VIRTUE AND ETHICS IN THE TWELFTH CENTURY
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INTRODUCTION

István P. Bejczy

In the course of the twelfth century, Western moral thought underwent a profound transformation. Although it is possible to measure the change in terms of quantity—many more texts on themes relevant to moral theology and philosophy were written, either as separate works or as parts of other genres such as homiletics and biblical exegesis—the transformations in the contents of these works are much more fascinating. The study of these transformations supplied the reason for convening a conference on *Virtue and Ethics in the Twelfth Century* at Nijmegen, The Netherlands, on 5 and 6 September 2003. The present collection of articles is the result of this conference.

Three different but interrelated phenomena appear to mark the transformation of twelfth-century moral thought. The first is its increasing systematization. This phenomenon is certainly not particular to moral thought alone: logical reflection, the methodical confrontation of received opinions and the desire to compose tightly organized bodies of knowledge pervaded the entire domain of learning in this period and form an essential part of what is called the renaissance of the twelfth century. The phenomenon thoroughly affected the character of moral thought as well, and it seems no exaggeration to say that medieval ethics took shape in the process. Naturally, moral sayings, educational treatises, exhortative letters and sermons, exempla, saints’ lives, penitentials and works on virtues and vices had circulated from the Early Middle Ages onwards and continued to contribute to the moral and spiritual formation of believers in the twelfth century and beyond. But the early medieval period did not produce any work of systematic ethical reflection comparable to Peter Abelard’s *Ethica*, any treatise establishing a reasoned classification of the virtues and vices of the kind in Alan of Lille’s *De virtutibus et de vitiiis et de donis Spiritus sancti*, or any manual on the formation of the inner self as well-argued and detailed as the spiritual writings of the Victorines and Cistercians.

The second phenomenon characteristic of the twelfth-century transformation of moral thought is an increasing interest in the psychology
of the moral agent. Again, the difference with the Early Middle Ages is far from absolute. The opinion that early medieval morality focused exclusively on deeds while disregarding human psychology has long been abandoned, and contemporary work on writers such as Gregory the Great reveals how sensitive early medieval authors could be to psychological processes. But twelfth-century authors, whether active in the monasteries or in the schools, unmistakably put greater emphasis than their early medieval predecessors on the intentions underlying human acts and on the motives of apparently virtuous or vicious attitudes. Generally speaking, the twelfth century seems to have revived the moral psychology of Augustine. The emphasis on right intentions and motives springs directly from the Augustinian conception of the will as the seat of morality, and of the good will—that is, the will submitting itself to God out of charity—as the condition of all true virtue. Augustinian charity even came to replace Gregory the Great’s humility as the chief virtue in twelfth-century intellectual discourse, and achieved at least equal footing with humility in monastic literature. In addition, some specific Augustinian doctrines on virtue were reintroduced in the twelfth century. Thus, the distinction between the officium and the finis of virtue, reintroduced in twelfth-century theology but generally attributed to Boethius, stems in reality from Augustine. Other views of Augustine, such as the notion of true virtue as a gift of God and the idea that the cardinal virtues survive in heaven, were incorporated into Peter Lombard’s Sententiae and therefore exercised a lasting influence on late medieval theology.

The third phenomenon related to the twelfth-century renewal of moral thought, in particular connected to concepts of virtue, is the lively reception of classical moral philosophy, represented most notably by two Roman authors of different philosophical backgrounds: Cicero, a prime champion of Roman Stoicism, and Macrobius, who in his Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis transmitted the Neo-Platonic ethics of Plotinus to the Latin West. From the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries, Cicero’s De inventione and Macrobius’ Commentarii remained the most frequently quoted ancient sources for the definitions and classification of the cardinal virtues. Before the twelfth century, Cicero, Macrobius and other classical authors were known in the Latin West, but their works were generally ignored in moral thought, which was largely dominated by the authority of Gregory the Great and writers in the monastic tradition of John Cassian. Only the most famous
Carolingian authors quoted directly from Cicero. Most early medieval authors do not even seem to have realized that Christian moral thought had classical antecedents, and that the cardinal virtues in particular were of non-Christian origin. By contrast, twelfth-century authors were well aware of these facts and took up the challenge posed by the existence of non-Christian moral philosophy, either by entirely rejecting its claims or by trying to define a border between natural goodness as conceived and practised by the ancients and true, Christian virtue in the Augustinian sense.

Investigating the twelfth-century renewal of moral thought and its effects in the later medieval period were the main aims of the conference on *Virtue and Ethics* of September, 2003. The participants were asked to concentrate on topics related to virtue and moral goodness rather than vice, sin and guilt. This concentration fitted the parameters of the research programme *A Genealogy of Morals: The Cardinal Virtues in the Middle Ages*, directed by István Bejczy at the Radboud University Nijmegen, which hosted the conference. The aim of the research programme, which is co-sponsored by Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) and the Radboud University Nijmegen, is to enhance our understanding of Western moral consciousness through the study of the cardinal virtues in the normative discourse of medieval Christendom. The twelfth century is of special interest to this study, since in that period the widely diffused genre of treatises on the vices and virtues, which “had belonged essentially to the field of harmatiology . . . as a practically-minded examination of the aptitude for evil and the necessity to combat sin,” now came “to include analyses of virtue on a par with, or even overshadowing, those of the vices,” as Richard Newhauser has put it.1

All contributions in this volume but one discuss Latin texts from the twelfth century and examine their specific importance for the history of virtue and morality. The remaining contribution concentrates on a non-Latin author (Maimonides) but highlights his influence on Latin ethical thought. The contributions are spread among monastic writing, (proto-)scholastic discourse and works addressed to the laity, and evenly represent the beginning, the middle and the end of the century.

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The volume opens with six contributions on monastic moral and spiritual thought. In “Medieval Ethics and the Illusion of Interiority: Augustine, Anselm, Abelard,” Burcht Pranger discusses the notion of the inner self as developed in monastic tradition up to the twelfth century. According to Pranger, monastic literature displays a nearly obsessive interest in the inner self, but the notion of the inner self is expressed in images borrowed from the external world: first, the world of prescriptive behaviour and discipline characteristic of monasticism; second, the normative world of Scripture, which never lost all of its “external” flavour. Pranger traces the problem of interiority back to Augustine and then turns to Wittgenstein’s “deconstruction” of the notion of interiority, finding it in inchoate form in Augustine and the twelfth-century monastic tradition (represented by Anselm of Canterbury and Peter Abelard) which continued Augustine’s thought. Pranger’s readings shed light on the problematic reconciliation of the emphasis on virtue and accountability, on the one hand, and the notions of grace and its destructive potential regarding the sustainability of virtue, on the other.

Arjo Vanderjagt, “The Devil and Virtue: Anselm of Canterbury’s Universal Order,” contends that for Anselm of Canterbury the fall of Lucifer represented a descent from personal unity into moral “multiplicity.” This moral multiplicity was not only ubiquitous, but governed and determined all human endeavours (intellectual and ethical, personal and political) ever since the Fall. In Vanderjagt’s view, the virtues to which Anselm insistently held the brothers and sisters entrusted to his care were not in fact in themselves moral virtues, but rather instruments to attain a freedom of choice which led to complete unity with God’s universal order. Anselm’s underlying idea, argues Vanderjagt, is that the devil has no right to human souls and cannot even so much as begin to impinge on them once humans actually begin to use their freedom of choice.

Willemien Otten, “In Conscience’s Court: Abelard’s Ethics as a Science of the Self”, starts by comparing two different portraits of Peter Abelard in recent biographies. While Michael Clanchy presents Abelard as a medieval knight, agonistic and competitive, who transferred his search for victory from the battlefield to the arena of logic, John Marenbon stresses the implicit and intrinsic ethical character of Abelard’s thought. Without taking note of this ethical aspect, we may perhaps be able to understand the logical aspects of his
thought, but we cannot fully expect to do justice to them. Otten undertakes a further probing of the ethical nature of Abelard’s thought, showing how his self-perception as a moine manqué is a dominant trait of his thinking, underlying even his confidence as a formidable master of dialectic. Otten concentrates on Abelard’s Ethica, comparing and contrasting it with elements drawn from his correspondence, the Planctus and his Theologies.

Ineke van ’t Spijker, “Hugh of Saint Victor’s Virtue: Ambivalence and Gratuity,” notes that for Hugh, beatitude was contingent on acquiring virtue (of course, only possible through grace), while virtue was achieved by the disciplina virtutis; love of virtue in connection with knowledge of truth was necessary for the restoration of fallen humanity. Van ’t Spijker considers virtue, the love of virtue and the discipline of virtue as elements within Hugh’s comprehensive view of humanity’s predicament in the world. She argues that for Hugh virtue was not so much the subject of ethics as part of his exegetical project: tropology informed love of virtue in much the same way as allegory informed the knowledge of truth. Van ’t Spijker clarifies Hugh’s idea of virtue by taking into account his notion of the prelapsarian state of humanity and of “natural virtues;” in addition, she elucidates the relation of Hugh’s idea of virtue with his views of affect, will, the ambiguity of intention and the need for self-knowledge.

In “Bernard of Clairvaux’s De gradibus humilitatis et superbiae and the Postmodern Revisioning of Moral Philosophy,” John Kitchen engages Edith Wyschogrod’s challenge to the dominant trends in moral theorizing. By applying her insights, he finds in the De gradibus a “conceptual tension” arising out of the way Bernard’s understanding of humility relates to the construction of another’s identity. In particular, he argues that Bernard’s characterization of humility creates symmetry instead of maintaining “alterity” in moral relations. The analysis attempts to show how monasticism, in its encounter with the broader developments of twelfth-century religious movements, conditions Bernard’s conception of the one in need, “the Other,” as “a second self.” After considering the interconnectedness of humility, identity and ethics, Kitchen then focuses on Bernard’s Christology and incarnational theology. On key points—alterity, time, and the instability of knowledge—he finds Bernard’s understanding of the Incarnation’s moral implications converging with the attempt to revise ethics along postmodern lines. In situating Bernard’s depiction of
Christ’s salvific work within the context of Wyschogrod’s study, he suggests that the De gradibus offers a way of “theologically explicating” postmodern moral thought.

Jeroen Laemers, “Claustrum animae: The Community as Example for Interior Reform,” takes its point of departure from Boethius’ definition of virtue as habitus mentis bene constitutae and focuses on the meaning of the latter part of the definition. According to what principle should the mind be organised, and how? Some medieval thinkers construct an analogy between the mind and the human community, presenting the well-ordered community as an example of the well-ordered mind. De claustro animae by Hugh of Folieto (c. 1095–c. 1172) provides a notable case in point. Its third book proposes a tropological interpretation of the cloistral buildings as well as the monastic community. Laemers demonstrates how the organization of the monastic community, dominated by charity, serves as a model for ordering the individual mind. Hugh employed the cloister metaphor to reflect the idea that a well-ordered mind is ultimately acquired in a process of social interaction of the kind that can be found in well-ordered monasteries. Describing in detail the social practice by which humans acquire virtue, Hugh actually put greater stress on the anthropocentric aspects of virtue than happened in contemporary moral philosophy.

The second section of this volume consists of five contributions on (proto-)scholastic thought. István Bejczy, “The Problem of Natural Virtue,” documents and analyzes the novel attention of twelfth-century scholars for the possibility of attaining goodness and virtue by natural means, unaided by grace and revealed truth. Bejczy demonstrates that from the early twelfth century, the Christian conception of virtue was challenged to some extent in didactic literature but much more seriously in religious writings, including canonist treatises, Cistercian works of spirituality, and even the Glossa ordinaria on the Bible. In academic theology, Peter Lombard recognized the moral goodness of non-Christians, while notably Alan of Lille and other Porretans expressly acknowledged natural (“political”) virtue; moreover, the concept of “political” virtues played a remarkable role in the thought of the civil lawyer Martin Gosia. Theologically, however, the relation between natural virtue and salvific grace remained problematic. Stephen Langton and Praepositinus of Cremona proposed a solution to which most theologians by 1200 seem to have agreed. Their idea that grace was active even in natural virtue may
have appeased opposition to accepting natural virtue outside the academic world.

