the understanding of the power of Jesus as an external gift from God, can be cited as commonalities, while at the same time the presentation of a \textit{raptus in coelum} is foreign to the Qur’an here. Important deviations from Socinian Christology are seen in the issues of revelation, the ascension, and the worship of Christ. Since, according to the Qur’an, Christ was rescued by God before he could die on the cross, and was carried up into heaven, the miracle of the resurrection could also not have occurred. Belief in the death, resurrection, and ascension of Christ was also not achieved in the Qur’an. Also, the worship of Christ who was carried up into heaven is also not possible according to the Qur’an. Despite this, it appears plausible that Grotius’ dogmatic candor with respect to Islam is grounded in his insight into the partially dogmatic congruence of Socinian doctrine and Qur’\textacuted{a}nic Christology. If this is the case, then here at work is that tolerance that Grotius encouraged with respect to Socinian doctrine, now directed at Islam.

After his explanation of the title Son Grotius turns to address a series of Arabian fables, which for the most part are not found in the Qur’an, and which, in Grotius’ view, demonstrate the droll imagination of the Muslim life. In this context, the depictions of the next world which are actually in the Qur’an are also criticized, since, from the Christian perspective, they appear all too mundane.\footnote{Grotius 1972, \textit{De veritate}, p. 93.}
4. The Footnotes

4.1. Authors in the Ancient Church and in Antiquity

Especially in the first section, in which Grotius addresses the emergence of Islam in the context of the decline of the young Church, one finds a series of citations from the time of the ancient Church. Furthermore, in the course of the argumentation where the voluntary nature of religion is cited against the forced spread of Islam, Grotius once again looks to the ancient Church and cites the church historian Lactanz.\(^\text{34}\) In addition to that, Grotius, in his remarks, touches on pagan antiquity through his references to Plato’s *Symposium*,\(^\text{35}\) without giving specific paragraph references. Here Grotius utilizes the discussion of *eros* in order to explain the begetting of the Word of God.

4.2. The Qur’an

Just as he refers to the Bible in his explanation of Christian doctrine, Grotius prefers to cite from the Qur’an in his analysis of Islam. Just as Vives before him, Grotius helps his readers by constantly referring back to the first Latin edition of the Qur’an.\(^\text{36}\) Grotius also makes use of the 1143 translation of the Qur’an by Robert of Ketton that was edited by Peter the Venerable, and which Theodore Bibliander revised and once again published in 1543.\(^\text{37}\)

4.3. Euthymius Zigabenus (†1120)

In the context of the explanation of the title, Son, for Christ, Grotius uses citations from the *Disputatio de fide cum philosopho saraceno in urbe melitine*, written by the Byzantine monk and theologian Euthymius Zigabenus. There, Grotius finds an example of the begetting of the Word, *ex mente*, which appears superficially to be comparable to the opinion presented by Grotius. In fact, Euthymius here shows in a dialogue with a Saracen, that he already understands the begetting of the Son as anal-

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\(^{34}\) Grotius 1972, *De veritate*, pp. 89–90 and 92.

\(^{35}\) Grotius 1972, *De veritate*, p. 93.

\(^{36}\) Grotius 1972, *De veritate*, p. 90.

ogous to the coming of the Word from the human spirit. It is worth mentioning, however, that Euthymius in no way allows this coming to exclude the Holy Spirit, and that, overall, he is explaining the beget-
ting in the context of the doctrine of the Trinity. In contrast, Grotius remains quiet about the context of Trinitarian doctrine in his citation, and consequently interprets quite freely that which Euthymius had for-
mulated in a very orthodox manner.\textsuperscript{38}

4.4. Peter the Venerable (1094–1156)

Grotius refers extremely frequently to the texts of Peter the Vener-
able, or to those texts translated by his order in the \textit{Corpus Toletanum}. The most meaningful of these translations is the aforementioned trans-
lation of the Qur’an by Robert of Ketton. The work outside of the Qur’an most frequently cited by Grotius was the manuscript \textit{Doctrina Mahumet}, written by Abdallah ibn-Salam and translated by Herrman of Dalmatia. The \textit{Doctrina Mahumet} gave an account of how Muhammad, while he was in Medina, was visited by a group of learned Jews, whose leader Abdallah questioned the prophet about his life and teachings. In this manner, the fictional dialogue deals with one hundred theologi-
cal questions about Islam, which Muhammad is able to answer in such an enlightening way that, in the end, Abdallah converts to Islam. Just as with Herrman of Dalmatia’s translation, and the edition by Peter the Venerable, Grotius cites the \textit{Liber generationis Mahumet et nutritia eius}, a translation of a collection of Jewish-Muslim legends, together with other texts, as proof of the human origin of Muhammad.

The text attempts to trace the appearance of a prophetic light through the generations, from Adam to Muhammad. Particular em-
phasis falls on the account of the miraculous events surrounding the birth and childhood of the prophet. Finally, it is important to mention the \textit{Disputatio Saraceni et Christiani à Petro Cluniacensi edita},\textsuperscript{39} which is also cited by Grotius. It deals with an Islamic-Christian dialogue between Al-Hashimi and Al-Kindi, and was translated from the Arabic accord-
ing to the instructions of Peter the Venerable.\textsuperscript{40}


\textsuperscript{39} Grotius 1972, \textit{De veritate}, p. 92.

\textsuperscript{40} Heering 2004, \textit{Hugo Grotius as Apologist for the Christian Religion}, p. 196. To the two
4.5. Ioannes Kantakuzenos (†1383)

Ioannes Kantakuzenos ruled the Byzantine Empire as self-proclaimed Emperor from 1341 to 1355. After his abdication, he retreated to a monastery and died in 1383. For a friend who had converted from Islam, he wrote some polemical treatises against Islam which, as regards content, relied to a large degree on the work of Riccoldo da Monte Croce. Amongst them is the *Contra Mahometem Orationes Quatuor*, which Grotius cites as evidence of two Muslim miracle stories not contained in the Qur’an.\(^{41}\)

4.6. Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464)

In the context of the begetting of the Son, *ex mente*, Grotius also refers to Nicholas of Cusa, and his 1461 text, *Cribratio Alkorani*.\(^{42}\) Through this reference, Grotius places himself in the tradition of a program of examining the Qur’an, which wants to create a theological basis for the integration of Islam into the Christian world. Grotius points to one place where Nicholas explains that it is also written in the Qur’an that everything is created through the Word. From this it follows that the Word, of which such a thing is said, cannot be created. In essence, this contains the conceptual kernel of the Christian doctrine of the begetting of the Logos. Therefore, the Logos is uncreated even according to the Muslim view. That the Logos is not finally called the Son of God by the Muslims appears to Nicholas as a triviality, since the Gospel calls the Word above all therefore the only-begotten child of God, since God according to this as according to the Plan created the world.\(^{43}\) According to Nicholas, since even the Muslims do not reject this meaning of the Logos, they do not disagree with the true content of the Christian doctrine. Grotius also cites a place in which the Logos is addressed in its function as a mediator of creation. Apparently, Grotius wanted to tie these thoughts together, and


\(^{42}\) Grotius 1972, *De veritate*, p. 93.

through the reference to Nicholas, to understand the Logos created \textit{ex mente}, above all, as a plan for the world in which God ordered it rationally.

4.7. \textit{Laonikos Chalkokondyles (1423–1490)}

In the first section of the sixth book, in which Grotius depicts the origin of Islam and its earliest expansion in the Orient, he cites the Byzantine historiographer Laonikos Chalkokondyles.\footnote{Grotius 1972, \textit{De veritate}, p. 90.} In his work, \textit{Ἀποδείξεως ἱστορίων}, he gives the historical account of the years 1298 to 1463 under the rubric of the question: How was it possible that the Turks became the rulers of the Greeks, and were able to annihilate this people, who previously appeared to be the focal point of world history? By referring to the Turkish sources, which Chalkokondyles conscientiously examined, he illuminated the origin of the Turks, the sequence of their rulers, their customs, and the everyday organization of the Ottoman Empire. Just as William Postel one hundred years after him, Chalkokondyles interpreted the emergence of Islam as a punishment from God against Christendom, that in the mirror of Islam, Christianity might recognize its own sinfulness.\footnote{For the history of the development of this line of thought, see Heering 2004, \textit{Hugo Grotius as Apologist for the Christian Religion}, p. 159.} Grotius also borrowed these thoughts from Chalkokondyles. Chalkokondyles was eagerly accepted in Western Europe as an authority on Turkish history. In 1556, a Latin version of his work was published in Basel under the title, \textit{De origine et rebus gestis Turcarum libri decem}. A French translation appeared in 1577.\footnote{Moravcsik 1958, \textit{Byzantinoturcica I}, pp. 391–397 and Göllner 1968, \textit{Turcica II}, pp. 47–48 and 363 and 410.}

4.8. \textit{Riccoldo da Monte Croce—Captivus Septemcastrensis}

In the section on the title, Son, for Christ, Grotius refers to yet another text, this one called, \textit{Contra Mahumetistas}. A certain “Richardus” is named as author.\footnote{Grotius 1972, \textit{De veritate}, p. 93.} This very inexact attribution makes it difficult to trace the text back to its author. Possibly the attribution refers to Riccoldo da Monte Croce, who is often cited as “Richardus,” and his text \textit{Confatatio Alcorani}. The Dominican missionary went on a journey to
Baghdad in 1300, and there he learned the Qur’an and Arabic. His relatively benevolent text refuting Islam found a broad audience in the West. Cydonius’ retranslation back into original Latin from the Greek found entry into Theodore Bibliander’s collection of works, *Machumetis Saracenorum principis, eiusque successorum vitae, doctrina, ac ipse Alcoran*, so that it was easily accessible to Grotius. However, the citation could just as easily refer to the original 1509 edition of the text, *Contra sectam Mahumeticam*, by Captivus Septemcastrensis. Since it was often printed as an appendix to the works of Riccoldo, it would still be regarded as the work of a “Richardus,” and be so cited. Just as Georgewitz a short time after him, Captivus Septemcastrensis wrote travelogues that give information about the history and customs of the Ottomans, mixed with autobiographical notes. Some portions of the text *Contra sectam Mahumeticam* are devoted to the faith of the Turks. It is possible that Grotius makes reference to these.48


Another unusual footnote is found in that section on Christ’s Son-title, dealing with the begetting of the Word *ex mente*. Grotius here refers to the Jewish physician and philosopher Judah Abrabanel, called Leo Hebraeus, and his *Dialoghi di Amore*.49 In his dialogue, Abrabanel attempts to understand love as a comprehensive principle of the world, in connection with Plato’s teachings on *eros*, that the emanation of the world from the divine unity into the creaturely variety is made possible.50 Grotius seems especially to be dealing with Abrabanel’s explanation of the origin of love in the third dialogue. According to Abrabanel, love has its origin in the eternal self-love of God. From eternity, God loved Himself as Beauty, and in this way is simultaneously both lover and beloved.51 Abrabanel’s argument stems from Ultimate Beauty, which is inherent to God, but at the same time is differentiated from him and exists as his intellect. In this way, the ultimate beauty according to Abrabanel can also be called the Word. It is understood that from the ultimate beauty flows the “beautifying beauty,” which in

49 Grotius 1972, *De veritate*, p. 93.
turn duplicates itself into the created universe as “beautied beauty.”

The inherency of the multiplicity of the world in the unity of God is, according to Abrabanel, mediated by multiple levels of beauty, of which even the uppermost level cannot be identified with God. In this manner, Abrabanel carries the conception of God, by stages, ever deeper into transcendence. In that Grotius goes back to Abrabanel for a more exact explanation of the begetting of the Word *ex mente*, he chooses a cosmological conception, which is completely obliged to defend the transcendence of God, while at the same time permitting the world principle to be thought of as God immanent. It is precisely this advantage that Grotius wanted to have, and it led him to suggest Abrabanel as a possible compromise in the debate about the begetting of the Logos.

4.10. *Bartholomäus Georgewitz*

As a support for his accusation that Islam counted externalities, such as circumcision, as the most important practical institutions of religion, Grotius called upon Bartholomäus Georgewitz’s work, *De Turcarum ritu ac ceremoniis.* Georgewitz was taken prisoner in the 1526 onslaught by Mohács, abducted, and sold several times in the slave trade. In this way he came to live first in Constantinople, and later in Asia, from which he escaped after 13 years in captivity, and fled to the Netherlands by way of Jerusalem. There he resided in Löwen, and in 1544 he wrote the aforementioned work, which dealt with the customs, traditions, and proverbial sayings of the Turks. The work appeared in the same year, and was also translated into Dutch. Georgewitz’s *De Turcarum ritu ac ceremoniis* distinguished itself by the fact that it did not rely on any of the previously available accounts of the Turks, but was based solely on the experiences of the author. As is characteristic for Georgewitz, the work has a starkly negative view of the Turks, and he continuously discussed the Ottoman Empire with the intention of delving into the possibility of a military defeat of the Turks. The numerous reprints of the work demonstrate the popularity it enjoyed during the 16th Century.

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53 Grotius 1972, *De veritate*, p. 93.
4.11. Joseph Justus Scaliger (1540–1609)

Grotius cites his teacher, Joseph Justus Scaliger, in order to establish that the first followers of Muhammad were thieves. For this he refers to the chapter, *De periodo Arabum*, from the third volume of the work, *De emendatione temporum*, which appeared for the first time in 1583, and went through two later editions in 1598 and 1629. In this work, the philologist Scaliger attempted to research all of the calendar systems known to him, and, cross-referencing them to one another, to establish a scientific chronology. On October 15, 1582, the Gregorian calendar reform was enforced in all the Catholic countries of Europe, and the attempted compilation of all the calendar systems of the world by Scaliger was received with great interest. His unusual philological talent made it possible for Scaliger also to consider the Arabic sources to research Oriental calendars. Furthermore, he maintained correspondence by letter with Oriental scholars. Scaliger constantly had difficulty orienting himself precisely in the field of Oriental chronology; he was, however, successful in converting many dates in the history of the Orient to the Julian calendar. His endeavors in Oriental chronology made it possible for Scaliger to discover several dating mistakes in the historical work of Hans Lewenklau. In this way, Scaliger’s work, *De emendatione temporum*, became an important contribution to Oriental historiography in Europe.


In addition to Laonikos Chalkokondyles, Grotius referred also to Hans Lewenklau’s *Neuwe Chronica Türkischer nation*, when it came to the question of the connection between Turkish culture and Islam. Lewenklau was born in Goerfeld in Westphalia, and studied in Wittenberg and Heidelberg, where he earned his Master’s Degree. Through a long residence in Constantinople, he attained a good knowledge of the Ottoman Empire and the Oriental languages. In 1590, in Frankfurt am Main, the aforementioned *Neuwe Chronica Türkischer nation* appeared, in which Lewenklau took a critical view of the known literature on Turkish his-
tory that had been compiled at that time. In addition, he also consulted the original annals of the Turkish sultan, which the authors before him had not yet responded to. These revisions, carried out by Lewenklau, marked a decisive point in Turkish historiography in Europe. Along with Chalkokondyles, Lewenklau can be named as one of the authorities in this field in the 17th Century.

The list of cited works shows that, by and large, Grotius was very familiar with the Christian literature on Islam and the Turks. The majority of the cited works were available to Grotius in the edition of works collected by Bibliander and Sylburg, which was widely disseminated in the 17th Century. The citations of the works by Chalkokondyles, Scaliger, and Lewenklau show, however, that Grotius was concerned with making the footnote apparatus in the field of Oriental history as current as possible. Given this, it is striking that no cited author portrays Islam in an excessively favorable light. It is presumed that Grotius had to be careful in his choice of citations to avoid the impression that he was a supporter of Islam.

5. Comparison with the argumentation of Juan Luis Vives

Juan Luis Vives, for his own part, was influenced by Propugnaculum fidei adversus mendacia et deliramenta Alcorani by Riccoldo da Monte Croce. Vives developed his analysis of Islam differently from Grotius, in the form of a dialogue. In it, he, like Grotius after him, used the Latin translation of the Qur’an edited by Peter the Venerable, which was widely distributed during the late Middle Ages. The arguments by Vives and Grotius are, in essence, identically formulated. Grotius differed from Vives only in that he did not allot the military expansion of Islam its own section at the end of the chapter, but allowed it to follow the comparison of the founders of the two religions. Further, Vives grants a more prominent place to the dogmatic differences between the Bible and the Qur’an, and discusses them before discussing their ethical

59 Bibliander 1550, Machometis Saracenorum principis and Sylburgius 1595, Saracenica sive Mahomethica.
differences. Grotius, in contrast, prioritizes the ethical problems of the Qur’an before the dogmatic differences. Grotius also differs from Vives with regard to content. Vives meticulously criticizes the theology of the Qur’an with respect to its understanding of God and its Christology. Just as Grotius does, he accuses the Muslims of polluting their understanding of God with anthropomorphic concepts, and criticizes both the fact that all of the crimes committed by Muhammad in the Qur’an are attributed to the will of God, and that, according to the Qur’an, God, on the one hand, does not forgive human beings, and on the other hand is not to be feared. Grotius does not adopt this criticism of the Qur’anic conception of God. Even in his stance on the Christology of the Qur’an, Grotius disagrees with Vives. Like Grotius, Vives also finds fault with the fact that though the Qur’an calls Christ the Word of God, it rejects the idea that he is the Son. Additionally, however, Vives dismisses the Muslim accusation that, through Christ, the governing of the world by God is endangered, with the argument that Christ, as one person of the Godhead, in accordance with his divine nature, has a part of the will of God. This criticism, which is based on the principles of the doctrine of the Trinity and the two natures of Christ, is not found in Grotius’ thought. Likewise, Grotius did not refer to the denial of the death of Christ as a dogmatic shortcoming as Vives did, but rather as a weakness in the historical reliability of the Qur’anic tradition. A further difference from Vives is seen at the beginnings of their arguments. Vives begins directly with the accusation that Muslims are forbidden any independent examination of religion through reason. Grotius presents this secondly. The first section in Grotius’ work, in which the origin of Islam is read historico-theologically and its historical origin is traced, is an innovation compared to Vives’ work. The reason for this is clearly that Grotius, on the basis of new research, attained a knowledge of the history of the Orient that as yet had been completely inaccessible to Vives. It is true that at the end of the chapter, Vives deals with the expansion of Islam, however, his knowledge of Oriental history corresponds to that of the Middle Ages. In this section he falls back on Riccoldo da Monte Croce and Thomas Aquinas.

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64 Graf 1932, Ludwig Vives als Apologet, p. 97.
Two points stand out in which Grotius differs from Vives. First, Grotius does not share Vives’ dogmatic condemnation of Islam, which is explained by his tolerant stance towards the Socinians. Second, Grotius gives special emphasis to the research on Turkish culture and the history of Islam that had been compiled in the course of the 16th Century. In this way, Grotius’ sixth book about Islam seems to be a successful updating of the somewhat obsolete writings of Juan Luis Vives.

6. Conclusion

Hugo Grotius’ analysis of Islam is characterized by two contradictory tendencies. Grotius is concerned with the reconciliation of the dogmatic Christological differences between Christianity and Islam. Here, he unmistakably follows the example of Nicholas of Cusa, who wanted to lay down the theological basis for a possible integration of the Ottoman Empire into the Christian world. Nicholas of Cusa, in *Cribratio Alkorani*, tried to demonstrate that, from a dogmatic standpoint, Islam was not completely opposed to Christianity. In a similar manner, Grotius also consistently sacrifices an orthodox formulation of the traditional dogmas, and from that gains an unusually large openness in the question of Christology as regards Islam, which, in this field, is dogmatically related to Socinianism. However, as far as those things that go against the emphasis on the credibility of the Bible and the ethical comparison of the founders of the religions and their teachings are concerned, Grotius is completely committed to the confrontation between the two religions. The credibility of the Bible and the ethical comparison ought to demonstrate the superiority of Christianity over Islam, but must necessarily avoid a relative disparagement of Islam. However, Grotius’ argument is not able to proceed without this devaluation of Islam. In that Grotius especially emphasizes the prophetic activity of Jesus and the Christian ethic, he attempts to revive the authority and superiority of Christianity, which he abandons in the area of dogma. The ethical comparison with Islam is decided almost exclusively in favor of Christianity, and this saves its truth and authority. Solely in the question of tolerance does Grotius, very cautiously, emphasize the superiority of Islam over Christianity. In his ethical comparison of the culture of western Christendom with that of Islam, Grotius adds a line of questioning which arose in the research on the Turks and Oriental history during the 16th Century. The interest in the dogmatic reconcil-
iation, and an ethically oriented confrontation, seems to be a further development of two previously mentioned lines of thought in the Christian discussion of Islam, which, in combination, appear almost to refute one another. If the Muslims could be persuaded by the Bible and its ethical teachings, then it would be incomprehensible that a reconciliation with the Islamic and Qur’anic Christology would also be necessary. It would not make sense to endow the Qur’an with any authority in the question of Christology, when its historical reliability and its ethical teachings are rejected. Obviously, Grotius accepts this contradiction in order to send a message about an urgently needed change in the authority of Christianity and its truth at the beginning of the 17th Century, and to urge that this change be consistently heeded in the study of Islam. His dogmatic openness does not stand in the service of a thoughtless surrender of the truth of Christianity to Islam. Rather, through this openness, Grotius wants much more to make clear that the Christianity has much better pillars for its truth in the Bible and in its ethical teachings, and that these pillars are completely able to establish both the truth, and the superiority, of Christianity in the face of Islam.

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PART IV

FROM POLAND TO THE NETHERLANDS
The reactions to Cartesian thought also include that of the Socinians, present in the Dutch Republic and involved in the theological-philosophical disputes of the time. By Reformed theologians like Samuel Maresius, Johannes Hoornbeeck and Abraham Heydanus, Socinians were put on a par with libertines, sceptics, atheists, Remonstrants and Roman Catholics, from the 1640s with Cartesian and from the 1670s with Spinozists. They published in the second half of the 1660s the Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum, containing the most significant works of the Dutch diaspora. These are writings related to Scripture: exegetical and hermeneutic commentaries and theological summaries. Nevertheless, there are in addition an Ethica Christiana by Johannes Crellius, inspired by Aristotle, and a commentary by Wolzogen on the Cartesian meditations. A moderate interest in philosophy on the part of the Dutch Socinians is shown by the Bibliotheca of Sandius where, besides himself and Wolzogen\(^1\), we also find Daniel Zwicker and both Joachim Stegman \textit{senior} and \textit{junior}, authors of ethical and metaphysical writings (on the existence of God, the nature of the mind, contingency, virtue).

Many historians (for example, Bock, Lauterbach\(^2\)) have reported incorrect information on the origins of Hans Ludwig Freiherr von Wolzogen (1600–1661) [Freiherr von Neuhäusel, Herr von Fahrenfeld]: he was held to belong to the Missingdorfer line of the Wolzogens—as was also the homonymous Cartesian professor in Utrecht, wrongly thought by many to be his son\(^3\)—and not to the Neuhauser line.

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\(^1\) Sandius 1684, \textit{Bibliotheca}, pp. 137–140.
\(^3\) Ludwig von Wolzogen [Lodewijk Wolzogen], Professor of Ecclesiastical History at Utrecht and a well-known Cartesian was baptised on 8 March 1635 in Amersfoort. He was not the son of the Socinian baron but rather of Hans von Wolzogen (1596–?), who belonged to the Missingdorfer line of the Wolzogens (in 1618, he was a member of the order of knighthood in Vienna). In the preface to his \textit{Apologie} (1669) Wolzogen states that the Socinian baron is his maternal uncle (not his father) and, to avoid any misunderstanding, adds that he has never had anything to do with him or his works.
Hans Ludwig was born on 28 May 1600 to the Baroness von Dietrichstein. Son of Hans Christoph, he was raised in the family (between Neuhaus and Vienna) and later studied at the University of Wittenberg. His family were Lutherans, as was the entire Neuhauser line of the Wolzogens, whereas the Missingdorfer line were reformed Protestants. Around 1625 Hans Ludwig went to stay at the Polish court.

From some of his letters we know that in the autumn of 1625 he was still at Neuhaus; on 12 February and 12 July 1625 he was in Vienna; on 29 November 1628 again in Vienna; on 11 September 1631 in Amersfoort; on 6 January 1636 in Poland; and in March 1639 back in Vienna. In 1655, he was in Basel where he was the Opponent in a dispute with Johann Heinrich Hottinger (De Scriptura sacra et gratuista peccatoris per Christum iustificatione). After the Socinians were driven out of Poland, he was in Breslau in February 1658 (letter dated 23-2-1658 to his nephew Hans Paul II Freiherr von Wolzogen).

His wife Elisabeth was born Baroness of Schrattenbach. They had two children: Katharina Felicitas and Sophia Elisabeth (the latter born in 1629). Both daughters were still living in 1648. His nephew Hans Paul II (son of one of his wife’s sisters) testifies to his uncle’s knowledge of both theology and mathematics—though there are no writings that confirm this.

Wolzogen’s reasons for studying in Wittenberg and emigrating to Poland were probably religious. According to some sources (including Jacob Rambach) he had already been drawn to reformed religion while in Austria; but this report is not reliable since it may be based on his being confused with the homonymous professor in Utrecht. He was on friendly terms (and may even have been his brother-in-law) with Florian Crusius, the doctor celebrated by the Socinians.

After being exiled from Poland, he went to live in the city today called Poznań, the city Jonas Schlichting came from, and not in Breslau as reported by Sandius. Two different years are given for his demise: 16 September 1661 according to Bock and 1662 to his nephew Hans Paul II, but without any indication of the exact date.

Wolzogen raised his objections to Descartes from the point of view of a double concern. From the philosophical point of view, he rejects spiritualism, that, in his judgement, lacks for its scholastic abstractness;

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from the theological point of view, Descartes’s rationalistic method is responsible for considering of minor importance religion’s ethical aspects and for instigating theoretical controversies: which are both useless (because too far away from everyday, sensible experience) and noxious to the harmony among Christians.\footnote{This is also Chmaj’s opinion. Chmaj, author of the one study about Wolzogen’s objections to Descartes, maintains that Wolzogen defends materialism against the idealism of Descartes (Chmaj 1957, Wolzogen, p. 433), and that the Socinian Philosopher claims that a philosophy which is nearer to nature and experience gives the right importance to religious universal moral prescriptions, by setting boundaries to the pretensions of human mind and shutting it decidedly out of supersensible sphere, whereas Rationalism leads to discord, owing to its continuous fomenting different opinions and arguments, all impossible to be verified (Chmaj 1957, Wolzogen, pp. 462–463).}

Wolzogen’s commentary on the \textit{Meditationes} focuses on some fundamental points, quoting some of the relative passages in italics. According to Thyssen-Schoute, Wolzogen’s objections to Descartes echo the “fifth objection” of Gassend and the theories of Henricus Regius\footnote{See Descartes/Regius 2002, Correspondance; Regius 1646; Fundamenta; Regius 1654; \textit{Philosophia Naturalis}; in addition: Regius 1657, Explicatio. And, lastly, Descartes 1648, \textit{Notae}.}.

The first meditation (p. 79c1\footnote{“c” stands for column: the in-folio is divided into two columns of text.}) concerns doubt and the deception perpetrated against the mind by the senses. This is a very old question addressed by the Stoics, the Epicureans and the Academics. It is not true that the senses, as such, deceive. If the senses are sound and work properly, they present the mind with the object as it appears. The senses neither deceive nor are they deceived: they transmit to the mind the data sent to them from phenomena. The error attributed by Descartes to the senses should be ascribed to the mind (\textit{mens}), to the judgment (\textit{judicium}) that the mind formulates on a perception. The mind errs when it is not careful and does not ponder adequately the circumstances in which it knows something. The error of the mind involves in part the sense organ (\textit{sensorium}), in part the perceived object and in part the means (\textit{medium}) in or through which perception takes place (smoke, water, glass). The mind or soul (\textit{animus}) is not deceived by the senses but rather by its own precipitation or own hesitation (\textit{oscitantia aut praecipitantia}) (p. 79c2). If the mind is sound and the conditions exist for the senses to function correctly, there is no reason to doubt the knowledge that derives from them, whether such knowledge be due to an almighty God or an evil genius (\textit{vaferimus daemon}).
Wolzogen concludes from this that in order to eradicate preconceptions one should not discredit sensible knowledge. Preconceptions are not like clothes (vestes) that can be put on or taken off as one wishes (pro arbitrio). Take the preconception of the Trinity, one of the most difficult to eradicate among Christians. Wolzogen’s objections—more moral than epistemological—to the first meditation can be summed up in his final belief that it is impossible to free oneself from preconceptions through a simple mental act of volition such as doubt. As for the rest, like Hobbes or Gassend, he scales down Descartes’ originality by asserting that the criticism of ingenuous faith in the senses is very old and widely known.

The second meditation is about the nature of the mind and whether it is easier to know than the body (p. 80c1). Descartes turns on its head the standpoint beginning from experience, according to which our knowledge takes its starting point from sensible perceptions. Wolzogen considers as non-consequential the reasoning by which Descartes infers the existence of the subject from the non-existence of bodies. At the beginning of the second meditation Descartes posits as not true or non-existent everything that comes under the senses. The inference he makes is fallacious because he assumes to be false—the existence of bodies—what he must demonstrate to be false. He considers the mind to be immaterial since from the moment that it is certainly something that exists—cogito ergo sum—it is distinguished from that which is corporeal and which, by its very nature, can be assumed not to exist without a preconception of the mind.

Nevertheless, as Wolzogen observes, while it is the case that whether the mind is or is not corporeal is open to discussion, there is no doubt that there are bodies in nature (p. 80c2). The existence or non-existence of bodies should not be postulated (supponendum) but rather demonstrated (demonstrandum). Moreover, Descartes does not demonstrate the incorporeal character of the mind directly (directè) but, instead, obliquely (per obliquum) when he asserts that nothing corporeal is pertinent to the mind. In spite of the imagination, mind and body have nothing in common (nihil commune).

The weak point in Descartes’ reasoning lies in the axiom according to which everything that I know clearly and distinctly is true. It is an axiom that equates the intensity of ideas with their truth, excluding any reference to experience (p. 81c1).

Wolzogen objects that the affections (affectiones) or qualities (qualitates)
of a substance can be considered separately and distinctly (separatim et distincte) even though they appear united in the substance. The mind is a substance and the ability to think (cogitatio) is one of its faculties (facultates). Descartes acknowledges this quality but he isolates it from the others. Then he poses the question whether the mind as a thinking substance is corporeal or not. Descartes’ mistake is that he makes into an absolute the quality which the mind has of being a thinking entity, separates the mind from bodies and, lastly, excludes that the mind is corporeal.

This ontological error entails an epistemological error. Descartes assumes that what is understood (comprehendere) through the imagination are only corporeal things, whereas that which is understood through pure intellect (purus intellectus) are immaterial entities. The example of wax demonstrates this error: “From it Descartes concludes that the intellect is distinct from the imagination and that, consequently, the true and distinct knowledge of the mind is conceived of only by the intellect and not by the imagination.” In Wolzogen’s view, the opposite is true. The example of wax shows that “also bodies are an object [objici] of the pure intellect”. Indeed, it would be impossible to understand that wax is wax if it were not understood that it is a corporeal, not a spiritual, substance.