In “Rethinking Lying in the Twelfth Century,” Marcia L. Colish examines two conflicting views on the acceptance of lying among twelfth-century and later scholastic authors. While Augustine repeatedly and at length analyzed lying of all sorts and condemned it under any circumstances, a number of twelfth-century thinkers (canonists as well as theologians) softened this doctrine considerably, accepting the morality of some kinds of lies, drawing on an alternative ancient and patristic tradition summed up in Latin by Ambrose of Milan. Colish investigates their reasons and relates these to other themes in their ethical teachings. Moreover, she traces the scholastic development of the position of making some forms of lying ethically acceptable from the twelfth into the early fourteenth century.

Cary J. Nederman, “Beyond Soicism and Aristotelianism: John of Salisbury’s Skepticism and Twelfth-Century Moral Philosophy,” argues that John of Salisbury’s self-professed New Academic adherence to moderate skepticism represents a third strand of moral discourse, between “interiorization of the moral life” (derived from the New Testament and, especially, Stoicism) and the political and teleological ethic of Aristotelianism with which John is sometimes associated. According to Nederman, John’s skeptical position shares with Aristotelianism the emphasis on morality manifested through public action, but lacks its teleological dimensions. John did indeed integrate into his political and moral doctrine significant elements of both Aristotelian and Stoic thought. But in John’s view, the foundations of social and political order in language and speech, and hence the need for debate and eloquence, may be traced to his acceptance of moderate skepticism. Thus, human association is only weakly natural; it requires the refinement and exercise of rhetorical skills and philosophical debate to achieve its realization and maintenance. The dichotomous positioning of Aristotelianism versus Stoicism thus covers over the occasions on which additional rival versions of moral inquiry played a role on the twelfth-century stage.

Riccardo Quinto presents an analysis and editio princeps of “The Conflictus uittiorum et uirtutum Attributed to Stephen Langton.” Quinto first delineates a list of four different works attributed to Langton which sometimes bear the title De vitiiis et virtutibus. He distinguishes each of these texts and investigates their interrelations. Next, Quinto focuses on the Conflictus uittiorum et uirtutum found in MS Laon,
Bibliothèque municipale 133, fols. 109vb–117va. He discusses the transmission of this text (comparing it in particular to the *De septem uiciis principalibus* preserved in MS Oxford, Bodleian Library Laud. misc. 544, fols. 4va–8ra), its model and sources, its influence and finally its authorship and date, concluding that the *Conflictus* is probably a youthful work by Langton, composed c. 1180. Finally, Quinto presents a critical edition of the text, following the Laon MS collated against the Oxford MS; a chapter from the Oxford MS which is lost in the Laon MS is separately edited in an appendix.

George R. Wilkes, “The Virtues of Rabbi Moses,” first examines some of the factors influencing the choice and application of terminology relating to virtue and the virtuous life in Maimonides’ ethical works, focusing on character traits and appetites, on the social dimension of moral virtues, and on the positive uses of extreme behaviour. Next, Wilkes investigates the wider reception of the discussion of the subject in the *Guide for the Perplexed*. Maimonides’ approach to virtue and the virtuous life had a relatively modest impact on Jewish ethical writing, but the translation of his thought on the subject in the Latin version of the *Guide* makes an interesting study in itself and leads into a wider discussion of the subsequent appropriation of Maimonides’ teaching by Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas and other scholastic ethicists. That a Jewish source might be treated as authoritative, or even relevant, goes to the heart of scholastic understandings of the universal character of ethical philosophy and natural law. Giving particular attention to ideas on the relationship between a virtuous public and private life and on the ethical force of revealed legislation bearing on contemporary Jewish-Christian(-Muslim) relations, Wilkes examines the extent to which the alleged ethical differences between faith communities were seen not only as consequences of the lack of virtue outside the community, but also as products of differing approaches to virtue itself within each community.

The third and last section of this volume comprises three contributions focusing on virtue and ethics in a wider social context. Richard G. Newhauser, “Justice and Liberality: Opposition to Avarice in the Twelfth Century,” examines the particularly close connection between two virtues that were seen to oppose avarice in this period, in mythic, legal, and social terms, and the continuing emphasis on avarice by moral thinkers as the key element that could account for the social and economic changes that accompanied the growth of a
money economy. Among all the other renaissances that scholarship has identified as having occurred in the twelfth century, one should surely count this period as part of a renaissance of attention to greed, as well. As Newhauser demonstrates, the reactions to new fiscal needs seen in the conception of avarice at this point in its history were twofold, and both testify to the influence of mercantile behaviour on moral perceptions. First, the poverty movements of the High Middle Ages drew attention to the need to address the social injustice of indigence that accompanied the commercial revolution, and second, the potential largesse of merchants was put forth as a key factor that would ultimately lead to a moral justification of commerce itself.

Björn Weiler, “Virtue and Politics in English Historical Writing,” explores the ethical norms by which William of Malmesbury in his Historia novella and Walter Map in De nugis curialium sought to define the virtuous exercise of political (predominantly royal) power. Both authors presented a mixture of historical narrative, exposition of basic moral norms, and ideas on the political structure of the realm. Weiler gives particular emphasis to the relationship between outward virtuous behaviour and the inner disposition of the rulers in question. Focussing on justice, Weiler argues that Malmesbury and Map defined justice on the basis of patristic, classical and biblical principles, but nonetheless valued its actual exercise in relation to very different norms and expectations: while Malmesbury wrote as an intellectual with strong moral concerns, Map’s aristocratic and courtly background is predominant, which made him identify virtue with nobility and doubt the moral quality of persons of low rank. This throws new light on the political culture of post-Conquest England and indicates that even a genre such as historiography reflects the variety of opinion on the nature of virtue in the twelfth century.

In “Charlemagne and the Young Prince: A Didactic Poem on the Cardinal Virtues by Giles of Paris (c. 1200),” Céline Billot-Vilandrau examines the Karolinus, a Latin poem of five books written between 1196 and 1200 by a canon named Giles of Paris for prince Louis, son of Philip Augustus. This work was intended to offer a model of good government and therefore can be considered a speculum principis. The text looks like a biography of Charlemagne but centres around the cardinal virtues. Billot-Vilandrau argues that Giles’ presentation of the virtues is far from commonplace and must be understood in relation to its historical context: beyond the description of Charlemagne’s actions, Giles intended to criticize Philip Augustus’ government
and the evolution of kingship in the French realm. Moreover, Billot-Vilandrau points to a particular ambiguity in Giles’ conception of the nature of the virtues. On the one hand, he seems to have thought that Charlemagne’s descendants owed the virtues to their Carolingian blood (compare Walter Map’s attitude analyzed in the previous contribution to this volume), in accordance with the growing importance attached at this time to the *reditus ad stirpem Karoli*, realized in the person of Louis because of his maternal ancestry. On the other hand, Giles insisted on the princely obligation to study and further develop the virtues lest he should turn into a tyrant, much in line with the moral thought of his age.

Thanks are due to the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), the Royal Dutch Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW) and the Radboud University Nijmegen for their generous subventions which laid the material basis for the conference on *Virtue and Ethics*, and thus for this book.
MONASTIC THOUGHT
There is nothing new in stating that the concept of Christian inwardness is intrinsically problematic. Nor does it come as a surprise that the Christian-Augustinian turn to a more drastic version of inwardness than the rather simple, Platonic division between soul and body, between “inner” intellectual and “outer,” sensible knowledge, has contributed to an even higher degree of confusion with regard to the clarity of the latter distinction. As for the Augustinian turn, Philip Cary has recently shown that its innovative characteristic is to be found in the creation of an inner space inside the human mind which opens up the possibility of the mind being able to harbour the divine without being absorbed by it, thus acknowledging the intertwined presence of both affinity and distance.\(^1\) The fact that this Augustinian invention of the inner self has subsequently, up to the heyday of Romanticism, developed into the specifically western notions of the self, privacy and inwardness, is common knowledge and so is, at least by now, the criticism of that development as philosophically and ethically flawed. In the tradition of British empiricism, inwardness, while having been hailed by generations of continental philosophers, artists and authors alike, has always been looked at with great suspicion. The latter did indeed turn into the utter rejection of any split between inner and outer in twentieth-century positivism and behavioural philosophy. Thus Gilbert Ryle’s famous “ghost in the machine”\(^2\) argument in his *The Concept of Mind* aimed at refuting Cartesian dualism while J.L. Austin’s linguistic exercises in *How To Do Things with Words* targeted the ethical implications of an appeal to inwardness as “an escape into excusability.”

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But we are apt to have a feeling that their [i.e., words spoken by way of promise] being serious consists in their being uttered as (merely) the outward and visible sign, for convenience or other record or for information, of an inward and spiritual act; from which it is but a short step to go on to believe or to assume without realizing that for many purposes the outward utterance is a description, true or false, of the occurrence of the inward performance. The classic expression of this idea is to be found in the *Hippolytus* (l. 612), where Hippolytus says...“My tongue swore to, but my heart [or mind or other backstage artist—Austin’s addition] did not.”

So much for intentionality in ethics, Aberlardian or otherwise. As in epistemology, so in ethics it is verifiability or, at least, the possibility of falsification that counts. Now the question I want to raise in this article is not primarily whether the “modern” version of inwardness, from Descartes onwards, is to be seen as either a continuation or a distortion of an older, specifically Christian, tradition. A huge literature exists about the development of the western self, the most prominent book being Charles Taylor’s *Sources of the Self.* Yet, although I do not intend to discuss this issue here and now, I would like to stress its importance, not only from a philosophical but also from a religious point of view, and, to an even greater extent, integrally as a philosophico-religious problem. Thus, it does makes sense to inquire into the possibly Augustinian antecedents—even if only as a matter of logic rather than of history pure and simple—of the increasingly “subjective” nature of the self on the one hand and the mechanisation of the world on the other. Similarly, with regard to the religious implications of the problem, it can and should be asked to what degree pietistic devotion, both Catholic and Protestant, up to and including Schleiermacher’s religion of emotion (*Gefühl*), despite its appeal to the language of tradition, is rather to be considered alien to the medieval, and patristic, mind set. So much is clear: Taylor skips the problem altogether, jumping as he does from Augustine to Descartes, and thence to Romanticism, leaving the medieval and early-modern period unaccounted for.

The question I want to raise, then, with regard to interiority in medieval (including Augustinian) texts in a sense precedes the problems

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of continuation or distortion in that it focuses on the basically illusory nature of the distinction between inner and outer. On the face of it, this stance seems first and foremost to be based on insights from modern philosophy such as the Wittgensteinian denial of any split between inner and outer, his main and quite irrefutable argument being the lack of any criterion that would enable one to distinguish between the one and the other. And, admittedly, in my view much is to be learned from this admirer of Augustine, in particular with regard to a more accurate assessment of pre-modern religious texts. What should be kept in mind is the fact that, although moving in different directions, Augustine and many medieval, religious writers, by applying the distinction between inner and outer, were as much bent on bringing out the intensity and clarity of speech as Wittgenstein was by denying that split. Thus, in Augustine, and, supposedly in quite a number of medieval, Augustinian texts as well, interiority functions in such a way that somehow a razor seems at work that scrapes away the distinction as much as it keeps drawing one. It is this simultaneous act of the mind turning inward just to be driven outward in an almost violent manner that, in my view, sets early and high medieval devotion apart from the later Middle Ages and all that has followed since. It goes without saying that this rather elusive state of a concept that was to become so dominant in the history of western culture asks for a subtle historiographical treatment. In this article I want to trace the Augustinian origins of the “illusion of interiority” by trying to assess its impact on human action. It will be crystal clear that we are not dealing here with ethics proper. But neither are the ethical dimensions absent in the texts of Augustine, Anselm and Abelard which I am proposing to discuss. If Abelard’s notion of intentional ethics seems to represent a moving away from the rather closed circuit of Augustinian and monastic decision-making, the point I want to make in this article is, first, that hitherto insufficient attention has been paid to the nature, ethical or otherwise, of the Augustinian-monastic literary body and, second, that the novelty of

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Abelard’s ethics has to be reassessed against the backdrop of its genesis. In this respect I follow the method practised by Ineke van ’t Spijker who, in a recent book, has discussed “the inner life” of an author such as Hugh of Saint Victor in the light of his essentially monastic context, even though it was his historic destiny to become popular with more scholastic-orientated minds.6

As such the paradoxes of Christian, and more in particular, Augustinian, inwardness have not gone unnoticed. Philip Cary and many others have pointed to the pre-eminence of the concepts of creation and incarnation, the resurrection of the body, the “material” authority of the church, all of which would seem, in one way or another, to block any (Gnostic) attempt to sever links between inner and outer, body and soul, sense experience and the intellect. In trying to account for the problematic nature of this split, most energy has been spent on the epistemological and anthropological aspects involved. Less attention has been paid to the semiotic intricacies of the problem, although Cary, for one, when concluding his book on Augustine’s invention of the inner self, lists this specific topic as one of the surprising consequences of the Augustinian “story of inwardness” that qualify as “themes for further work,” all of which “stem from Augustine’s consistent, resourceful, and increasingly subtle attempts to maintain the priority of inner to outer, precisely as the external things of the faith come to occupy center stage in his thought:”

The first surprise is about the concept of signs. This concept is central to Augustine’s account of the value of external things. Augustine originates medieval and modern semiotics by classifying both words and sacraments as a species of signs. His is the first expressionist semiotics, in which signs are understood as outward expression of what lies within. It is also Platonist semiotics, in that the most important use of signs is to signify intelligible things. Of course, being by definition sensible and therefore external, signs cannot adequately represent the inner truth; for no Platonist would say that a sensible thing can make intelligible things intelligible. Hence the surprise: for Augustine we do not learn things from signs, but the other way around—we come to understand the significance of a sign only after we know the thing it signifies. Thus for example the proper interpreter of Scripture is one who already knows the spiritual things it signifies and therefore is not captive to a literal reading of its signs.

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The crucial theological implication of this surprise is that no sign—neither word nor sacrament—can be an efficacious means of grace. For no external thing can convey to us an inward gift. The now standard Roman Catholic view that the sacraments not only signify but confer grace is a departure from Augustine, rooted in twelfth-century developments. This medieval view of the sacraments, rather than Augustine’s view, was in turn the ground for Luther’s doctrine of the Gospel as an external word that bestows on us the righteousness it signifies. Thus in regard to the crucial question of whether external signs can have salvific power, the crucial divide is not between Catholic and Protestant but between the medievals and Luther on the one side and Augustine and Calvin on the other. Calvin speaks for Augustine as well as for many Protestants when he warns us not to “cling too tightly to the outward sign.” But Luther speaks for many Roman Catholics when he insists that we can never cling too tightly to external means of grace as the sacraments and the Gospel of Christ.7

If one ignores the questionable status of Cary’s rapprochement between Calvin and Augustine, this passage aptly illustrates the complexities of the medieval use of “inner” and “outer,” raising the question whether the major distortion in that use has occurred in the Middle Ages themselves rather than in the wilder yet more distinguishable provinces of intellect and emotion in the (early) modern era. Roughly—and, without any doubt, inaccurately—speaking, much of the devotional and doctrinal developments in the Middle Ages can be qualified as a _Verdinglichung_ of Augustinian notions, to such a degree even and so successfully that those very developments could effortlessly be read back into Augustine himself. Thus, the famous two cities, whose “spiritual” and “internal” status (rooted in love and hatred, respectively) was central to Augustine’s concept of history, were externalised into the material appearance of church and state. More importantly, the controversies over the Eucharist (Paschasius Radbertus and Ratramnus, Berengar and Lanfranc) resulted in the _Verdinglichung_ of the sacraments which, as Cary points out, became vehicles of grace rather than signifiers depriving the Augustinian _signum_ of its operational, semiotic potential. Things become even more complicated if one realises that Berengar’s emphasis on the referentiality of the sacrament (working _intellectualiter_ and not _sensualiter_), however Augustinian in tone, did not tell the full Augustinian story. Nor did Lanfranc’s view on this matter, in spite of its Augustinian emphasis on the closeness—just falling short of identity—between the sacrament and the _res sacramenti._

7 Cary, _Augustine’s Invention_, 143.
As Peter Cramer has pointed out, both men somehow dealt with “the loss of body” and “the oxymoron of the corpus fractum/corpus integrum,” that is, with a corpus that was hovering between fragmentation and wholeness. But what is primarily at stake here is not so much the thing of the Eucharist, as, rather, the relation between sign and res, that is, the paradox of the “realistic” effect of referentiality.

Now, one of the conclusions that can be drawn from Cary’s remarks is the thesis that the “sacramental” drive toward exteriorisation is to be qualified as a decline from grace. And indeed, as far as I am concerned, strong arguments can be marshalled in favour of this view. Even though such a claim has to be further refined in order to be wholly convincing, it can, for the time being, be used for the sake of convenience, if only to articulate the contrast between the Augustinian and medieval tensions between “interior” and “exterior” on the one hand and the early modern ones on the other. For so much is clear, it is one thing to have to account for internalisation, mystic or otherwise, based on a Thomistic theory of knowledge acknowledging the priority of the senses, and another one to move within the confines of a Augustinian-Platonic framework in which, as Cary rightly points out, we learn, in Augustine’s rephrasing of the Platonic model at least, signs from things rather than the other way around. Of course, the argument would be much simpler if those “things,” that is, the Augustinian res, were there for the taking to the same degree in which sense knowledge can be seen as the hardware from which spiritual software is to be derived (“abstracted”), or, the other way around, if the distinction between sense and intellectual knowledge would have remained as unproblematically clear cut as the Platonic view of the matter, untainted by the “material” claims of Christianity. However, both in Augustine and the majority of his medieval followers, the problem lies precisely in the fact that the res that, spiritually understood, lends meaning to signs, is an elusive one, which, furthermore, can only be given as a gift of grace while at the same time, quite un-Platonically, taking on the aspect of visibility, certainty, confidence and authority. And it is in this context of spiritual outspokenness that the extremely strong, Augustinian language of exteriority (the authority of the church and Scripture) should be assessed.

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Now, if we agree that medieval interiority and exteriority should not be interpreted in terms of later developments, we face the problem as to how to go about the matter without such anachronistic support. There is no easy way out of this question, since pre-modern interiority, for one, is no less exterior-bound than later models were to be, even though the latter may seem to be easier to handle in view of the dualistic remoteness from their counterparts (the ghost in the machine, mystic and pietistic devotion versus the outside world, Romantic imagination, etc.). Regardless of the outcome of our search, so much can be said in advance. The intertwining of interiority and exteriority, rather than their dualistic opposition, lends the final outcome of their embrace, that is, its performative appearance in reading and meditation, a touch of violent intensity that was to be lacking in later configurations.

One of the most exterior aspects of meditative and exegetical literature is its being instrumental in terms of exercise, related, in monastic terms, to the equally “external” issue of discipline. Nothing new here, as Pierre Hadot has demonstrated by bringing to the fore the notion of spiritual exercise as one of the characteristics of Greek philosophy tout court, large portions of which went into the making of Christian literature. Further, it could be argued that spiritual exercise operates as the interiorisation par excellence since it affects the mind inwardly through external means.\textsuperscript{9} It does not make much difference whether the exercise takes place in the shape of a philosophical debate or by listening to a sermon and meditating on a text. In either case the mind is being stirred and driven inward, the executive action itself meanwhile remaining spectacularly outward. Yet in my view an important corollary should be made to this argument. Unlike the average Hadot-like, Greek exercise and, it should be added, unlike much of the late-medieval and Baroque specimens of devotional exercise, the Augustinian and early-medieval way of turning inward, if executed rightly, is bound to return to the surface level—the senses, that is, the external world in the widest sense of the word, whether visual images or the sound of voice and the materiality of writing—from which it has departed. “Return, return,

O Shulamite, return, return, that we may look upon thee” (Cant. 6:13). In other words, the interior space created by Augustine in order to lodge the human and the divine, is not, as later developments would have it, to be used as a private room for inner experience providing the mind with a place to stay. It rather is a springboard enabling the mind to return to the world of sense experience and speech just to realise, like the (later) Benedictine monk stuck to his stabilitas loci, that it has never left it.

In order fully to grasp the meaning of these Augustinian and medieval dynamics we should ponder the implications of Cary’s argument that for Augustine we do not learn things from signs but signs from things and that, consequently, knowledge of spiritual things precedes the literal reading of signs. Philosophically speaking, this stance would seem to produce an aporia that cannot be properly resolved qua philosophy. For from a Platonic point of view, signs, “being by definition sensible,” can never lead to full intellectual knowledge, to the truth, that is. Now, the problem for Augustine is neither the unbridgeable gap between the sensible and the intellectual as such nor their enigmatic intertwining that manifests itself ethically, as, for instance, in the Confessiones, as a lack of self-restraint, but, rather, the fact that the interior man who is being taught—illuminated—by the interior master, Christ, occupies a “spiritual” position beyond the intellect and the senses (without the latter being altogether absent for one moment). Yet that superior position is far from being static. The “spiritual” truth being prior to anything else reverses, so to speak, the order of things. Right in the middle of the world of signs which are supposed to bring us back to the res, the latter—disguised as the interior master, Christ—reigns supreme. Due to its “spiritual” priority, this res is always one step ahead of the mind in search of knowledge and is never for the taking. Far from being divested of voice, language and visibility, this interior master—the very condition of truth—speaks loud and clear, dinglich, so to speak. Doing so, this inner speech makes a move that seems to go against the grain of the natural order of things, and in particular of language. Like God residing in the innermost part of the mind (interior intimo meo)\(^\text{10}\) it pushes the interior treasure (of memory) to the surface, thus intensifying the outward nature of man’s (linguistic) existence. The fact,

\(^{10}\) Augustine, Confessiones 3.6.11, ed. Lucas Verheijen, CCSL 27:33.
then, that even Augustine and his followers can in a sense be called Wittgensteinian (to the degree, that is, to which their interiority eliminates itself in the process, and doing so, proves that the tertium, the dividing line between inner and outer, was illusory all along) has an extraordinarily violent effect. It produces the authoritative voice of the tollē lege and the iūbe quod vis, or, as in the case of the most Augustinian of early medieval thinkers, Anselm of Canterbury, the discovery by way of an ineluctable, almost violent, dream vision of the unum argumentum, the proof that the spiritual truth, however elusive, is and always has been the prime mover of the language of thought. Finally, it accounts for the typically Augustinian restlessness, since the spiritual truth displays its superiority in an uninterrupted process of coming and going, in its capacity of being the verbum that conditions all other words, always both offering and demanding to be spoken while at the same time withdrawing in a way that is reminiscent of the frenzy of love.

If my characterisation of the relationship between exteriority and interiority in Augustine is correct, its effect on the status of virtues as indeed on the status of life, whether private or political, is bound to be considerable. It is not so much the fact that any discussion of secular, philosophical virtue within the realm of human behaviour—a rare phenomenon anyhow up to the twelfth century—is to be subsumed under the more powerful language of religious love. That is certainly the case, as we can see in De civitate Dei where the glory of the Romans including their pursuit of virtue is given its due on the one hand while ruthlessly being stripped of its claim of finality in time and space on the other. More importantly, the overwhelming


12 See Hugh of Saint Victor, De arrha animae, in L’Oeuvre de Hugues de Saint-Victor, vol. 1: De institutione novitiorum, De virtute orandi, De laude caritatis, De arrha animae, ed. H.B. Feiss and Patrice Sicard, transl. Dominique Poirel, Henri M. Rochais and Patrice Sicard (Turnhout, 1997), 282 (PL 176:970B–D) on the visit of the beloved who comes “invisibly, secretly, and incomprehensible...to be touched, not to be seen.” By “frenzy” I mean at once the passion, as described by Hugh, aroused by love and the frustration about the inability to achieve full satisfaction, which, in turn, intensifies the desire for more.

power of divine grace would seem to wipe out altogether any sus-
tainability of virtue or, for that matter, any sustained human behav-
ior in general. The fact, however, that such utter elimination does
not really take place is not due to any reserve or discretion on the
part of grace and its concomitant features in the later Augustine of
predestination and the gift of perseverance. It rather is the way grace
operates, punctuating the realm of the *condicio humana*, or, to put it
in term of *De civitate Dei*, the realm of the *saeculum* as the *commixtio*
of the two cities, rather than imposing its presence by means of an
all out attack on the human mind. Unfortunately, later, scholastic
discussions have obscured the subtleties of this Augustinian approach,
moulding them into the more one-dimensional framework of scholas-
ticism bent on dealing with distinct issues rather than with semantic
complexes. Thus, the problem of grace and perseverance was dis-
cussed in analogy to the problem of habit and virtue, at times merg-
ing in the process (as in habitual grace) highlighting the proliferation
of moments as of *potentia* and *actus* instead of emphasising the integrity
of grace. And it was the integrity whose violent and unliveable intru-
sion was exiled from the safer, less “existential” exercises of school
theology. There, even the gift of perseverance lost its all-pervasive
presence and was chopped up instead, and limited to an active and
a passive part culminating in the “final perseverance” at the moment
of death. Inevitably, “extreme” Augustinianism became associated
with fatalism, from Gottschalk onward to the extreme positions in
the seventeenth-century controversy between Jansenius and his fol-
lowers and the Jesuits. But what went unnoticed in those later devel-
opments was the fact that the presence of Augustinian grace and
perseverance hinged on their being delivered wrapped in time as a
gift to hold on to the moment of self-restraint presented at the
moment of conversion. For Augustine the sheer inability of the human
will to do just that and the subsequent call on the human will to
come forward and respond, vocally, to the divine vocation coincides
with the moment of the mind’s turn inward being reversed into a
pull outward, either move losing its distinctness in the process. That
is how a decision is made, how virtue is materialised, how, from the
vast fields of memory a word or an image is produced that justifies
Augustine’s claim that the depths of the human mind are fathom-

14 For a subtle discussion of this problem see Robert A. Markus, *Saeculum: History
less and reach out and back into the divine. Any other option would somehow and at some stage be Pelagian and diminish that depth by turning inwardness into the realm of deliberation and, by implication, of excusability.