Descartes is wrong on two counts: he makes a clear distinction between intellect and imagination and he holds that a substance can be known without accidents, whereas given their finiteness (in hoc mortalitatis statu), men know something of it only through its sensible properties. Furthermore, the idea that the mind is easier to know than the body is also false. If the mind has no relation with the body, we know only one of the mind’s qualities, while, once the body is assumed to exist, we know more about it. Wolzogen’s arguments draw on the observations of Arnauld (fourth objections), of Gassend (fifth objection) and, with regard to the cogitatio as the sole property of the mind and to the debate on the axiom that everything I perceive clearly and distinctly is true, also of Caterus (first objections). Regarding the Cartesian conception of the ontological and epistemological independence of thought from reality, Wolzogen expresses the empiricist viewpoint that all knowledge begins from the senses and sensible reality. The antipathy towards the new philosophy is not generated by an aversion to the centrality of the finite subject, but rather by the spiritual and independent nature of the mind.
The third meditation, that on the existence of God, also aroused great interest in Wolzogen. He disputes nativism, a much discussed theme in modern theological and philosophical thought. In accord with the more liberal tendencies of Lutheranism and Calvinism (for example Calixt and Arminius), Fausto Socini does not admit natural knowledge of God. Wolzogen remarks that natural knowledge of God is impossible only if referring to the first cause \((causa remotissima ac prima)\), to God as creator of the world. What we have here is the Pauline conception of natural theology (Romans 1:19–20). But if we refer to the immediate cause \((causa proxima et immediata)\) and not to the one God infused in the maternal womb \((in utero matris immediate)\), then it is absurd because it would mean that the finite human mind is able on its own to produce an infinite idea.

Wolzogen believes it is possible to have universal or single ideas of things. An innate idea cannot be universal since in order to form it a “long doctrine, meditation, use and experience” would be needed. Besides, if the innate idea were a single idea it would be merely a tautology: I am I \((ego sum ego, p. 82c1)\).

In the third meditation, Descartes presupposes he has demonstrated that the “I” is thought but he only actually does this in the fourth meditation. On the other hand, he cannot demonstrate it because he does not demonstrate that God is not a deceiver \((deceptor)\) and hence does not establish a certain criterion of truth. Moreover, lacking a criterion of evidence, innate ideas—which the “I” has by abstracting from the senses—could also be images of sensible origin \((phantasmata)\).

Lastly, Wolzogen objects to the transition \((profectio)\) from the idea of “I” to the idea of God and of corporeal things. In fact, the ground for these ideas is believed to be in the mind, which is, however, known and characterised only as a faculty of thought \((p. 83c1)\). This is all we know of the mind and from this, from what is incorporeal, we cannot deduce that which is corporeal.

Also the idea of God as an idea of an infinite and most perfect entity \((idea entis infiniti et perfectissimi)\) involves a contradiction. For Descartes an idea is an image, something determinate, distinct, finite. He admits that the infinite as such cannot be conceived of; nonetheless the mind represents the infinite as limitless. For Wolzogen, on the contrary, the infinite (for example, the diameter of the universe) cannot be understood as an idea or as a clear and distinct concept but, rather, through thought: each time I set a limit to the universe, I am immediately carried beyond
it by the mind and so on ad infinitum. But thought is finite. A finite idea in progress (idea actu finita) cannot represent an infinite entity (p. 83c2).

Again: the formal reality of the idea of God is that it is a mode of the mind or of thought. But the mode (modus) is not a real being. This idea has formal reality (modalitas), not effective reality. If it derives from thought it has also objective reality, but as its cause it has only itself. This last objection is taken from Caterus, the author of the first objections. The point in question is the transition from the mind to reality. To have an idea (though a clear and distinct one) is not sufficient to conclude that the object represented by this idea exists.

As Wolzogen sees it, the idea of God is not the idea of something really existing outside of us but an idea generated by the mind, which through its faculties is able to extend and amplify what it represents to itself. The idea of God in us—the innate idea—demonstrates the existence of God to the same extent that the idea of a stone demonstrates it: in that in our intellect, of which it is a mode, the stone has been put by God as creator of the world and not in that it expresses an infinite reality which our mind would not be able to produce by itself.

The objections put forward by Wolzogen take their inspiration from the standpoint of the theological (in this case Thomistic) tradition, which is also the foundation for the objections of Caterus, who believes that man can only have a negative and imperfect notion of God. On the other hand, the rejection of nativism depends on the empiricist perspective, from which there are only universal (adventitious) or singular (analytic) ideas.

The fourth meditation establishes that the cause of error lies in the fact that the will is more extended than the intellect. Taking up Gassend’s fifth objection, Wolzogen contests this since the will moves on the basis of what the intellect impels it to desire or avoid (p. 86c1). Descartes confuses the will and judgement (p. 86c2). It is judgement, which is a function of the intellect that errs, not the will.

Wolzogen passes over the fifth meditation (he considers it a continuation of the fourth) and comments on the sixth, which deals with the existence of material things and the distinction between mind and body (p. 87c1). The Cartesian distinction between intellect and imagination is obscure: neither of them is able to represent a thousand-sided polygon (chiliogonus). As for the mind, it is a question of knowing whether it is corporeal and non-extended or material (of fine matter, ether, vapour). In this case, too, Wolzogen refers to the first objections of Caterus.
and in particular to the use that the priest from Haarlem makes of Duns Scotus’ real distinction. The Cartesian axiom according to which “what I clearly conceive to be divided is divided” is not valid since in a body I perceive many separate properties; this does not, however, entitle me to consider each of them as a substance (p. 87c2). The mind perceives between itself and the body a formal or modal distinction (one between qualities) that does not imply a real distinction (one between substances).

Not even the argument about complete (completae) substances satisfies Wolzogen. While it is true that the mind is thought and the body is extended, this does not prove that the mind is incorporeal. Thought is the faculty of a subject (substance) of which it is not known whether it is incorporeal or not. Thinking (cogitans) is a property and does not express the essence of the thing spoken of. As both body and mind at the same time, man is a complete substance. But the body (and the mind) is such only in relation to its parts and not in itself (p. 89c1). Even if the mind were corporeal or spiritual, it could not think without the aid of the body (absque corporis organo).

On the one side the rejection of Cartesian philosophy by Wolzogen bears witness to the separation between philosophy and religion maintained by the Socinians with their consequent disinterest in theological questions independent from Scripture and Revelation. Nevertheless, on the other side, Wolzogen’s reaction shows the importance assumed by the new philosophy in the mid-1600s, about which even those who were not involved or affected felt that they had to give their opinion in a documented form and make clear their own philosophical convictions.

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Works by Wolzogen


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8 According to Wolzogen, K. 1859, Geschichte. Christoph von Wolzogen, Privatdozent of Philosophy [Frankfurt a. M.], an offspring of Hans Ludwig, has recently informed Martin Mulsow about the existence of many unpublished works and letters by Hans Ludwig, among which is a Magnum opus mathematicum (Een groot wiskundig werk), both in Latin and in Dutch, in which the system of arithmetics and geometry is exposed in a very clear way.
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Conciones sacrae XXII, translated into Dutch from the German manuscript.
Johannis Crellii Franci von dem Vater, zwey Bücher […], translated from Latin (De uno Deo Patre) into German by Wolzogen and published in 1645.
Annotationes ad quaestiones Jonae Schlichtingii a Bucowietz de bello, magistratu et privata defensione. In: Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum.
Responsio ad Jonae Schlichtingii à Bucowietz annotationes in annotationes de bello, magistratu et privata defensione. In: Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum.
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The presence of the affiliates of the *Ecclesia Minor* on Dutch soil dates to the end of the sixteenth century. It was effectively never interrupted, in spite of the hostilities and open condemnations to which the Socinians were subjected, along with the religious sect which had showed itself most open towards them, the Arminians. Numerous young Socinians completed their cultural training by attending universities outside their own national territory, and in particular in Holland.\(^1\)

Beyond this, there was no shortage of missions on the part of Polish Unitarians aimed at seeking political-religious support from the Dutch authorities. One of the earliest of such missions was entrusted to Krzysztof Ostorodt and Andrzej Wojdowski, who arrived in Amsterdam in 1598 with an extensive collection of anti-Trinitarian works. Andrzej Wojdowski was, moreover, also in contact with Jacob Arminius.

The epilogue of their journey was, however, far from happy since, notwithstanding the assurances provided by the letters of introduction from the King of Poland, in the space of a few weeks their books were confiscated; the Faculty of Leiden declared the publications heretical and blasphemous, and the two Socinians were expelled from the country by decree of the States-General.

Having returned to Poland, the two Socinians published, in Dutch, an *Apologia* against this decree of expulsion, in which they demanded the pacific defence of the diversity of opinions in matters of religion: “Freedom should be allowed to hold sway in the observance of religious practices, while it ought to be forbidden for sects to descend to the level

\(^1\) Classic studies on this topic are Kühler 1912, *Socinianisme*; Kot 1937, *Mouvement*; Le Moal 1968, *Dimensions.*
of reciprocal insults in their arguments, both in their gatherings and in their published writings. All should universally respect the peace.”

This theme was to constitute one of the most fecund conceptual nuclei of Socinian thought in the course of the seventeenth century. The Socinians were foremost—continued the two authors of the Apologia—in not hating or condemning anyone, on condition that they recognised Jesus, the Son of God, as the Saviour, and that they dedicated themselves to his service. In their turn, the Socinians—claimed the two writers—recognised that they did not accept the divinity of Christ and the Holy Spirit since “Christ was in substance generated centuries before by God the Father and the Holy Spirit is a person.”

But it is precisely this point—emphasise Ostorodt and Wojdowski—which “gives rise to the controversy between us and your theologians”. Concluding the Apologia, the two Socinians exhorted the States General of Holland to reconsider the writings which had been torn from their hands on their arrival in Amsterdam, and which had possibly been burnt or were perhaps still stored away somewhere, significantly recalling that: “Among these was the Dissertation by Fausto Socinus on Jesus Christ the Saviour, written over twenty years ago and set from the very start at the disposal of your theologians, and to which up to this moment no one of them has had the courage to reply”.

Another ten years were to pass before the first replies to Sozzini’s work appeared in Holland. In 1611 Sibrandus Lubbertus came up with a huge confutation in a volume of more than sixty hundred pages in which he opposed the orthodox credo of Jacobus Covetus to the heresy of Faustus Sozzini. The Lubbertus’ correspondent Johannes Fontanus welcome the volume as “necessarius, utilis et solidus”, but the principal merit of this confutation or strong demerit (naturally in the eyes of his contemporaries), was that his comment was in fact an indirect reproposal of the thesis sustained in the De Iesu Christo Servatore by Fausto Sozzini. After reading the Lubbertus’ volume, in 1608, Johannes Wtenbogaert significantly write to the author: “Confutationem Socini tuam valde aveo videre. Ego haecenus Socini libros, quod coram Deo dico, ...

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5 Woude van der 1963, Sibrandus Lubbertus, p. 145. For the “Anti-Socinus” position of Lubbertus, see more extensively Woude van der 1963, Sibrandus Lubbertus, pp. 139–147.
6 Lubbertus 1611, Iesu.
non legi: jam vero me ejus legendi et cum tua confutatone, ubi edita erit, conferendi desiderium tenet.”

A few years later, in 1617, the authoritative and official refutation was published by one of the most prestigious exponents of the Arminian wing, Hugo Grotius. In the preface to his precious edition of the De Satisfactione Christi, Edwin Rabbie offers several interpretations of the reasons which urged Grotius to this late reply to an author who had died thirteen years earlier, and which led him to don the habit of theologian and polemicist, notwithstanding the fact that he was much more firmly established in his role as political exponent and eminent jurist.

It was the fact of the German theologian Conradus Vorstius being called to fill the chair, which had belonged to Arminius that triggered the most severe series of accusations of Socinianism to be levelled against the exponents of the Arminian sect. It was once again the Franeker theologian Sibrandus Lubbertus who drew attention to the connections of the newly-elected Vorstius with the exponents of Middle-European Socinian thought and—in a hefty tome of over eight hundred pages—to implicate in the accusation of favoring the diffusion of the Socinian heresy not only the theologians and front-liners of the Arminian sect, such as Wtenbogaert, but also the administrators of the University of Leiden and the States-General of Holland. This was an accusation which, while it had merely grazed the founder of the sect, Jacobus Arminius—who does not appear to have had any direct or significant knowledge of anti-Trinitarian works in general, or of the writings of Fausto Sozzini in particular—now appeared in a distinctly more significant light to Grotius, who was at the time the Fiscal Attorney of the Orders of Holland and West Frisia, and called for a severe reply. This public reply surprised even the Remonstrants themselves (as the Arminians were called after the Remonstrance of 1610), including Gerard Vossius, and was in any case to earn Grotius the name of Socinian.

And so Grotius’ De Satisfactione Christi was designed at once as an act of self-defence and one which would distance the “catholic”—understood in the broad sense of Christian religion—credo from any

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7 Woude van der 1963, Sibrandus Lubbertus, p. 181.
8 Grotius 1990, Defensio.
9 Lubbertus 1613, Commentarii.
affinity with the positions adopted by Fausto Sozzini. By choosing to focus his criticisms on the *De Iesu Christo servatore*, Grotius had probably deliberately selected as grounds for confrontation a work on which he could bring to bear, as indeed Sozzini himself had done, the war machine of his juridical experience alongside the sophisticated mechanisms of his classical and Biblical philology, so as to provide a meticulous examination of the doctrine of the satisfaction of Christ. Beyond this, he probably preferred to leave to one side the thorny and intriguing question of an analysis and refutation of Socinian thought on the themes of predestination and free will, an area in which the orthodox Calvinist ranks, impersonated in those years by Gomarus and his followers, were particularly sensitive.

Conceived as a collection of working notes, Grotius never actually intended this work to see the light, or at most destined it to a limited circulation within a narrow circle of co-religious theologians and jurists. It was as a result of the interest of Gerard Vossius, and of his persistent encouragement, that the *De Satisfactione Christi* became not only an emblem of anti-Socinian polemic upon Dutch soil but, above all, came to represent the setting at arm’s length of a heresy which the Remonstrant sect in these years—and throughout the course of the seventeenth century—was persistently accused of re-proposing.

At the same time as he was writing the preface to Grotius’ work, Vossius himself was drafting his weighty *Historiae de controversiis, quas Pelagius eiusque reliquiae moverunt*, a historical-theological reconstruction of Pelagian doctrine and argument. This volume appeared in September 1618. The explicit purpose of the work was to protect the Remonstrant faith from the accusation—the echo of which was to reverberate down the century—of having revived and re-proposed the Pelagian heresy with all its subversive charge. Significantly, in introducing the *De Satisfactione Christi* of Grotius, Vossius located Sozzini’s ideas upon the long heretical path which goes from Paul of Samosata—one of the first to have been condemned for having denied the divinity of Christ—to Arius and Nestorius and through to Pelagius, *humanarum virium praedicator*, who had forcefully asserted human potential. A condemnation doubly necessary—concluded Vossius—since it emerged from the clear teaching of the Holy Scriptures and since it would staunch the flow and proliferation of the Socinian heresy within Dutch soil.

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12 Vossius 1655, *Historiae*.
13 Grotius 1990, *Defensio*, p. 84.
With the authority which came naturally to him through his position as governor of the theological college of the University of Leiden, as well as from his fame as a philologist and theologian, Vossius brought his eloquence to bear on the defense of the Remonstrant creed from the twin-pronged attack of accusations of both Pelagianism and Socinianism leveled, not only by the Dutch theologians, but also by the Calvinists from the other side of the Channel.\footnote{See Simonutti 2001, Necessità.}

2. A Shared Editorial Enterprise

In his \textit{Dictionnaire}, in the entry devoted to the Sienese heretic, Fausto Sozzini, Pierre Bayle recalled the numerous attempts made by the Socinians to establish themselves within Holland and concluded: “Le Schisme des Arminiens a favorisé l’entrée du Socinianisme dans la Hollande; car ils ne refusent pas la Communion Ecclésiastique aux Sociniens”.\footnote{Bayle 1740, \textit{Dictionnaire}, s.v. Socin, nota K, vol. IV, p. 232.}

Notwithstanding the distance from the Socinians, which was, as we have seen, necessarily adopted by various front-line Arminian exponents, epistolary and cultural relations as well as doctrinal similarities were not lacking.

During the second half of the seventeenth century, among the Socinian descendants of the \textit{Polish brothers} who sojourned for a while in the Germanic cities or passed through Amsterdam, we can number Samuel Crel and Benedictus Wiszowaty, who established contacts with the most important representative of Arminianism of the last quarter of the century, the theologian Philippus van Limborch.

Writing to the Dutch theologian in March 1682, Benedictus Wiszowaty enclosed two copies of the work by Samuel Przypkowski, \textit{Religio vindicata a calumniis atheismi},\footnote{Przypkowski 1672, \textit{Religio}.} which had appeared ten years earlier and the essay of Michael Servet prefixed to the \textit{Dialogorum de Trinitate libri duo},\footnote{Servet 1532, \textit{Dialogorum}. Wiszowaty is very probably alluding to the slight, and largely formal, retractions, which Serveto made on republishing his work after it had aroused an initial wave of reactions. We should note that a Dutch translation of Miguel Servet’s work \textit{De trinitatis erroribus libri septem}, by Reinier Telle, appeared in Leiden in 1620.} which Wiszowaty said he believed was not contained in the
manuscript copy in Limborch’s possession. Recalling, moreover, that he had seen at the Arminian’s house the volume dealing with the Raków colloquy, Wiszowaty informed his correspondent of the name of the person who had collected the materials of the Acta Colloquii Racoviensis which had been held in October 1601: the Socinian Valentinus Smalcius, who was also author of the preface. Smalcius’ purpose in gathering this material was to hand down the nucleus of Socinian doctrine to posterity. At the end of his missive, Wiszowaty begged his correspondent to send him a copy of the letter from Fausto Sozzini to Cornelius Daems which had once belonged to his father and of which Limborch had courteously informed him he was in possession of.

But the most crucial importance of Wiszowaty’s letter is the fact that he enclosed with it a complete list of the works published by the Socinian Samuel Przypkowski, as well as another long list of those which had remained in manuscript form. He accompanied this list with an explanation of the care with which he himself had collected the manuscripts and pamphlets of the eminent Socinian, concerned that this incomparable edifice should not be dispersed through inheritance. Having decided to leave Amsterdam to settle permanently in Borussia, Wiszowaty entrusted this material to the knowing hands of Limborch so that it would not risk ending its days fattening cockroaches or woodworm, or being consigned to oblivion.

The Remonstrant theologian personally supervised the printing of the works of Samuel Przypkowski, which were to see the light only ten years later, in 1692, collected in the weighty in-folio entitled Cogitationes sacrae, ostensibly printed in “Eleutheropoli”, which was obviously Amsterdam. In the letter dated 29 August 1691, Limborch announced to the Socinian that “The works of the most Noble and Learned Samuel Przypkowski are being printed. The edition is already almost complete.” The printer, continued Limborch, had not been obstructed

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18 Some of this material has been published in Szczucki 1966, Epitome. I am particularly grateful to Antonio Rotondò for having allowed me to consult several precious documents contained in his library.
19 Letter from Benedictus Wiszowaty to Philippus van Limborch dated 2 March 1682 (University Library Amsterdam, K 88a). The correspondence between Benedictus Wiszowaty and Philippus van Limborch is made up of four missives from each sent between 1682 and 1704. The letters are housed at the University Library of Amsterdam. See also Barnouw 1963, Philippus van Limborch, p. 25.
20 Przypkowski 1692, Cogitationes.
21 Philippus van Limborch to Benedictus Wiszowaty dated 29 August 1691 (University Library Amsterdam III D 17 159)
in his work, and the last writing to go to press had been the *Vindiciae Tractatus de Magistratu*, composed by Przypkowski as a reply in the course of his polemical exchange with his co-religionist, the Socinian Daniel Zwicker.\(^{22}\) Finally, Limborch asked Wiszowaty for assistance in the revision of the biography of Przypkowski with which it was planned to open the volume, and which his corrections would have rendered infinitely more realistic.

In February 1697, Benedictus Wiszowaty wrote to Limborch to convey to the latter his satisfaction at being able to hold the works of Przypkowski in his hands. He expressed his gratitude to the Arminian, to whom the Socinians acknowledged great honour and praise, being supremely indebted to him for the felicitous outcome of the edition and also to the printer, specifies Wiszowaty, whoever he may be. Nevertheless, Wiszowaty does not fail to observe certain erroneous biographical details, especially in relation to the polemics which Przypkowski had had to support during his lifetime, relating both to exegetic matters and to questions of ethics and politics.\(^{23}\)

The interesting, albeit scanty, correspondence between Wiszowaty and Limborch extended over a span of more than twenty years—from 1682 to 1704—touching on various theological and exegetic questions: from the theme of marriage and adultery to that of the Holy Supper. Dating from several years later is another brief correspondence between Limborch and the young Socinian resident in Germany, Samuel Crell.\(^{24}\) In his letters the latter showed himself to be interested in gathering material related to the Synod of Dordt and the epistolary contacts between the Arminians and Socinians which were established at that period. Among the mutual acquaintances who were mentioned in the course of these letters, the most important is undoubtedly the philosopher John Locke, who had been visited in the course of 1701 not by Samuel himself, but by his cousin Daniel Crell, who had enjoyed the hospitality of Sir Francis and Lady Masham at the manor house in Oates in Essex where the philosopher lived.

\(^{22}\) To the polemic between Przypkowski and Zwicker see Bietenholz 1997, *Daniel Zwicker*, p. 142ff.

\(^{23}\) Letter from Benedictus Wiszowaty to Philippus van Limborch dated 1 February 1697 (University Library Amsterdam, K 88c)

\(^{24}\) The correspondence of Philippus van Limborch and Samuel Crell is made up of six letters, three sent by each of the writers between 1701–1704. The documents are housed at the University Library of Amsterdam.
The political situation in Holland in the 1680s was certainly far removed from the dramatic season of the Synod of Dordrecht and the wars against France; nevertheless these crucial moments in the Dutch history of the seventeenth century remained a strong presence in the culture and religious debate of the time. The accusation of a religious affinity with the Socinians, which had stigmatised the Arminians from the very start of the century, became a stock theme in the polemics launched against them by the supporters of Gomar and the orthodox Calvinists.

Sponsoring the edition of the works of an important Socinian writer was, consequently, a cultural event rife with significance. It bore witness to a particular attention on the part of Limborch who, as far back as the early days of 1682, wrote to Jean Le Clerc to send him a catalogue of the works contained in the Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum and expressed his wish that the as yet unpublished works of Przypkowski should become part of the same, as effectively they did ten years later, coming to constitute the seventh volume.

Samuel Przypkowski lived from 1592 to 1670. His early education was taken care of by his family, which belonged to the minor Polish aristocracy. He continued his training in Rakow, where the religious community had a flourishing school. Subsequently, as was the custom among the social and cultural elite, he undertook a Grand Tour. He studied in Altdorf and then in Leiden in the period between 1616 and 1619, before returning to his homeland. The Dutch years were crucial for him; when he arrived at the University of Leiden, one of the two chairs of theology had been entrusted to the eminent Arminian thinker Simon Episcopius, (the other being held by the moderate Calvinist, Johannes Polyander). Adopting a prudent and far-sighted academic policy, the administrators of the university had opted for a balanced approach in relation to the two factions, the Remonstrants and the Orthodox, which had already clashed during the early years of the seventeenth century, maintaining an open and tolerant climate in the attempt to protect the academic body from the harsher theological and political conflicts.

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25 Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum quos Unitarios vocant ... Irenopoli [=Amsterdam], 1656–1692.
26 See Simonutti 1984, Arminianismo, p. 86.
Of the Remonstrant’s point of view, the events and dramatic outcome of the Synod of Dordt between 1618 and 1619 had negative consequences: at the University of Leiden any possibility of political and religious openness was swept away; Episcopius was banished, and the ecclesiastical authorities began to exercise a much stricter doctrinal and political control. The time at which Przypkowski left Leiden and Holland was consequently marked, not only by a dramatic stiffening of theological attitudes, but also by a fervent debate about the diversity and legitimacy of the interpretations of the religious creed, and the forms and limitations of the interaction between political and religious power which had been so crucially brought into question by the outcome of the Synod.

According to his anonymous biographer, it was precisely in these years in Leiden that Przypkowski composed his most famous work, the *Dissertatio de pace et concordia Ecclesiae*, leaving it unpublished for ten years, most likely because he was discouraged by the events in Holland. He was to publish it in 1628, only significantly shortly after the revocation of the sanctions imposed on the Remonstrants and their readmission to Holland. He nonetheless preferred to conceal his own identity behind the pseudonym of Irenaeus Philalethes, indicating the site of publication, undoubtedly Amsterdam, as Eleutheropoli, and further concealing the name of the publisher under the pseudonym of Godfridus Philadelphus.27

It is significant that the volumes of the *Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum* are attributed to this same publisher, Godfridus Philadelphus, and that some of the volumes bear as the city of publication the name Eleutheropoli, that is Amsterdam. Similarly relevant is the fact that, in 1692, for the in-folio of Przypkowski’s *Cogitationes sacrae* the same name, Eleutheropoli, is once again used for the place of printing. We are dealing, therefore, with a city, and probably not a single printer, but a clandestine entourage supported by the more tolerant religious sectors and which, moving within the broad mesh of Dutch political control, was able to produce works and organise editorial enterprises of extreme importance.28

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The *Dissertatio de pace et concordia Ecclesiae* played a significant role not only in Przypkowski's own production but also within the larger sphere of Socinian thought. In tackling theological questions regarding which, and how many, ought to be the fundamental dogmas of the Christian religion upon which it is possible to reach the broadest consensus of the various churches and confessions, or dealing with the significance and importance for salvation of the Trinitarian dogma and other divine mysteries, and finally with the problematic definition of heresy and the heretic in the light of such considerations, Przypkowski focused his argument upon a sensitive emphasis on the ethical significance of Biblical teaching and the words of Christ.

Once he has successfully dispersed the mists of ecclesiastical tradition which obscure the true teaching contained within the Biblical text, man must exercise his own free judgement for the purpose of leading a holy life. His duty is to love and obey God and Christ and this will lead him to beatitude. It is through such devoted love and not intellectual examination that man fulfils the will of God. Anyone, therefore, who obeys the pact desired by God and sanctioned by the figure of Christ, who is faithful to this and conforms with its precepts shall be admitted to eternal happiness, whatever the errors committed by his intellect may be.

Moreover, continued Przypkowski, the essential aspects of the divine Revelation in relation to salvation can be clearly understood by everyone. If, therefore, it is actual behaviour which either brings man close to God or makes him liable for punishment, in a Christian society founded on gentleness and love nothing but the very broadest toleration in relation to both works and beliefs can flourish.

While remaining within the sphere of the Socinian concept of a reduction of the dogmatic apparatus of Christian doctrine by means of rational thought—themes to which the Polish thinker was to remain faithful—Przypkowski also took his place within the Erasmus-influenced *philosophia Christi* current which was vitally alive in Holland in the early seventeenth century, taking over the teachings of Episcopius which he had heard in Leiden, probably even during the professor's final oration before his exile.

In the course of this final lecture Episcopius exhorted Christians in general, and his students in particular, to distance themselves from
interpretations of the sacred texts saturated with the philosophical spec-
ulations of the academics, and to focus instead on an understanding of
the message of the testament in its “naked, open and plain” truth. Only
thus may the Christian recover the authentic divine teaching in all its
ethical significance. The Christian’s task is therefore to commit himself
to achieving beatitude through obedience to divine precepts. For Epis-
copius, as later for Limborch, the divine decrees necessary for human
salvation are simple, are within the reach of the minds of all men, and
are unequivocally contained in the Bible and the words of Christ. By
complying with the pact of faith with Christ the Saviour and obeying
the precepts of God, every believer can achieve eternal salvation. The
Remonstrants, consequently, place the emphasis on the role of ratio-
nal free will and choice in men who, worn down but not definitively
corrupted by sin, set off to pursue the path of beatitude.

Voluntarism and the defense of free will could not fail to galvanize
the opposition of the followers of Gomar, and more generally the more
orthodox sector of Dutch Calvinism, supporting as they did the concept
of the dual predestination of man to salvation and eternal punishment.
The conviction that every theological dispute can be conducted in
peace and concord, and without any damage to civil society, remained
a constant among the Remonstrants. It was on such a basis that they,
and Episcopius in particular, founded their concept of toleration: the
possibility of reuniting in love, gentleness and peace all those who
believe in the fundamental divine precepts of the Christian religion and
of salvation, and all those who obey the same ethical dictates to achieve
beatitude.

These are themes which were fully shared and taken over by Przyp-
kowski in the Dissertatio de pace et concordia Ecclesiae. Effectively, on the
appearance of the second edition in 1630, the work was attributed
to the pen of Episcopius. A further significant sign of this familiarity
with the Dutch scene and with the dramatic conflicts which troubled
it, is the fact that the tenth chapter of the Dissertatio was devoted to
a refutation of the predestinarian ideas of Calvin. Like the Arminian,
the Socinian too harshly criticised the rashness and presumption of the
intellect which expects to achieve eternal salvation through the mere
confession of faith, that is through a merely mental act, while the only
true way is through the sanctity of life, the love of God and the obe-

dience to the pact of Christ. As for the Arminian, for Przypkowski, too, what was fundamental was the textual lesson which makes it possible to discern the dogmas and precepts necessary for salvation; for the Socinian these could not include the dogma of the Trinity, in relation to which, nonetheless, what is important is our obedience to the divine laws and our love towards the two Persons, rather than a scrutiny of their substance.

Consequently, true error does not consist “in intellectus halucinatione” but “in voluntatis pravitate”, and therefore disobedience and incredulity are the only reasons for the exclusion of man from eternal salvation. According to the Pole, but also according to Episcopius, God has given every man the means to achieve salvation, since all are capable of understanding the simple and explicit divine message. Przypkowski based his defence of toleration for all believers, and the absence of excommunication and condemnation for the errantes, or the heretics, on this eirenic and universalistic concept. But we shall return to this latter aspect further on.

Here, however, we should recall that on certain doctrinal aspects the Remonstrants never subscribed to an affinity with anti-Trinitarian ideas; on the contrary, on several occasions they openly revealed their disagreement with the Socinians. The Remonstrants did not share with the Socinians the denial of the dogma of the Trinity, the affirmation of the human nature of Christ and his mere role as mediator between God and man. For the Remonstrants, instead, as well as being man, Christ also shared the divine substance with the Father; the sacrifice of Christ was not merely an example to be followed to achieve salvation, but rather his sacrifice was the path for the remission of sin.

It is nevertheless important to emphasize the important affinities between the ethical and political reflections of Przypkowski and the thought of the Remonstrants. These were ideas which marked the distance between the Polish thinker and the Socinian concept of politics, and on the other hand his closeness to the reflections which were being made by the Remonstrants at that time, in particular by Grotius and Wtenbogaert, highlighting once again the importance of his youthful experience on Dutch soil.