In conclusion, it can be said that for Augustine the practising of virtues, as indeed more generally the making of decisions as to which way to move in life, is a matter of time and timing. At precisely the moment at which the move inward does not get lost in the intricacies of excusability and the move outward is purged of any entanglement in the realm of the senses, a praesens praesentis is established that not only enables the receiver to accept the gift of grace but also lures him into not delaying that acceptance any longer.

Now, as far as predestination and the gift of perseverance are concerned, the history of Augustinianism can be seen as a decline from grace. And indeed, if one takes Augustinianism in that narrow sense, it is undeniable that, from the Council of Orange onward, a model has been in place that somehow toned down the extreme aspects of Augustine’s thought in favour of a more moderate view according to which the infusion of grace did not exclude human co-operation altogether. However, this view owes more to the skeleton-like outlook of history produced by later theologians preoccupied with doctrinal issues of free will and grace than to the complexities of history proper. If, on the other hand, one takes the Augustinian legacy in a more subtle sense as a complex of memorial and temporal signs, then a different picture emerges which to a large extent accounts for its popularity and survival in the monastic culture dominating the scene up to the rise of scholasticism. For all the differences between Augustine and monasticism with regard to Pelagianism—but then, exactly what was Pelagianism but a controversy that got out of hand in the heat of an increasingly polemical debate?—, there is more common ground between the monastic type of “anthropology” and Augustine than official, doctrinal history has allowed for. Thus both Cassian’s and Benedict’s charters of the monastic life were rooted in memoria as the gate to heaven from which the vicissitudes of life and the threat of disintegration could be governed and kept at bay.\footnote{Cf. John Cassian, De habitu monachorum 5.10, ed. Jean-Claude Guy (Paris, 1965), 204.} And although it is undeniable that these founders of
western monasticism had quite a different view from Augustine’s concerning the *initia gratiae* and the nature of the divine gift, all of them agreed as to the memorial nature of a life whose Augustinian intensity was further enhanced by the closed circuit of the monastic existence. As a result, the quintessentially Augustinian restlessness mentioned above, rather than being assessed in merely existential terms as representing life in the *regio dissimilitudinis*, was only further intensified in the ritualised context of monastic memory.

To illustrate this point it would be tempting to turn to Hugh of Saint Victor, the *alter Augustinus par excellence*, and his fellow Victorine brother Richard. One of the challenges we would meet doing so would be to square the view of life as a gift of grace with the extraordinary, almost violent nature of monastic training and exercise, precisely at the crossing point where the mind, on turning inward, is catapulted outward into the building and reshaping of the “inner” self. However, underlying this complex of “contrary things” is a concept of time excoriating any moment of hesitation, of gaps and delays in the execution of the monastic will, in “doing the right thing,” which was analysed in a more refined fashion by Anselm of Canterbury.

As for Augustine, so for the monastic thinkers the point of departure for any reflection is spatial, made up of the inner recesses of the soul. Whilst Peter Damian sings the praise of his hermitage, both inner and outer, Anselm and Hugh mark the beginning of their spiritual journey by turning to the *secretum animae*, the private room of the soul. “Let me talk to the secrecy of my soul, and let me ask from her, in a friendly conversation, what I desire to know. No one else should be admitted, but we [the soul and the self] should exchange words in private (*soli*) with an open mind.”16 Hugh’s opening of his *Soliloquium de arrha animae* is permeated with the same Augustinian intimacy as Anselm’s *Proslogion*: “Come now, little man, flee a bit your busy life, take a bit of distance from the turmoil of your busy mind . . . enter into the inner room of your mind and set aside everything besides God or that which may help you to look for Him. And, when you have closed the door, search Him . . .”17 Yet we have to be more precise. The point of departure is not only spatial; it is also temporal. In short, it is a chronotope comprising both time and

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16 Hugh of Saint Victor, *De arrha animae*, p. 228 (PL 176:951C).
space. Leaving this blend of space and time unaccounted for would result into a distorted view of monastic decision making. From a merely spatial point of view, the soul’s turn inward would merely serve the purpose of transcending the universe with its seducing beauty into the transcendence of eternal space (thus reducing eternity to space). Conversely, from a merely temporal point of view, time would be unqualified as a here and now, then and there, leaving too much room for restlessness to live a life of its own (thus reducing eternity to a sublimated version of time). A chronotope, on the other hand, takes care of the intertwined occurrence of time and eternity, and of the inner and outer spaces of the soul, producing the room for decisions to be made as they ought to be made.

In his three treatises, advertised as a *studium sacrae scripturae*, De veritate, De libertate arbitrii and De casus diaboli, Anselm draws the conclusion from the monasticised appearance of time and space which prove to affect the feasibility or non-feasibility of virtue and vice. As for Augustine, his universe of signs may still suggest a considerable freedom of movement provided by the “neutral” moment the two cities, or, for that matter, the two movements of the mind inward and outward, meet; and indeed, as we have seen, there is room for “virtue,” pagan or otherwise as within sacred history. Anselm, for one, is thoroughly Augustinian, so thoroughly indeed that, acting upon the premises of monasticism, he condenses the spaciousness of Augustine’s universe by single-mindedly heeding the bond between *signum* and *res*. That this is nothing but a logical step becomes clear if we remember Cary’s warning that signs in themselves cannot convey grace; in other words, the Augustinian universe of signs hinges on the one and only *res*, God, the Trinity, which is fathomless and incomprehensible in itself. It is this very incomprehensibility, and it alone, that triggers the Augustinian unrest as indeed the restlessness of his followers, inviting the mind to turn inward, not into the reassuring space of interiority but into the vast fields of memory.

Nothing spectacular so far, and Anselm would have been but a faithful follower of Augustine if he had left things to that. As

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18 “Chronotope” is a concept coined by Bakhtin to express the coalescence in literary turns and tropes of space and time. See Mikhail M. Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*, transl. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, 2nd ed. (Austin, 1990), 84–258.

things are, however, Anselm, in his three treatises, has tightened the Augustinian chronotope even further by bringing in the res, so to speak, into the heart of the signs themselves. Thus, his definition of truth, of veritas sola mente perceptibilis, proves that, unlike our usus loquendi which talks of truth of this and that, “this and that,” that is, the senses, the will and the intellect, have to be assessed inside truth itself.\textsuperscript{20} This primacy of truth can be illustrated with the example of time. We usually talk about things having time, whereas, strictly speaking, things are in time and not the other way around. With regard to the freedom of will the majestic opening statement of De libertate arbitrii states that, appearances notwithstanding, the power to sin is not related to free will, but, rather, as the treatise makes clear, that free will is “the power to keep the rectitude of will for the sake of that rectitude itself.”\textsuperscript{21} The screws are tightened even further in De casu diaboli when the devil is proven to have wanted nothing when he refused the gift of perseverance before it had been given.\textsuperscript{22}

Now, although this reversal of everyday speech into the primacy and solidity of truth may lend sustainability to the workings of the human will, the price to be paid for this stability would seem a lack of theatricality since the deliberations of the human mind, the waver ing between different options, is excluded from the game. However, nothing is further from the truth. In a sense Anselm can be said to be the most Austin-like medieval thinker to the same extent to which he can be said to be the most Augustinian thinker. Excusability having been eliminated, there is no backstage actor whispering “My tongue swore to, but my heart did not.” Every decision made is made, as in the theatre, on the spot, on stage, that is, and on the spur of the moment. That is where the monastic chronotope comes in. Despite the appearance of immovability, there is a distinct ring of urgency about Anselm’s view of the process of decision making. And moving within a narrow space, there certainly is a drama of temporality going on. Unlike the pursuit of virtue or vice based on a moment of indifference, here there is just no medium between the intention to make a right or a wrong decision and the execution of that decision itself. In fact, there is no room for intention at all. To

\textsuperscript{20} Id., De veritate 13, ibid. 1:196–99.
\textsuperscript{21} Id., De libertate arbitrii 13, ibid. 1:225–26.
\textsuperscript{22} Id., De casu diaboli 3, ibid. 1:236–40.
will freely, to do the truth, means to do the right thing here and now, this moment and the next. A corollary of this stance would be that it is not even an option to do the wrong thing. Just as Bernard’s description of the ladder of monastic vice in the guise of *superbia* is bound to be a caricature of virtue and humility, so for Anselm to pursue injustice means to pursue nothing at all.\(^{23}\)

Now, one might wonder how, if at all, this solidity of decision making is related to the move inward as described by Augustine, Anselm and Hugh, to the withdrawal into the inner room of the soul as indeed to the accompanying features of unrest and a general feeling of falling short. As far as Anselm is concerned, the turn inward into the *cubiculum mentis* is not directed at providing the mind with more breathing space, more “conscience,” in order to ponder various alternatives. It rather establishes a link with the objects of will, intellect and meditation as ever so many intrinsic parts of the mind’s memorial activities. That is why an object can never be neutral, never a *Ding an sich*, although, in the last resort, it is as out of reach as the Kantian “thing.” But it is a Kantian thing (*Ding*) in the reverse. Rather than being intended by the human mind, its memorial status causes it to be on a par with the searching, remembering mind which is at the same time living in exile, far removed from its goal. That is what the Augustinian *caritas* is about. Being the virtue *par excellence*, in fact the one and only, it operates not only as a drive forward or inward, but it also brings the elusive “object” out and back, so to speak, by appealing to its memorial status. Accordingly, to do the right thing means to re-establish the proper link with the willing mind and the willed object, to restore the reciprocity of truth (reversing the truth of “this and that” into “this and that” inhabitting truth). That is the moment at which interiority has run its course and manifests itself in the willed and cherished object disguised as *rectitudo* having “come out” into the open, being willed freely, *propter ipsam rectitudinem*. A moment indeed. “To hold on to that moment is a privilege of the elect, angels and men. To hold on *inseparabiliter* is a gift to be bestowed to the angels after the ruin of their reprobate colleagues, and to man after death.”\(^{24}\) In the meantime, all the


\(^{24}\) Anselm of Canterbury, *De libertate arbitrii* 14, in *Sancti Anselmi opera* 1:226.
latter can do is turn inward in order to bring out the moment of truth, to prolong his freedom of will and keep the threat of disintegration at bay.

If Anselm does indeed radicalise Augustine’s view on freedom, free will and intentionality, it becomes clear that this moral density in which the intention of the act from within was identical with its outward execution was not destined to survive. For, outside the monastic “textual community,” it appeared impossible to speak of an object, not only as an intended object but also as a memorial one, as part of a performative process of willing, that is.

In conclusion I want to discuss briefly Abelard’s notion of intentionality which seems to do away with the entire Augustinian, and certainly with the Anselmian, setting.

On the face of it there is not so much cause for worry since Abelard follows a long, patristic tradition which links sustained acting (perseverantia) to willing: non incoepisse sed perfecisse virtutis est. For Abelard, too, endorsing Hugh of Saint Victor, action was part and parcel of a good will: perficere dominus est bonae voluntatis factum adiungere, paraphrased by David Luscombe as: “when the opportunity to act is present, there can be no meritorious will which does not proceed to act.”25 There is one big stumbling block, however, and that is the notion of intention as neutralising the objective good- or badness of an act and making it dependent on a particular point of view. Recently István Bejczy has pointed out the inconsistencies in Abelard’s use of intention, in particular the amorality of acts resulting from it on the one hand, and the bad or good nature of acts on the other, thus making the morality of the agent’s intention “depend on the morality of his act rather than the reverse.”26 This is a contradiction in terms that, as Bejczy demonstrates with relentless logic, has been insufficiently noticed, or smoothed over by many a respectable scholar. As far as intentionality is concerned, one cannot have one’s cake and eat it too. Thus, it would seem inconsistent to maintain that sin is a consent to evil without “presupposing a notion of evil which is independent from consent itself and hence from human intentions.”27 “Deeds cannot,” as some interpreters of Abelard have it, “be objec-

27 Ibid., 13.
tively right or wrong but virtuous or sinful on account of the agent’s intention since Abelard made no such distinction.”

What is at stake here is not only the degree of inwardness represented by consent and intention and, more generally, the “rise of individuality” as a turn inward and a shunning away from simplistic objectivity, but also the status of the intended objects in their relation to the intending mind. The combination of those two aspects reintroduces an even more fundamental problem inherent to in- and exteriority, and that is the issue of excusability. Now, I do not want to deny for one moment that Abelard, in his *Ethica*, is moving away from the old monastico-Augustinian complex as outlined above. On the other hand, it would be somehow anachronistic to judge him exclusively from the more businesslike, “scholastic” point of view which he has helped to bring into existence. For all the brilliance and sharpness of Abelard’s logical exercises, we know that quite a number of his *sic et nons* are not as clear cut as they appear to be, in particular when mixed with “theological” issues. This does not mean that I think Bejczy is wrong in bringing out the inconsistencies which are undoubtedly there. All I want to say is that it might be rewarding to have a look at the semantic frame, at the semantic goings-on inside the complex of argumentation, however inconsistent, not in order to smooth over any gaps and holes, but to bring to light the web within which intention and actions are (still), to a greater or lesser extent, interwoven.

Admittedly, the wording of Abelard’s intention is quite strong: “Works in fact, which as we have previously said are common to the damned and the elect alike, are all indifferent in themselves and should be called good or bad only on account of the intention of the agent, not, that is, because it is good or bad for them to be done but because they are done well or badly, that is, by that intention by which it is or is not fitting that they should be done.” What Abelard really describes is the process of making and executing a decision, distinguishing between “the consent of the mind by which we sin” and “the performance of the action when we fulfil in a deed what we have previously consented to.” Inside this process of decision

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28 Ibid., 17.
making the (potential) deed changes colours, so to speak, without, for that matter, turning neutral altogether (nor, it should be added, being good or bad in an unambiguous way). Rather than calling the moments of indecision underlying this process “amoral,” I think we should stick to Abelard’s own terminology of “indifferent” as indicating different processes of decision making. Now, the “scholastic” aspect of Abelard’s approach could be called the differentiation he injects into this process of decision making resulting in a moment of indifference, whereas in the Augustinian-Anselmian view there could be no such delay, just as there could be no degrees of sinfulness, since even the most minute sin was seen as a maximum offence against God.\(^\text{31}\) As we have seen, to will properly was to do the right thing here and now. Yet I wonder whether Abelard’s view on intention, however radical and new, could not at the same time sustain a reading going a bit against the grain of sheer amorality, a reading, that is, in which some connotation of the older, monastic semantics can still be heard? Take the following passage:

Tell me, I ask you, if Christ ordained what should not have been ordained or if they [sc. the disciples] repudiated what should have been kept? What was good to be commanded was not good to be done. You at any rate will reproach the Lord in the case of Abraham, whom at first he commanded to sacrifice his son and later checked from doing so. Surely God did not command well a deed which it was not good to do? For if it was both good to be commanded and good to be prohibited—for God allows nothing to be done without reasonable cause nor yet consents to do it—you see that the intention of the command alone, not the execution of the deed, excuses God, since he did well to command what is not a good thing to be done. For God did not urge or command this to be done in order that Abraham should sacrifice his son but in order that out of this his obedience and the constancy of his faith or love for him should be very greatly tested and remain to us as an example . . . This intention of God was right in an act which was not right, and similarly, in the things we mentioned, his prohibition [that is, Christ’s prohibition to his disciples to reveal his miracles] was right which prohibited for this reason, not so that the prohibition should be upheld but so that examples might be given to us weaklings of avoiding vainglory.\(^\text{32}\)

\(^{31}\) This runs counter to the Stoic view, as David E. Luscombe notes in Peter Abelard’s Ethics (Oxford, 1971), 74 n. 1: “The Stoics taught that there are no degrees of virtues and that an intention or an action must be either good or bad.”

\(^{32}\) Peter Abelard, Ethica 1.18.5–19.5, pp. 19–20 (translation: Peter Abelard’s Ethics, p. 31).
Granted that this passage aims primarily at defending the flexibility inherent in the Abelardian notion of intention, other more ancient voices sound through. What comes to the fore here is not the amoral-ity or neutrality of action or a deed, but, rather, its being subsumed under a process of mutual intentionality of faith, trust and love which somehow reminds us of the primacy of Augustinian charity. There even is a playfulness in this passage which is reminiscent of the way Abelard’s greatest critic, Bernard of Clairvaux, has handled such issues. Using the figure of pia simulatio, God acted as if he demanded from Abraham the execution of his command whereas in fact what He was up to was to test his faith.33 Similarly Bernard, amongst others, has pointed out how Christ was acting as if he wanted to leave the men of Emmaus just to elicit from them the request not to leave them “since evening will fall.”34 The fact that Abelard implies that God’s acting would have been wrong if it had been not been “saved” by his intention is telling enough in this respect. As things are, actions are part of a process, a game even, and have to be assessed accordingly. Inside that process both an act and an intention can be called right or wrong. Whether this is intrinsically consistent or not depends on the view one takes on the degree to which acts and intentions are clear-cut entities. I would agree with Bejczy that things look a bit muddled here. But, for all the possible rights and wrongs of Abelard, his view of consent and intention, although perhaps heralding a new era of interiority and, even, subjectivity from a retrospective point of view, is not the stuff of excusability—appearances notwithstanding, it should be added. For if anyone would seem to fit in with Austin’s picture of the backstage actor and his Hippolytus whose “tongue swore to, but whose heart did not,” it is the God ordering Abraham to sacrifice his son thus driving a wedge between his command and his—silent—intention. The delay between command and execution governed by intention which Abelard grants his God seems to open up the possibility of unqualified interiority and of duplicity. This would be true, indeed, if decision making were to be taken out of the performative context of the Augustinian-monastic


tradition, thus changing the status of both action and intention. As for Augustine and Anselm, despite all circumlocutions, action and intention are always—“always” marking the intricate working backward and forward of temporality—bound to converge. To what degree Abelard succeeded in moving out of this closed circuit of decision making is open to debate. So much is clear, however, that, for all his driving forward, echoes can still be heard of inwardness and outwardness meeting each other in a split and qualified moment of “indifference” comprising intention, consent and action.
THE DEVIL AND VIRTUE:
ANSELM OF CANTERBURY’S UNIVERSAL ORDER

Arjo Vanderjagt

In an important recent article, István Bejczy writes that “[d]uring the first decades of the twelfth century, Western moral thought underwent a profound transformation. One of the most important elements of change was a renewed emphasis on the intentions underlying human acts. The moral value of human behaviour was believed to reside in the inner motives of the agent rather than in the outer aspects of his deeds.”¹ After positing the genesis of this view in the school of Laon, Bejczy astutely explores and criticises the well-known theory of intention developed by Peter Abelard (1079–1142). He does this in close connection with early twelfth-century notions of intention, will and charity, upon which he does not further elaborate. This present contribution offers some considerations on these points with regard to the monastic practice and thought of the great late eleventh- and early twelfth-century monk, spiritual father, thinker and ecclesiastical politician Anselm of Canturbury (1033–1109).²

Anselm’s ethical and moral theory is usually elaborated—often highly theoretically—through an analysis of his so-called Tres tractatus, three dialogues in which a Master and his Student discuss truth, freedom of choice and the fall of the devil, and the attendant, defining notions of rectitudo (rectitude, rightness, correctness) and iustitia (justice, good order, even balance).³ My approach to Anselm’s idea of virtue

³ The modern edition of Anselm’s works is Sancti Anselmi Cantuariensis archiepiscopi
here will be from a different vantage point, namely from his collection of letters in particular, which have not often been used in discussions of his thought. These letters were not written to convey any kind of abstracted, systematic philosophy, theology or ethics. Given his political importance as the abbot of the large monastery Le Bec in Normandy and later as the primate of England, Anselm must have written many letters for reasons of ecclesiastical and political administration, but he himself collected for posterity only his letters on spiritual matters and those devoted to reforming the Church politically. The former were written with a pedagogical intent for the spiritual edification and especially for the comfort of Anselm’s correspondents, often monks and nuns but also family members and those with political authority both ecclesiastical and secular. They are written in a personable narrative, often in a colorful, direct and exhortative style far removed from the theoretical, highly grammatical, definitional and logical analyses of thinkers such as the scholastic Abelard or even of Anselm in his guise as a young teacher of the trivium. Personal as these letter are, they were early on diligently collected, in the first instance by Anselm himself, and they were widely dispersed during the Middle Ages and became a kind of staple of monastic literature. Although they are primarily of an exhortative and admonitory nature, Anselm in them on occasion also tries out ideas that he analyses rather more theoretically in his more formally-


\[ ^4 \text{ The critical edition of Anselm’s letters is in } \textit{Sancti Anselmi opera} 3–5. For an English version: } \textit{The Letters of Saint Anselm of Canterbury}, \text{transl. Walter Fröhlich, } 3 \text{ vols. (Kalamazoo, 1990–94).} \]

\[ ^5 \text{ Anselm’s letters and his prayers and meditations appear to have been more appreciated, especially in monastic communities and sometimes at secular courts, than his philosophical treatises. On the letters, see Fröhlich’s introduction to Anselm, } \textit{The Letters} 1:26ff., \text{and Southern, } \textit{Saint Anselm: A Portrait}, 458–81 (“Appendix: Towards a History of Anselm’s Letters”); the latter has a full critical discussion of the views of Fröhlich and Vaughn. On the dissemination of Anselm’s prayers and meditations, see Jean-François Cottier, } \textit{Anima mea: Prières privées et textes de dévotion du moyen âge latin: Autour des “Prières ou méditations” attribuées a saint Anselme de Cantorbéry (XIe–XIIe siècle)} \text{(Turnhout, 2001).} \]
oriented treatises. An instance of this procedure is his letter to the monk Maurice, written c. 1083, which discusses the definition and meaning of evil. In four or five pages Anselm here summarises what he has written on evil and about the will of the devil to do evil in *De casu diaboli*, the treatise which he had only recently completed and which he attaches to his letter at Maurice’s request. It appears that this theme had been a subject of their earlier correspondence as well. Anselm connects his discussion directly to pastoral advice in dealing with one brother Theduinus, “who, following the fancy of his own will, neglects the cloistral life and lingers at the king’s court.” Theduinus stands in danger of falling prey to sin and evil if he does not correct himself. Anselm is willing to tolerate his presumption with regard to his monastic vows a little longer, preferring that he correct himself on his own initiative. But as his abbot he will if necessary bring the full severity of the monastic rule to bear on Theduinus in order to force him to obedience for his own good, for the good life is built upon obedience. “Obedience alone could have kept man in paradise from where he was expelled through disobedience, and nobody will reach the heavenly kingdom except through obedience.”

These writings by Anselm can be studied for our purposes much in the way in which Martha Nussbaum in *Love’s Knowledge* claims “that certain—especially moral—truths about human life can only be fittingly and accurately stated in the language and forms characteristic of the narrative artist...A view of life is told. The telling itself—the selection of genre, formal structures, sentences, vocabulary, of the whole manner of addressing the reader’s sense of life—all of this expresses a sense of life and of value, a sense of what matters and what does not, of what learning and communicating are, of life’s relations and connections.” Following this line of analysis, we might say that in Anselm’s case his view of life is strongly recommended personally in a way quite different from an objective exposition or the proffering of a general moralistic guideline. Similarly, Anthony Cunningham in his recent *The Heart of What Matters*, writes—in my view convincingly—that “the errors of ethical theory—such as Kant’s

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categorical imperative—can best be corrected by a moral philosophy that pays attention to particular people leading particular lives, complete with rich emotional attachments that are prey and sometimes prone to conflict." This article deals with Anselm’s letters in this fashion.