Under the entry “Socin” in his Dictionnaire, Pierre Bayle subjected to his characteristic ironic scrutiny the Socinian renunciation of “l’ambition et aux armes” and more specifically, the reply of Fausto Sozzini to Paleologus, written to condemn every form of taking up arms, even against oppressors. “Il y condamne si fortement la prise d’armes des
sujets contre leur Prince, et les Théologiens Protestans qui ont dit qu’il étoit permis de s’opposer aux oppresseurs de la liberté de conscience, que jamais peut-être les partisans les plus outrez de la puissance arbitraire et despotique des Souverains n’ont parlé plus nettement. Il parle plutôt comme un Moine qui auroit vendu sa plume pour faire hâir la Réformation Protestante, que comme un fugitif d’Italie.\textsuperscript{30}

It was from this position adopted by Sozzini and by the Socinians such as Daniel Zwicker, that Przypkowski distanced himself in his \textit{De jure Christiani Magistratus},\textsuperscript{31} most likely written around 1650, and in the \textit{Vindiciae Tractatus de Magistratu} composed in the years 1661–1663, in reply to the objections of Daniel Zwicker.\textsuperscript{32}

According to Przypkowski, the aims of Church and State are not opposed but, on the contrary, each in its own sphere and through different modes of government, operates for the good of mankind, one in terms of eternal welfare and one in terms of temporal welfare. The Church and State both participate, each at a different but not conflicting level, in that harmonious purpose, that aspiration to goodness, which resides in human nature.\textsuperscript{33}

Nor was any man excluded from religion on account of holding some State office. “On the contrary—wrote Przypkowski—rather there has never been a State without Religion, or Religion outside a State”.\textsuperscript{34}

In his treatises, far from conjecturing a Utopian Christian society where the governing figure of the Magistrate is not necessary since obedience to religion guarantees social harmony, as Zwicker and many of his co-religionists believed, Przypkowski elaborated a conception of the relation between State and Church which was most probably influenced by Grotius’ work \textit{De jure belli ac pacis}. The definition of the scope and the limitations of the tasks of the Magistrate is founded on the distinction between State and Church which was most probably influenced by Grotius’ work \textit{De jure belli ac pacis}. The definition of the scope and the limitations of the tasks of the Magistrate is founded on the distinction between Church and State. The Magistrate is responsible for the management of public affairs, including the right to undertake war and to declare terms of peace, and all that does not go against the laws of God and the precepts of Christ. Moreover, added Przypkowski, if someone

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{31} Przypkowski 1692, \textit{Jure}.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Przypkowski 1692, \textit{Vindiciae}.
\item \textsuperscript{33} As the Pole writes (Przypkowski 1602, \textit{Jure}, p. 689): “Neque igitur collidenda, neque confudenda cum republica religio est.”
\item \textsuperscript{34} Przypkowski 1692, \textit{Animadversiones}, p. 630: “Imo vero nulla unquam Respublica absque religione fuit, nec ulla religio nisi in aliqua Respublica”; see also Pintacuda de Michelis (1975): \textit{Socinianesimo}, in particular ch. IV.
\end{itemize}
should assert something in a manner which is not absolute and simple but in accordance with the permission of the Magistrate, and if such a thing should have to be performed not in accordance with Christian dictates but with others, then we should fall into something new and paradoxical as is illustrated in the Holy Scriptures.\footnote{Przypkowski 1692, \textit{Jure}, p. 735a.} For Przypkowski, “\textit{oportet quidem Deo magis obsequi, quam hominibus}”\footnote{Przypkowski 1692, \textit{Jure}, p. 735b.} was an essential tenet.

In contrast to the position sustained by Fausto Sozzini in his writing against Paleologus, Przypkowski was convinced that absolute non-resistance is an act contrary to Scripture and reason\footnote{See Bietenholz 1997, \textit{Daniel Zwicker}, p. 147.}. He emphasized the difference of sphere of action, which exists between the public right of the Magistrate and the right of private citizens, who are not permitted to do such things as may instead fall within the competence of the Magistrate in his public role.\footnote{Przypkowski 1692, \textit{Jure}, p. 736b.} Przypkowski’s work, therefore, focused the shifting of the problem of toleration from the strictly religious sphere within which it was confined in Socinian thought towards a political formulation of the question. In the \textit{De jure Christiani Magistra-tus} Przypkowski confirmed, in the face of Sozzini and the Socinians, the need to recognize the entire scope of public justice and the requirement to construct a condition of peace and social harmony precisely on the basis of social rules.

5. \textit{The Closing Chapters of the Theologia christiana}

It is also important to emphasize that a similar shifting of the question of toleration from a strictly religious field—in which the components arguing for an eirenic concord were strong—to an arena in which political aspects became increasingly relevant, was a process which had also characterized Remonstrant thought. The pressure of political events, the Remonstrance of 1610, and above all the Synod of 1618, obliged the Remonstrants to reconsider the relations between State and Church, and—in a Calvinistic manner—the supremacy of the latter.

To the theocratic concepts and those sustaining the ‘collateral’ nature of political and religious power put forward by the orthodox Calvinists, the Remonstrants opposed a moderate Erastianism, a revalu-
tion of the function and the authority of the Magistrate in sacra. Such concepts found their most famous and systematic expression in the work of Grotius, and were illustrated by the writings of the political commitment of the theologian and advisor to Oldenbarnevelt, Johannes Wtenbogaert, one of the compilers of the Remonstrance of 1610.

And so Grotius recommended the Christian prince to pursue truth and union, exhorting him to ensure the civil and ecclesiastical peace of his realm starting from the proviso: that in the first place he should abstain as far as possible from making definitions, except for those dogmas essential to salvation. Like his co-religionists, he reduced to an exiguous number the fundamental dogmas and essential rites of the Christian doctrine. He also recalled that in numerous ancient Councils the matters which tended to be disputed with excessive subtlety regarding the disposition of predestination and the manner of conciliating grace and human free will, were largely left aside and passed over in a cautious and wise silence. He concluded his writing on the power of the Magistrate “in sacra” by adopting the words of the Council held in Carthage in the third century: all that it remains for us to do is express our own opinion on this same argument, without judging anyone and without excluding anyone from the right to communion, even if he should have a different opinion.

In his reflections on how legitimate it is for a Christian to exercise civil authority, Episcopius confirmed that the Christian Magistrate could not issue orders and laws which were counter to his own religion. Although it may be part of his task—as also confirmed by the ancient texts and the New Testament—to punish usurpers, atheists, villains and profligates, that is to perform all that may be considered necessary to protect civil society from the dissolution to which the late-

42 Grotius 1993, Potere, p. 140.
43 Episcopius 1650, Tractatus, p. 93. In view of their conception of the power of the Magistrate, and its limits in both the civil and the religious sphere, it is probable that the Remonstrants were one of the polemic targets of the late confutation of the famous anti-monarchist work Vindicia contra tyrannos made by their historic enemy, G. Voetius. Cf. G. Voetius 1662, Disquisitio. Also interesting is the circulation in Holland of the Vindiciae in the epitome edited by Francis Coornhert, the brother of Dirck: Coornheert 1586, Onderwijis.
ter might reduce it, nevertheless Episcopius exhorts the Magistrate not to transform himself into a tyrant, but to find an appropriate means of punishment which does not involve the death penalty, since for the Christian no sin exists for which the hope of eternal salvation is not contemplated. It is also the Magistrate’s task to guarantee the tranquility of the Church in its public aspects and for such religious rites as are adiaphorous, that is non-essential to faith and salvation. It is therefore licit to dissent on the adiaphora, and to establish mutual toleration among Christians in relation to these.

In the mid 1680s, Philippus van Limborch took over the ideas of liberty and toleration of his famous forefather, making them one of the pivots of his theory of reciprocal toleration among Christians. He concluded the Theologia Christiana, his systematic treatise of Remonstrant theology, with four chapters in which he analyzed the definition of heretical, and expounded his concept of toleration. For Limborch, the essential foundations of this theory centred on a definition of who the heretics were, and a consequent clearing of the field of the numerous arguments against the dissenters.

A heretic is not simply one who errs, since there are many different ways of contravening the religious precepts, but one who, in complete awareness disobeys the fundamental dogmas with perfidy and obstinacy. It is significant that Limborch included among such treacherous and blasphemous the supporters of absolute predestination, who, in complete awareness, attribute to God the existence of sin, injustice etc.

On the contrary, those who are generally referred to as heretics, continued Limborch, are those who distance themselves from the decrees of the Synod and the generally accepted sentences or who propagate a grave error. These heretics, however, are not convinced that their position is erroneous; on the contrary, they believe, albeit through vain reasoning, that they are defending the truth. It is on this definition that Limborch based the non-liability to punishment of the heretics and more specifically the fact that consciences cannot be persecuted, whatever their interior conviction. He directed his polemic indiscriminately against both Dominicans and Calvinists, in the conviction that the Church’s role is to correct the erring by spiritual means alone.

44 Episcopius 1650, Tractatus, p. 94. See also Episcopius 1655, Confessio, p. 93.
45 Cf. Episcopius 1655, Confessio, Praefatio and chapp. XXIV–XXV.
46 Limborch 1686, Theologia, p. 888b.
47 Limborch 1686, Theologia, p. 889b.
The civil power, instead, has the power of protecting the good and punishing wrongdoers. The Magistrate can, therefore, in serious cases banish and condemn the errant, but only if he is a malefactor. Should the heretic be merely a Christian who dissents on matters of non-essential dogma—that is those which are more obscure and mysterious—then the Magistrate cannot exercise the power of condemnation since in so doing he would exceed the limitations which God himself has laid down for temporal power. There is a distinct separation between the two powers, by which the temporal power proves to be weakened and even invalidated where it attempts to legislate in ‘Jura Dei’. Finally, neither the Church nor the State can overreach the limits of Christian moderation “sed errantes, quamdiu errant, fraterne tolerare”.

In the last two chapters of the *Theologia Christiana* Limborch expounded his concept of toleration based on rational consensus and a minimal creed to which all have the intellectual capacity for access. He focused on the aspects which make this an effective instrument of coexistence between religious dissidents, an instrument which guarantees the *libertas prophetandi*, which avoids the propagation of conflict and confusion and which is, above all, an instrument of peace between Christians.

These are arguments which recall the final chapters of Przypkowski’s *Dissertatio de pace et concordia ecclesiae*, the latter’s definition of heretics as persons guilty of blasphemy—as they were conceived in antiquity—and of heretics understood as dissidents, erring individuals who are the product of the diversities triggered by the recent divisions of creeds. These are the modern heretics who, not being impious or blasphemous, but merely diverging on marginal questions of faith, are not to be subjected to excommunication or cruel punishments, remedies which are sure to prove damaging and dangerous for the salvation and conservation of the Church. Przypkowski concluded in the last chapter of his writing that, as regards the heretic, it is not only possible but essential

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48 Limborch 1686, *Theologia*, p. 896b: “Cum ergo in dissensionibus circa obscuriora ac magis recondita Religionis Christianae mysteria nondum judicio infallibili determinatum sit penes quem sit veritas; nec etiam de cujusquam crimen constare potest. Adde quod error crimen non sit quod poenam proprie meretur. Ac tandem, Magistratum potestatis sua exercitium ulterius extendere nec posse nec debere, quam intra limites quibus a Deo circumscribat est; est enim vicarius Dei, potestatemque habet determinatam. Nullum autem illi dominium in conscientias hominum concessum est: hanc itaque si arripiat, potestatis suae limites transilire, ac in jura Dei invadere censendus est.”

to act with Christian peace and concord, as, moreover, was the case in the early Christian church. The Holy Scriptures are the depositories of truth, of that truth which emerges from free confrontation in a climate of reciprocal charity “libera vero collatione in mutua caritate sola veritas”.

Love for God and one’s fellow man, and the resultant climate of peace and toleration can alone guarantee the search for truth.

Przypkowski’s death in 1670 did not result in the dispersal of a heritage of thought which, thanks to Limborch, not only assumed its due importance within the history of the Socinian sect, but which with full entitlement also came to form part of the history of Remonstrant thought. The works of these two writers are emblematic in their exemplification of the cultural affinities between Socinians and Remonstrants, in particular as regards concepts of freedom and ethic voluntarism, the role of obedience in religion, the theme of the extension and limitations of the power of the state and the toleration of all dissidents.

The sponsorship and publication of Przypkowski’s works in the early 1690s signified, in a certain sense, the recognition on the part of the Arminians of a certain sharing of the path with the Socinians, a path which had wound out down the century and which had accompanied the political events and religious debates which were gradually coming to affirm the values of religious and civil toleration, to uphold the libertas prophetandi and the libertas philosophandi of eighteenth-century Europe.

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PART V
ENGLISH QUARRELS
PLATONISM AND THE TRINITY: 
ANNE CONWAY, HENRY MORE 
AND CHRISTOPH SAND

Sarah Hutton

The Cambridge Platonist Henry More (1614–1687) was a Trinitarian, who defended the doctrine of the Trinity as an essential creed of Christianity, denial of which was tantamount to repudiating Christianity and the authority of the New Testament. His pupil, Lady Anne Conway (1630–1679), came to regard the doctrine of the Trinity as an obstacle that stood in the way of persuading non-Christians of the truth of the Christian religion. More’s defence of the Trinity against those who repudiate or misconstrue it drew not just on interpretation of the bible, but also on non-Christian sources, namely the writings of the Greek philosophers and the Jewish kabbalah. Lady Conway, too, studied ancient philosophy and the kabbalah. She also took a keen interest in religious groups, who either rejected the Trinity or subscribed to Christological doctrines incompatible with Trinitarianism: particularly the Familists and the Quakers. By contrast with More, she did not think that kabbalistical writings, truly interpreted, confirmed the received doctrine of the Trinity. For she denied the distinction of persons in God and conceived of Christ as both logos and Adam Kadmon, thereby incorporating kabbalism into her understanding of the relationship between God and creation. While this indicates that her view of the Godhead did not conform to orthodoxy in respect of the Trinity, it is nevertheless an open question whether Anne Conway can be called an Anti-Trinitarian. In all likelihood the discernible differences between More and Conway on the Trinity probably owe a good deal to Lady Conway’s interest in Quakerism and the influence of Francis Mercurius van Helmont. However, both More and Anne Conway were aware of other currents of Anti-Trinitarian thought, notably Socinianism. Although Anne Conway’s extant writings make no explicit reference to Socianianism as such, two figures with Socinian links are named in her correspondence with More: Christoph Crell and Christoph Sand.¹ Both

¹ Conway 1992, Letters, pp. 204 and 342.
men were in England at different times during the 1660s. Christoph Crell paid a visit to More at Christ’s College, Cambridge in 1662. And Christoph Sand, appears to have spent time studying at Oxford in 1664, and was in contact with Henry Oldenburg, Secretary to the Royal Society. More complained about Crell’s ignorance of philosophy. But Sand, like More and Conway, drew on Greek sources in his Anti-Trinitarian writings. It is with Sand that I shall be concerned in this paper, which represents a preliminary enquiry into the relationship between Socinianism and Anne Conway’s divergence from More on the matter of Trinitarianism. I examine the discussion of the Trinity by Conway and More and suggest points of comparison with Christoph Sand’s analysis of the relationship between Platonism and Trinitarianism.

1. Platonism and Trinitarianism

The divergent views of the Trinity held by More and Conway illustrate the ambivalent relationship of Platonism to Christianity. From earliest Christianity through to the Reformation, Platonism has enjoyed something of an ambiguous reputation as both confirmation of and corrupter of Christian belief. The relationship of Platonism to the doctrine of the Trinity was particularly controversial. Where St Augustine had recommended the Platonists as coming closest among pagan philosophers to Christian doctrine, others attributed the Trinitarian errors of both Origen and Arius to the influence of Platonism—a charge that was repeated in the Middle Ages by St Thomas Aquinas and echoed in the Renaissance by George of Trebizond’s warnings about the dangers of Platonising Christianity. In the seventeenth century, the Jesuit ecclesiastical scholar Denis Pêtau underlined the link between Platonism and Arianism.

Nevertheless, with the recovery of modern corpus of Plato’s philosophy in the Renaissance, the Platonic Trinity found new champions. Plato’s fifteenth-century translator, Marsilio Ficino, took a compatibilist approach to Platonism and Christianity in a bid to recommend Plato’s philosophy to the Christian world by treating him as the atticis-

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ing Moses. Ficino presented Plato as the most important of a line of ancient sages whose works preserved ancient theological truth, or *prisca theologia*, derived ultimately from Moses and the Hebrew prophets. But even those who accepted the existence of a *prisca theologia* were cautious about citing Plato’s supposed Trinitarianism. Notwithstanding the fact that Anti-Trinitarians, especially Protestants, grounded their position in their reading of scripture, and not on philosophy, their post-Reformation opponents treated their Anti-Trinitarianism as a revival of Arianism, and attributed their errors to the influence of Plato, as had been the case with Arius. The fact that there was a new attempt to defend the doctrine of the Trinity by reference to Plato explains the Anti-Trinitarian reversal of the charge of Platonising. One example is the English Anti-Trinitarian, John Biddle, who, in his *Apostolical and True Opinion concerning the Holy Trinity* (1650), pours scorn on the ‘brain-sick Notions’, of Trinitarian arguments, notions ‘that have neither scripture nor sense in them, and were first hatched by the subtility of Satan in the heads of the Platonists, to pervert the word of God’.

Biddle’s anti-Platonism is of a fairly traditional kind, which focuses on the terminology of Trinitarian theology, rather than the supposed Trinitarianism of Plato himself. A rather different approach was taken by Biddle’s German contemporary Christoph Sand, whose Anti-Trinitarianism, is both more scholarly and, arguably, less hostile to Platonism. For Christoph Sand examines Greek philosophy and Jewish sources, in order to show that passages supposedly supporting the doctrine of the Trinity, do nothing of the kind. Sand’s writings consist of lengthy footnotes to Trinitarian claims, with extensive quotations taken from the kind of sources that Christian Platonists used to make their case for the convergenc of Platonism and Christianity and the existence of a Platonic trinity. The fact that Sand apparently took the *prisca theologia* seriously (though he does not use the term), is perhaps testimony to the success of Ficino in presenting the case for a Christianised view of Plato. In his *Nucleus historiae ecclesiasticae*, for example, Sand claims that, following Plato, the later Platonists, Plotinus, Amelius, Porphyry, Iamblichus, and Proclus, taught that the One is the Highest

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4 On the *prisca theologia* see Walker 1972, *Ancient Theology*.
5 Biddle 1650, *Opinion*.
6 His arguments are an answer to the Platonizing of Morainvilliers d’Orgeville, in all probability Louis Morainvilliers d’Orgeville’s *Examen philosophiae Platonicae* (Maclovii 1650).
Good and that Mind (mens) is the first of the creatures and of things generated by God. He also argues that they taught that Mind or mens is divine but inferior to the One. Sand retails the view that Philo, the Platonists and Pythagoreans derived their dogmas from scripture. His *Disserutatio περὶ τοῦ λογοῦ*, for example, displays much learning in support of the claim that the Platonic first being is not one and the same with ‘the one and the good’ of the first person of the Trinity. The first mind (‘prima mens’) is just that, ‘first mind’, and not God. Sand denied that the fathers, Plato, Philo and even the Paraclete ever talk about the logos as ungenerated (‘ingenitus’) but conceive the logos or the word as distinct from the ungenerated God of all things. By arguing in this way that Trinitarian tenets are *not* to be found outside Christian traditions, Sand in effect de-couples Platonic philosophy from Trinitarianism, removing it as a platform for defenders of the Trinity. Instead of being the bête noir of Trinitarians and Anti-Trinitarians alike, Platonism becomes firmly identified with a non-Trinitarian idea of God. Sand even includes an entry on the Platonists in his *Bibliotheca anti-trinitariorum*.

2. Henry More

Henry More might have agreed with Biddle that the terminology of Trinitarian doctrine is confusing and conducive to misperceptions of the Godhead. But, rather than laying the blame at the door of the Platonists, he blames scholastic theologians, whose ‘curious definitions’ are handled ‘so unskillfully and perplexedly’. The doctrine weakened by such ‘unintelligible spinosities’ is the exact reverse of the doctrine Biddle believed to have been corrupted by such things, namely the doctrine of the Trinity. The Christian Platonism of More was not a matter of theological terminology, but a matter of doctrine, underpinned by the same *prisca theologia* to which Christoph Sand refers. From his earliest writings (his *Philosophical Poems*) to his latest writings (his commentaries on the kabbalah), More defended the doctrine of the Trinity by appealing to Platonism. In his very first published work, his Platonist poem, *Psychozoia. A Platonick Song of the Soul* (first published in 1642

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7 Sand 1669, *Nucleus*, pp. 204f.
8 Sand 1670, *Disserutatio*.
and reprinted in 1647), More sets out a poetical version of the Platonic Trinity which he glosses in the preface ‘To the Reader upon the first Canto of *Psychozoia*’. ‘The famous Platonicall Triad’ consists of *Ahad* or *Atove* (‘the first Principle of all beings, the Father of all existences’), *Aeon* (‘Wisdom and Intellect’) and *Psyche* or *Uranore* (Love).\(^{11}\) More’s parallelism between the Platonic and Christian Trinity is uncomplicated, based largely on the order and terms of the Platonic Triad, and the assumption that ‘a near correspondency of Names … should imply agreement in nature’. He supports his case for the parallelism between the Christian and Platonic trinities by setting out in detail two parallel columns of seven names ‘belonging to the second unity of each Triad’. In the first of these, under the heading ‘The Sonne of the Good’, More lists Greek terms and phrases from Greek philosophy. Corresponding to these in the second column are Greek biblical terms. The sources More cites here and in the notes to the poem include Plotinus, Proclus, Philo and Hermes Trismegistus. While he acknowledges that the Platonic Trinity falls short of the ‘high mystery’ of the Christian Trinity, he passes over in silence the implied subordinationism of the hierarchy of its components, merely saying that the Platonic Trinity is a ‘threefold Hypostasis’.\(^{12}\)

The Trinity, and, more particularly, the Platonic Trinity is discussed again in More’s *An Explanation of the Grand Mystery of Godliness*, a work published in 1660, a time of political and religious regrouping in England, with the re-establishment of monarchy and the pre-civil war ecclesiastical order. In this work, More distances himself from the puritan sects of the interregnum, even while defending the principle of toleration. His defence of the Trinity is just such a vindication of his own orthodoxy. But it is also a defence of Platonism against imputations of heterodoxy associated with it. The religious figures against whom More writes in this work are largely impostors, among them, from antiquity, Apollonius of Tyanna and, from recent history, David Joris and Hendrik Niclaes. The last two, about whom More had written in his earlier *Brief Discourse of Enthusiasm* (1655), impugn the divinity of Christ by setting themselves up as the new Messiah, making ‘their Union with God the same with that of Christ’s’.\(^{13}\) More accused Joris of sadducism, or denial of the existence of spirit, and Niclaes of claiming his own

\(^{11}\) More 1660, *Explanation*, pp. 10f.
body was united with Christ's soul to become the human manifestation of Christ through direct, and therefore physical, union with God, 'that no less Union than Real and Physical Deification'. These heresies obviously have a bearing on the doctrine of the Trinity, since they concern the person of Christ. More argued, furthermore, that the doctrine of the Trinity was an essential safeguard against errors of this kind. Although More attacks Anti-Trinitarianism, he does not name any specific Anti-Trinitarians. (He refers to Socinus obliquely as 'the first author of this sect that boldly denies the Trinity'.) Rather, More defends the Platonic associations of the Trinity in what amounts to a re-affirmation of the position taken in his poems, but without the fanciful names he there adopts. The Platonic Trinity, he writes, consists of three hypostases in the deity: the good (τάγα), intellect ( νοῦ), and soul ( ψυχη). While he acknowledges the inherent subordinationism in this schema, he claims that the Platonists treat the three hypostases as unified in three ways: by the life or energy resounding through them; by the same kind of union whereby the soul is united to the body; and in a manner similar to the emanation of light from the sun. More does not give sources for these claims.

In More's account, the primary charge against the Platonic Trinity, is that its Platonic origins are pagan, that

_The Trinity … is nothing else but a Pagan or Heathenish Figment brought out of the Philosophy of Pythagoras and Plato, and inserted into the doctrine of the Church by the ancient Fathers who most of them were Platonists._

More's answer to this charge is that the Platonic Trinity is 'rational' and that if the Church Fathers had taken the doctrine from the Platonists, they would have explained it in a more simplified way than is the case. As evidence of the rationality of the Platonic Trinity, More claims that it is not liable to the 'bold cavils' which 'our daring wits' level against the Christian Trinity. These include the charge that if the persons of the Trinity are equal, this is an unnecessary reduplication of essences, which does nothing to bridge the gap between God and creation. If the three persons are distinct, then they are three gods. In any case, if the Platonists were Trinitarians, their source for the doctrine was not paganism, but ancient Judaism. To support his contention that the doctrine of the Trinity was derived by Plato and Pythagoras from the

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14 More 1660, Explanation, p. 506.
15 More 1660, Explanation, p. 7.
ancient Jews More cites the example of Philo of Alexandria (c. 20 BC–AD 40), in particular Philo’s doctrine of the *logos*:

Philo the Jew speaks often of this Principle in the Godhead, calling it λόγον θεοῦ [the Word of God], or τὸν Θείον λόγον [the Divine Word], or sometimes, ὁ θεὸν [God], or other sometimes πρώτογονον θεοῦ υἱὸν [the Firstborn Son of God] and attributes unto it the Creation of the World, as also the Healing of the Disease of our Minds, and the Purging of our Souls from Sins; in so much that this further might be a good Commentator upon this first Chapter of St. John.

The dual faceted *logos* of Philo combines, on the one hand, the *logos* as eternal archetype or only begotten son, and, on the other, the *logos* as first created being, or first-born son of God. This dual aspect makes the *logos* both bridge between and separator of God and creation, the mediator between God and the world.

More cites the bible in support of the doctrine, especially on the *logos*. He concludes his account of the Platonic Trinity by praising the design of providence in preparing the way for Christianity, by ensuring that adumbrations of Christian doctrine were current among the pagans, especially the Pythagoreans and Platonists.

That the Trinity should be kept so long warme and be so carefully polished by those Heathens that knew not the main Use thereof … prepared those parts of the World where their Philosophy had taken foot-hold to an easy reception of Christianity.

While More’s defence of the Platonic Trinity in *An Explanation* can be read as an answer to Anti-Trinitarians like Biddle, it was probably intended as a defence of the use of Platonism in Christian theology generally. It is therefore a defence which could be used against both Anti-Trinitarians and Trinitarians alike. Part of More’s purpose was undoubtedly a bid to defend his own Origenism in the face of re-established Church of England orthodoxy. His success was only partial, as we know from the censure which he incurred from Samuel Parker.

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20 George Bull, for example, dismisses Platonism as an ‘enthusiastic’ philosophy in his *Defence of the Nicene Creed*. 
and others. But he continued to defend his position by pressing the argument that, far from being a corruption of paganism, Trinitarianism was attested in the writings of the ancient Jews, whence the Platonists derived their version of the doctrine. When, in the 1670s, More encountered the Jewish kabbalism in the texts made available to him by Christian Knorr von Rosenroth, he set about interpreting them in Christian kabbalist fashion. In two texts, one of which was printed by Knorr in the apparatus accompanying his *Kabbala denudata*, More argues that the first three of the ten sepiroth represent the Trinity. The true interpretation of the kabbalah, is, however, available only to those blessed with the light of Christian revelation. The kabbalistic texts then being translated by Knorr show that the ancient Jews corrupted the original truth contained in the Pythagorean decad that preserved in symbolic form the true doctrine of the Trinity.

3. Anne Conway

Like Henry More, Anne Conway read and discussed many heterodox religious writings, including those of Nicolaes. Her curiosity about heterodox Christians extended, eventually, to the Quakers, resulting in her conversion to Quakerism shortly before she died. Her life-long religious quest leaves its mark on her posthumously published treatise *The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy*, which combines metaphysics with theology. That Trinitarianism was clearly a central concern of Anne Conway’s when writing her philosophy is evident in both the over-all framework and the conceptual detail of the system contained in the book. She outlines a Neoplatonic hierarchy of being consisting of three species, the first of which is God, from whom the second and third species derive. The second being, Middle Nature, shares in the nature of both the first (God) and the third (Creature), as a bridge between being and becoming. The subset of created entities which make up the third species may increase in perfection, thereby becoming more spiritualised, or fall away from it, so becoming more like body. The book is a religious philosophy in the important respect that the system so expounded derives from the divine nature: for the created world reflects the justice, wisdom, infinity and

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power of God, while the ontological states whereby creatures increase or decrease in perfection, are also part of a moral order in which they may become spiritually regenerate or degenerate. The religious dimension of the work is unmistakable from her use of theological terms to designate the three orders of being: instead of using the Plotinian term *hypostasis*, she uses Christian terminology, designating the three species God, Christ and Creature. The Christian connotations of the second species are re-inforced by the fact that she calls Christ ‘Jesus Christ’, ‘Messiah’, and ‘mediator’ between God and man, who ‘became flesh’:

Jesus Christ signifies the whole Christ, who is God and man. As God, he is called *logos ousios*, or the essential word of the father. As man, he is the *logos proforikos*, or the word which is uttered and revealed, the perfect and substantial image of God’s word, which is eternally in God and perpetually united to him so that it is his vehicle and organ, just like the body in respect to the soul.

At first sight Anne Conway’s system appears to be non-Trinitarian. Notwithstanding the fact that she calls Christ, ‘god and man’, within her tripartite ontological scheme, the second species (Christ), is clearly subordinate to the first (God), as a second order of being, a lesser nature than God. Christ is ‘the most excellent creature outside God’. Her heterodoxy is underlined by the fact that she insists that this ‘Christ’ is also Adam Kadmon. Furthermore, she singles out the doctrine of the Trinity as an obstacle to Jews, Muslims and others. If the wording about distinct persons were removed, then the faiths might be united:

If the phrase concerning the three distinct persons were omitted—for it is a stumbling block and offense to Jews, Turks and other people, has truly no reasonable sense in itself, and is found nowhere in Scripture—then all could easily agree on this article.

Nevertheless, Anne Conway insists that Christ is divine. And, indeed in the passage cited above she calls him ‘God’. Furthermore, in her account of God, she retains the idea of a triune deity, construing this as a triplicity of God, divine wisdom and divine will:

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Wisdom and will in God are not entities or substances distinct from him but, in fact, distinct modes or properties of one and the same substance. And this is that very thing which those who are the most knowledgeable and judicious among Christians understand by the Trinity.

A note to the first chapter expands on this, describing the Trinity as a representation of God:

The first concept is the infinite god himself, considered above and beyond his creation; the second is the same God insofar as he is the Messiah; the third is the same god insofar as he is adapted to the perception of creatures.\(^{27}\)

But, even with this allowance for a triune God, the result is far from orthodox. Her treatise certainly bears the hall-marks of Anti-Trinitarianism in her subordination of Christ to God and her explanation of the indwelling of Christ in created things by ‘intimate presence’. However, there is no parallel for her conception of God and Christ in Anti-Trinitarian writing. For ‘Christ’ is conceived as equivalent to Philo’s dual-faceted *logos* and the kabbalist Adam Kadmon. In its function as ‘Middle Nature’ this ‘Christ’ is also a metaphysical principle, a spirit through which life and movement of created things may be explained. In this important respect her *Principles* amounts to a re-interpretation of the doctrine of the Trinity, as a metaphysical truth rather than as a tenet of faith. Furthermore, if the second species, Christ/Adam Kadmon/Middle Nature, is to be identified with the wisdom of God, and is therefore not subordinate to God, her system is open to the charge of pantheism.

4. *Christoph Sand*

Anne Conway did not follow More in all things, as her critique of him in her philosophical treatise makes plain.\(^ {28}\) But it is particularly noteworthy that she diverged from More on the matter of the Trinity, while agreeing with him on the importance of Platonism and kabbalism for the Christian faith. Furthermore, where More discerned further support for Trinitarianism in kabbalism, she was prepared to dispense with the doctrine on the grounds that it was a deterrent to Jews and Moslems. Part of the explanation for this must be that she was disposed

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\(^{27}\) Conway 1997, *Principles*, p. 11.

\(^{28}\) Hutton 1995, *Conway*. 
to interpret kabbalism differently from More, perhaps on account of her acquaintance with Francis Mercury van Helmont.\textsuperscript{29} But it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that other factors disposed her to take the syncretic view of Christ that she did. One such factor may have been Socinianism. Of the two figures with Socinian links named in her correspondence with More, Johann Crell and Christoph Sand, the latter, as we have seen, adopts the view that there were strong parallels between the teachings of ancient philosophy, Christianity and Judaism. Furthermore, Sand used this syncretism, to reverse the Plato-Trinity link advanced by Trinitarians like More, and to make Plato an Anti-Trinitarian. It is impossible to be sure how extensive Anne Conway’s knowledge of the writings of Sand may have been. There is one reference to a book by Sand in \textit{The Conway Letters}, and the Conway library appears to have held one text by him. The book mentioned in \textit{Conway Letters} is Sand’s \textit{De origine animae}. The text in the Conway library is \textit{Nucleus historiae ecclesiasticae}. But she may well have read other books by him. Her reading of Sand must, of course, be put in context of the fact that she was acquainted with a large number of writings by religious radicals.\textsuperscript{30} Many of those who caught her attention were noted for their heterodox views on the Trinity and Christ: in addition to Socinianism, Behmenism, Familism and Quakerism all figure in her correspondence with More. Most, though not all of these, had been criticised by Henry More in his \textit{A Brief Discourse of Enthusiasm} and his \textit{An Explanation of the Grand Mystery of Godliness}. More’s particular interest in Sand’s \textit{De origine animae} would have related to Sand’s admiration for Origen, and his discussion of the doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul. For Sand claimed that this was a tenet of Platonism. He also claimed that it was a Jewish doctrine, citing not just the writings of Menasseh ben Israel but kabbalistic sources, the Zohar and commentators such as Isaac Luria.

The importance of Sand for Conway is twofold. First of all, repeatedly through his writings, he shares with her the view that Platonism is close to Christianity, and that there are parallels between Christianity, Greek Philosophy and the kabbalah. Secondly, Conway and More

\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Adumbratio kabbalae christianae} printed at the end of the 1684 volume of \textit{Kabbala denudata}, takes the form of a dialogue between a Christian philosopher and a learned Jew. The Christian sets out to demonstrate to the Jew the compatibility of Jewish doctrines with Christian teachings, in particular, the parallel between Christ and Adam Kadmon. The \textit{Adumbratio} also endorses the transmigration of souls (a doctrine dear to Van Helmont) and a doctrine association with More, spirit of nature.

\textsuperscript{30} See Hutton 2004, \textit{Anne Conway}. 
were exposed to his writings just at the point when they began their investigations into the kabbalistical texts brought to England by Francis Mercury van Helmont from Christian Knorr von Rosenroth who was engaged in preparing his translation of kabbalistic texts, subsequently published as *Kabbala denudata*. It was in 1671 that More mentioned *De origine animae* to Anne Conway, the same year, in which, through the good offices of Van Helmont, the first kabbalist manuscripts arrived from Germany, where Knorr von Rosenroth was preparing his *Kabbala denudata* for publication. Sand is not to be credited with stimulating their interest in kabbalism, but it is quite possible that his critique of the synthesis of Platonism and Christianity, on the one hand, fired More’s determination to demonstrate kabbalistic Trinitarianism, and on the other, contributed to Lady Conway’s doubts about More’s defence of the Trinity by recourse, first to Platonism, and secondly, to kabbalism.

5. Christological Controversy

The More-Conway letters for the last decade of Anne Conway’s life register increasingly intense discussion of religious matters, particularly Christology. These letters show a battle over the second person of the Trinity being played out in the context of kabbalism. This is registered in the *scholia* added to the Latin translation of More’s *Opera philosophica*, which he was preparing for the press between 1676 and 1678. The trigger for this was the Quaker leader George Keith, with whom Anne Conway was in close contact, in the period 1674–1678, during which time Keith was developing a new Christology, first propounded his *Immediate Revelation* (1668), and which he discussed with Anne Conway, Henry More, and Knorr von Rosenroth at this time.

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33 This is discussed more fully in Hutton 2004, *Anne Conway.*
34 These *scholia* were added between 1677, when *denudata* was published, and 1679 when the second volume of More’s *Opera omnia* appeared. The relevant *scholia* are those which accompany More’s kabbalistic writings. The first volume of More’s *Opera omnia*, published in 1675, contains no *scholia*. See Hutton 2004, *Anne Conway.*
36 One of the sources for Keith’s views were his letters to Knorr, which he showed to More. Conway 1992, *Letters*, pp. 408 and 415f. Keith’s letters to Knorr are held at the Herzog August Bibliothek, Wolfenbüttel, Cod. Guelph, 30. 4.
The outcome of these conversations and correspondence was Keith’s doctrine of the extension of the soul of Christ according to which Keith sought to explain the Quaker doctrine of the inner light by drawing on both kabbalism and Platonism, including Henry More’s penumatology. More’s rejoinder to this theory is summed up in a long scholium which More adds to section 10 of his discussion of the second kabbalistic table in his *Opera philosophica*. Almost as long as the original discussion this scholium contains an attack on the Lurianic doctrine of the emanation of Adam Kadmon and the ten sepiroth from the Godhead (*Aensoph*). These are doctrines which More regarded as fundamental errors that rendered kabbalism a materialist pantheism. He also singles out for condemnation the ‘Quaker’ doctrine deriving from this that the soul of the Messiah is extended throughout the world, a most abominable (*foedissimus*) error which, writes More, smacks of Arianism, Sabellianism and Paganism.37

Henry More was clearly alert to the multiple threat to the doctrine of the Trinity posed by Keith’s Quaker-kabbalistic idea of Christ. What he did not know, but probably feared, was that Anne Conway was formulating a conception of Christ which was open to the charges of subordinationism and pantheism. (He only became aware of Lady Conway’s treatise after her death). To compound dangers of heterodoxy, by explicitly denying the Trinitarian doctrine of ‘persons’, her conception of God as unipersonal smacks of Anti-Trinitarianism. At the same time, however, she meets the criteria according to which More recommended the ‘Platonicall triad’ of Platonism as proto-Christian doctrine. Although she does not use the ‘Platonic’ terminology of the Platonic Trinity outlined by More (good—intellect—soul) her system is amenable to the same Christian Platonic interpretation which More and other Christian Platonists applied to Platonism itself. Furthermore, her system meets the very criteria according to which More defended the Platonic Trinity in *An Explanation of the Grand Mystery of Godliness*. First of all in its being ‘rational’: she argues that the existence not just of God, but of Christ (that is Christ *qua* second species) can be demonstrated by reason: ‘That Christ … is a mediator is as demonstrable from the principles of sound reason as is the existence of God’.38

Secondly, the three species of her system do not replicate one another so avoiding the charge of un-necessary reduplication. Thirdly, the uni-

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directional line of dependence of the second and third species on the first means that they cannot be taken to be ‘three gods’ equal one to another. Finally, her system has no ‘gap’ or ‘chasm’ between God and Nature: her argument for the existence of the second species (Christ) answers the objection that God and creatures are radically distinct. Without Middle Nature, she writes, ‘there would be an utter chasm and gap between God and creatures’. To these points of comparison with More’s account of the Platonic Trinity we may add that Anne Conway’s illustration of the unifying aspects of her system of species echoes More’s explanation of the unity of the Platonic Trinity: her three species are one in substance (spirit), characterised by life and energy. According to More the Platonic hypostases emanate from the one; Anne Conway also describes the production of the species in terms of emanation. More claims that the Platonists explain the unity of their Trinity by the comparison of the unity of soul and body. Similarly, Conway compares the union of Christ with God as being ‘just like the body in respect to the soul’. In other words, if Anne Conway’s system is recognised as ‘Platonic’ by the self-same liberal criteria of interpretation by which More effects an accommodation between Platonism and Christianity, Anne Conway’s philosophy has claims to be interpreted as ‘Trinitarian’. Significantly, however, Anne Conway does not deny Christ or the divinity of Christ, a fact which keeps her within the Christian fold, by Henry More’s own criteria. Nevertheless, to underline the ‘Platonic’ framework of her system does not render it immune to the charge of deviation from orthodoxy. On the contrary, the very ‘Platonism’ which may have satisfied Henry More, makes of Anne Conway a classic instance of Platonism introducing subordinationist errors into the doctrine of the Trinity. For all its vestiges of Trinitarianism, Anne Conway’s revision of the doctrine in Platonic terms, takes her system in an Anti-Trinitarian direction. And this is where she comes closest to Christoph Sand. For her position is consistent with the learned Anti-Trinitarianism of Sand, who argued that the parallels between Platonism and Christianity confirmed the truth of the Anti-Trinitarian conception of God. Sand, furthermore, found further confirmation of his views in kabbalism. Whether Sand would have agreed with Anne Conway on the divinity of Christ is another issue—but one which underlines the fact that although Anne Conway

was exposed to many currents of thought, both orthodox and heterodox, her position is very much her own. Her objective was to demonstrate the existence of Christ in such a way that even Jews, Turks and other ‘unwilling’ believers might be converted to Christianity. The parallels she saw between Christianity, Judaism and philosophy gave her grounds to believe that, even non-believers would be persuaded of the truth about Christ, the son of God, ‘the eternal mediator’ between man and God.

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William S. Babcock, while discussing the relative eclipse of the doctrine of the Trinity in modern thought since the seventeenth century, writes:

My own inclination is to think that the crucial developments took place in the seventeenth century, especially in England, and reached a culmination of sorts in the complex (and vituperative!) English controversy over the Trinity that broke out in the 1690’s.\(^1\)

I wish to follow Babcock’s lead and consider that seventeenth-century discussion, and to sketch the possible influence of this debate upon George Berkeley. Berkeley’s defence of spiritual substance bears the imprint of the Trinitarian debates of the 1690’s in England and the ensuing theological controversies. Berkeley’s late work *Siris; A Chain of Philosophical Reflections* of 1744 is quite explicit in its admiration for the Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth. It is also quite explicit in its development of a defence of the doctrine of the Trinity. Once we consider the references to the great Trinitarian Controversy of the 1690s in Berkeley’s earliest notes at the beginning of the eighteenth century, we realise that Cudworth’s great work *The True Intellectual System of the Universe* of 1678 had a central role in these debates in the last decade of the seventeenth century. The major protagonists, Trinitarian and Anti-Trinitarian, Sherlock and Nye respectively, were both Cambridge graduates, and Cudworth was a persistent point of reference throughout the debate. In the remaining part of the paper I shall suggest a role for Edward Stillingfleet in the forging of Berkeley’s mind. Stillingfleet was yet another Cambridge man.

Stillingfleet’s attack on Locke in the midst of this Trinitarian debate concentrated upon the inadequacies of Locke’s concept of ‘substance’. Stillingfleet’s motive was to show that Locke could not articulate the

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Christian doctrine of the Trinity, in which ‘substance’ and ‘person’ are the key concepts, within the terms of his own philosophy. And, of course, Berkeley’s argument hinges crucially on the concept of substance: denying the intelligibility of Locke’s material substance and affirming his own theologically motivated concept of spiritual substance.\(^2\)

Once we recognise the continuous strand of speculation upon and argument about the concepts of ‘person’, ‘substance’, ‘unity’ from Cudworth to Berkeley, it becomes clear that the doctrinal controversies surrounding Socinianism exerted a profound impact upon English (and Irish) intellectual life in the Enlightenment. We can also see that the Cambridge Platonists were hardly isolated figures with very limited influence. On the contrary, Cudworth in particular plays a key role in some of the seminal debates of the period.

1. Cudworth’s ‘Platonick’ Trinity

Ralph Cudworth is a fine example of that tolerance which indeed constituted a great achievement of the age of Enlightenment. He writes in a manner redolent of John Locke:

> I perswade my self, that no man shall ever be kept out of heaven, for not comprehending mysteries that were beyond the reach of his shallow understanding …\(^3\)

However, it is an egregious error to suppose that a Latitudinarian had no interest in the dogmas, i.e. in the doctrines of the Christian religion. Cudworth’s exposition of the Trinity plays a central role in his *The True Intellectual System of the Universe* of 1678. John Locke thought that Cudworth produced the best historical account of the doctrine of the Trinity, and Cudworth pursued the roots of the doctrine to Philo of Alexandria and to the pagan Neoplatonists.\(^4\)

The Church Fathers were enormously important in late seventeenth-century English thought, even though Newton and Locke tended to be critical of Patristic thought as both unscientific and unbiblical. Indeed, much that is curious to the modern reader of Cudworth’s *True Intellectual System of the Universe* relates to his determination to present the Fathers

\(^2\) Ayers 1970, *Substance*.
\(^4\) See Locke 1864, *Commonplace*, p. 298.
of the Church within the context of the intellectual debate of Late Antiquity. This is influenced by the desire to attack Neo-Epicureanism, Scepticism and deterministic Fatalism as instances of the adage ‘nihil novi sub sole’, but also to lend weight to the view that Platonism is best seen as the ‘old Loving Nurse’ of Christian theology.

In 1662 Simon Patrick (if S.P. is short for him as author) observed that:

"True Philosophy can never hurt sound Divinity. Christian religion was never bred up in the Peripatetick School but spent her best and healthfullest years in the more Religious Academy amongst the primitive Fathers: but the Schoolmen afterwards ravished her thence, and shut her up in the decayed ruines of Lyceum, where she served a hard servitude, and contracted many distempers …. let her alone be Mistress, and choose her Servants where she best likes; let her old loving Nurse, the Platonick Philosophy be admitted again into her family …"  

The doctrine of the Trinity is one of the most important and controversial doctrines of Christian theology. Although the basic intent of the tenet was to preserve the idea of the necessary redemptive role of Jesus of Nazareth, the language of the dogma was thoroughly philosophical: ‘unity’, ‘uniqueness’, ‘simplicity’, ‘difference’, ‘identity’, ‘substance’, ‘relation’ and ‘spirit’ are all metaphysical concepts. Since the dominant philosophy in Late Antiquity was Platonism and the Fathers used Platonic concepts to expound the doctrine, it was perfectly reasonable for Cudworth to explore an apologetic for the Trinity within the resources of the Platonic tradition.

The rich and prolix historiography which Cudworth produced in the True Intellectual System of the Universe, together with his attempt to find vestigia trinitatis in pagan writers such as Pythagoras; traces of a Trinity which are rooted in the ancient theology of a divinely revealed cabbala, has created much confusion. Cudworth presents himself as rediscovering the genuine Platonic Trinity as opposed to corrupt Platonic and pseudo-Platonic triads. In some respects one might even see Cudworth as distancing himself from Henry More’s less critical avowal of a Plotinian and subordinationist Platonic Trinity in his early writings. Cudworth wishes to present a proper understanding of the providential contribution of Platonism to the doctrine of the Trinity without under-

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5 S.P. 1662, Account, p. 24
mining the integrity of the specifically and inalienably Christian component of the dogma. This is a “Middle thing also, betwixt the Doctrine of Sabellius and that of Arius; it being neither a Trinity of Word only, or logical Notions, or meer Modes; but a Trinity of Hypostases”.\(^8\) Sabellius sees the persons of the Trinity as mere modes of a single being and thus is unable to do justice to the distinctively Christian vision of the reflexive unity and communion of the equal persons of Godhead. Arius places the second person on the side of creation. This has the implication that Christ is not the essential expression of Divine Love but a merely contingent product of the Father’s will.\(^9\) The major problem with the Trinity of the later Platonists lay in their subordinationism. If the First principle is strictly superior, then the second and third principles decrease in status:

Or if it be considered in \textit{Visibles}, then will the \textit{Second Hypostasis}, be resembled to the \textit{Image} of a \textit{Face} in a Glass, and the \textit{Third} to the \textit{Image} of that \textit{Image} reflected in another Glass, which depend upon the \textit{Original Face}, and have a \textit{Gradual Abatement} of the vigour thereof.\(^10\)

Hence though the Neoplatonists recognised the Logos, it is seen as a secondary product of the One, rather than as an essential component of the Godhead. This failure of pagan Neoplatonism to integrate thought and reason into the Godhead leads to an irrational denial of Divine intelligence:

\begin{quote}
Shall we say that the \textit{First Hypostasis or Person}, in the Platonic Trinity, (if not the Christian also) is \ldots \textit{Sensless} and \textit{Irrational}, and altogether devoid of \textit{Mind} and \textit{Understanding}? Or would not this be to introduce a certain kind of \textit{Mysterious Atheism} and under the pretence of Magnifying and Advancing the Supreme Deity, Monstrously to Degrade the Same?\(^11\)
\end{quote}

Cudworth’s account did not go uncriticised. In 1685 John Turner, a Cambridge man and fellow of Cudworth’s College (Christ’s), wrote \textit{A Discourse concerning the Messias}. The text is aimed at Cudworth’s \textit{System} and particularly attacks Cudworth’s concept of identity. Turner alleges that without the affirmation of numerical identity Cudworth falls into the trap of tritheism.\(^12\) This is the beginning of a controversy which does not explode until the publication of another Cambridge product:

\(^{8}\) Cudworth, \textit{System} p. 596. \\
\(^{9}\) See Hedley 2001, \textit{Trinity}. \\
\(^{10}\) Cudworth 1678, \textit{System}, p. 581. \\
\(^{11}\) Cudworth 1678, \textit{System}, p. 585. \\
William Sherlock’s *A Vindication of the Doctrine of the Holy and Ever Blessed Trinity* in 1690. However, it is instructive that the Trinitarian controversy should have these Cambridge roots. Leslie Armour has observed that when Cudworth published his *True Intellectual System of the Universe* in 1678 the British Library had no recorded books on the Trinity. \(^{13}\) There are then no recordings until 1685, the year in which John Turner published his *Discourse concerning the Messias*.

2. *The Great Trinitarian Controversy*

In the 1690’s there was in England a particularly virulent controversy concerning the doctrine of the Trinity. \(^{14}\) The conflict between Locke (1632–1704) and Edward Stillingfleet (1635–1699) reflected some of the problems within the Restoration Settlement. The Latitudinarians, of whom Stillingfleet was a particularly distinguished instance, felt that the Act of Uniformity of 1662, which demanded consent to the Thirty Nine Articles and discipline of the Church of England, had been too draconian. Dissent was formally tolerated in 1689. \(^{15}\) But the Latitudinarian interest in the growth of a genuinely national Church and their opposition to the rigidity of the High Church party encouraged an atmosphere in which the Anti-Trinitarians could profit. This was reinforced by the latitude which James II encouraged for the sake of Catholics, but which benefited radical Socinian Protestants. \(^{16}\) Anglicans were in the vulnerable position of having to explain the difference between the doctrine of the Trinity and the doctrine of Transubstantiation. Socinians claimed that both were unscriptural, while Catholics could appeal to Church tradition. Anglicans were forced to explain how they might consistently defend the former doctrine while rejecting the Roman doctrine of the Mass as unscriptural.

Philip Dixon has produced an authoritative account of these Trinitarian controversies in his book *Nice and Hot Disputes. The Doctrine of the Trinity in the Seventeenth Century*. \(^{17}\) Dixon highlights the vital role of Stephen Nye’s tract *A Brief History of the Unitarians* (1687). Nye was the

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\(^{13}\) Armour 2003, *Trinity*.


\(^{15}\) Spurr 1997, *Religion*.

\(^{16}\) See Wiles 1996, *Heresy*, p. 67. Wiles notes that Nye rejects the term ‘Socinian’ in favour of ‘Unitarian’.

\(^{17}\) Dixon, *Nice*, pp. 108f.
Rector of the parish of Little Hormead in Herfordshire and a product of Magdalene College Cambridge. The work consists of a vigorous apology for ‘Unitarianism’ and a critique of the common understanding of Trinitarian dogma as an effective tritheism subject to the following objections: it is unscriptural and irrational, it concedes ground to the extravagances of ‘popery’, and it is an unnecessary barrier to the conversion of Jews, Moslems and pagans.

Nye’s work was followed by Arthur Bury, chaplain of Exeter College, Oxford, who published *The Naked Gospel* in 1690. Bury’s book nevertheless presented the doctrine of the Trinity as a grave distortion of the Gospel and it created indignation in Oxford: the Bishop of Exeter ejected Bury and his book was publicly burned. Dixon argues that it was in the year of 1690 that the controversy really became inflamed, and that the true source lies in the person of William Sherlock (1639/40–1707). Nye’s *Brief History* was reprinted in that year with a critique of the Athanasian Creed. It was this year that the Dean of St Paul’s, the Cambridge educated Sherlock, published his reply: *A Vindication of the Doctrine of the Holy and Ever Blessed Trinity and the Incarnation of the Son of God. Occasioned by the Brief Notes on the Creed of St Athanasius and the Brief History of the Unitarians, or Socinians, and containing an answer to both*. In some respects Sherlock draws upon the Augustinian model of mind as a relational unity in *De Trinitate* IX and X: “What are meer Faculties and Powers in created Spirits, are Persons in the Godhead, really distinct from each other, but as inseparably United into One, as Three different Powers are essentially united into One Mind”.18 The three persons of the Godhead are united in so far as they are related in mutual self-consciousness; and on Sherlock’s account, Petavius and Cudworth had proved that the Nicene Fathers did not understand *homoousios* as numerical or quantitative but as qualitative identity: the ‘same Specifick Nature’.19 However, Sherlock is much more deeply sympathetic to the Cappodocian Fathers than Cudworth.20 Indeed, unlike the characteristic monistic inclination of the Western Trinitarian theological tradition, Sherlock displays a distinctly Cappodocian preference for a pluralistic starting point in his own theory of the Trinity. The Divine persons are three infinite centres of self-consciousness, which perfectly interpenetrate as reciprocal consciousness of each other.

18 Sherlock 1690, *Vindication*, pp. 135f.
19 Sherlock, 1690, *Vindication*, p. 106.
Sherlock was immediately accused of tritheism by fellow Cantabrigean Nye and was explicitly linked by Nye to Cudworth.\(^{21}\) Sherlock’s account led to much discussion of the concept of a person. Nye replied with his *The Acts of Great Athanasius* in which he argues that self-consciousness will sustain one but not three persons. The cantankerous Oxford theologian and stalwart High Churchman Robert South (1634–1716) attacked Sherlock in 1693 in his *Animadversions upon Dr Sherlock’s Book Entitled A Vindication of the Holy and Ever Blessed Trinity &c. Together with a more necessary Vindication of that Sacred and Prime Article of the Christian Faith from his New Notions, and False Explications of it. Humbly offered to his Admirers, and to Himself the Chief of Them*. In this ferociously rancorous work South seized upon Sherlock’s attempt to develop a theory of the relations of the persons of the Divine substance in terms of self-consciousness.\(^{22}\) Nye responded with his trenchant *Consideration on the Explication of the Doctrine of the Trinity by Dr Wallis, Dr Sherlock, Dr S-th (sic), Dr Cudworth and Mr Hooker; and also of the account given by those who say, the Trinity is an Unconceivable and Inexplicable Mystery* 1693. Here Nye attacks the Oxford Professor of mathematics John Wallis as a Sabellian, Sherlock as a Cartesian Tritheist, Cudworth as a Platonick Trinitarian, i.e. Arian, South as having presented the Trinity of ‘Aristotle’, a scholastic and a crypto Socinian. Finally, Hooker is ridiculed as presenting a Trinity of ‘contradictions’. As Dixon eloquently and forcefully demonstrates in his book *Nice and Hot disputes*, Nye is a brilliantly caustic writer who employed ridicule with devastating effect.\(^{23}\) Nye’s favoured stratagem was to expose the internal divisions within the Trinitarian camp.

3. Stillingfleet: a Controversial Latitudinarian

Sherlock’s *Vindication* had thus generated a remarkably vigorous reaction. Edward Stillingfleet (1635–1699) published his *A Discourse In Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity: with an answer to the late Socinian Objections against it from Scripture, Antiquity and Reason and a preface concerning the different Explications of the Trinity and the Tendency of the present Socinian Controversie* in the midst of this vituperative debate about the Trinity

\(^{21}\) Nye 1693, *Considerations*, p. 6.
in 1697. Stillingfleet, like Locke, is often referred to as a ‘Latitudinarian’. Although the term was originally used to describe the Cambridge Platonists, it has come to be used by scholars to denote a loosely knit group of Church of England men of liberal and moderately rationalistic temper whose intellectual roots lay in the irenic theology of the Cambridge Platonists. Characteristic of such theologians was a liberal approach to Church authority, a strong emphasis upon reason, and an insistence upon the ethical dimension of the Christian religion. Stillingfleet was a Cambridge man and seems close to Henry More in many of his ideas, and Locke was a close friend of Cudworth’s daughter Damaris, and has a much stronger ‘Platonic’ component in his thought than often assumed.24 Both men disliked scholasticism, both were deeply influenced by Descartes and the new ‘way of ideas’.

Given the close intellectual and social links between Locke and Stillingfleet, the ill-tempered nature of their exchange is very puzzling. Was this a battle between the left and right wings of the same school? Did Stillingfleet recognise at the end of his life the bankruptcy of a position pursued by Locke and which he himself had followed? The work of Sarah Hutton and John Rogers has modified our picture of his work.25 Sarah Hutton has shown that the second, posthumous, form of his main work *Origines Sacrae* bears a striking resemblance to the interests and obsessions of the Cambridge Platonists.26 His library contained works by Copernicus, Descartes, Gassendi and Arnauld, Boyle, More and Hobbes. At least at the beginning of his career Stillingfleet was ideologically close to Henry More and even Descartes in his interests. In the first version of *Origines Sacrae* he uses the language of clear and distinct ideas and employs the ontological argument. Like the Cambridge Platonists he defends innate ideas and rejects the idea that knowledge can be founded on sense experience; he defends the immortality of the soul with epistemological arguments close to the kind employed by Henry More. The second version of *Origines Sacrae* is much more openly critical of Descartes for the rejection of teleology, unreasonably exacting criteria of knowledge and the atheistical temper of his thought. However, Stillingfleet is still on the side of the moderns—he

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24 Hertling 1892, *Locke.*
quotes Boyle approvingly. But he believed that Locke’s thoughts could lead to heresy, and he clearly saw Toland’s *Christianity Not Mysterious* as an instance of this. Stillingfleet saw Locke through the distorting lens of John Toland’s work *Christianity not Mysterious* 1696. Hence Stillingfleet’s view of Locke is determined by his perception of the ramifications of Locke’s view in the midst of the virulent Trinitarian controversies of the 1690’s.²⁷

Stillingfleet was very aware of the corrosive effect of the debate upon the Church of England. In his preface he discusses Nye and Tindal, and in particular attempts to rebut Nye’s claim that the ‘orthodox’ Trinitarian divines were hopelessly divided amongst themselves. Stillingfleet insists that weakness in the articulation of a doctrine does not entail heresy, and that many of the Trinitarian protagonists within the controversy agreed on the basic Trinitarian definitions. In the tenth chapter of his *Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity* Stillingfleet turns to the Deistic thought of John Toland (1670–1722) in his *Christianity Not Mysterious*. Toland was drawing upon a vocabulary inherited from John Locke’s Essay, in which he rejects those tenets of Christianity which are cannot be articulated in terms of ‘ideas’. The source of unintelligible mysteries lies, according to Toland, in the wiles of unscrupulous Priestcraft. ‘Ideas’ for Toland are conceived of as Lockean objects of the mind in thought. A cardinal point of the Cambridge Platonists was the conviction that Christian theology must cohere and not conflict with modern science and philosophy, and Stillingfleet represents their concerns when he asks the following question. If we suppose the empiricist principle of Locke to be true, how can we be certain that there are ‘Spiritual Substances’ in the World because we can have no ‘clear and distinct Ideas’ of them?

Locke did deny that the human mind can have a concept of substance which amounts to more than ‘something we know not what’ - this is a classic instance of Locke’s sceptical realism. Stillingfleet, as John Rogers has eloquently demonstrated, was not an obvious candidate to criticise Locke on this score, since he himself was very close to Locke in a cautious appropriation of the corpuscularian philosophy.²⁸ But in the 1690’s with the fury of the Trinitarian debate at its height, it was difficult for Stillingfleet to leave Locke rest with such scepticism

with regard to a concept which is so central for the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. With regard to ‘spiritual substance’ Stillingfleet evinces some elective affinity to Cudworth. Stillingfleet writes approvingly of the Platonic account of spiritual substance:

Aristotle’s fault lay in applying Nature only to Corporeal Substances; and whatever was above them he looked on as above Nature, but the Pythagoreans and Platonists took Nature to extend to Spiritual as well as to Bodily Substances. Which appears by Timaeus Locrus his Book of Nature; in the beginning whereof he divides Things into two kinds, Intellectual and Corporeal; and the former, whose Nature was more excellent, he derives immediately from the best Principle, viz. God himself.  