Before commenting on his more general ideas about morality and aesthetics, our modus operandi, then, will first allow us to examine three central motifs of Anselm’s own monastic experience and that of his friends, and of the practice which he advocates: namely, 1) the experience of the devil’s onslaught on the body and soul of monastic brothers and sisters, 2) the virtue of the monastic rule in combating the temptations of the devil, and 3), what might be called “the comfort of intention,” that Anselm offers to upright monastics whenever they are unsure about the practical results of their acts. The second part of this paper connects this individual and personal experience and practice to Anselm’s logic—if you will: rhetoric—of freedom of choice, will and the aesthetics of the universal order.

Experience and practice

The onslaught of the devil

Perhaps a good way to describe the moral tribulations of medieval monastics is by employing the concept of moral multiplicity, elaborated by John Rist in his Real Ethics: Rethinking the Foundations of Morality. He points out that it has been a perennial, persistent theme in moral philosophy and philosophical anthropology “that insofar as a human agent becomes wicked he or she becomes ‘multiple,’ and that insofar as he or she becomes good he becomes single, ‘simple’ and unified (which does not mean that to be wicked is simply to be a complex, or that to be good is to be a self-sufficient, personality).” To be sure, “multiplicity” is a different thing than “complexity,” because a complex person can function intentionally by keeping an eye on a single goal which is not doubted. On the other hand a multiple personality

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would be torn apart by his or her differing intentions precisely because there are, in this case, sets of opposing goals. This “multiplicity” in the sense of being torn apart by mental doubts as well as by corporeal sensations, with no feeling for and a total doubt of direction and unity or goal, is a dramatic experience of many medieval monastics.

Such a one is Otloh of Sankt Emmeram (c. 1010–c. 1070) who in these terms in his Liber de temptatione cuiusdam monachi writes about the attack the devil made on his body and soul a year or so before Anselm was born. Even before Otloh begins to describe the terrible temptations of the devil, his little autobiography at its very beginning already shows evidence of “multiplicity,” of a dual personality or even a “double life.” He relates that as a sinful youth he had heeded God’s admonition to better his ways and decided to become a monk, adding, however, that he did so nullis suorum amicorum scientibus (unknown to his friends). So here is Otloh the youth and the fellow of his friends on the one hand, and on the other Otloh the secret, the secretive monk. The reader is further told how he, the young monk, was torn between reading pagan authors and reading the Bible, and then Otloh proceeds to relate his encounter with the devil, or at least with the way the devil violently makes use of the monastic’s own delusions to undermine his faith. These delusions are described in terms of the aspects of a “multiple” personality, a person in more than one mind, someone who convincingly says or believes one thing and then just as firmly does the other. The devil sees no problem in this and seeks to persuade Otloh that these things are all a matter of hermeneutics:

Surely you can see daily that such is indeed the case! From this it becomes clear that even the authors of the ancient scriptures, who put down pious and virtuous guidelines, did not live according to the precepts of these same guidelines. Understand then that all the books of divine law were written in this same way: that is to say, externally they have a kind of face-value piety and virtue but internally they

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require another interpretation and insight. For example, most books and especially the divine ones can easily be seen to have differing meanings literally and in their insightful interpretation.\textsuperscript{12}

According to Otloh’s autobiography, the first “fraud” or delusion which the devil deploys to undermine his faith is directly related to the fact that Otloh had decided in secret duplicitously to become a monk and that he had done so without proper consultations with others and, even more importantly perhaps, without an inner examination of his own motives. He has not been upright and forthcoming; he thus proves to be another person than he really is. It is this “fraud” with which he is immediately confronted. Otloh follows this up with a description of a series of delusions and deceptions which culminate in his total doubt of the existence of God and in his thinking that the Bible contains no real truth at all and that it has no use. In this process of his soul’s destruction, he also loses the function of his intellectual powers and even the capacity of his corporeal senses. In a last dramatic attempt to sustain himself as his own person \textit{et vires animi colligens / emisi talem labiis et pectore vocem}, he exclaims: “If you are the Omnipotent, and if you are everywhere present, as I have read often in many books, then I ask of you now: show me who you are, and also what you are able to do by ripping me as it were from the jaws of this imminent peril. For I can no longer bear to suffer such crises.”\textsuperscript{13}

The inexorable nature of a narrative of this kind leaves no other solution than an immediate answer from God who in one fell swoop—\textit{nulla dehinc mora}—destroys all of Otloh’s doubt and gives him such an inextinguishable light in his heart that he never again suffers from these delusions and “frauds.” More important for my purpose here than this autobiographical certainty is that after this recounting of

\textsuperscript{12} Otloh of Sankt Emmeram, \textit{Liber de temptatione}, p. 258: “Nonne ergo hæc ita esse cotidie potes probare. Unde patet et auctores scripturarum antiquarum religiosa quidem honestaque dicta composuisset, sed non secundum corundem dicti- num qualitatem vivisse/. Igitur secundum talem modum omnes legis divina libros intellege conscriptos, ut videlicet religiositatis et virtutis superficiem quandam exterius habeat/, interius vero rationem aliam et intellectum exquirant/, sicut in plurimus maximeque in divinis codicibus facile reperiantur sententiae, aliam in litera, aliam in intellegentia rationem retinentes.”

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., p. 260: “O si quis es omnipotens/, et si sis undique preasens/, sicut et in libris legi sepissime multis/, iam precor, ostende, quis sis/, et quid quoque possis/, eripiens citius me a periculis imminentiis. Nam suffere magis nequeo discrimina tanta.”
the devil’s attacks on his insight or intelligence and his moral rectitude and the way in which these attacks were definitively turned away from him by the Omnipotent, Otloh in his account returns immediately to the duplicity with which he had decided to become a monk. He now tells his reader that he is unable to hide the salvific experience which has dispelled the devilish delusions to which his body and spirit were prey, and that he cannot but write them down in his “Once-there-was-a-monk” book. Through its writing he becomes one, is healed from multiplicity, is unified. He has thus overcome his own earlier duplicitous multiplicity. He has found a unity which is perhaps less riveting than Augustine’s multi-faceted personality in the *Confessions*14—with which Otloh’s booklet has often been superficially compared—but this unity does deliver him from the terrible *confusio* to which he had been a prey, described in another of his works, the *Liber visionum*.15

This sense of multiplicity and *confusio*—with their near synonym “tumult”—is a staple of monastic literature down through the ages. “Tumult” is associated with the distractions of city life, even (following Os. 10:14–15) with the destruction of cities, and by Anselm with the confusion of worldly affairs outside the monastery and in an extended meaning with the very deprivation of true life in “the land of darkness and the shadows of death.”16 It is also found in Anselm’s strongly personal, even autobiographical, and famous *Proslogion*—a meditation, it must be remembered, not a scholarly treatise—in which he offers an argument for the true existence of God on the basis of an analysis of the definition of the word “God.” Anselm enjoins his thinking soul to leave behind the “tumult” of his thoughts and to enter into its own inner chamber and there to seek God with the instruments provided for that exercise. As we know if

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16 In *Ep.* 165 to William who succeeded Anselm as abbot of Bec, in *Sancti Anselmi opera* 4:38; *The Letters* 2:57, Anselm bemoans being entangled in a greater “tumult” (the technical term translated as “turmoil” by Fröhlich) of affairs now that he has become the archbishop of Canterbury. In his second meditation (on the loss of his virginity), Anselm describes Hell in the terms used in Job 10:21–22 as a place of darkness and death in which there exists a “tumult” without order, in eternal horror. See *Sancti Anselmi opera* 3:3–91; *The Prayers and Meditations of Saint Anselm*, transl. Benedicta Ward (Harmondsworth, 1973).
we follow his reasoning beyond chapters 2 and 3, the result of this expedition is that he learns that God is one and not divided (ch. 18), and that ultimately all believers will have one, single will, namely the will of God; they shall be entirely unified (ch. 25). Quoting Rom. 12:16, he extends this idea of a single will of the faithful with God to the relationship of the faithful with each other. It is this latter relationship to which Anselm calls his monks. In a long letter written c. 1086 to Hugh “the hermit of Caen,” Anselm deftly connects this unity of will to the love of God and the mutual charity of those who love Him. He insists time and again that this singular love yields up a single will: “Just as opposites cannot exist together at the same time, therefore, so this love cannot reside within a single heart along with any other love. So it is that those who fill their hearts with love of God and their neighbor will nothing but what God wills or another person wills—as long as this is not contrary to God.” This will is the will or intention to do the good which is required by God.

In his pastoral letters Anselm tirelessly points out how important it is for the monks and nuns with whom he corresponds to remain steadfast against the temptations of the devil exactly because that trickster cunningly strives to undermine the single-mindedness of a will inclined to the Good. The devil is malicious and menacing enough when he tries openly to “annihilate Christ’s new recruit by inflicting a wound of ill will.” But he becomes far more evil and outright dangerous when he tries slyly to deflect a monk—in this case, for example, the novice Lanzo to whom a personal letter of c. 1072 is addressed—from his true goal by creating in him a kind of double conscience. The devil seems to permit him to hold on to his monastic vow, yet he never lets up on his attempts to convince him by various kinds of cunning arguments that he was exceedingly foolish and imprudent to have taken it on under such superiors, among such companions, or in such a place, so that all the time he is persuading him to be ungrateful for the goodness begun by God... Certainly, as long as this monk is forever dreaming up elaborate plans to move, or, if he is unable to move,
at least dwelling on the bad start he made, he never attempts to strive
for the goal of perfection. For since the foundation which he laid
displeases him he will never wish to build the frame of a good life
upon it.\textsuperscript{21}

In many other letters, Anselm time and again writes about the wily
and cunning technique of the devil in creating in the monk or nun
a multiplicity of desires and a variety of possible lives, which detracts
them from the true will that leads to the single life of uprightness
and unity of purpose necessary for attaining to God.

\textit{The virtue of the monastic rule}

It is the virtue of the monastic rule which helps the committed monk
or nun who enters the cloister to regain humankind’s unity of purpose
directed to communion with God. Anselm nowhere discusses either
the theological or the so-called cardinal virtues theoretically in rela-
tion to each other. Of course, he does mention many of them, but
always in practical connection to the maintenance of or the falling
away from the virtuous life of rational creatures, angels and human
beings alike. This obviously is true for his letters to monks and nuns
and others, but it also holds for the \textit{Tres tractatus}, in which he is try-
ing to get to the bottom of the reason for the fall of the angel Lucifer
into sin—after all, that angel was and even after his fall continues
to be an individual, rational creature, and he is not a theoretical
construction of modern intellectual and sometimes even religious
life.\textsuperscript{22} The precepts of monastic rule and the individual virtues are
for Anselm not “goods” in themselves, and they are not to be sought
after on their own behalf. There is here no Kantian categorical
imperative but almost a kind of Hobbesian instrumentalism: the
virtues are instruments that serve to keep multiplicity at bay and to
help the insight and practice of monastics to focus single-mindedly
on the ultimate goal. The main term, rule or ‘virtue’ which Anselm
uses in this context is \textit{stabilitas loci}, that is to say, the injunction that
a monk or nun bind themselves physically to a given monastery.
Obedience, charity and poverty are the instruments of virtue that

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{22} For a short account of this construction of the devil, see Ernest Gellner, “The
Devil in Modern Philosophy” (first published in 1958), in id., \textit{The Devil in Modern
serve this norm of *stabilitas loci* as it is derived from the monastic rule. From Eadmer’s biography of Anselm and from his own letters we know how much Anselm himself agonised about asking permission from his spiritual brothers to be relieved from the oath binding him to the locality of the monastery at Le Bec,²³ a release made necessary by his call to the see of Canterbury as primate of England. Indeed, before this call, he had even resisted his election to be prior and abbot of Le Bec on the grounds that these functions would divide his attention between too many worldly activities, forcing him on inspection tours of the monastery’s many out-lying properties. Only when he is at length convinced that it is for the good of the Christian community and when his charity in taking up these duties is appealed to, does he—even then still with tears—agree to commit his energies to them. For Anselm the *stabilitas loci* serves the true stability of the believer, which will in the end bring him unity and peace of mind. It is with great personal cost and danger that this rule of monastic life is given up, as he himself daily seems to have experienced; hence, his strict words about the monk Theduinus mentioned earlier.