Stillingfleet’s critique of Aristotle’s fault is manifestly unfair. However, it does reveal the mark of the Platonic propensities of Stillingfleet’s Cambridge training. Attacking Locke’s claim that he cannot understand what is meant by nature as substance, Stillingfleet argues that the Church Fathers ‘all agree that Incorporeal and Invisible Substances are real natures’. Stillingfleet, like Cudworth, moves easily from ancient to modern sources. A few pages after the classical and patristic references he turns to Boyle. Stillingfleet does not reject contemporary corpuscularian philosophy, but he wishes to point to its explanatory limits and to the dangers which some materialistic construals of corpuscularianism imply. He wishes to expose the materialistic and sceptical tendencies in Locke’s thought. For Stillingfleet, Locke’s agnosticism about ‘substance’ seemed to be subverting or dismantling a concept which any explication of the Trinity requires. Stillingfleet was committed to the new philosophy and yet was concerned to avoid any collateral damage for Christian doctrine and belief. This meant an attack upon the materialistic implications of thoroughly Empiricist epistemology. Hence we can, perhaps, envisage Stillingfleet as a mid point between the Cambridge Platonists and George Berkeley. Stillingfleet shared with More and Cudworth the interest and sympathy with modern science and philosophy together with a desire to defend the ancient tenets of Christian doctrine. Berkeley’s attack upon Lockean empiricism is vastly more incisive and imaginative than that of Stillingfleet, but it takes off from Stillingfleet’s point of attack on Locke’s empiricism. There are, indeed, various explicit references to the Trinitarian controversy in Berkeley’s

29 Stillingfleet 1698, Bishop, p. 96.
30 Stillingfleet 1698, Bishop, p. 102. The quote before: p. 100.
early *Commentaries*. In this context a word such as ‘substance’ has inalienable theological connotations. Speaking of his own immaterialism Berkeley writes:

> I take not away substances. I ought not to be accus’d of discarding Substance out of the reasonable world. I onely reject the Philosophical sense (wch in effect is no sense) of the word substance …. NB I am more for reality than other philosophers, they make a thousand doubts & know not certainly but we may be deceiv’d. I assert the direct Contrary.32

Berkeley is referring to Stillingfleet’s challenge that Locke’s theory of ideas could not generate an adequate concept of substance. Berkeley’s sympathy for Stillingfleet’s cause is explicit:

> We have assuredly an Idea of substance, twas absurd of Locke to think we have a name without a Meaning, this might prove Acceptable to the Stillingfleetians33.

The clear aim of Berkeley’s *Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* of 1710 is to establish God as that ‘incorporeal active substance or spirit’ which excites in finite minds ideas of sense.34 Berkeley considers this is the most effective antidote to the ‘depraved bent of the mind toward atheism’.35

4. *Berkeley and the Trinitarian Controversy*

The complex roots of the usage of concepts like consciousness, self consciousness and personal identity are entangled with Christian doctrine in the British Enlightenment. Thinkers such as Sherlock or Stillingfleet were not reactionaries, but engaging with the new philosophy of the age. A contemporary secular mind, accustomed to seeing the Enlightenment as the emancipation from religious dogma, may find this extensive and vigorous debate, which absorbed and intrigued contemporaries of the stature of Leibniz, concerning the inner life of the Godhead, profoundly puzzling. Equally, those who regard the Enlightenment as a regrettable triumph of rationalism may be surprised that

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31 Berkeley 1975, *Works*, especially *Philosophical Commentaries* §§310; 413; 584. See also Dahrendorf 1932, *Locke*, pp. 73ff.
the dogma was such a hotly contested issue in the early Enlightenment. At the very least the controversy of the late seventeenth century, and Berkeley’s reception of this debate, is an indication of the importance of the Arian-Socinian-Unitarian strands in Western theology for an appreciation of the intellectual culture of the early modern period. Berkeley was acutely aware of the close connection between philosophical and theological conceptual problems. At the end of his career in 1744 Berkeley is concerned to claim “how unphilosophical soever that doctrine may seem to many of the present age, yet it is certain the men of greatest fame and learning amongst the ancient philosophers held a ‘Trinity in the Godhead’.” I wish to claim that we can use *Siris* as a gloss on the *Treatise* in so far as it serves to underline the theological concerns of the philosopher Berkeley. Once we are aware of the intense and highly metaphysical debates concerning ‘substance’ and ‘person’ that were generated by the Trinitarian controversy of the end of the seventeenth century, and which had their roots in Cudworth in particular, we can see Berkeley in his *Siris* as taking up again issues which must have been hotly debated in the Dublin of his youth and which are discussed in his notes of this period.

Berkeley in *Siris* explicitly refers to Augustine’s insistence that the doctrine of the logos in John’s Gospel was ‘also found in the writings of philosophers, who taught that God had an only begotten Son by whom are all things’. Berkeley also refers to the ‘learned doctor Cudworth’, an instance of the fact that:

… the greatest men had ever a high esteem for Plato; whose writings are the touchstone of a hasty and shallow mind; whose philosophy has been the admiration of ages; which supplied patriots, magistrates, and lawgivers to the most flourishing States, as well as Fathers to the Church, and doctors to the Schools.

Such sentiments may be an instance of Berkeley turning to Platonism in his dotage, and neglecting his own more radical earlier philosophy. But he clearly viewed his own immaterialism within this broader Platonic tradition:

Proclus, in his *Commentary on the Theology of Plato* observes there are two sorts of philosophers. The one placed Body first in the order of beings,

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and made the faculty of thinking depend thereupon, supposing that the principles of all things are corporeal; that Body most really or principally exists, and all other things in a secondary sense, and by virtue of that. Others, making all corporeal things to be dependent upon Soul or Mind, think this to exist in the first and primary sense, and the being of bodies to be altogether derived from and presuppose that of the Mind. 

It is exactly this priority of Soul or mind and dependence of matter upon mind which Berkeley wishes to defend when he argues in his *A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* of 1710 and his *Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous* of 1713 that sensible items must exist in a mind or spirit. Berkeley concludes, not that they have no real existence, but that seeing they do not depend on any one agent’s thought, and have an existence distinct from any particular agent, there must be some other mind in which they exist. As the sensible world really exists, it is certain that there is an infinite omnipresent spirit who contains and supports it. Mind is the only possible substance. Berkeley is making the same point when he observes that the “Pythagoreans and Platonists had a notion of the true System of the World. They allowed of mechanical causes but actuated by soul or mind”. One might note that both the language and the sentiment expressed in this quotation reflect Cudworth’s *True Intellectual System*. 

David Berman has convincingly argued that it is a mistake to concentrate too narrowly upon Locke as the target of Berkeley’s theocentric immaterialism, and Berman has emphasised the importance of the Irish context of Berkeley’s intellectual development. Yet if we see the Locke-Stillingfleet controversy as important for Berkeley’s development, it becomes clear that Locke had a special role within this Irish context. Perhaps the very fact that Toland was an Irishman and that Dublin was a centre of debate about the exchange between Locke and Stillingfleet is significant, and in the early notebooks of Berkeley we find explicit reference to the controversy. Locke was taken by Berkeley to exemplify a latent materialism cognate with that evinced clearly in obvious radicals such as Vanini, Hobbes or Spinoza. In the wake of Toland and Stillingfleet the radical implications of Locke’s philoso-

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41 Berkeley 1948, *Siris*, §266; p. 124.
phy for theology would not be far-fetched, and this may well help to explain the theological motivation of Berkeley’s philosophical critique of Locke.43

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43 I would like to thank Maurice Wiles, Victor Nuovo, Leslie Armour, Sarah Hutton, John Rogers, Ben Carter, James Vigus, Jan Rohls and Philip Dixon for their advice and learning.


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ISAAC NEWTON, SOCINIANISM  
AND “THE ONE SUPREME GOD”

STEPHEN DAVID SNOBELEN

… we know that an idol is nothing in the world, and that there is none other God but one. For though there be that are called gods, whether in heaven or in earth, (as there be gods many, and lords many,) but to us there is but one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we in him; and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we by him.  
(1 Corinthians 8:4–6)

1. Isaac Newton and Socinianism

Isaac Newton was not a Socinian.¹ That is to say, he was not a communicant member of the Polish Brethren, nor did he explicitly embrace the Socinian Christology. What is more, Newton never expressly acknowledged any debt to Socinianism—characterised in his day as a heresy more dangerous than Arianism—and his only overt comment

¹ The first version of this paper was written in 1997 as an MPhil assignment in History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Cambridge. I am grateful to Peter Lipton and my supervisor Simon Schaffer for their invaluable help at that time, along with David Money, who kindly refined my Latin translations. A later version of the paper was presented in November 2000 as a lecture in the Department of Early Hungarian Literature at the University of Szeged in Hungary. I benefited greatly from the knowledge and expertise of the scholars of the early modern Polish Brethren and Hungarian Unitarians associated with that department. I am particularly grateful to my host, József Barna, who translated the entire paper, word for word, into Hungarian. It was also a special pleasure to discuss things Socinian and Unitarian with Sándor Kovács and Lehel Molnar, two young ministers in the Hungarian Unitarian Church from Cluj/Kolozsvár, Romania. The much smaller 1997 draft was published as Snobelen 2003, Newton. In revising and expanding this paper, which represents my current views, I am indebted to József Barna, Michael Hunter, Scott Mandelbrote, John Marshall and the participants at the Munich Conference. For permission to cite manuscript material in their archives, acknowledgements are due to the Syndics of the Cambridge University Library, Cambridge, the Fondation Martin Bodmer, Geneva, the Jewish National and University Library, Jerusalem, the Provost and Fellows of King’s College, Cambridge and Uppsala Universitetsbiblioteket, Sweden. Quotations from Newton’s unpublished papers enclose insertions in angle brackets and represent deletions as strike-outs. An increasing number of Newton theological manuscripts can be viewed online at: www.newtonproject.ic.ac.uk.
on this movement is negative. Nevertheless, both Newton’s theology and religious life reveal a host of parallels with Socinianism. In this preliminary study, I demonstrate that Socinian analogies can be found in Newton’s theology, historiography, textual criticism, biblical hermeneutics and even his natural philosophy. Nor are the parallels limited to areas of his thought, for Newton also adopted social strategies commonly employed by seventeenth-century Socinians. Additionally, Newton contemplated publishing an antitrinitarian work and met with at least one known communicant Socinian. Although the precise sources and motivations of the parallels are more difficult to assess, an appreciation of Newton’s alignment with several features of Socinianism is crucial to making sense of a number of his pursuits—and this includes his intentions for the General Scholium to the *Principia mathematica*, one of the classic texts of the Scientific Revolution.

This paper begins with a brief introduction to the Socinians, along with a discussion of the difficulty of defining the term “Socinian” in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. I then move on to assess the consonance of Newton’s theology with that of Socinianism. To do this, a thorough investigation of various sorts of evidence is needed. First, I demonstrate Newton’s apparent openness to Socinianism by outlining his contacts with individuals associated with Socinianism, examining tolerant comments on Christologies compatible with Socinianism and analysing the contents of his library. This exercise will establish the plausibility of a sustained engagement with Socinianism. I then turn to a survey of Newton’s writings to reveal a host of analogies with the thought of this heretical movement. In addition to significant doctrinal parallels, I show that Newton shared a reformist doctrinal agenda with Socinians and that both his philosophy of history and his eschatology reflect this. Finally, I conclude that Newton—an eclectic thinker—utilised tools in his theological and intellectual apparatus that are either Socinian in nature or so close to Socinian that there is little appreciable difference.

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2 While tentative conclusions can be made now about the content of Newton’s private theological papers, more definitive studies will have to await further advances in the textual work of the Newton Project.

3 Two papers deriving in part from the original form of this paper, and which deal with aspects of Newton’s engagement with Socinianism, have now been published. See Snobelen 1999, *Newton*, and Snobelen 2001, *God*.
Isaac Newton, Socinianism and “The One Supreme God” 243

2. Defining Socinianism in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries

Emerging in the 1560s from Erasmian, Anabaptist and Evangelical Rationalist currents of thought, the Polish Brethren were a product of the Radical Reformation. In 1580 the Siennese theologian Fausto Sozzini aligned himself with the Brethren, bringing intellectual cohesion to the movement of which he became eponymous. Their doctrinal system of antitrinitarianism, mortalism and believers’ baptism, along with others factors such as their rejection of mystery in religion, belief in the separation of church and state and pronounced anti-creedalism, branded the Socinians as heretics in the eyes of their orthodox contemporaries. Partly for this reason, after almost a century of uneasy toleration, the Catholics—with the complicity of the Calvinists—expelled the Brethren from Polish lands in 1660. This event, along with the dissolution of their Raków press in 1638, led to the development of a Socinian diaspora in the Low Countries, whence their publications filtered into England. Socinianism was a book religion both in its biblicism and erudition, as well as its steady output of Latin theological texts. And while these books were anathematised by the orthodox, Socinian works proved popular in radical circles. Even though the lower clergy found the prices of these volumes out of their reach, they remained in steady demand in seventeenth-century England.

Although Socinianism is rooted in specific historical and regional contexts, and while the movement enjoyed relative doctrinal stasis, the term “Socinian” came to mean many things in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and untangling these nuances is difficult. There are at least seven senses in which the word “Socinian” is used in the relevant literature: it can refer to the community of the Polish Brethren, the complete Socinian theological system, antitrinitarianism in general or of the Socinian variety, the rejection of dogmatism, the avowal of religious toleration, the application of reason to Scripture, or simply be used as an epithet for heresy, much like “Arian” or “atheist.”

What is more, to add to the confusion, not only were the terms Arian

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4 On the early Socinians and the Radical Reformation, see Williams 1992, Reformation. See also Szczucki 1983, Socinianism, and Dán/Pirnát 1982, Antitrinitarianism.
5 The press at Raków printed roughly 500 titles in all by the time of its dissolution (Williams 1992, Reformation, p. 1175).
7 See also Trevor-Roper 1987, Catholics, pp. 95–96, 186–190, and Sullivan 1982, Toland, pp. 82–108 and Martin Mulsow’s contribution to this volume.
and Socinian frequently used interchangeably, but Socinian Christology (which held Christ to be the literal Son of God miraculously conceived by the virgin Mary) was constantly conflated with humanitarianism (the belief that Christ was a mere man born of human mother and father). This conflation may have at times been a deliberate attempt to radicalise Socinians further in the eyes of contemporaries. Whatever the reason, the historian must look beyond labels and common conceptions and misconceptions to the content of the theology.

Throughout the centuries precisely what has been viewed to be “orthodox” and what has been perceived to be “heresy” have often been in flux; in some cases ideas previously considered orthodox came to be regarded as heretical—and vice versa. What is ‘orthodox’ and what is ‘heresy’ is also a matter of perspective. And what yardstick should be used? The Scriptures? Church tradition? For these reasons it is important for scholars of early modern Christian theology to adopt for historiographical and methodological purposes the recommendations that Walter Bauer made in the 1930s for early church history: namely, that “orthodoxy” and “heresy” should be used as categories that emanate from the sociological and political dynamics of the periods in which the labels were employed. This is no less important for the study of Isaac Newton’s theology, as so many of his contemporaries employed a “slippery slope” argument for theological heterodoxy. That is to say, many assumed or contended for apologetic purposes that divergences from orthodoxy such as Arianism and Socinianism were only way stations along the path to outright infidelity and unbelief. One contemporary heresy watchdog, the Calvinist divine John Edwards, asserted that “in the very Socinian Doctrine it self there seems to be an Atheistick Tang”. This aspersion is more than misleading for, while some Socinians employed reason in their theology to a somewhat greater extent than some members of orthodoxy, they were also generally more biblicist than Trinitarians. Unfortunately, many modern historians have adopted this unhelpful and unsophisticated metaphysical reductionism and have, for example, characterised Socinianism as representing a “lower” Christology than orthodoxy. Sympathetic accounts of early

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8 For a Socinian rejection of humanitarianism, see Racovian Catechism (1818), pp. 52–55.
9 Bauer 1971, Orthodoxy. For more on Bauer’s challenge to scholarship, see Ehrman 1993, Corruption, pp. 7–9.
10 Edwards 1695, Thoughts, p. 64.
modern dissenters will recognise the apologetic nature of the categories employed by their orthodox contemporaries and abandon the vertical metaphor that positions Trinitarianism at the top and Socinianism near the bottom (or at least much further down the scale than Trinitarianism). Rather than employ a scale-based classification, it is imperative that the theological “middle” of dissenting figures studied be recovered. As much as possible, the theological world must be seen from the perspective of the dissenters themselves, not their enemies. The author of the *Principia mathematica* did not see his Christology as “low” or somehow defective. Instead, he saw himself in the middle, with the orthodox Trinitarians on the right (who were to be blamed for adding to God’s truth) and the unbelieving Deists and atheists on the left (who were guilty of subtracting from it).\(^\text{11}\)

Isaac Newton was an intellectual who came to passionately reject the doctrine of the Trinity. The Socinians were not only the largest, but also the most intellectually-sophisticated and vibrant antitrinitarian movement of his time. There is then, *prima facie*, sufficient reason to raise the question of whether Newton either was attracted to Socinian theology or appropriated it. Certain observers in Newton’s own day and shortly thereafter certainly thought so, even if their evidence was sometimes based on hearsay and a loose definition of Socinianism. In the second paper of his epistolary debate with Newton’s supporter Samuel Clarke, Gottfried Leibniz suggested that Newton adhered to a Socinian view of God.\(^\text{12}\) Although Leibniz’s insinuation was based on a mistaken surmise (that Newton was limiting God’s foreknowledge), it is possible that the Hanoverian philosopher knew more about Newton’s private faith than he was willing to admit in print. After all, rumours about Newton’s antitrinitarian unorthodoxy had already begun to circulate.\(^\text{13}\) Shortly after Newton’s death Voltaire referred to Newton as an Arian or Socinian.\(^\text{14}\) David Hume applied the same two terms to him later in

11 Historians of dissent need not agree with the views of their subjects, or even have a view. The point I am making relates to historiographical method.
12 Leibniz and Clarke 1956, *Leibniz-Clarke correspondence*, p. 19. The famous epistolary debate between Leibniz and Clarke took place from 1715 to 1716; it was first published in French and English in 1717.
14 Voltaire 1960, *Letters*, p. 43. Voltaire probably obtained much of his information on Newton and his circle from personal discussions with Clarke, with whom he became acquainted while in England in 1726 (Barber 1979, *Voltaire*, pp. 51–54).
the same century.\textsuperscript{15} Nor were these three philosophers alone.\textsuperscript{16}

Yet, despite the suspicions raised in the eighteenth century, very little has been written since then on the possible associations of Newton’s theology to that of Socinianism.\textsuperscript{17} Some modern scholars have raised the possibility that Newton was either a Socinian or influenced by Socinianism, only to repudiate the idea quickly.\textsuperscript{18} Even the partisan Unitarian historian Herbert McLachlan went on record to say that he did not think it likely that Newton was extensively involved with this movement.\textsuperscript{19} For the most part, the possibility that Newton was engaged with Socinian theology has been ignored. Although Richard S. Westfall treats Newton’s theological beliefs extensively, Socinianism is not listed in the index of his \textit{Never at rest}, the leading biography on Newton.\textsuperscript{20} Instead, Westfall tends to treat Newton’s theology as \textit{sui generis}. From a practical point-of-view, this myopia is not difficult to understand. Few historians are sufficiently competent in both Newton’s voluminous manuscripts (which have only been substantially available since their 1991 publication on microfilm) \textit{and} the formidable Latin Socinian corpus (which is difficult to access and still primarily untranslated). Also, some of the crucial evidence presented here has until recently either been unavailable or has remained unexploited by historians. Another deterrent to exploring a possible association with this greater heresy is the incontestable evidence that Newton—who, unlike the Socinians, believed in Christ’s preexistence—was in some respects Christologically closer to Arianism than Socinianism.\textsuperscript{21} This need not be an obstacle; as we will see, it was no stumbling block to Newton himself.

\textsuperscript{15} Hume 1963, \textit{Hume}, p. 84.
\textsuperscript{16} An example of a contemporary divine who accused Newton of Socinianism is considered below.
\textsuperscript{19} McLachlan, Herbert, 1950, \textit{Newton}, p. 16.
\textsuperscript{20} Westfall 1980, \textit{Rest}.
\textsuperscript{21} Added to this is the fact that while many historians have labelled Newton simply as an Arian, few have critically analysed Newton’s Christology against the options available in his lifetime.
Newton had contact with at least four men associated with Socinian thought. First, sometime around 1689, he entered into theological dialogue with John Locke, whose engagement with Socinianism is now beyond question. The two must have been aware of each other’s antitrinitarianism, for one result of their friendship was Newton sending his confidant and fellow heretic his letters on the Trinitarian corruptions of Scripture for anonymous publication on the Continent (the “Two notable corruptions”). Locke’s interest in Socinianism is confirmed by his library. By the end of his life he had acquired at least forty-three Socinian books—a library of Sociniana noteworthy for both its size and the range of its titles. Locke began purchasing and reading such works as early as 1679. Although Locke may not have agreed with every aspect of the Socinian Christology, several aspects of his theology parallel the doctrines of the Socinians, including his thenetopsychist mortalism. It is also now clear that Locke was involved in antitrinitarian networks. Not only did he have personal contact with Socinians and English Unitarians, but he possessed an unpublished manuscript treatise on the Prologue to John’s Gospel written by the Christological Socinian Jacques Souverain.

The second example is Hopton Haynes. One of the officers who served under him at the Royal Mint, this theological radical not only worked closely with Newton in the affairs of the Mint, but they also worked together on things antitrinitarian. The two discussed antitrini-

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24 Although Locke appears to have adhered to a belief in the preexistence of Christ, his unitarianism is in many respects compatible with Socinianism (Marshall 2000, Locke, p. 178).
26 See Harrison/Laslett 1971, Library, who do not, however, identify all Locke’s Socinian works. Accounts of Locke’s Socinian library can be found in March 2000, Locke, pp. 118–119 and Snobelen 2001, Socinianism, pp. 105–106.
tarian theology and, in 1709, Haynes produced for Newton a translation of the first part of his heretically-inspired “Two notable corruptions.” Two books published by Haynes after Newton’s death confirm that he was a Christological Socinian. Haynes was involved in antitrinitarian networks that included both English Unitarians and Continental antitrinitarians. New evidence uncovered by Sándor Kovács in the Transylvanian Unitarian archive at Cluj/Kolozsvár, Romania has revealed that Haynes introduced the Transylvanian Unitarian Zsigmond Pálfi to Newton in 1701. This information comes from a 1736 letter written to the Transylvanian Unitarian István Ágh by the Socinian Samuel Crell, grandson of the Socinian luminary Johann Crell. Pálfi’s visit to England came at the end of a three-year stint as student at the University of Leiden; Ágh was himself studying at Leiden in 1736. Both men went on to become bishop of the Transylvanian Unitarian Church. It is hard to imagine that Newton’s antitrinitarian collaborator at the Mint would have arranged the meeting between Pálfi and Newton had all three not been theological unitarians. Thus, Crell’s letter suggests that knowledge of Newton’s antitrinitarianism extended to officials within the Transylvanian Unitarian Church.

Most spectacular is Newton’s meeting with Samuel Crell himself. Several scholars have commented on the 1726 meeting between the two men. New evidence now allows us to clarify and fill out the details of their relationship. Sometime late in 1725 Crell, who had been visiting England since childhood, made another trip there to see to the publication of his work on the Prologue to John’s Gospel, which was eventually published in late 1726. The principle argument of this book is that the traditional reading of John 1:1b, “and the Word was God” (et Deus erat Verbum), was a corruption of the original

30 Baron 1763, Cordial, Preface, vol. 1, p. xviii; Newton, Jewish National and University Library, Jerusalem, Yahuda MS 20; Haynes to John Caspar Wetstein, 17 August 1736, British Library Add. MS. 32,425, f. 388r.
31 Haynes 1747, Causa; Haynes 1790, Scripture.
32 Kovács forthcoming, Contributions.
33 Martin Mulsow provides further light on Crell’s travels in England in his contribution to this volume.
reading, “and the Word was of God” (et Dei erat Verbum). By the summer of 1726 Crell had been encountering difficulties attracting subscribers for this work; he needed 200 and had obtained only fifty. A formerly-unavailable letter from Crell to Newton shows that a meeting was arranged between the two in July 1726. Before the meeting, Crell sent Newton a list of propositions for the book, seeking Newton’s patronage. Nor did Crell shy away from revealing the main thrust of the work: “if only Christian Theologians had seen and acknowledged that Christ is nowhere in Scripture expressly called God … so many controversies about the Deity of Christ would not have been stirred up”. This unequivocally antitrinitarian statement implies that Crell knew Newton’s position—knowledge that may have come from Locke, with whom Crell had stayed in 1699. Crell is careful to assure Newton that his name would not be revealed if he choose to support the publication, and closes by referring to their up-coming meeting a few days hence. Furthermore, Crell opens the letter by reminding Newton that he was “not completely unknown” to Newton, who had “liberally” assisted Crell’s return to Germany some fifteen years earlier. This indirect contact between the two men in or around 1711—significant in itself—was previously unknown.

Nor was the July 1726 meeting the only personal encounter between the two ageing heretics, for Crell later related in a letter to his correspondent Mathurin Veyssière de la Croze that while in England, he had

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37 Samuel Crell to Isaac Newton, 16 July 1726, Uppsala Universitetsbibliotek, Wallers hs England & USA. This letter was traced too late to be included in the Royal Society’s official publication of the Newton Correspondence, which was completed in 1977. It appeared among a collection of thirty Newton letters purchased by Dr Erik Waller at the 1936 Sotheby’s sale of Newton manuscripts and bequeathed at his death to the University of Uppsala. A. Rupert Hall published an abbreviated translation of the letter, which was originally written in Latin, along with twenty-nine other Newton letters, in Hall 1982, Newton, p. 33. Hall, however, passes over its significance. It was my encountering of this letter in October 1996 that initiated the research that led to this paper. See Appendix I for a full translation of the letter.
38 Crell to Newton, 16 July 1726. Emphasis in original.
39 Locke 1981, Correspondence, vol. 6, pp. 459–460, 466–467, 495, 576–7577, 638. If Crell’s knowledge of Newton’s unorthodoxy had not come from Locke, it must have come from those in heretical clandestine circles who were aware of Newton’s antitrinitarianism—even if the general public was not.
40 Crell to Newton, 16 July 1726.
41 Crell to Newton, 16 July 1726. Newton’s past patronage of Crell helps explain why he was approaching Newton for support in 1726.
“spoken at different times” with Newton.42 Also critical is the context in which Crell introduces Newton in his letter: after his listing of several English Unitarians, including William Whiston, James Peirce and Daniel Whitby.43 Crell provides several details that derive from his visits with Newton, including the latter’s personal claim to him that he had written a commentary on the Apocalypse. He notes further that Newton “was very well versed not only in mathematics and natural philosophy, but also in theology and ecclesiastical history”,44 implying that they had discussed such topics. De la Croze is also told that Newton had “wished to read my book, and did read it, while it was going through the press, because it seemed to contain new things”.45 What is more, Newton is said to have placed ten guineas in Crell’s hand—presumably to help advance the publication.46 While Crell’s work was published primarily with the financial backing of the radical Matthew Tindal,47 since his library contained the volume, it is evident that Newton offered Crell the support of at least a single subscription—if not more. Newton’s financial support of the period’s leading Socinian theologian on at least two occasions must not be ignored.48 If Newton met with other

46 Jordan 1730, Recueil, p. 44. Jordan also records that the meeting between Newton and Crell lasted for two hours. Manuel gives the amount as one guinea (Manuel 1968, Portrait, p. 464 n. 24).
48 A mere meeting with a known Socinian does not in itself prove sympathy. During his stay in England during the mid-1720s, Crell also met with Trinitarians such as Daniel Waterland (Crel to de la Croze, 17 July 1727, in: Lacroze (1742–1746), Thesauri, vol. 1, p. 105). He is also said to have met with Archbishop John Tillotson (d. 1694) on a previous trip to England (Wallace 1850, Biography, vol. 3, p. 469). Yet, Crell’s polite visits with learned orthodox churchmen would have been of an entirely different order than his visits with a fellow antitrinitarian. Waterland wrote in favour of the Trinity; Newton wrote against it. Crell continued to take an interest in Newton’s theological views after Newton’s death in 1727. In a letter he wrote on 28 September 1736 to William Whiston, Jr. (the son of the Newtonian William Whiston), Crell reported on the discovery of Newton’s “Two notable corruptions” among the papers of Jean Le Clerc after the latter’s death earlier that year (Crel to Whiston, Leicestershire Record Office, Conant MSS, Barker correspondence, vol. 2, letter 123A). A transcription of the “Two notable corruptions” (in the original English) taken from a copy Crel commissioned forms part of the collection at Bibliotheek der Rijksuniversiteit, Leiden (MS. Semin. Remonstr. Bibl. 12).
communicant Socinians, no records of such encounters have come to light. On the other hand, if Newton had met with other Socinians, this would not be surprising.

Given his meetings with Crell and the support he offered him, it is notable that Newton did not believe Socinians were heretics. In a lengthy manuscript treatise on Church history, Newton observes that those in the early Church who believed in Christ’s preexistence refused to call heretics those who did not, and, in addition, took the question of Christ’s existence before his birth as being an adiaphoron. Newton opens one section in his Church history with the following statement:

The great charity of the first Christians is manifest by the communion of the Churches of the circumcision (Jews) & converted Jews & Gentiles. The converted Jews or Churches of the circumcision were by the unconverted Jews called the sect of the Nazarenes (Act. 2.5) & they were all zealous of the law (Act. 21.20 & Gal. 2.12,13) & when the dispersion of the Churches of the circumcision by the wars of the Romans was at hand, Matthew wrote his Gospel in hebrew for their use & therefore not the Nazarenes are not to be reckoned among the hereticks.49

The Nazarenes, as Newton explains elsewhere in this manuscript, did not believe Christ existed before his birth in Bethlehem. Although Newton crossed it out and chose a passive verb instead, his original words “I do not” are revealing.

Newton goes on to point out that those “who believed that Jesus took his beginning from the Virgin Mary” and those “who believed that Jesus was before the world began … conversed together as brethren & communicated with one another as members of the Church catholick till the days of Justin Martyr, without falling out about their different opinions”.50 Newton then says:

For when Justin had represented to Trypho the Jew that Christ was God before the world began, & was afterwards born & became a man, & Trypho put him upon proving this: Justin replied that tho he should fail in proving that Christ was God before the world began, yet if he could but prove that Jesus was the Christ of God, it was sufficient for the Christian religion, some of the Christians believing [sic] that Christ was only a man.51

49 Newton, Fondation Martin Bodmer, Geneva, Newton MS, 5A, f. 1r. See also Newton, Yahuda MS 15.5, f. 85r, where Newton asserts that Christians in the early ages generally believed in the preexistence of Christ.
50 Newton, Bodmer MS, 5A, f. 3r.
51 Newton, Bodmer MS, 5A, f. 3r.
In the next folio, Newton wrote:

The Christians … who believed that Christ was before the world began, were much the greater number in the days of Justin Martyr, but did not look upon the Christians of the other opinion as heretics, or think the difference between the two opinions material to the truth of the Christian religion.\(^{52}\)

That these historical discussions are also a gloss on affairs in his own day is made plain in a subsequent folio, where Newton asserts that

if any man cannot believe all this [i.e., the preexistence], yet if he believes [sic] as much as the Nazarenes or primitive Christians of the circumcision believed; the Churches have no (more) authority now to condemn & excommunicate him then they had in the Apostles days to condemn & excommunicate the churches of the circumcision in Judea over whom James the brother of our Lord was bishop.\(^{53}\)

All of this helps explain why Newton had no trouble meeting with a Christological Socinian: the preexistence of Christ was neither an essential doctrine nor one worth dividing over.