Anselm’s clearest and longest statement on the monastic life is found in the letter to Lanzo. Almost to the exclusion of the other regulations of the Rule of Saint Benedict, the main theme of it is this *stabilitas loci*. Even if the monk is not happy with the monastery he has chosen for his profession, he should not dwell on this bad start or insist on moving—“unless it is so bad that he is forced to do evil against his will . . . Just as any young tree, if frequently transplanted or often disturbed by being torn up after having been recently planted in a particular place, will never be able to take root, [and] will rapidly wither and bring no fruit to perfection, similarly an unhappy monk, if he moves from place to place at his own whim . . . never achieves stability with roots of love, grows weary in the face of every useful exercise and does not grow rich in the fruitfulness of good works . . . Wherefore it behooves anyone taking on the vow of monastic life to strive with total application of his mind to set down roots of love in whatever monastery he made his profession.”²⁴ Thus,

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the main theme here is that of the *stabilitas loci* and the virtues of constancy (*constantia*), meekness (*mansuetudo*) and patience (*patientia*), which lead to and help the monk achieve inner stability and a single-minded grip on the holy life founded upon charity.

*The comfort of intention*

Anselm’s letters show an overriding concern with the problems of volition in this monastic vocation. He realises full well that the will for a stable and holy life may be thwarted not only by inner, personal weaknesses but also by circumstances over which the monk or nun has no influence or control. It has been pointed out by Hiroko Yamazaki that Anselm makes a clear distinction between evil and sin.25 There is, obviously, such a thing as an ontological evil caused by the fall of the devil to which anyone may be subject; “natural” blindness, for example, is such a thing. No one in the present is at fault for that—whatever its ontological genesis might be—though it is an evil and may induce to sin. Here it must be pointed out that in this line of thought, Christ’s death and resurrection not only saves the individual sinner morally, but also does away with cosmic evil ontologically. For Anselm, however, the distinction between evil and sin lies in the personal volition or intention of the acts of individual rational beings, not in some sort of general ontology or metaphysics.

In the Autumn of 1106, Anselm wrote a pastoral letter to one Robert, the nuns Seit, Edit, Thydit, Lwerun, Dirgit and Godit, who were entrusted to his care, and their chaplain William.26 Apparently they were worried about “unbecoming emotion[s] of the body or the soul, such as the *sting in the flesh* of anger or envy or vainglory.”27 Anselm is sure that they should not fear that such emotions or thoughts will be imputed to them as vices and sins “as long as your intention [*voluntas* is the term Anselm actually uses] does not associate itself with them on any account,”28 that is, as long as they do not

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27 Ibid. 361; *The Letters* 3:186.

28 Ibid.
give in to the desires of the flesh. Their will for the good can never be taken away from the faithful against their own will, for this will is the very heart of their “rationality.” The following long quote from the earlier part of his letter underpins this conclusion; it is interesting for what it says and does not say, and it is for this reason given here in extenso:

My dearest daughters, every action, whether praiseworthy or blameworthy, earns praise and blame according to the intention behind it. For the root and principle of all actions that are in our own power lie in the will, and even if we cannot do what we wish, yet each of us is judged before God according to his will. Do not therefore consider only what you do but what you intend to do; not so much what your deeds may be but what your intention is. For every action which is done rightly, that is to say with a just intention, is right, and whatever is done without a right intention is not right. The man with a just intention is called just, one with an unjust intention is called unjust. Therefore, if you wish to live a good life, continually keep watch over your will in both great and small things, in those things subject to your power and in those over which you have no control, so that your will may not deviate from righteousness in any way.

If you wish to know whether your intention is right: what is subject to the will of God is certainly right. Whenever you plan or think of doing anything great or small, speak thus in your hearts: “Does God want me to want this or not?” If your conscience answers: “Yes, God does want me to want this and such an intention pleases him,” then whether you are able to do what you want or not, cherish that intention. If, however, your conscience tells you that God does not want you to have that intention, then turn your heart away from it with all your might. If you want to drive it completely away from you, exclude the memory and thought of it from your heart as far as you can.29

In other words: Anselm’s brothers and sisters do not need to worry about any volition, plans or even acts that are incomplete or that in some other way are impeded as long as their will and intention is right and just. If his readers “persevere in this holy and pious intention, you may be certain that a great reward from God awaits you for this holy zeal.” It must be noted that Anselm does not write here about acts that have no moral dimension; neither does he call moral acts indifferent. He is concerned with ethically praiseworthy or blameworthy actions that are defined as such by the intention or

29 Ibid. 360; The Letters 3:184–85.
more precisely by “the will” with which they are performed. He further limits these actions to those “that are in our power;” we may not be able to do what we wish, perhaps through external circumstances, but we are judged by God according to our “real” wish or will (de propria voluntate). Of primary consideration for his correspondents if they want to live a morally good life (bene vivere) is the question whether in all relevant actions their will is just and right (iuste, recte).

Theory

Central to an understanding of Anselm’s theory of virtue is his concept of evil, which he derives from an example given by Augustine in his De natura boni.30 We call cancer an evil. Cancer exists in a living body and is determined to destroy it. As cancer increases, thus, too, the life of the body diminishes. But when cancer has completely destroyed the body it is itself also totally destroyed. Without the living body, cancer cannot exist. The application to evil is evident: evil is the absence, the privatio of life and goodness. When goodness is destroyed by evil in the way a living body is destroyed by cancer, it becomes clear that evil is, in the final analysis, nothing, and that it is able to subsist only because of any goodness which still remains. Anselm’s definition in De conceptu virginali is short: “evil is nothing other than the absence of a good that should, that ought to exist” (malum non est aliquid quam absentia debiti boni).31 This definition by Anselm at first sight would appear to be a kind of paraphrase of Plato’s and Augustine’s ontologies of evil.

It has, however, been pointed out by Christian Schäfer that by employing this formula, Anselm gives Platonic ontology a distinctly ethical flavor all his own.32 By using the term bonum debitum he is in fact translating ontology into deontology or ethics. Evil for him is not merely a negation of a good or the good, but the absence of a good that should or ought to exist, that ought to exist as a part of the

31 De conceptu virgini 5, in Sancti Anselmi opera 2:146–47.
order of creation. The function of volitions and intentions is to move rational beings forward to the good. By introducing this *debitum*, Anselm is proposing a norm or a normative connection to the ontological order of the good without, however, reducing personal acts to stages of an ontology of necessary determination. The will for him is always a personal choice albeit necessarily only for the good. In a manner of speaking he is moving from the descriptive and theoretical mode to a prescriptive and—from the perspective of the injunction of obedience and *stabilitas loci*—even a performative one. Moreover, by distinguishing sharply between evil as a matter of general ontology and sin as a matter of the volition or intention of specific rational beings, such as angels and the individual people entrusted to his care, Anselm is able to sound a certain note of optimism with regard to the human condition. The condition of rational beings—angels and human alike—does not in and of itself necessarily decline to nothingness or evil. I will come back to this in a moment.

In a more theoretical mood than in the above-mentioned letter, Anselm expands on his idea of intentional or conscious sinning in his treatise on the incarnation of God, *Cur deus homo*. Boso, the student, puts to Anselm, his instructor, the question how Christ can “blot out the sins of those who have put Him to death.” Addressing a passage from the New Testament (1 Cor. 2:8) that Abelard will later use, Anselm succinctly states his idea of intention. “Saint Paul writes about the people who crucified the Lord as follows: ‘None of the rulers of this world knew this wisdom. If they had known it, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory.’” Anselm then explains this text as follows in *Cur deus homo*: “For a sin knowingly committed and one done through ignorance differ so greatly that an evil which they never could have done if they had recognized its enormity is venial, because it was done in ignorance.”33 Anselm here seems to accept, indeed explain, the difference between committing a sin knowingly and willingly, on the one hand, and doing or falling into evil through ignorance, on the other. Though at first reading Anselm might be thought to anticipate Abelard, closer scrutiny defies

this interpretation. Anselm does not approach this problem, if indeed to his mind it is one, from the angle of a general classification of acts as sinful or not. His focus, rather than on the theoretical consideration of the moral status of the act of crucifying Christ—which is without doubt evil—, is on the possibility of forgiveness for the perpetrators. What evil acts can be forgiven? What sin is venial? Anselm is clear: falling into evil through ignorance is sinful but can be forgiven because in ignorance there is no intention to sin. Ignorance, after all, is the absence of knowledge and ontologically speaking it can have no intention. Grave though it is, non-intentional sin in which the will is as it were paralysed by lack of knowledge is forgivable; but it does remain sinful.

There is here another further important deviation from the Platonic-Augustinian line. Anselm is clear that the only innate “possibility” of all things created is for them to incline to non-existence. It is only God who upholds them as true beings if they continually strive towards him. Still, Anselm does not discuss this non-existence of created, rational beings in the terms of death or corruption in the way of Plato or Augustine. Strictly speaking, death and corruption are the result of the wrongly and incorrectly inclined will of rational creatures—first and foremost that of the fallen angel, then Adam and Eve and by extension the entire human race; and they are not to be found as sin though indeed as evil caused by sin in the creation as such which God continually upholds and causes to exist. Thus, Anselm’s *Tres tractatus* are not an exercise in the study of ontological “incompleteness” but rather an analysis of ethical evil in the terms of a wrongly inclined will beginning with that initiated by that fallen angel, the devil.

What then did the angel do that merits his fall into evil? To be brief: he sinned; his volition was not in accord with God’s created order; he was disobedient. The long answer is for Anselm and his

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34 For Anselm, obedience is always tied tightly to justice. Justice and rectitude display the order of things as God has ordained and created them. Obedience means adhering to this order not for any reward but voluntarily, *ex corde and ex amore*, not by necessity but freely (*sponte*); it then becomes the prime virtue. Cf. Anselm, *Car deus homo* 1.10, *Sancti Anselmi opera* 3:64–67; Hopkins and Richardson, *Anselm of Canterbury* 3:64–67. For a report of Anselm’s view on obedience, see Alexander of Canterbury, *Liber ex dictis beati Anselmi* 14, in *Memorials of Saint Anselm*, ed. Richard W. Southern and Francis S. Schmitt (Oxford, 1969), 161–63. It is against this theoretical background that Anselm’s exhortations to his monastic correspondents to be obedient to their priors and abbots must be understood. Through
Student to address the question why this volition was not in accor-
dance with the order of creation, and how this can be, seeing that
God, who is good, is the Creator of all things and also of all voli-
tions and intentions. How then can these be sinful? It would carry
us too far now to try to explain Anselm’s solution to this last prob-
lem. Suffice it to say that he casts his answer in an intricate game
of speaking *propri* and *impropri* in conjunction with an analysis of
the negation—what it means to use the words *non* and *nihil*. As for
“why” the devil’s volition was a sin, it can be concisely said that his
act of will was *inordinata*; in other words: his transgression was not
in the fact that he did not will something he was supposed or even
allowed to will, but he willed *it circumventing the order in or to which God
created everything*. In *De casu diaboli*, in the middle of chapter 4, Anselm
is very clear in a single sentence what the angel did that merited
his fall: “He sinned by willing something beneficial which he did not
possess and was not supposed to will at that time *(quod nec habebat nec
tunc velle debuit)*, even though it was able to (at some time) increase
his happiness.” And after a short discussion Anselm again summarises:
“The Devil both freely (*sponte*) departed from willing what he was
supposed to will and justly lost what he had because he freely and
unjustly willed what he did not possess and was not supposed to
will.”35 We might paraphrase Anselm’s idea of the fall of the angel
by saying that he sought the goal of existence too much rather than
too little, so much so that he jumped the gun, so to speak; he willed
before he was allowed to will what was good for him. It must be
pointed out that it is not only the single-mindedness toward the good
and the putting aside of multiplicity which inform the ethical, vir-
tuous person, but also a reckoning with the ordered flight of time’s
arrow.