4. *Newton’s Socinian Library*

The Polish Brethren also entered Newton’s life in the form of several volumes of Socinian writings. Newton was no great bibliophile and his library, although respectable in size, was nowhere near as impressive as some of the great personal libraries of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Although it is certainly true that Newton did not agree with every book he owned or read, and while his Socinian library in no way competes with Locke’s in volume or breadth, it is still significant that Newton included in his library at least eight titles by Socinian writers.\(^{54}\) In Newton’s day, there were at least three different motivations to induce a scholar to acquire Socinian books: to study Socinian theology in order to attack it; to provide impressive ornaments in a great literary collection; and curiosity or genuine sympathy for

\(^{52}\) Newton, Bodmer MS, 5A, f. 4r.

\(^{53}\) Newton, Bodmer MS, 5A, f. 8r; cf. Newton, Yahuda MS 15-5, f. 96r. It is significant that these writings on the history of the Church date from the second decade of the eighteenth century, long after Newton became aware of Socinian teaching.

the teachings contained within these works. It hardly needs stating that Newton was no heresy hunter, much less a champion of orthodoxy. Nor was he the sort of man who sought to impress with his personal treasures. The evidence suggests that Newton was driven by the third motivation.

Newton’s collection of Sociniana included four titles by Fausto Sozzini and one each by Johann Crell, Samuel Crell, Stanislaw Lubieniecki and Janasz Szlichtyng. The four titles by Sozzini are controversial tracts, including one that treats the matter of Christ’s pre-existence. The title by Johann Crell is a commentary on 1 and 2 Thessalonians. The work by Samuel Crell is the aforementioned treatise on the prologue to John’s Gospel. The book by Lubieniecki is not primarily theological, but a compilation of records of comet sightings. As such, it served as a source for Newton’s work on cometography. Finally, Szlichtyng’s work is a commentary on Hebrews. Newton’s personal access to Socinian ideas was not limited to these eight explicitly Socinian books. He also possessed an antitrinitarian book by the Transylvanian Unitarian György Enyedi, whose ideas were in part shaped through cross-fertilisation with early Socinianism and whose work in turn is cited in the Polish Brethren’s Racovian Catechism. Additionally, Newton owned a copy of The Faith of the One God, which was made up of fifteen tracts by various Socinian-influenced English writers, including John Biddle, who has been described as “the Father of English Unitarianism”. Finally, Newton’s library included Christopher Sand’s Nucleus historiae ecclesiasticae. While rejecting Socinian Christological formulations, the German Arian accepted other ideas from the Socinians, such as irenicism, and includes accounts of Socinians in his Nucleus. Sand was also on good terms with such Socinians as Andzrej and Benedykt Wiszowaty, grandson and great-grandson of Sozzini, the latter of whom edited Sand’s posthumous Bibliotheca antitrinitariorum (1684). This list, of course, represents the minimum of such books Newton possessed. In addition to these titles, Newton also had acquired an anti-Socinian

55 See Appendix II for a detailed list based on Harrison 1978, Library.
56 Newton’s copy of Lubieniecki’s work is dog-eared. See Appendix II. Newton’s reading of Lubieniecki’s work on comets may provide a limited example of Newton’s use of a Socinian work for his natural philosophy.
57 A note in Newton’s hand on the fly-leaf indicates that Newton purchased this volume (as opposed to receiving it as a gift or inheriting it from someone). Harrison 1978, Library, item 557. On Enyedi, see Balázs/Keserű 2000, Enyedi.
publication by Edward Stillingfleet and a work written against Sand by George Bull. Eight Socinian works might not appear to be many. Yet one must remember that these books were generally harder to obtain than orthodox works. These eight titles can also be compared to the relative paucity of books by figures of the Magisterial Reformation owned by Newton: a mere two works by Martin Luther and only one by John Calvin graced the shelves of his library.

There are no records of when Newton acquired this collection; the publishing dates, however, provide helpful *termini a quo*. While six of the volumes referred to above were published before Newton’s birth, the following would have been acquired in Newton’s active years: Sand (1669), Enyedi (1670), Lubieniecki (1681), Bull (1685), Biddle (1691), Stillingfleet (1697) and Samuel Crell (1726). References to both the Socinians and Sand in his “Two notable corruptions”, along with another note on Sand in his theological notebook, document that his reading of these authors was well underway by 1690 at the very latest. The fact that several of his Socinian books show signs of dog-earning confirms that these works did not sit idle.

Newton was not restricted to the Socinian and semi-Socinian works in his own library. First, he had access to books by the Socinians at Trinity College, which held a range of such titles during the late seventeenth century. Newton also had access to the library of Isaac Barrow, an opponent of Socinianism. Barrow owned Sand’s *Nucleus* and *Interpretationes paradoxae quatuor Evangeliorum* (1670), the Racovian Cat-

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60 Newton 1959–1977, *Correspondence*, vol. 3, pp. 84, 89; Newton, King’s College, Cambridge, Keynes MS 2, f. 19’ (this source, Newton’s theological notebook, dates to c. 1684–1690). In Newton’s brief reference to the Socinians in the “Two notable corruptions” he explicitly disagrees with one of their textual interpretations. It is difficult to determine whether this represents a genuine disagreement on this point, or if it was an attempt to cover his tracks. The word “Socinians” appears in a Latin text in Newton, Andrews University (James White Library), Berrien Springs, MI, ASC MS.N.47 HER, p. 40. Although the term is in Newton’s hand, the text is difficult to read in the microfilm reproduction and will thus have to be examined in the original in order to ascertain the nature of this example (which may form part of a quotation). On 26 November 2004, Scott Mandelbrote, my colleague in the Newton Project, announced to those of us attending the conference “Fausto Sozzini e la filosofia in Europa” at Siena that he had discovered a manuscript that allows us to be sure that Newton was reading Socinian works by the late 1670s. Mandelbrote intends to publish a paper on this important discovery.

61 See Appendix II.

62 Snobelen 1999, *Newton*, p. 385. In the late 1660s and possibly into the early 1670s, Newton’s rooms were immediately underneath the Trinity College library.
echism and Joachim Stegmann, Sr.’s Brevis disquisitio. Locke’s extensive library of Sociniana is crucial for the period from the late 1680s until Locke’s death in 1704. It is possible that Locke granted Newton access to this collection during the latter’s several visits to Oates. For his London period, Newton’s close friend Samuel Clarke, a near-neighbour with whom he dined regularly and who published an antitrinitarian work in 1712, is important. Clarke appears to have possessed as many as two sets of the Socinian collected works, the Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum (BFP). Also, Clarke’s patron Bishop John Moore held in his famous library roughly fifty Socinian titles represented in almost seventy copies. Moore was rumoured to be an antitrinitarian working with Clarke and Newton, and was among the small group sent copies of the 1713 Principia. Since Newton’s 1690 allusions to the Socinians and Sand were not to any works he himself owned, or at least to any books found in his library at his death, it is clear that he was using a wider range of works than those cited above. If Newton was interested in Socinian teachings, on-going access to Socinian books outside his home may also explain why his library of Sociniana is relatively small and could even be described as defective. With Newton’s access to Sociniana established, we now turn to consider whether ideas present in these works find parallels in Newton’s thought.

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63 Snobelen 1999, Newton, pp. 384–385 (where the Brevis disquisitio is mistakenly attributed to John Biddle, who was in fact the translator).
64 Snobelen 1997, Library. It is possible that one of the sets of the BFP that may have been Clarke’s possession at his death (which came two years after Newton’s) could have come from Newton’s library. If so, there is no documentary evidence to confirm this and it is extremely unlikely that any evidence will ever surface to confirm this either way.
65 Cambridge MS Oo.7-49, 40r, 60r, 198r, 199r, 215r; Bodleian Library, Oxford MS Add. D.81, 95r, 376r, 385r, 408r, 499r–499r, 414r, 443r, 454r, 455r; Bodleian MS Add. D.81*, 108r, 266r. Samuel Clarke, who had been Moore’s chaplain, was the chief cataloguer of Moore’s library. Although there is no direct evidence that they were created by Newton, it is worth noting that Moore’s set of the eight-volume BFP retains clear signs of the dog-earing that is characteristic of Newton’s own books (Cambridge University Library, class mark 4.2.14-).
66 Robert Wodrow 1842–1843, Analecta, vol. 2, p. 285; vol. 3, p. 461. Although there is no evidence to suggest that Moore was in fact an antitrinitarian, the rumours may reflect an awareness of contact between Moore and Newton.
5. Parallels with Socinian Theology

It is clear that the most important source for Newton’s theology was the Bible. This biblicism was shared with the Socinians. Newton also rejected the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds, while accepting the earlier Apostles’ Creed, the language of which conforms closely to that of the Bible. The same is true of the Polish Brethren. Newton’s exhaustive study of the biblical texts yielded many results that veered from received theology. The shared biblicism of Newton and the Socinians poses a challenge for the historian of Newton’s theology, as allowances must be made for the possibility that some of the evident parallels may be the result of similar exegetical itineraries. For the moment I will put this possibility to one side and begin to examine the parallels. One of the most important set of these lies in the domain of Christology. These examples range from the general to the specific. Despite the fact that Newton, unlike the Socinians, believed in the premundane existence of Christ, on many other points there is agreement. One constant theme that reverberates throughout the writings of both Newton and the Polish Brethren is the argument that only the Father is truly and uniquely God—based on such pivotal loci biblici as 1 Corinthians 8:4–6. Early on, in the 1670s, the biblically-minded Newton had come to this conclusion, including as the second statement in a series of twelve statements on God and Christ the following: “The word God (put absolutely) without particular restriction to ye Son or Holy ghost doth always signify the Father from one end of the scriptures to ye other.” Statement ten amplifies this understanding of the Father as supreme God:

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69 When composing their own confessions of faith, both Newton and the Socinians often used the model of the Apostolic Creed. For Newton, see Newton, Keynes MS 3, p. 29; Newton, Keynes MS 8; Newton, Yahuda MS 15-3, ff. 44–46. For a Socinian confession that uses the Apostles’ Creed as a template, see Jonasz Szlichtyng’s 1642 Confession of Faith in Williams 1980, Brethren, pp. 309–418.

70 Newton, Yahuda MS 1-4, f. 150r; Newton, Yahuda MS 15-3, f. 66v; Newton, Keynes MS 3, p. 45; Newton, Bodmer MS, 5 and 5A. The extensive discussion of the preexistence in the latter manuscript shows that Newton was exercised by the subject—possibly as a result of his exposure to Socinian Christology.

71 William 1980, Brethren, pp. 316, 392, 398; Catechism 1818, pp. 29, 34, 57, 151, 196; Lubieniecki 1995, History, p. 163; Crell, J. 1665, Books, pp. 13–22, 190, 214, 222; Newton, Keynes MS 2, f. XI; Newton, Keynes MS 8, f. 1r; Newton, Bodmer MS 1, ff 12r, 15-1, f. 29v.
It is a proper epithete of ye father to be called almighty. For by God almighty we always understand ye Father. Not that we hereby (Yet this is not to) limit the power of ye Son, For he doth what soever he seeth ye Father do; but to (acknowledg) ye all power is originally in ye Father & that ye son hath no power in him but w' derives from ye father for (he professes that) of himself he can do nothing.\(^72\)

This is just the beginning. Newton’s understanding of the Father as a God of absolute dominion is also a feature of Socinian doctrine.\(^73\) Newton shares with the Socinians a powerfully voluntarist conception of God, a corollary of the God of dominion.\(^74\) Newton’s conclusion that Christ is God by virtue of role and office, but not by nature, is identical to Socinianism.\(^75\) In holding that the unity between the Father and the Son was of a moral quality, rather than a metaphysical quality of essence, Newton also agrees with the Socinians.\(^76\) Related to this, a conception of the relationship between God and Christ being one of shared monarchical dominion, as opposed to shared essence, can be found in both the writings of Newton and the Socinians.\(^77\) The same is true of the characterisation of the doctrine of the Trinity as polytheism.\(^78\) In contending that the term “Son of God” is semantically equivalent to the title “Messiah”, thus connoting no metaphysical or ontological import (as in consubstantiality with the Father), Newton also echoes an argument made before his birth by Johann Crell.\(^79\)

\(^{72}\) Newton, Yahuda MS 14, f. 25. See also statements one and three for further clarification of Newton’s position.

\(^{73}\) Newton, Bodmer MS, 1, ff. 11r–12r, 5B, ff. 7r–8r; Williams 1980, Brethren, pp. 391–394; Catechism 1818, p. 25; Lubieniecki 1995, History, p. 163. James E. Force has admirably demonstrated this key feature of Newton’s theology (Force 1990, God).

\(^{74}\) Force 1990, God; Catechism 1818, pp. 25–28.

\(^{75}\) Newton, Keynes MS 3, p. 45; Newton, Bodmer MS, 5B, ff. 8r–9r; Catechism 1818, pp. 34–36, 55. For more on the Socinian rejection of the use of substantial or essential language to describe Christ’s relationship to God, see Catechism 1818, pp. 55–65, 127–167. The extensive coverage of this topic in the Racovian Catechism demonstrates its paramount importance in Socinian apologetics.

\(^{76}\) Newton, Bodmer MS, 5B, f. 7r; Catechism 1818, pp. 154r–133.

\(^{77}\) Newton, Yahuda MS 15.5, f. 154r; Catechism 1818, pp. 35r–36r, 54r–55r.

\(^{78}\) Newton, Yahuda MS 15.5, f. 154r; Catechism 1818, pp. 29, 33.

\(^{79}\) Newton, Keynes MS 3, p. 32; Crell, J. 1665, Books, pp. 156–157. The articulation of this argument by Locke in his Reasonableness of Christianity (1695), was one of a series of examples of putative Socinian doctrine in this work that elicited the charge of Socinianism. Many orthodox commentators saw in the designation “Son of God” an ontological import that confirmed Christ’s full deity, although at least one (nominal) Trinitarian, the Dutch Remonstrant Philip Limborch, also saw the terms “Son of God” and “Messiah” as synonymous (see Snobelen 2001, Socinianism, pp. 99–100).
Even Newton’s portrayal of the Holy Spirit as the spirit of prophecy may reveal Socinian affinities, as may his use of the term *Deus Optimus Maximus* for the supreme God (a title of Cicero’s origin much used by the Polish Brethren). When not touching on the preexistence specifically, Newton’s Christology could easily be mistaken for Socinianism. Since Newton seldom raises the matter of the preexistence in his discussions of God and Christ, this means that most of what he writes on these topics is compatible with Socinianism.

But there is need for caution. While it is true that most of what Newton says about God and Christ apart from the preexistence is compatible with Socinianism, most of Newton’s Christology apart from the preexistence is also compatible with fourth-century Arianism. For example, Arians believed that only the Father is God in the absolute sense. They also commonly deployed 1 Corinthians 8:6 to support this subordinationistic stance. One of Newton’s contemporaries associates the view that Christ was God by office not nature with both the fourth-century Arians and the modern Socinians. Moreover, in the case of the Arians, there is unambiguous evidence from a range of Newton’s manuscripts to demonstrate that he had researched their doctrines. From this it is possible to conclude with a reasonable degree of certainty that, in addition to his own scriptural exegesis, Arianism played a role in shaping his theology.

Nevertheless, several factors suggest that it would be wrong to conclude that Newton’s Christology and Arianism are completely isomorphic. First, although Newton sometimes defends the Arians as an unjustly persecuted group in his historical writings, Newton never explicitly aligns himself with that party. Second, Newton’s animus against the employment of metaphysical language in theology was directed towards Arians as well as Athanasians, as is made clear by the passage found among his drafts for his Church history:

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81 Cambridge University Library MS. Add. 3965, f. 542r; cf. Williams 1980, *Brethren*, pp. 574, 588 n. 106, 665, 669 n. 42, 674, 682 n. 2. This observation should be tempered by the fact that this title was sometimes used by orthodox writers as well.
82 More analogies between Newton’s Christology and that of the Socinians is presented below in the section on the General Scholium.
In these disputes Arius & Athanasius had both of them perplexed the Church with metaphysical opinions & expressed their opinions in novel language not warranted by Scripture. The Greek Church had to preserve the Church from these innovations & metaphysical perplexities & put an end to the troubles occasioned by them anathematized the (novel) language of Arius in several of their Councils, & so soon as they were able repealed the novel language of the homousians, & contended that the language of the scripture was to be adhered unto. The Homousians rejected the father & son one God by a metaphysical unity of substance: the Greek Churches rejected all metaphysical divinity as well that of Arius as that of the Homousians & made the father & Son one God by a Monarchical unity, an unity of Dominion, the Son being subject to the father receiving all things from the father, being subject to him, & executing his will & sitting in his throne & calling him his God, for & so is but one God with the father as a king & his viceroy are but one king. For the word God relates not to the metaphysical nature of God but to his dominion.

In this passage, Newton not only condemns both Arius and Athanasius for “perplexing” the Church with metaphysics and novel language but, using the example of the ancient Greek Church, he contrasts the notions of “a Monarchical unity” and “a unity of Dominion” of God and Christ (which he views positively) with the formulations of both the Arians and the Athanasians. Unlike many fourth-century Arians, Newton refused to speak of Christ’s nature as being of similar (homoiousios) nature to his Father. In his positive affirmations of belief, Newton completely rejects ontological descriptions of the relationship between the Son and God the Father. Newton did not believe it appropriate to discuss the substance of God and Christ; Arians ultimately did. Although the earliest Arians, at least, characterised the relationship between the Father and Son as one primarily of will, while the Athanasians characterised the relationship as one of essence, so that the early debate was between voluntary and ontological Christologies, it is instructive that Newton himself viewed the Arians as having sul-
lied their theology with ontology. In his de-ontologisation of God talk, Newton is closer to the seventeenth-century Socinians than the fourth-century Arians.

There is a third reason for caution. Evidence has already been cited to suggest that Newton believed the matter of the preexistence (or not) of Christ to be an adiaphoron. These statements hint at a reflexive element, suggesting that Newton himself was not sufficiently certain about the scriptural grounds of Christ’s preexistence to include it among the fundamenta. In the same series of passages where he discusses the charity of early Christians in tolerating both views, Newton also acknowledges that the Bible directly treats Christ’s human birth and physical resurrection rather than any premundane existence:

> And Justin supposes according to the doctrine of Orpheus, that this generation was not from all eternity but only before the world began, & that w\(^{th}\) respect to this antemundane generation Christ is called the Son of God: whereas in scripture he is called the Son of God with respect to his miraculous birth of a Virgin & his resurrection from the dead, & there is no mention in scripture of any other generation of the Son of God. John tells us, In the beginning was the Word, but he doth not tell us that he was begotten before or in the beginning. This opinion came partly from the Theology of the heathens words of John by deduction & partly from the theology of the heathens & whether it be true or false we cannot know without an express revelation, nor is it material to the Christian religion. Sacred history begins with the creation, and what was done before the beginning we are not told in scripture, unless (perhaps) he was called the first born of every creature to denote the antemundane generation of his spiritual body.\(^{89}\)

In both declaring that there is no explicit biblical avowal of a premundane generation of the Son, and that the doctrine cannot be determined true or false without the backing of the Word of God, Newton affirms that the doctrine should not be pressed as a fundamentum. His lack of a firm commitment to one view over another may help explain why two of his theological intimates left behind contradictory characterisations of this belief on this point.\(^{90}\)

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\(^{89}\) Newton, Bodmer MS, 5, f. 4\(^{r}\). This passage seems to suggest that Newton believed the biblical support for the preexistence of Christ to be tenuous.

\(^{90}\) Hopton Haynes and William Whiston (Newton’s successor at the Lucasian Professorship, with whom Newton eventually parted company) respectively classified Newton as a Christological Socinian and Christological Arian (Baron 1763, Cordial, Preface, p. xviii; Whiston 1728, Records, Part II, pp. 1076–1082). These different characterisations
That Newton’s irenic comments on what could anachronistically be called proto-Socinian theology in the early Church date from the early eighteenth century suggests Newton may have grown more receptive to Socinian thought over time. It is certainly noteworthy that Newton portrays the Arians positively in the 1670s, and even in his “Two notable corruptions” and his “Paradoxical questions” of the late 1680s and early 1690s, of roughly the same period, while speaking negatively of the Socinians in the “Two notable corruptions”, but goes on in his later years to attack the Arians for introducing metaphysics in religion while he simultaneously begins to show more charity towards the Socinian position. These apparent diachronic shifts may suggest an increasing disaffection with the Arian Christology and a growing warmth for a completely non-essentialist dynamic monarchianism—a position with greater affinities to Socinianism.

The preexistence appears to sit lightly on Newton’s Christology. Although Newton does go into detail when discussing many other aspects of his Christology, including those he held in common with both Arians and Socinians, there are no systematic discussions of Christ’s preexistence in his surviving papers, only passing references (where, it is true, he affirms it). In examining much of the same manuscript evidence, historian of Arianism Maurice Wiles concurs that “[a]t times a Socinian Christ seems to be all [Newton] feels the need to affirm”. Nevertheless, Wiles adds that although “one might describe his religious position as predominantly Socinian, there is no doubt that his overall theological position is Arian rather than Socinian”.

This is undoubtedly reflect in part the apologetics of Haynes and Whiston, who were themselves Socinian and Arian (or semi-Arian) in their respective Christologies.

91 Newton, Yahuda MS 14, f. 25r.
92 In the latter writing Newton defends Arius against the hostile aspersions and insinuations of Athanasius (Newton, Clark MS; Newton, Keynes MS 10).
93 Confirmation of this possibility will have to wait for both a more systematic survey of Newton’s papers and the determination of more precise dates for each of Newton’s manuscripts. A useful comparison can be made between Newton’s twelve statements on the word “God” (Newton, Yahuda MS 14, f. 25r; c. 1670s), which includes a positive allusion to the Arian interpretation of the prologue to John and the twelve articles on God and Christ (Newton, Keynes MS 8; c. 1710s–1720s), which is more biblical in its language and which contains no direct or indirect allusion to Arian theology. Nevertheless, even in the earlier document, Newton explicitly states that the union between the Father and the Son is an “agreement of will and counsel” (Yahuda MS 14, f. 25r).
94 Wiles, Archetypal heresy, p. 84.
a judicious conclusion. Although formally Newton’s Christology was Arian, he appears to have adhered to a practical Socinian Christology. Put another way, Newton’s Christology stood on the Socinian side of Arianism rather than the orthodox side. In at least one important respect, it was also further from orthodoxy than Socinianism. A defining moment occurred in the histories of the Polish Brethren and the Transylvanian Unitarians when between November 1578 and April 1579 Fausto Sozzini (not yet formally aligned with the Polish Brethren) debated the Transylvanian Unitarian bishop Ferenc Dávid on the adoration and invocation of Christ. While Newton, like Sozzini, but unlike Dávid, held to a qualified adorant Christology, Newton, like Dávid, but unlike Sozzini, affirmed a non-invocant Christology.

But an evaluation of the relations of Newton’s theology to that of Socinianism should not end with Christology and Trinitology. The affinities of Newton’s beliefs with those of Socinianism are brought into more pronounced relief when we step back from Christology and view the entire doctrinal profiles of Newton and the Polish Brethren. Socinianism was a complete doctrinal system in which other unorthodox beliefs formed an integral part of the theological rationale. It is important to note, therefore, that the Socinians were also maligned for their view of Christ’s atonement. This is not, as often claimed, a rejection of the atonement, but instead a different construal of the doctrine than that popular in orthodox theology. In his De Jesu Christo Servatore (1594) Fausto Sozzini rejected the orthodox satisfaction theory of the atonement, a theory that held that God’s wrath was appeased or satisfied through Christ’s death on the cross, a sacrifice that involved a sort of legal transaction in which Christ died as a substitute for humans.

95 Cf. Frank Manuel, who wrote that Newton “never settled into a fixed position” on the preexistence (Manuel, Religion of Newton, p. 57).
97 On this celebrated debate, see Williams 1982, Issues.
98 Newton sharply distinguished between the worship of the Father as God and the worship of Christ in a secondary sense as Lord (Newton, Keynes MS 8, f. 1r; cf. Newton, Keynes MS 3, pp. 47–48; Newton, Sotheby’s Lot 255-7, f. 2r [private collection]).
99 Basing his reasoning on scriptural testimony, Newton affirmed that prayer should be directed to the Father in the name of the Son, but never directly to the Son (Newton, Keynes MS 3, p. 48; Newton, Keynes MS 8, f. 1r). I am grateful to Mihály Balázs of the University of Szeged for his incisive analysis of the non-invocant theology in Keynes MS 8 and to József Barna for translating this document into Hungarian for the benefit of his colleagues in Szeged.
Sozzini argued that the view that held that God was a wrathful deity who demanded the satisfaction of a legal transaction prior to granting atonement for the sin’s of men and women was inconsistent with God’s grace. Instead, Sozzini argued that God has the right to grant atonement and eternal life freely, without any transaction. Sozzini believes it unjust for God to ask men and women to forgive each other freely, if he does not do so himself. There is in Sozzini’s model of the atonement a greater stress placed on Christ’s crucifixion as exemplary of an ethic of self-sacrifice to which humans should aspire.

In two related manuscripts Newton comes to similar conclusions. After affirming the biblical language of Christ’s blood washing away the sins of believers, Newton writes:

For a man to forgive his enemies even ⟨injuries⟩ without satisfaction ⟨made to him⟩ is no injustice. It’s an act of mercy & more commendable then to forgive an Enemies ⟨injuries⟩ upon satisfaction made. Its our duty to do so a duty & God has ⟨in effect⟩ commanded us to do it if we expect to have our sins forgiven. And that wth is an act of mercy, a duty a ⟨commanded a commendable⟩ meritorious act in us cannot be injustice in God.

On the same page Newton goes on to argue that “⟨it is for ⟨lawful for God as for us⟩⟩ to forgive injuries without satisfaction of justice”.

While suggestive, Newton’s discussion of the atonement in these two manuscripts is insufficiently precise to allow much more clarification. It is also noteworthy that in his church history Newton includes “the ⟨nature of the⟩ satisfaction made by Christ” among a list of adiaphora “more difficult to be understood & not ⟨so⟩ absolutely necessary to salvation”.

Both the Socinians and Newton were also mortalists who saw the teaching of the immortal soul, like the Trinity, as an unwarranted and unscriptural obtrusion upon primitive Christianity. Since Newton’s
manuscripts only occasionally discuss the intermediate state between death and resurrection, it is difficult to ascertain whether he adhered to mortalism of the psychopannychist (soul sleep) or thnetopsychist (soul death, with eternal life given at the resurrection) variety. The latter position was that of both the Socinians and John Locke.\(^\text{105}\) It is possible that Newton’s mortalist anthropology was too inchoate for him to be able to articulate the difference. Nevertheless, a statement of Newton recorded by the Scottish mathematician David Gregory may point to thnetopsychism.\(^\text{106}\) In his short manuscript “The Question stated about abstaining from blood”, Newton argues that Genesis 9:4–5 teaches that the Hebrew word *nephesh* (often translated “soul” in the King James Version) denotes a corporeal substance since it is equated with blood.\(^\text{107}\) This physicalist notion of *nephesh* may also suggest thnetopsy-


\(^{106}\) “Ad Religionem non requiritur Status animæ separatus sed resurrectio cum memoria continua,” which is translated in the Newton correspondence as follows: “Not a separate existence of the soul, but a resurrection with a continuation of memory is the requirement of religion” (Newton 1959–1977, *Correspondence*, vol. 3, pp. 336, 339).

\(^{107}\) Newton, Sotheby’s Lot 232, f. 2r. This manuscript, which has remained in private hands since its sale at the 1936 Sotheby’s London auction of Newton manuscripts, was recently (and briefly) made available for public viewing when it was offered at the 3 December 2004 Sotheby’s New York auction of Newton papers. The auction catalogue reproduces the folio cited here (Quarrie 2004, *Sir Isaac Newton*, p. 43).


\(^{110}\) Williams 1992, *Reformation*, pp. 1262–1284; Newton, Yahuda MS 39 (in this short treatise on persecution and toleration, Newton contends that the church has no authority to use the arm of the magistrate for the purposes of punishment). On the other hand, in his “Irenicum” Newton articulates a position compatible with Anglicanism,
ism was their irenicism and advocation of religious toleration.\footnote{Williams 1980, Socinian, pp. 291–302, 342–354, 559–581.} This, too, is found in Newton’s writings.\footnote{Newton, Keynes MS 3; Newton, Yahuda MS 15, f. 154r.} Finally, Newton’s use of “A.C.” (\textit{Anno Christi}) instead of “A.D.” when giving dates in the Christian era parallels Socinian practice.\footnote{Although a minority usage, some orthodox writers also used “A.C.” Nevertheless, Newton’s use of “A.C.” is striking.} This exercise in extending the parallels with Socinianism beyond positions centred around the Trinitological problematic is crucial. Not only are these additional theological positions more closely aligned with seventeenth-century Socinianism than ancient Arianism but, while differing in certain details, it can be said that Newton’s overall doctrinal profile displays broad agreement with the theology of the Polish Brethren.

6. Antitrinitarian View of Church History

Newton’s view of ecclesiastical history underpinned and helped to justify his antitrinitarianism. For decades, Newton combed the weighty annals of the Christian church in an effort to deconstruct the received history of the Trinitarian party and assembled in its stead a history that took the perspective of the primitive Christian faith in the One True God—a perspective that had in Newton’s view been shunted aside by the malevolent and imperialistic forces of the Athanasian party. A pivotal aspect of this project involved explaining the origin of false doctrines through the distortion of the biblical message with Hellenic philosophy, abstruse metaphysics and the post-Apostolic creedal tradition. When we turn to consider the question of the genesis of Newton’s view of Church history, one obvious answer would be his own innovation. After all, a legitimising apologia historica is a necessary corollary to the advocation of a minority doctrinal position.

Yet the Arian Christopher Sand had trodden this path before Newton. That Newton both owned and read Sand’s \textit{Nucleus historiae ecclesiasticae} (his copy is dog-eared) raises the possibility that he was consciously aligning himself with a historiographical tradition that had already been established. Christopher Sand (1644–1680), two years Newton’s
junior, studied at Königsberg and Oxford. In 1664, less than a decade before Newton began his historical quest, Sand was searching the archives of Oxford and uncovering evidence for an antitrinitarian view of Church history. Sand’s *Nucleus* was a work of immense learning that even earned the respect of the opponents of antitrinitarianism. In the *Nucleus*, Sand sought to restore “the ‘Arian’ and ‘Arianizing’ currents in the history of Christianity”. This conforms precisely with Newton’s own agenda from the 1670s into the 1690s. As with Newton’s “Paradoxical Questions concerning ye morals & actions of Athanasius & his followers”, Sand’s history is replete with references to Athanasius, the homoousians and the Arian party. The importance of these parallels is heightened by the fact that Sand’s *Nucleus* appeared in 1669, only a few years before Newton became an antitrinitarian. But this is not all. Sand’s philosophy of history was almost certainly influenced by Socinian historiography and his works contain extracts from Socinian accounts of Church history. But Newton also had direct access to the Socinian view of ecclesiastical history in their own writings and the parallels are remarkable.

First, we see with both the Socinians and Newton an intense study of the early Church and an acute sensitivity to doctrinal anachronism and innovation. Both the Socinians and Newton were keen to restore the original doctrines of Christianity, and both desired a “second” reformation. As with the Socinians, Newton contended that the corruption


117 Newton’s “Paradoxical questions” exists in two versions, the William Andrews Clark Memorial Library MS and King’s College, Cambridge, Keynes MS 10.

118 See the first and second books (*liber primus* and *liber secundus*) of Sand 1669, *Nucleus*.

119 Pages 146–147 of *liber primus* of Sand’s work include references to the Socinians, Fausto Sozzini and Enyedi. Newton’s copy has page 146 folded down (Trinity College, Cambridge, NQ.9.17).

120 Examples of the Socinian view of church history can be found in the relevant sections of Stanislaw Lubieniecki’s *Historia Reformationis Polonica* (1685), along with Andrzej Wiszowaty’s *Narratio compendiosa* (c. 1668), in Lubieniecki 1995, *History*, pp. 80–87, 190–193, 199–201, 248–250, 275, 336–337. Wiszowaty’s *Narratio* was embedded in Sand 1669, *Nucleus* (where it first appeared in print), and thus available to Newton. A short example of Benedykt Wiszowaty’s antitrinitarian reading of the Christology of the early church is given in a footnote to the final edition of the Racovian Catechism (*Catechism* 1818, pp. 167–168). An excellent overview of the Socinian antitrinitarian philosophy of history, including a synopsis of Benedykt Wiszowaty’s “Medulla”, can be found in Szczucki 1979, *Historiography*, pp. 285–300.

121 Williams 1980, *Brethren*, p. 560; Newton, Bodmer MS, passim.
of language and the introduction of novel terminology were foremost in
the list of the causes of divisions among the early Christians.\textsuperscript{122} In both
the Socinian view of Church history and Newton’s own writings, the
introduction of the unbiblical word \textit{homoousia} and its use against Arius
was seen as an lamentable stain on the Church.\textsuperscript{123} The Socinians and
Newton were united in concluding that one of the main corruptions
of primitive Christian teachings was the introduction of Greek philos-
ophy and metaphysics.\textsuperscript{124} As seen above, for this Newton blamed both
Athanasius \textit{and} Arius.\textsuperscript{125}

This antitrinitarian philosophy of history is exemplified in the work
of Socinian Benedykt Wiszowaty, great-grandson of Sozzini. Lech
Szczucki’s summary of Wiszowaty’s unpublished, but indicative, “Me-
dulla” (c. late 1680s) is invaluable. An extremely apologetic work, it used
testimony from the writings of the early church to demonstrate that
the teachings of the Church had become corrupt (representing Greek
philosophy as a chief culprit), but that the primitive truth (\textit{primaeva ver-
titas}) had been preserved by a theologically-pure remnant.\textsuperscript{126} This is, of
course, an adaptation for antitrinitarian purposes of a standard Protes-
tant historiographical motif.\textsuperscript{127} For Wiszowaty only a chosen few can
“discover the supreme good, which is divine truth; the masses, on the
other hand … will never chose ‘the best things’”.\textsuperscript{128} Wiszowaty’s vision
of the true Church was that “of a minority, one defeated, persecuted
and suffering, but one which nevertheless, dauntlessly convinced of the

\textsuperscript{122} Jarmola 1990, \textit{Origins}, p. 60; Newton, Bodmer MS, 5, ff. i’–2’, 8, f. i’; Newton,
Yahuda MS 15.5, f. 154’.

\textsuperscript{123} Lubieniecki 1995, \textit{History}, pp. 248–249; Newton, Clark MS, \textit{passim}; Newton,
Keynes MS 10, \textit{passim}.

\textsuperscript{124} Lubieniecki 1995, \textit{History}, pp. 274–278; Newton, Bodmer MS, 5A, ff. i’–2’,
7’, 5B, f. 7’, 8, f. 1’; Newton, Yahuda MS 15.5, ff. 79’, 97’, 154’, 170’. A manuscript treatise by
the French Socinian Jacques Souverain among Locke’s papers provides vivid parallels
not only to Newton’s belief that the original Gospel had been corrupted by Greek
philosophy, but many other elements of Newton’s antitrinitarian thought. See Sou-
verain, “Some General Reflections upon The beginning of St John’s Gospel”, Bodleian
Library, Oxford, MS Locke e. 17, ff. 211–216. This manuscript is copied out princi-
pally in the hand of Locke’s amanuensis Sylvanus Brownover, with some corrections
by Locke himself. For more on Souverain and the strident attack on the Trinity in this
manuscript, see Marshall, “Locke, Socinianism, ‘Socinianism’, Unitarianism”, pp. 126–
131. Since Locke had this manuscript in his possession (likely from the late 1690s),
Newton may have been granted access to it.

\textsuperscript{125} Newton, Yahuda MS 15.5, f. 154’.

\textsuperscript{126} Szczucki 1979, \textit{Historiography}, p. 296.


\textsuperscript{128} Szczucki 1979, \textit{Historiography}, p. 294.
justice of its cause, passes on to succeeding generations the torch of
divine truth”.129 The Socinian invective against the introduction of phi-
losophy into the Church and their pronounced (and justificatory) rem-
nant theology are startlingly reminiscent of positions Newton held.130
That the plot of Newton’s Church history manifests similar interpr-
etive and apologetic contours to those of the Socinians is suggestive—
especially since it was such an uncommon approach in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries.

Remarkable parallels to Newton are also to be found in a small pam-
phlet published by the Englishman Paul Best, who had converted to
Socinian opinions while travelling in central and eastern Europe and,
during the English Civil War, was condemned to death for denying
the Trinity.131 In his sixteen-page tract Mysteries discovered, Best, who had
studied at Cambridge a half-century before Newton, not only presents
the standard Socinian positions that only the Father is truly God, but
also argues that the Trinity is a central feature of the great apostasy
predicted in the Apocalypse, and lays the chief blame for introducing
the doctrine against the Latin Church.132 Newton similarly integrated
his antitrinitarianism into his interpretation of the Book of Revelation,
implicating the Roman Church with the introduction of Trinitarian-
ism.133 The apocalyptic exegesis of both Newton and Best was shaped
by that of the great Cambridge historicist exegete Joseph Mede, but the
infusion of an antitrinitarian thrust represents a radical turn from the
standard English Protestant anti-Catholic interpretation of the Apoca-
lypse. Elaborating on his view, Best, who uses caustic language similar
to that seen in some continental Socinian literature, writes that “we
may perceive how by iniquity of time the reall truth of God hath
been trodden under foot by a verball kinde of Divinity, introduced
by the Semi-pagan Christians of the third Century in the Western
Church, immediately upon the ceasing of the heathenishe Emperors”.
134
By “the third Century in the Western Church”, Best apparently means

129 Szczucki 1979, Historiography, p. 295.
130 For Newton’s view of the small remnant class, see Snobelen 1999, Newton, pp. 389–
391.
131 Best 1647, Mysteries. Best was released in 1648, apparently after being pardoned.
On Best, see McLachlan, H.J. Socinianism, pp. 149–162 and my New DNB entry on Best.
132 Best 1647, Mysteries, pp. 5, 10–13.
133 As Westfall aptly wrote, “Trinitarianism stood at the center of his interpretation of
the prophecies. It was the Great Apostasy foretold by God when men would fall away
from the true worship into idolatry” (Westfall 1981, Career, p. 351).
134 Best 1647, Mysteries, p. 11.
the beginning of the fourth century A.D., as he goes on to state that the 1260-year apostasy of the Apocalypse commenced with “the first Nicene Council about 328”, and thus the “general Apostasy is expired, the mystery discovered, and the unity of God, Zech. 14.9. come upon the stage”; with this, apocalyptic Babylon is deemed fallen.\textsuperscript{135} Taken from the Books of Daniel and Revelation, early modern Protestant interpreters regularly identified the 1260-year (day) period with the apostasy of the Roman Church. Best links the period with the ascendancy of Trinitarianism and thus it is significant that later in his pamphlet he speaks about a “third Reformation which succeeded the Calvinian upon the Turkish territories more remote from the Romish tyranny, especially, about Anno 1560, in Transylvania, Lithuania, Livonia, and Polonia”, which, although he does not believe it is complete, he clearly associates with the rise of the Socinian church.\textsuperscript{136} Newton also interprets the 1260 years in an antitrinitarian way. But Newton’s approach displays an even more radical stance, as he completely decentres the Protestant Reformation and apparently even marginalises the Socinian Reformation of the late sixteenth century in placing the fall of Babylon and the preaching of the true (unitarian) Gospel far into the future.\textsuperscript{137}

As with Newton and the continental Socinians, Best was outraged by those who set up new Creeds without warrant and inveighed against the Nicene Creed.\textsuperscript{138} In a manner similar to Newton, the Athanasian Creed is also attacked, as is the introduction of the Greek term homoousia.\textsuperscript{139} Like Newton, there is additionally a conception of a small, per-

\textsuperscript{135} Best 1647, Mysteries, p. 11. This can be compared with the periodisation of Stanislas Lubieniecki in Lubieniecki 1995, History, pp. 82, 415 n. 9 and 10.

\textsuperscript{136} Best 1647, Mysteries, p. 15. For more on the Socinian notion of a “third reformation” after those of Luther and Calvin, see Lubieniecki’s account of the reformation moving through Lutheran, Calvinist and Unitarian stages (Lubieniecki 1995, History, p. 89).

\textsuperscript{137} Newton, Yahuda MS 1. 3, f. 53r; Newton, Yahuda MS 9, f. 158v; Newton, Keynes MS 3, p. 35. See also Newton, Ms. Locke c. 27, f. 88, which places the fall of Babylon and the preaching of the true Gospel around the time of the seventh trumpet; cf. Newton, Yahuda MS 7.2a, ff. 29v–38v. In one of his later apocalyptic chronologies, these events happen around 2060 A.D., 1260 years after 800 A.D. (Newton, Yahuda MS 7.3g, f. 13v and Yahuda MS 7.50, f. 8v). It is possible that one reason why Newton looked to the future and discounted the Socinian reformation (of which he was surely aware) was because it was not ultimately victorious, having been suppressed by the Catholics in Poland in the early to mid-seventeenth century and afterwards forced to go underground. This may have helped confirm his belief that the time was not yet ripe for open preaching of the unitarian faith (cf. Snobelen 1999, Newton, pp. 391–393).

\textsuperscript{138} Best 1647, Mysteries, pp. 5, 11, 12, 15.

\textsuperscript{139} Best 1647, Mysteries, pp. 3, 14.
secuted remnant class. Best’s fiery and densely-written pamphlet displays a blend of antitrinitarian theology and apocalypticism that compares well with Newton, even if this admixture is not commonly seen among continental Socinians. Although Best’s Mysteries discovered was condemned to be burnt by the hangman, two copies of the tract were held at Trinity College in Newton’s day.

Whether or not Newton read Mysteries discovered, Best, learned Cambridge scholar, Socinian theologian, apocalyptic exegete, Church historian, tolerationist and radical dissenter, offers one of the closest parallels to Newton’s system of theology.

7. Antitrinitarian Textual Criticism

Textual criticism provides yet another parallel. Although textual criticism by itself does not signal theological radicalism (after all, there were Protestant and Catholic textual critics in the seventeenth century), Newton shared with the Socinians a desire to utilise textual criticism for specifically antitrinitarian ends. Many point to Catholic textual critic Richard Simon’s publications of the 1680s and 1690s as effectively launching biblical textual criticism as a discipline. Sozzini and the Socinians, however, employed textual criticism a century before this. Yet while Simon used textual criticism partly as a tool to undermine the authority of the Bible (in order to assert the authority of the Church), the biblicist Socinians, believing that the Word of God did

140 Best 1647, Mysteries, p. 14.

141 The Wren Library at Trinity College, Cambridge currently holds two copies of Best’s Mysteries discovered. The shelf marks are Y.8.163 (old shelf marks: Z.7.23 and 5.17.a.2) and I.15.911 (old shelf mark Z.8.3; this copy is missing the final pages from page 15 on). Copy Y.8.163 is bound in a volume immediately after copies of Fausto Sozzini’s Tractatus de justificatione (Raków, 1616) and John Biddle’s Twelve arguments ([London], 1647). While neither copy of the pamphlet is listed in Hyde’s 1675/76 manuscript catalogue of the library, both copies of Mysteries discovered (Z.7.23 and Z.8.3) are listed in the c. 1700 partial class catalogue of the Wren Library (Trinity College, Cambridge, MS. Add.a.109, pp. 446, 451). The lack of inclusion of the two copies in the Hyde catalogue does not necessarily mean that neither copy was at Trinity College during Newton’s time there (1661–1696), as the Hyde catalogue does list Sozzini’s Tractatus de justificatione (item 2710). Intriguingly, copy I.15.911 is dog-eared in a manner indistinguishable from the dog-earing of books known to be owned by Newton, with pages 12 and 14 turned down. If, as seems likely, Newton read Socinian books in Trinity College Library, it seems reasonably probable that Newton would have at least stumbled across copy Z.7.23—that is, if he did not seek out Best’s work intentionally.
not contradict itself, were eager to use textual criticism to eliminate contradictions in order to undergird the authority of the Bible.\textsuperscript{142} Like the humanist scholar Erasmus before them, the Socinians stressed the use of philology in the study of biblical doctrine. The Socinians were skilled textual critics and many of their conclusions were prescient.\textsuperscript{143} For example, following the lead of Erasmus, they understood that the \textit{comma Johanneum} (1John 5:7) was a late textual corruption.\textsuperscript{144} As in this case, much of their effort was devoted to purging post-Apostolic Trinitarian corruptions. Both the philological approach and the programme of identifying corruptions are manifest in the \textit{“Two notable corruptions”}, the textual critical manuscript work on 1John 5:7 and 1Timothy 3:16 that Newton sent to Locke in 1690 for anonymous publication on the continent.\textsuperscript{145} While he gently chides the Socinians for a particular interpretation in his single explicit reference to the Socinians in the manuscript,\textsuperscript{146} this reference nevertheless confirms that Newton searched through Socinian writings for evidence. Sand is cited with approbation.\textsuperscript{147} Nor was this treatise the product of a momentary fascination. Newton’s continued interest in antitrinitarian textual criticism is shown both by his contemplation of publishing the \textit{“Two notable corruptions”} in the early eighteenth century and by his desire to read Samuel Crel’s book near the end of his life.

The \textit{“Two notable corruptions”} is not a straightforward exercise in textual criticism: it is a deliberate attempt to expose unwarranted infiltrations of doctrinal \textit{novae} into the sacred text. Newton’s description of the two verses in question as \textit{“corruptions”} makes this intention plain.

\textsuperscript{142} Cf. \textit{Catechism} 1818, pp. 17–18, 42.
\textsuperscript{143} This can be confirmed by consulting Ehrman 1993, \textit{Corruption}, which documents the many examples in which orthodox (proto-Trinitarian and Trinitarian) copyists adjusted the original readings of the New Testament to reflect the developing Trinitarian theology.
\textsuperscript{144} Crel, J. 1665, \textit{Books}., pp. 186, 244; \textit{Catechism} 1818, pp. 39–42; Williams 1992, \textit{Reformation}, p. 645. While some Trinitarians, including Erasmus, suspected that the \textit{comma} was an interpolation, many contended for its authenticity, partly because of its perceived apologetic value.
\textsuperscript{145} The text of the \textit{“Two notable corruptions”} is published in Newton 1959–1977, \textit{Correspondence}, vol. 3, pp. 83–149.
\textsuperscript{146} Newton 1959–1977, \textit{Correspondence}, vol. 3, p. 84. On the other hand, in his personal Bible Newton emended the end of John 3:13 “who is in heaven” to read “who was in heaven” (Trinity College, Cambridge, Adv.d.1.10\textsuperscript{2}), an emendation supported by Fausto Sozzini, who in turn was relying on a suggestion made by Erasmus (Williams 1982, \textit{Issues}, p. 319).
\textsuperscript{147} Newton 1959–1977, \textit{Correspondence}, vol. 3, p. 89.
It is clear from the document that his goal was to remove two chief supports for the doctrine of the Trinity. As Westfall correctly observes, “it is hard to believe that anyone in the late seventeenth century could have read it as anything but an attack on the trinity”.\footnote{Westfall 1980,} Although Newton asked Locke to suppress the writing before it was published, the timing of his composition of the “Two notable corruptions” during the English Unitarian-Trinitarian controversy, which commenced in 1687 with the publication of the Unitarian Stephen Nye’s \textit{A brief history of the Unitarians, called also Socinians} in 1687, is significant. Had Newton’s “Two notable corruptions” been published in the early 1690s—especially in the English version that Newton contemplated—it almost certainly would have been viewed as an intervention in the controversy.\footnote{For background on this controversy, see Douglas Hedley’s contribution to this volume.} It is difficult to imagine that such observations would have been wrong.

\section{Scriptural Hermeneutics}

Biblical interpretation offers further examples of consonance between Newton and the Socinians. Newton made several comments on the use of reason in interpreting the Scriptures that are reminiscent of Socinian exegetical principles. In a manuscript on time, place and God, Newton writes that “the human race is prone to mysteries, and holds nothing so holy and perfect as that which cannot be understood … It is the concern of theologians that the conception \[of God\] be made as easy and reasonable as possible”.\footnote{Cambridge University Library MS. Add. 3965, f. 546r (original in Latin; my translation); cf. Crelle, J. 1665, \textit{Books}, p. 245.} Newton believed that the Scriptures are reasonable and composed in the tongue of the common people.\footnote{Newton, Yahuda MS 15-5, f. 99f.} Moreover, he was committed to the hermeneutic of interpreting more difficult passages with those more easily understood:

\begin{quote}
If it be said that we are not to determin what’s scripture & what not by our private judgements, I confesse it in places not controverted: but in disputable places I love to take up wth what I can best understand. Tis the temper of the hot and superstitious part of mankind in matters of religion ever to be fond of mysteries, & for that reason to like best what they understand the least. Such men may use the Apostle John as they
\end{quote}
please: but I have that honour for him as to believe [sic] he wrote good sense, & therefore take that sense to be his wch is the best.\textsuperscript{152}

In one of his early prophetic manuscripts, Newton also lays down several “Rules of Interpretation” intended to determine “when an interpretation is genuine & of two interpretations which is the best”.\textsuperscript{153} Newton believed in the unity and simplicity of God’s Word. In a direct allusion to his studies of nature, and in deployment of the parsimony principle in hermeneutics, Newton writes that he chose biblical interpretations that “without straining reduce things to the greatest simplicity … Truth is ever to be found in simplicity, & not in ye multiplicity & confusion of things”.\textsuperscript{154}

These same methods were encouraged by Socinian theologians. An attack on mysteries in religion can be seen, for example, in Johann Crell’s railing against the cavils of Trinitarians who cry “mystery” when at a loss to align their extra-biblical doctrine with the Word.\textsuperscript{155} As for the belief that the Bible was written for the common people, a positive affirmation of this sentiment is also found in Johann Crell’s writings.\textsuperscript{156} Motivated by an antitrinitarian doctrinal agenda, the compilers of the Racovian Catechism contend that “more obscure passages of Scripture” are to be understood “by an attentive comparison of them with similar phrases and sentences of less ambiguous meaning”.\textsuperscript{157} Similarly, Paul Best argues that the standard Trinitarian tactic is to resort to “difficult and figurative texts to confirm their inventions”, an approach he rejects in favour of a methodology in which “that which is most plain, common and commanded is the measure of that which is more difficult and obscure”.\textsuperscript{158}

Although analogies to most of these hermeneutical principles and ideals can be found with varying degrees of regularity among the exegetes of the Reformation, and while the analogies may be partly explained by the fact that both the Socinians and Newton imbibed—either directly or indirectly—the philological culture of the Renaissance, Newton’s use of these principles is in several respects more char-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{152} Newton 1959–1977, \textit{Correspondence}, vol. 3, p. 108; cf. Newton, Keynes MS 5, ff. 1r–2r.
\item \textsuperscript{153} Newton, Yahuda MS 1.1a, f. 10r.
\item \textsuperscript{154} Newton, Yahuda MS 1.1a, f. 14r.
\item \textsuperscript{155} Crell, J. 1665 \textit{Books}, p. 245.
\item \textsuperscript{156} Crell, J. 1665 \textit{Books}, p. 245.
\item \textsuperscript{158} Best 1647, \textit{Mysteries}, p. 12.
\end{itemize}
acteristic of Socinians as opposed to orthodox interpreters or Renaissance humanists. Not only are these principles presented with particular force and vigour by both Newton and Socinian writers, and brought to the rhetorical forefront in a way not commonly seen among orthodox theologians, but with both Newton and the Socinians these methods are given a hard edge in a deliberately antitrinitarian apologetic. In explicit contradistinction to Trinitarian exegetes, the undercurrent behind these assertions of hermeneutic style by both Newton and the Socinians is that when these methods are employed with skill and acumen, the student of Scripture will arrive at the non-Trinitarian (i.e. pre-Trinitarian) truth of the Word. What is more, both the attack on the putatively defeatist invocation of “mystery” in hermeneutics, along with the positive assertion that the Bible is not only perspicuous but also reasonable in its meaning, are much more distinctively unorthodox.

Before concluding the overview of the hermeneutics of Newton and the Socinians, it is worth noting that some of Newton’s scriptural interpretative principles find striking analogies in his natural philosophical method. Newton’s four “Rules of reasoning in philosophy”, published in the *Principia*, provide some examples. An affirmation of the unity of phenomena in the natural world and the inference of universal principles from specifics can be found in Rules II and III. The Scottish mathematician David Gregory records a variant of this method he obtained from Newton:

> The best way of overcoming a difficult Probleme is to solve it in some particular easy cases. This gives much light into the general solution. By this way Sir Isaac Newton says he overcame the most difficult things.

This principle is similar to Newton’s hermeneutic in which the meaning of difficult texts is induced from those that are apparent. The simplicity reflex can also be seen in Newton’s study of nature, declaring in Rules I and III that “Nature is pleased with simplicity” and “wont to be simple”. Finally, Newton’s aversion to the use of vain hypotheses in natural philosophy compares well with his opposition to the corruption of Scripture with metaphysics and philosophy. That this

159 In three articles, Maurizio Mamiani has explored the analogies between Newton’s biblical hermeneutics and his natural philosophical method, suggesting that the former may have helped shape the latter. See Mamiani 1991, *Rhetoric*; Mamiani 2001, *Meaning*; Mamiani 2002, *Newton*.


affinity of style between Newton’s hermeneutics and his natural philosophical method also extends to Socinian hermeneutics and his natural philosophical method perhaps should not be surprising. The parsimony principle is, after all, a light motif in the history of medieval and early modern philosophy and natural philosophy, and the Socinians were learned in philosophy as well as theology. It also appears that the rules of reasoning owe something to the Ramist Robert Sanderson’s *Logicae artis compendium* (1618), a text Newton owned.\(^{163}\) Sanderson in turn may have appropriated hermeneutical principles from similar humanistic sources as the Socinians. Nevertheless, these added examples provide yet another instance of analogous ideas that might have served to reinforce Newton’s awareness that in the Socinians he found kindred spirits.

9. Socinianism and the Scholium

When Newton published the second edition of the *Principia* in the early summer of 1713, he included among many additions and refinements to this great work an appendix that summarised in terse and compact prose some of the most significant and distinctive elements of his natural philosophy, ranging from his cometography and his inductive method to gravity to theology. This is the famous, yet still imperfectly understood, General Scholium. Aside from one quick reference to the Scriptures and one brief natural theological comment in the first edition of the *Principia*, along with more elaborate statements on natural theology in the Queries he added to the Latin edition of the *Opticks* in 1706, Newton had never before dared to commit theological ideas to print. Theology makes up more than half of the General Scholium. Even more dangerous for a heretic, most of this is theology proper, as opposed to natural theology.

At the beginning of the theological section of the General Scholium, Newton articulates an expression of the design argument by stating that the “most beautiful System of the Sun, Planets, and Comets, could only

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\(^{163}\) On this, see Mamiani 2002, *Newton*. Mamiani argues plausibly that Newton’s sixteen rules of prophetic interpretation were based partly on Sanderson’s *Logicae* and that elements of the prophetic rules were later adapted for the *Principia*’s rules of reasoning. It is also possible that Newton accessed the *Logicae* directly when formulating the rules of reasoning, although the latter are closer to the prophetic rules than to the principles outlined by Sanderson.
proceed from the counsel and dominion of an intelligent and powerful being”. He goes on to say that “if the fixed Stars are the centers of other like systems, these, being form’d by the like wise counsel, must be all subject to the dominion of One.”

He then describes this Being:

This Being governs all things, not as the soul of the world, but as Lord over all: And on account of his dominion he is wont to be called Lord God παντοκράτωρ, or Universal Ruler. For God is a relative word, and has a respect to servants; and Deity is the dominion of God not over his own body, as those imagine who fancy God to be the soul of the world, but over servants. The supreme God is a Being eternal, infinite, absolutely perfect; but a being, however perfect, without dominion, cannot be said to be Lord God; for we say, my God, your God, the God of Israel, the God of Gods, and Lord of Lords; but we do not say, my Eternal, your Eternal, the Eternal of Israel, the Eternal of Gods; we do not say, my Infinite, or my Perfect: These are titles which have no respect to servants. The word God usually signifies Lord; but every lord is not a God. It is the dominion of a spiritual being which constitutes a God; a true, supreme or imaginary dominion makes a true, supreme or imaginary God. And from his true dominion it follows, that the true God is a Living, Intelligent, and Powerful Being; and from his other perfections, that he is Supreme, or most Perfect.

What were Newton’s intentions in presenting this biblically-framed language at the end of his Principia? One of Newton’s contemporaries claimed he knew. Basing his accusation on an intimate knowledge of Socinianism superior to that of all but a handful of specialist scholars alive today, in 1714 the Calvinist heresy-hunter John Edwards publically denounced the theology of the General Scholium, asserting that the argument that God is a relative term had been taken straight out of the thirteenth chapter of Johann Crell’s De Deo et ejus attributis (Concerning God and His attributes). What Edwards astutely identified in the General Scholium as antitrinitarian in this carefully-worded text can now be confirmed as such on the basis of Newton’s less circumspect private theological papers. While it is important to be cautious when treating the claims of an orthodox apologist, especially in an age when the term Socinian was so casually thrown about to smear theological oppo-

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167 This is the primary purpose of my paper “‘God of gods, and Lord of lords’: the theology of Isaac Newton’s General Scholium to the Principia” (Snobelen 2001, God). See also Stewart 1996, Seeing, and Force 1990, God.
nents, Edwards’ charge nevertheless has substance. In what follows, I will show that Edwards’ assertion that the General Scholium contains language reminiscent of Socinianism is, if anything, an understatement.

The basic principle in the Trinitarian conception of God is an ontology of substance. Thus, the term “God” is seen as primarily absolute, referring to essence. For the Socinians, the single most important defining principle of God is sovereignty and dominion. For this reason, “God” or “a god” can either refer to a being with supreme and undetermined dominion or to a being with shared, limited, or delegated dominion. Thus, the term “God” is seen as primarily relative, connoting rule and office in varying degrees. To support this contention, the Polish Brethren drew attention to loci biblii where ordinary human beings, such as rulers, are called God when acting as representatives of the supreme God (Psalm 82:6 being an example cited by Christ in John 10:34). It follows then that in the handful of times Christ is called “God” in the Bible the term need not be taken in an absolute, substantial sense. This is the apologetic corollary of the contention. Socinians held that the word God is used only of the Father in the absolute, undetermined sense, while it is used of Christ, angels, and some humans in a relative or derived sense. In either case, the term obtains its meaning from dominion and power.

As Edwards intimates, Crell makes this very point in chapter thirteen of his *De Deo*, where he writes that the term “God” in both the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures is frequently qualified by an additional word or clause, “by which his relation is signified to others, as when God is said to be God of this or that” (my emphasis). He then goes on to elaborate:

> From this, I say, it is easily understood, that that term is neither by nature particular, nor does it signify God’s essence itself. Indeed, such particular names in Hebrew do not permit additional clauses. For example, it is not said Moses or Jesus or Paul of this or that, except when the term son is implied (in the case of the names of women, daughter or wife). The essence of God is also from the number of absolute things, not of relative things. Why therefore is God so frequently called God of these or those? Certainly because the term God is principally a name of power and empire, to which is owed honour and veneration, and because it is customary to pay respect to parents. An additional clause of this kind therefore signifies that God is the most kind God of that, of which God is said to be lord and ruler, as the examples teach.\(^{168}\)

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\(^{168}\) Crell, J. 1630, *Deo*, chapter 13, “De nomine θεοῦ”, columns 101–102. The underlined words correspond to the Latin material that John Edwards cited from Crell as
The argument that the term God is primarily a word denoting power and empire is precisely the same as that presented by Newton in the above-cited lines from the General Scholium, where he writes that “[i]t is the dominion of a spiritual being which constitutes a God”. Newton’s God was a God of dominion, and so it was with the Socinians. And, as Edwards correctly claimed, the presentation of God as a relative word is found not only in the passage quoted above, but in much of the preceding material in chapter thirteen of Crell’s De Deo. Moreover, Edwards also notes that Newton employs a title for God, Deus summus (“Supreme God”), that can also be found in the writings of both the Arians and the Socinians, who required the qualification summus “to distinguish the Father from the Son, who they hold to be an Inferior God”. Newton’s private writings confirm that for him the “supreme” God is the Father alone.

But Edwards could have continued. Several more analogies exist as well, not only in Crell’s De Deo, but in other Socinian writings. In chapter twenty-three of his De Deo, Crell again presents the One True God (the Father) as a God of dominion:

evidence that Newton was using that Socinian author. Translations from Crell’s De Deo are my own, corrected by Dr David Money.

169 A manuscript example of Newton’s characterisation of God as a God of dominion can be found in Newton, Bodmer MS, 5A, ff. 8r–9r.


171 Edwards 1714, Remarks, p. 39. On page 40 of this same work, Edwards concludes that Newton must mean the Father when he uses Deus summus. The title Deus summus occurs three times in the original Latin of the General Scholium (the third example being added in 1726 to the note on space) (Newton 1968, Principles, vol. 2, pp. 389–390, 390 note b). For two examples of the title in Crell, see Crell, J. 1630, Deo, “De nomine ὁ θεός”, columns 99 and 101. As Edwards’ critique insinuates, what is crucial here is the combination of the use and the antitrinitarian intent of this expression.

172 Newton, Sotheby’s (1936) Lot 255–9, f. 2r (private collection); Newton, Keynes MS 3, p. 43; Newton, Yahuda MS 14, f. 25r; Newton, Yahuda MS 15–3, f. 46r; Newton, Yahuda MS 15–5, f. 98r. In his manuscript treatise “Of the Church”, Newton refers to the Father as “the supreme Lord” (Bodmer MS, 5A, f. 9r). In an annotation at the end of Query 31 in a copy of the 1717 edition of his Opticks, Newton speaks of the “one supreme Lord God”, by which he means the Father (Manuel 1963, Newton, plate facing p. 117). Newton also uses the term “one supreme God” in Newton 1728, Chronology, p. 190. Although it is conceivable that one might use this title of the Father in a highly subordinationistic interpretation of the Trinity, Newton’s use is thoroughly antitrinitarian. Thus, without the benefit of the added clarity of Newton’s private papers, Edwards’ conclusion that Newton used the expression Deus summus in an antitrinitarian way was correct. For additional examples of the antitrinitarian use of the title “the one supreme God” by the Socinians, see Catechism 1818, pp. 96–97.
God received dominion from no-one, because by his excellence of itself, not received from some other source, entirely on his own authority, he produced all things, by neither another’s help nor command. Therefore he has might by himself, because he is lord of those things, and if any dominion deserves to be called natural, God’s dominion over all things so deserves to be called with the highest justice. Yes, the dominion of God is supreme, and indeed absolutely supreme. Certainly since he received his dominion from no one, but—unlike all those who have some dominion—from himself, he is necessarily supreme lord of all things. Whereupon he is also called Lord of lords.

Crellic’s explication of the True God’s absolute and underived dominion—His supreme dominion—closely matches Newton’s statement in the General Scholium that “a true, supreme or imaginary dominion makes a true, supreme or imaginary God”. The Latin expressions “omnium dominus” (“Lord of all”) and “Dominus dominorum” (“Lord of lords”) appear in both Crellic’s De Deo and Newton’s General Scholium.

Later in the same chapter, Crellic expands on his conception of the God of dominion using concepts and even specific titles of God that appear in Newton’s General Scholium:

Therefore as the dominion of God is absolutely independent, both most great and most complete, and finally eternal: so also is the empire of God, or power of ruling and governing. Because the empire of God is independent, yes indeed because it is most great and most complete, for that reason it ought to be repeated, because He is called the only powerful one by Paul. For the word in Greek is dynast, a word that we have said denotes those who are able to have much influence over others on account of their power. God alone, however, is said to be “powerful one”, because He has empire alone by himself, and indeed over all things, and whoever has power (by himself, that is), has it either by His gift, or at least by His permission. It also pertains first to loftiness, then to breadth of the same empire, because he is King of kings, Lord of the dominant, Lord of hosts, God of gods, and finally God and head of Christ himself. It is said, he [Christ] is himself King of kings and Lord of lords, head of all principality and power, God of all things, or all beings, in this blessed age, seeing that he is lifted up by God himself over all things. From which it appears, the breadth of the divine empire was not lessened at all, when he handed Christ power over all things in heaven and earth—as we also said—from dominion above.
Although many of the titles used of God in this passage ultimately derive from the Bible, it is striking how similar the second half of this passage is to the section in Newton’s General Scholium where superlative titles are used of God. The Latin versions of the biblical expressions “God of gods” (deus deorum) and “Lord of lords” (Dominus dominorum) appear in both this passage from Crell and in Newton’s General Scholium. For both Newton and the Socinians, these titles ultimately refer to the Father alone as supreme deity and thus have clear antitrinitarian import, even though Crell argues that since they are relative expressions, they can be used of Christ in a secondary sense. It is also notable that Crell uses the analogy of an empire to articulate both God’s dominion and the way in which he communicates power and authority to Christ. This dynamic monarchianism has already been seen in Newton’s writings on the relationship between God and Christ. Moreover, Crell’s use of relational titles for God such as “God of gods” and “God of Christ”, with which, as Crell puts it, God is said to be “God of this or that”, is exactly what we see in Newton’s General Scholium, where the term God is said to be defined by relations, as in “my God, your God, the God of Israel, the God of Gods, and Lord of Lords”. Newton and Crell share an antitrinitarian nominalism.

Crel also deals with “God” as a term denoting authority, dominion and empire in his De Uno Deo Patre libri II (Two books concerning One God the Father):

… the name GOD, is in its own Nature common, and agreeth to all them, who have some sublime Empire, or eminent Power; as Princes and Magistrates on the Earth; in the Heavens, to Angels; and above all these, to Christ, the Head of all Angels, and King of kings; but by way of Excellency to that Supream and Independent Monarch, and attributed to him as proper.177

On the following page, he adds to this:

For he is accounted as Independent, who doth not depend on him, on whom only he can truly depend. Whence all the Idols of the Gentiles, are by vertue of these words, or rather, of the sens therein comprehended, simply excluded from true Godhead; since they were so far from truly

176 Examples of the antitrinitarian use of the title “God of gods” can be found in Catechism 1818, pp. cviii, 35; that Newton used it in an antitrinitarian sense, applying it to the Father exclusively, can be see from Newton, Yahuda MS 7.1k, f. 2r; Newton, Keynes MS 3, p. 29; Newton, Bodmer MS, “Additional chapters,” f. 73r.
177 Crel, J. 1665, Books, p. 4. I am quoting from the anonymous English translation of 1665.
depending on the Father, as that they were not believed to depend. But Christ is not excluded herefrom, because his dependence on the Father, in respect of his Divine Empire over all things, and Worship suitable to such an Empire, hath most evident proofs been demonstrated.  

The same argument about God being a term that relates to dominion and not essence is found at the beginning of the section on the nature of God in the Racovian Catechism:

**What do you understand by the term God?**

The supreme Lord of all things.

**And whom do you denominate Supreme?**

Him, who, in his own right, has dominion over all things, and is dependent upon no other being in the administration of his government.

Here it is clear that the term God is seen as equivalent to the term Lord, a word that more immediately conjures up the notion of dominion and power. The Racovian Catechism also discusses the difference between absolute and relative uses of the term “God”, with the former alone referring to the Father. Furthermore, because for him the One True God is the Father, Newton’s presentation in the General Scholium of the “One” who unites through his all-pervading dominion all of the planetary systems in the universe, and hence all of creation, is unitarian. The Socinians, too, used the term “(the) One” to describe the unipersonal God.

But this is not all. In the third (1726) edition of the *Principia*, Newton added a note on the word “God” that expands his meaning:

Dr. Pocock derives the Latin word *Deus* from the Arabic *ād* (in the oblique case *ād*), which signifies Lord. And in this sense Princes are called *Gods*, *Psal. lxxiii*. ver. 6; and *John* x. ver. 35. And *Moses* is called a *God* to his brother *Aaron*, and a *God to Pharaoh* (*Exod. iv*. ver. 16; and vii. ver. 1 [sic; 8]). And in the same sense the souls of dead princes were formerly, by the Heathens, called *gods*, but falsely, because of their want of dominion.
In equating the term “God” with “Lord” (a word that straightforwardly refers to dominion), Newton once again stresses that the chief characteristic of “God” or “gods” is dominion. This attempt to present the terms “God” and “Lord” as equivalent mirrors the already-quoted lines from the Racovian Catechism on the God of dominion. The position that persons other than the True God can be termed “God” is a also standard Socinian view and it is expressed in the very same chapter of Crelle’s De Deo specified in 1714 by John Edwards. For both Newton and the Socinians, this conception of dominion also explained how the Son of God could be called God and not be “very God” in the Nicene formulation. Three out of the four biblical passages used by Newton in this note are also utilised by Crelle for the same purpose in the same chapter of De Deo. Additionally, the point about false and imaginary Gods can be located in similar form in Crelle’s Concerning One God the Father. Finally, the argument on the communicability of the term “God”, along with the scriptural references used by Newton in the note on God, can be found commonly elsewhere in the Socinian corpus.

It is stunning that some of the closest parallels to Socinianism appear in one of Newton’s public documents. It is a testimony to Newton’s boldness that he went on to add further material that conforms to Socinian argumentation in the second version of the General Scholium in 1726 and that he did so after Edwards’ published attack of 1714. The close affinity of several aspects of the General Scholium were not only recognised by a theologically-alert observer in Newton’s own age, but can be confirmed through an expanded survey of Socinian texts. Whether or not Newton actually derived these ideas directly from Crelle’s De Deo as Edwards claims, is impossible to confirm on the available evidence. Newton apparently did not own a copy of the work, although he certainly could have accessed it through Samuel Clarke’s copy of the Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum around the time of the composition of the General Scholium. During Locke’s lifetime, he could have accessed Crelle’s De Deo in one of the three editions Locke owned. But, as already demonstrated, if Newton’s General Scholium

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185 Crelle, J. 1665, Books, p. 5.
187 This includes the edition published in the BFP, which Locke owned. See Harrison/Laslett 1971, Library, items 331, 877 and 3103.
is informed by Socinian arguments, these ideas need not have come from Crell’s *De Deo*. Whatever their precise source or sources, many of the theological ideas embedded in the General Scholium conform so closely to Socinianism that a contemporary observer identified them as such, even without the benefit of the additional testimony adduced in this essay. Furthermore, whatever Newton’s beliefs at the time of the composition of the General Scholium, because this document expresses nescience about the substance of God and only contains arguments that can be used to contend that Christ takes the name God in an honorific sense, while omitting any arguments that Christ in some way shared a similar nature to the Father, on paper the General Scholium contains arguments that can be used for Socinianism, but none that can be used exclusively for Arianism. Perhaps this is one reason why Edwards raised the spectre of Socinianism rather than the fourth-century heresy of Arius. Even with the remaining uncertainties, it is possible to conclude that the single most important text in the history of science ends with an attack on the Trinity infused with arguments that mirror those of the leading heretical movement of the seventeenth century.

10. Associations with a Greater Heresy

Thus far I have avoided sustained engagement with the question of whether or not Newton consciously appropriated Socinian teachings. This paper has demonstrated the plausibility of such a scenario by pointing both to Newton’s access to Socinian sources and the wide array of parallels between his theology and that of the Polish Brethren. It certainly would be understandable if Newton had been attracted to the Socinians’ rich antitrinitarian scholarly culture, or if he had wanted to access the sophisticated argumentation of the most intellectually-advanced antitrinitarian movement of his age. It also possible that Newton was drawn to the Socinians in part because they were neither tainted by the Christological controversies of the fourth century nor corrupted by the metaphysics introduced into Christianity in that age.

Although I have considerably expanded the examples of parallels between Newton’s theology and that of the Socinians in this paper since publishing “Isaac Newton, heretic” and “God of gods, and Lord of lords”, those familiar with these two earlier studies will note that I have taken a somewhat more cautious approach in this paper.
This is something that cannot be said of the Arians. Still, any claims for conscious dependence on the Socinians will remain circumstantial unless more direct evidence surfaces. Of course, since Socinianism was a proscribed heresy, it would hardly be surprising for the evidence to be both elusive and inconclusive if Newton had indeed appropriated some of their teachings. Partly for these reasons, the primary focus of this paper is simply to show that Newton’s theology exhibits a remarkable range of points of contact with Socinianism. This in itself is useful, for, aside from some of his intimates, no-one in Newton’s lifetime knew much of anything about his theology. Knowing that his theology resembles that of the Socinians in many respects helps confirm that it would have been viewed as damnable heresy if it had become widely known. Nevertheless, the genesis of what could be called Newton’s “Socinianesque” theology remains an important consideration. There are several possible sources: Newton’s own independent exegesis, Judaic monotheism, \(^{189}\) primitive Christian theology (including Arianism), Erasmian biblical philology, \(^{190}\) contemporary non-Socinian radical theology (including non-Socinian British Unitarianism), Socinianism itself, and combinations of these. Anyone familiar with Newton’s private theological papers will take the first four possibilities as givens. For this reason, the last dynamic can be assumed, at least with respect to the first four possibilities. The fifth and sixth possibilities will be explored in what follows.

Elsewhere I have argued that Newton’s beliefs show affinities with non-Socinian radical and dissenting theologies of the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries. \(^{191}\) This includes both the movements of the continental Radical Reformation as well as British non-conformists from the Civil War through to the early eighteenth century. In the latter category the British Unitarians loom large. Much of the antitrinitarian argumentation of writers like John Biddle, who is often termed “the father of Unitarianism”, and Stephen Nye, is isomorphic with that of Newton. Additionally, Newton’s near intervention in the Trinitarian controversy

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\(^{189}\) On Newton’s relation to Judaism, see Goldish 1998, *Judaism.*


of the late 1680s and early 1690s reveals that he shared some common reformist goals with the British Unitarians. Newton’s anti-Athanasian “Paradoxical questions” is part of the same genre as the Unitarian Tracts of the 1690s. Newton owned at least one collection of the Unitarian Tracts and would have been familiar with the teachings of the movement that produced them—a movement that was developing its theology contemporaneously with Newton. It is also hard to avoid the conclusion that Newton must have responded positively to much of what is contained in the German Arian Sand’s *Nucleus*, a work that we know he read carefully. The brief interval between the 1669 publication of the *Nucleus* and Newton’s own espousal of antitrinitarianism is suggestive. But here it is worth noting that both Sand and the British Unitarians in turn owed theological debts to the Socinians. Moving beyond antitrinitarian contemporaries, Newton’s mortalist theology can be compared favourably with that of seventeenth-century English mortalists such as Richard Overton. His belief that he was part of a small, persecuted remnant is reminiscent of seventeenth-century British non-conformity. All of this reveals a general orientation away from orthodoxy and towards dissent and heresy.

While allowances must be made for the Socinian penchant for wrapping their doctrines in an orthodox cloak, it can also be argued that on at least four important issues, Newton was further from orthodoxy than the Socinians: his already-mentioned stance on the non-invocation of Christ, his belief that the true reformation of Christianity lay in the future, his powerful millenarian eschatology and his rejection of a personal devil. As already shown, Newton’s non-invocant Christology places him on this point closer to the Transylvanian Unitarians than the Polish Brethren. While seventeenth-century Socinianism (unlike the pre-Socinian Polish Brethren) generally downplayed millenarianism in favour of a stance closer to Augustinian and Calvinist amillennial eschatology, the example of Paul Best does demonstrate that the combination of Socinian theology and Protestant prophetic thought was both possible and productive. Some later Unitarians, notably Joseph Priestley, also combined antitrinitarian and apocalyptic thought. The

192 Overton 1643, *Mans*.
193 Scott Mandelbrote points to Newton’s non-conformist sensibilities in Mandelbrote 1993, *Duty*.
194 Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Socinians sometimes tried to appear as orthodox as possible to avoid verbal and physical persecution.
seventeenth-century Socinians apparently held to a literal, personal devil and literal, personal demons, even though it does not feature prominently in their systematic theology. In contrast, Newton, like many early nineteenth-century Unitarians, saw the devil as symbolic of human lust and the language of demon possession in the Bible as accommodated speech for human madness and the like.

On the other hand, in some areas Newton was more theologically conservative than the Polish Brethren. This is seen not only in his adherence to the preexistence of Christ (a view shared by Trinitarians), but in other areas as well. One example is Newton’s apparent belief that there is a role for the intervention of the monarch in the church. Despite Leibniz’ insinuation in the Leibniz-Clarke debate, Newton did not agree with Sozini’s contention that God’s foreknowledge is less than perfect. On the contrary, Newton declares in the General Scholium that God not only fills time as well as space, but that he “knows all things that are or can be done”. Also, Newton did not follow the Socinians in their belief in the priority of the New Testament. While a concentrated focus on the New Testament can be seen in the theological writings of his friend John Locke, Newton’s Christianity was thoroughly grounded in both the Old and New Testaments. In this Newton is nearer to the English Puritans and other Calvinists than the Socinians.

Even without evidence of direct linkages, there is substantial overlap between Newton’s religious culture and that of both the Socinians and English Unitarians. Quite apart from the doctrinal analogies, Newton adopted a common strategy of many crypto-Socinians on the continent and in England: Nicodemism. Newton’s Nicodemite strategy of outwardly confirming to orthodoxy while secretly harbouring heretical beliefs mirrors that of such crypto-Unitarians as Stephen Nye, who came of age at the same time as Newton. And Newton’s Nicodemism was both passive and active, as he was not only a secret heretic, but

195 Catechism 1818, pp. 7–8, 188.
196 Catechism 1818, pp. 7–8.
197 Snobelen 2004, Lust.
198 As mentioned above, despite the fact that much in Newton’s “Irenicum” suggests that the Church and King are to exist in separate realms, Newton still speaks of a role for the King in selecting Bishops and Presbyters (Newton, Keynes MS 3, p. 22).
200 For a detailed discussion of Newton’s Nicodemism, see Snobelen 1999, Newton.
201 Nye took his BA at Cambridge in 1665, the same year as Newton (New DNB).
his “Two notable corruptions” and General Scholium reveal that he was also actively engaged in an antitrinitarian reformist programme. His actions thus show that he was directly or indirectly a player in the subversive Socinian-Unitarian agenda in both the 1690s and the 1710s. In this light it is astonishing that some of the closest analogies with Socinianism are found in a document he released in the public sphere and that he went on to add to the General Scholium another parallel to Socinianism after being attacked for Socinianism. Here we must ask the question: why would he take such a risk if he was not genuinely sympathetic to an agenda that could be broadly construed as Socinian or Socinian-Unitarian? Without question, Newton was publically aligning himself with known Socinian and Unitarian positions. It was a bold enterprise.

Nevertheless, neither verbal parallels nor similarity of motive in themselves prove Socinian inspiration. It is also true that few individual doctrinal analogies between the theology of Newton and the Socinians are unique to Socinianism. The overall doctrinal profile, however, is strikingly close. Thus we return to the question, Whence this doctrinal profile? A *homogenetic* relationship between the theology of Newton and the Socinians is a real possibility. Such a genetic relationship would include the mediation of teachings through the thought of the Arian Sand and the British Unitarians, in which case the appropriation may not always have been conscious. A genetic relationship would make sense against the backdrop of recent studies of Newton’s theology that suggest he was less of a theological autodidact than previously assumed. The aforementioned possibility of a subtle drift towards Socinianism as the years wore on would also make sense if there was a long-term genetic relationship. Still, there is an outside chance that the relationship was strictly *homomorphic*. If so, the parallels between the independently-developed theologies could be accidental artefacts of the common biblicism and anti-creedalism of Newton and the Polish Brethren. Newton’s theology was hammered out primarily on the anvil of Scripture and this, combined with his rejection of post-Apostolic doctrinal novelty, undoubtedly contributed to the dramatic convergence between his beliefs and those of the Socinians.

It is my belief that a subtle combination of the two is the most likely scenario. Even if few or no parallels derived directly from his engagement with Socinianism, Newton’s theology came to resemble Socinianism on many points and Newton surely would have been aware of this. After all, Newton owned and read Socinian books. It is hard
to imagine that these writings had absolutely no impact on Newton; the circumstantial evidence that they did is powerful and compelling. What is more, as Edwards’ attack demonstrates, a theologically-astute contemporary observer had no trouble identifying Newton’s theology with Socinianism. If both Newton and his informed contemporaries could have seen the analogies, the line between direct appropriation (conscious or unconscious) and simultaneous discovery must have been very fine—if it existed at all. Newton may have in any case wished to conclude that his religion was shaped first and foremost by the Bible (which it undoubtedly was), and that he was by no means a disciple of a contemporary theologian or movement—a defence expressed by some of the British Unitarians.202 Newton’s writings reveal no slavish dependence on any one theological tradition and this includes the Polish Brethren, as his differences from them attest. Newton was above all an eclectic theologian who added to his own innovation ideas from several theological streams, both orthodox and unorthodox. It is enough that this paper provides ample evidence to suggest that one of these streams was Socinian.203

Although Newton was neither a Christological nor communicant Socinian, he was certainly a Socinian in several of the senses common in his own day. This paper has shown that he was also much closer to doctrinal Socinianism than these general definitions. Whichever road he travelled getting there, Newton’s theological system and religious ethos closely resemble those of Socinianism narrowly construed.204 Isaac Newton is possibly the greatest figure in the history of science and certainly one of the leading intellectuals of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. He is unquestionably the most significant figure to be associated with Socinianism. These facts alone demand that more work be done on the nature of the wide-ranging alignment of the religion of the author of the *Principia* with that of the Polish Brethren. One suspects that the last word has not been said on Isaac Newton and Socinianism.

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204 This is similar to Marshall’s conclusion about Locke and Socinianism in Marshall 2000, *Locke*. 
Bibliography


Best, Paul (1647): Mysteries discovery. Or a mercurial picture pointing out the way from Babylon to the Holy City, for the good of all such as during that night of general error and apostasy, 2 Thes. 2.3. Revel. 3.10. have been so long misled with Romes hobgoblins [London].


Crelj, Johann [1630]: De Deo et ejus attributis, in Iohannis Volkelii Misnici De vera religione libri quinque. Quibus prefixus est Iohannis Crelji Franci liber De Deo et ejus attributis, et nunc demum adjuncti ejusdem De uno Deo Patre libri duo. [Raków].

Crelj, Johann (1665): The two books of John Creljus Francus touching One God the Father. Kosmoburg [= London].


Edwards, John (1695): Some thoughts concerning the several causes and occasions of atheism. London: Robinson et al.


Haynes, Hopton (1747): Causa Dei contra Novatores: or the religion of the Bible and the religion of the pulpit compared. London.

Haynes, Hopton (1790): The Scripture account of the attributes and worship of God: and of the character and offices of Jesus Christ. 2nd ed., London.


Kovács, Sándor (forthcoming): “Contributions to the late XVIIth-century relationship of the Transylvanian Unitarians and their co-religionists in England and the Netherlands”.


Sand, Christopher (1669): Nucleus historiae ecclesiasticae: cui praefexus est tractatus de Veteribus Scriptoribus Ecclesiasticis. Cosmopolis [= Amsterdam].

Sand, Christopher (1670): Interpretationes paradoxae quatuor Evangeliorum. Cosmopolis [= Amsterdam].


Stephens, William (1722): The divine persons one God by an unity of nature: or, that our Saviour is one God with his Father, by an eternal generation from his substance, asserted from Scripture, and the Ante-Nicene Fathers. Oxford.


Appendix I
Samuel Crell to Isaac Newton, 16 July 1726

*English translation*

Most Illustrious Sir

Not completely unknown to You, I, whose return to Germany fifteen years ago you liberally equipped with money, most humbly address you for the first time by means of a letter. The best and greatest God be your great reward! The book that could not see publication there, I have brought hither, the printing of which, as you see, two Printers and Booksellers have undertaken here, but with the stipulation that I find buyers for two hundred copies before the book goes to press. But thus far I have scarcely found buyers for fifty copies. Since certain persons have made promises, I turn to You, Most Illustrious Sir, and I present to You these Propositions, hoping for some promotion of this work from You, whereby the Printers might be incited, which I also seek with very humble entreaties. It appears that the book will not be without use, and it is secured against satiety and fastidiousness of style by its manifold variety of argument and clarity of expression. Its first and principal argument is that if only Christian Theologians had seen and acknowledged that Christ is nowhere in Scripture expressly called God, it would appear that so many controversies about the Deity of Christ would not have been stirred up. Therefore my book, if it does not restrain these controversies, will at least mitigate them somewhat, and will perchance contribute something. These Propositions indeed are not being made public and are being shown only to Men of moderation. Those who have begun to promote this work, do not wish their names to be revealed, and nor will Yours be revealed to anyone, Most Illustrious Sir, if you choose to give some money for some copies of it. I thought I would send this to you before by means of a letter, so that when the matter has been considered by you, meeting you personally next Monday, I may learn what you have decided concerning the matter.

To Your most Illustrious name

Your most devoted supporter

Samuel Crell.

Written in London
16 July 1726
Illustrissime Domine

Non prorsus ignotus Tibi, per iteras primùm Te humillimè compello, quem ante quindecim annos redeuntem in Germaniam liberali viatico instruxisti. Deus opt. max. sit merces Tua magna! Librum qui ibi lucem publicam videbat, duo hic suscepere Typographi iidemque Bibliopolæ, verùm eà, lege ut emptores exemplarium ducentorum priùs inveniam quam liber prelo subjiciatur. Sed hucusque nonnisi quinquaoquinqua fere exemplaria reperire potuit. Quidam promiserunt Quare me ad Te Illustrissime Domine converto, et has Tibi Propositiones exhibeo, sperans aliquam a Te operis hujus promotionem quâ Typographi incitentur, quod etiam precibus humillimis expetis. Liber non videtur fore inutilis, et est multiplex varietate argumenti ac stylo perspicuo contra satietatem et fastidiam munitus. Quod primum præcipuumque ejus argumentum attinet, si jam olim Theologi Christiani vidisset et agnovissent, Christum nullibi in Scriptura expressè vocari Deum, non videntur tantas lites de Christi Deitate excitaturiuisse. Ergo ad fluctus tales, si non compescendos, aliquantum saltem mitigandos, nonnihil forsan liber meus contribuet. Propositiones verò istæ non fiunt publici juris, et nonnisi moderatis Viris ostenduntur. Qui opus hoc promovere coeperunt, nolunt nomina sua propalari, neque Tuum Illustrissime Domine, si in exemplaria ejus pecuniam aliquam impendere volueris, cuiquam manifestabitur. Hæc per literas ad Te præmittenda fuisse putavi, ut re à Te considerata, die Lunæ proximo ipse coram, quodcunque ea de re constitueris percipiam.

Illustrissimi nominis Tui

Cultor devotionissimus

Samuel Crellius.

Dab. Londini

1726. d. 16. Julii. 205

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205 Crell to Newton, 16 July 1726, Wallers autografasmeling England och USA, Uppsala Universitetetsbibliotek. An abbreviated translation appears in Hall 1982, *Newton*, p. 33. I would like to thank Uppsala University for providing me with a copy of this manuscript letter and for granting me permission to reproduce its text. I am also grateful to Dr David Money (Cambridge) for helping correct my translation of the Latin.
Appendix II

Sociniana and Related Works in the Library of Isaac Newton

Socinianism

CRELL, JOHANN. Commentary in Epistolae Pauli Apostoli ad Thessalonicenses. Ex prælectionibus Iohannis. Crellii Franci conscriptus à Petro Morskovio à Morskovv. 8º, Racoviae Typis Pauli Sternacii Anno à Christo nato, 1636. [458] H; M/Ff 6; Tr/NQ.114 viii [bound with 421; pp. 32, 38 turned down].1590–1633; AB 2:567; Commentary on the Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Thessalonians. Edited by Peter Morscovius from the lectures of Johann Crell the Frank.

CRELL, SAMUEL. Initium Evangelii S. Ioannis Apostoli ex antiquitate ecclesiastica restitutum, indidemque nova ratione illustratum In isto Opere ante omnia probatur, Joannem non scripsisse, Et Dei erat Verbum. Then the entire first eighteen verses of that Gospel, and many other texts of Scripture are also illustrated; and not a few passages of ancient ecclesiastical writers and heretics are sifted and amended.


SOZZINI, FAUSTO. De Iesu Christi Filii Dei natura sive essentia, nec non de pecatorum per ipsam expiatione disputatio, adversus Andream Volanum. Secundò edita. [Preface signed F.S., i.e. F. Socinus.] 8º, Racoviae, 1627. [495] H; M/A3–14; 1537–1604; AB 2:336; A disputation concerning the nature or essence of Jesus Christ the Son of God, and also on the expiation of sin by him, against Andreas Volanus.

———. De Unigeniti Filii Dei existentia, inter Erasmum Iohannis, & Faustum Socinum disputatio, A Socino iam ante decennium ex ipsius Erasmi scripto ... composita & conscripta: Nunc tamen primium typis excusa. 8º, 1595. [496] H; M/A3–12; NQ.9.5 viii [bound with 1385].1537–1604; AB 2:335; A disputation between Erasmus Johannis and Faustus Socinus concerning the existence of the Only Begotten Son of God, now ten years past, put together and edited by Sozzini from the writing of
Erasmus himself; now however published for the first time. This is the first edition. Johannis was at the time an Arian minister and the disputation was on Christ’s preexistence (AB 2:374–378). This was the Socinian publication of the disputation; Harrison is thus mistaken to identify it as by Johannis, who produced his own edition of the dispute in 1585.

———. Defensio animadversionum F. Socini in assertiones theologicas Collegii Posnaniensis de trino et uno Deo, adversus G. Eutropium canonici Posnaniem, ab eodem F. Socino conscripta. 8°, Racoviae, 1618. [1534] H; M/A3–19; 1537–1604; AB 2:335–336; A defence of the animadversions of Faustus Socinus on the theological assertions of the College of Posnania concerning the three and one God, against Gabriel Eutropius, Canon of Posnania, written by the same Fausto Sozzini. Edited by Hieronim Moskorzewski.


Transylvanian Unitarianism

ENYEDI, GYÖRGY. Explicationes locorum Veteris & Novi Testamenti, ex quibus Trinitatis dogma stabili solit. 4°, [Groningen, 1670; originally publ. c.1598]. [557] H; M/A6–14; Tr/NQ.8.23 ['Is. Newton pret. 6.' on fly-leaf; a few signs of dog-caring]. 1533–1597; Explanations of the doctrine of the Trinity in the Old and New Testament, from which the doctrine of the Trinity is commonly established.

Continental Arianism

SAND, CHRISTOPHER, Jr. Nucleus historiae ecclesiasticae: cui prefixus est Tractus de veteribus scriptoribus ecclesiasticis. (3 pts.) 8°, Cosmopolis [Amsterdam], 1669. [1444] H; M/A1–20; Tr/NQ.9.17 [a few signs of dog-caring]. 1644–1680; AB 3:318–328; Nucleus of ecclesiastical history: to which is prefixed a tract on the ancient ecclesiastical writings. This book contains material about and by Socinians.

English Unitarians

[BIDDLE, JOHN, et al]. The Faith of the One God, Who Only Is the Father; and of One Mediator between God and Men, Who is only the Man Christ Jesus; and of one Holy Spirit, the Gift (and sent) of God; Asserted and Defended, in Several Tracts contained in this Volume; the Titles whereof the Reader will find in the following Leaf. And after that a preface to the whole, or an Exhortation to an Impartial and Free Enquiry into the Doctrines of Religion. 4°, London, 1691. [604] H; M/H2–13; Tr/NQ.9.32. 1616–1662; AB 3:173–206. Biddle was an English Unitarian
who early on fell under the influence of continental Socinians, while still retaining some of his unique theological ideas. This title includes a total of fifteen tracts, including several by Biddle and Stephen Nye.

Notes

Newton also owned several antitrinitarian works by Samuel Clarke and William Whiston, including the first and second editions of Clarke’s *Scripture-doctrine of the Trinity* (1712; 1719) and Whiston’s *Sermons and essays* (1709), *Primitive Christianity reviv’d*, 4 vols (1711) and *Historical preface* (1712). Most or all of these works were likely given to Newton by their authors. This annotated list has been adapted, corrected and expanded from the relevant entries in John Harrison, *The library of Isaac Newton* (Cambridge 1978). Item numbers (in square brackets), abbreviations and shelf marks listed after each item are from Harrison, and are explained in Harrison, *Library of Newton*, pp. 79–81. Following this are the author’s dates, a reference to the relevant entry in Wallace, *Antitrinitarian biography*, 3 vols. (London, 1850) and, where the original title is in Latin, an English translation (often adapted from Wallace).
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