It is in this order of reality, of the creation, that beauty lies for
Anselm. Thus, this creational order is aesthetically the most beautiful
there is. In fact, Anselm several times uses the word *pulchritudo* to
describe it, and also metaphors of color. Again, it is here that Anselm

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35 *De casu diaboli* 4, in *Sancti Anselmi opera* 1:241–42; Hopkins and Richardson,
*Anselm of Canterbury* 2:140.
parts company with Plato.\textsuperscript{36} For in Plato, beauty is seen as an aesthetic quality or property that is intrinsic to some objects or that may be said of things. Anselm, however, emphasises that beauty and utility are not as much properties as they are aesthetic values. These values are respects in which things can be good, important, or desirable. If beauty is only a property of objects, such as in the theories of Plato and Aristotle, the statement that a given object is beautiful would be a merely descriptive report, on a par, say, with a statement that a given object is round.\textsuperscript{37} If beauty, however, is a value or a virtue, the statement that a given object is beautiful has an evaluative component, even perhaps a moral or an ethic. That is to say: a personal judgment is given about that object’s goodness, importance, desirability. And, of course, it is on the basis of such a judgment that one is taken to task for ignoring the will’s inherent goodness, as indeed happens to the devil in \textit{De casu diaboli}, when Anselm indicates that his sin lies not in a false description of the powers of the will but in a fundamentally wrong \textit{judgment and action}. Anselm, in fact, calls the angel’s inordinate desire, intention or volition, “a matter of thieving:” “Therefore, since with God’s permission the evil angel, through robbery, used the power freely given by God, he had the use—which is the same thing as the willing—from God.”\textsuperscript{38} This false judgment with regard to how the will is to be used destroys its \textit{justitia} or rectitude, that is to say, the correct relationship that it has to creation and to God. The inordinate will or intention creates a will that attempts to parallel the will of God with which the truly rational will of created beings strives to be or is—at least, at some time—at one, that is: united. In fact, this original will of rational creatures can in no way be removed from them except of their own accord. There is no power outside the monk or nun that is strong enough to deflect their good volition unless they themselves allow it to. This is obviously an enormous consolation for anyone who constantly feels the onslaught of evil and the devil in the way suggested of Anselm’s brothers and sisters in their correspondence. At the same time, it is an awesome duty to remain steadfast; the alternative is terrible.


\textsuperscript{37} James W. McAllister, \textit{Beauty and Revolution in Science} (Ithaca, 1996), 30.

\textsuperscript{38} Anselm, \textit{De casu diaboli} 28, in \textit{Sancti Anselmi opera} 1:276; Hopkins and Richardson, \textit{Anselm of Canterbury} 2:177.
Anselm does not tire in enticing, cajoling and commanding monks and nuns to bolster their determination through the stability of place and obedience to their spiritual leaders, priors and abbots alike. If one falls it is entirely through one’s own responsibility. In that case one is at odds with one’s own will. Inordinate will creates multiplicity, and thus breaks the unity of the created order.

In *Real Ethics*, John Rist—without reference to Anselm—hits the nail on the head thus: “Of course, insofar as we become more unified, our possible ‘freedom’ will appear more morally restricted. That does not matter since, if we are to be ‘single-minded,’ certain ‘options’ (all, that is, which would increase our multiplicity) will become morally nigh impossibilities since we could hardly bring ourselves to ‘choose’ them even where we have the physical capacity to do so.” A bit later, Rist sounds a note of some regret. This regret, I think, would have been lost on our eleventh- and twelfth-century monastics. He writes: “...there is a significant sense in which we cannot become one person or ‘self.’ To be one person or ‘self’ thus understood would entail being incapable of moral regression, being aware of all that is required for the achievement of the best possible approach to ‘singleness of heart’ and so unable to lose sight of it. ‘Choice’ would have ended.”

Anselm, however, would here disagree with Rist entirely. In *De libertate arbitrium*, he argues that “free choice” can never mean a choice between the morally wrong on the one and the morally good on the other side. The only truly free choice is the absolute choice for a virtuous life. Such a choice allows one to continue to choose that virtuous life in the awareness that evil and the master of evil, the devil, lurks everywhere, even on occasion gaining access to our hearts through our own negligence—something Anselm harps on in his letters. Hence, the almost constant litany of Anselm to not desist in willing the good through and with the help of the monastic virtues. Such is the life of Anselm’s monastic correspondents, as is overly clear from his letters and from his biography. On the other hand, a so-called choice for evil means, on the basis of the very definition of evil that Anselm develops, that all choice for “good” in the future will be impossible. So, far from ending choice, only the unified, single-minded rational creature, whether angel or humankind, which
has the unique, single power of choice for the good, can—aided by the virtues—choose in full meaningfulness. For Anselm this unity cannot but destroy multiplicity and duplicity. There is no place in this order for Otloh of Sankt Emmeram’s “secret” profession. In the context of the degree of intention that someone may have, Anselm is clear about the total transparency of a faithful monk. Writing to William, a brother of Saint Werburgh at Chester, c. 1096, Anselm adamantly insists on this: “Since you profess to be a monk by your habit, I exhort, I beg, I advise you always to endeavour to be inwardly, in the sight of God, what you appear to be outwardly, in the sight of men.”

Moral acts are not truly deeds if they are not the resultants of free choice; and when deeds do in fact come forth out of freedom of choice, they are in the end subsumed into the Good. Correctly speaking, moral acts for Anselm have no intrinsic value; at the least they are instruments, at the most they lead to Morality with a capital M. In a sense, the title of István Bejczy’s article to which we referred at the beginning of this paper might be adapted to Anselm’s philosophy of virtue, indeed to his entire idea of morality: “Deeds without value in themselves: Anselm’s teleology of choice and virtue.”

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40 Ep. 189, in Sancti Anselmi opera 4:75; The Letters 3:112–13. Anselm’s letters are full of remarks of this kind.
IN CONSCIENCE’S COURT:
ABELARD’S ETHICS AS A SCIENCE OF THE SELF

Willemien Otten

I Individuality and Identity in Peter Abelard

Peter Abelard is one of those thinkers who is more successful today, and better or at least more generally liked, it seems, than he was for a long time. Not that he did not meet with success in his own day—there were few scholars in the twelfth century who did not count themselves among his pupils—but this appreciation was countered by the fierce opposition of Bernard of Clairvaux and others. Even when the ups and downs of his twelfth-century success stabilized into a general historical preference for Abelard over Bernard in post-medieval times, more often than not this positive reception was accompanied, if not driven entirely, by an intense dislike of less rational, more authoritative, in sum, more clerical modes of argumentation.¹ It is precisely as the moine manqué² that he was in his own day that Abelard has had a hard time finding his niche in most subsequent historical analyses of the Middle Ages, his fate changing with whatever is the current tide of medieval studies. This observation is true even today, as we witness a remarkable resurgence of Abelardian studies. Remarkably, even in this respect, then, as in


most other aspects of his life and work, Abelard presents an interesting contrast with the daunting figure of Bernard of Clairvaux, whose self-styled image of the perfect monk has so far revealed few, if any, historiographical cracks, despite his self-labelling as the *chimaera* of his age.³

For an example of contemporary reception models of Peter Abelard, we may turn to the recent studies by Michael Clanchy and John Marenbon. There, we find very different portraits of Peter Abelard which can to some extent be seen as complementary. What Clanchy has admirably brought to the fore is the notion of Abelard as a medieval knight, an agonistic and competitive *homo ludens*,⁴ one who could easily transfer his search for victory from the battlefield to the arena of rhetoric and dialectics.⁵ After all, did not the quest for spoils remain the same? What Marenbon has added to this image is the idea—already known but not yet fully integrated into the scholarly appreciation of his work as a whole, even if this whole is admittedly an unfinished one—that Abelard’s thought contains an implicit and intrinsic ethical character as well. Without taking note of this ethical aspect we may perhaps be able to understand the logical fine points of his arguments, but we cannot expect to do full justice to them in the context of an overall assessment of his rational view of the structure of reality, including the reality of the divine.⁶

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⁴ Michael T. Clanchy, *Peter Abelard: A Medieval Life* (Oxford, 1997), analyzes Abelard according to his various roles such as master, knight, lover, monk, implying on the one hand that Abelard’s personality does not coincide with any of these, and on the other, that it disintegrates into aspects of all of them. It is interesting that the Dutch medievalist Johan Huizinga, who coined the term *homo ludens*, called Abelard already “a theologian, a philosopher, a knight, an artist, a schoolmaster and a journalist” in a lecture given in 1935. See Johan Huizinga, “Abaelard,” in *Handelingen en levensberichten van de Maatschappij der Nederlandsche Letterkunde te Leiden* (1934–35): 73. See also the two chapters on Abelard in my *From Paradise to Paradigm*, 129–214.

⁵ This is an allusion to Peter Abelard, *Historia calamitatum*, ed. J. Monfrin, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1962), 63–64: “et quoniam dialecticarum rationum armaturam omnibus philosophie documentis pretuli, his armis alia commutavi et trophes bellorum conflictus pretuli disputationum.”

⁶ See John Marenbon, *The Philosophy of Peter Abelard* (Cambridge, 1997), 213–331, esp. 213: “Ethics, then, embraces discussion of God, as the highest good, and his
Building on Clanchy’s and Marenbon’s analyses, I want to undertake in this essay a further probing of the ethical nature of Abelard’s thought situated not just against the broad background of his own rational views, but also against the backdrop of twelfth-century intellectual culture. More specifically, I want to see how Abelard’s ethical interest fits in with his reputation as moine manqué, or rather, I want to see what provoked his choice to perceive himself as such.\textsuperscript{7} That he does so is crystal clear to me, even if the “why” is as yet undetermined. One only needs to look at his final letter to Heloise, in which he not only urges her to win the crown of glory, to be the perfect nun and virgin, but also seems convinced that she is fully capable of doing so.\textsuperscript{8} The very point of her monastic work (in the sense of opus dei) seems at least in part to be that she thereby enhances his personal chance of salvation. Even if her only deed were to accomplish the setting free of his soul, the soul of her one and only soul-mate, so the subtext of his exhortation reads, she will have fulfilled her monastic duties successfully.\textsuperscript{9} But what about his monastic life, then? More concretely, what is the impact of monastic life on his ethical thinking?

ordering of the universe, analysis of the most general evaluative terms and of the acts they are used to qualify, theoretical examination of laws and conduct, and practical consideration of social arrangements and individual behaviour. Abelard’s systematic, though developing, treatment of these areas is found, then, not only in the two works clearly devoted to ethics, the \textit{Collationes} and the \textit{Scito teipsum}, but through the whole range of his broadly theological writing from about 1125 onwards, including his poetry and his letters to Heloise.”\textsuperscript{7} One could argue that in addition to a moine manqué, Abelard is an abbé manqué as well, as was suggested to me during the conference by Prof. Marcia Colish. In reference to the analysis which my article “The Bible and the Self” unfolds, it is relevant to highlight that it analyzes Otloh’s and Abelard’s autobiography by treating them as an “autohagiography” and an “automartyrology,” respectively. In my “Autobiography and the Dialectic of the Self,” \textit{Proceedings of the Patristic Medieval and Renaissance Conference, Villanova University} 19–20 (1994–96): 177–87, I have nuanced my position by arguing that Abelard’s position oscillates in fact between adopting an automartyrological and an autohagiographical tone of voice.

\textsuperscript{8} See Otten, “The Bible and the Self,” 142–46.

\textsuperscript{9} In \textit{Letter IV} (Ipse rursus ad ipsum), ed. J.T. Muckle, “The Personal Letters Between Abelard and Heloise,” \textit{Mediaeval Studies} 15 (1953): 83, Abelard states: “Quibus qui-dem singulis rescribere non tam pro excusatione mea quam pro doctrina vel exhortatione tua, ut eo scilicet libertius petitionibus assentias nostris, quo eas rationabilius factas intelleixeris . . .” This exhortation of Heloise then, on a professional monastic as well as on a personal level, seems to be the subtext of Abelard’s \textit{Letter VI} (Rescriptum ad ipsum de auctoritate vel dignitate ordinis sanitonialium), ed. J.T. Muckle, “The Letter of Heloise on Religious Life and Abelard’s First Reply,” \textit{Mediaeval Studies} 17 (1955): 240–81, which praises and idealizes the role of biblical and monastic women.
To the extent that this essay tries to answer that question, it seems to me that for Abelard being a monk must ultimately have been a mere role to play, not in the pejorative sense that there was no sincerity to his motives (perhaps there was even too much honesty), but in the sense that monastic identity provided him with more restrictions than chances for self-expression. Especially, it offered him no hope for a lasting satisfaction. Far less than the sexual restraint that was a premise of the monastic life (a problem which for Abelard, even if it had not resolved itself in other and more cruel ways, was not necessarily an insurmountable one), it is the ethical dimension of how to live a Christian life that could no longer be fittingly expressed for him in a life under the Rule of Benedict. In conformity with the seminal article by John van Engen, I do not attribute this disjunction between personal desires and available societal and spiritual roles to any perceived decline of Benedictine monasticism as such. Rather, it says much about the fluidity and ambiguity of twelfth-century social roles and linguistic aspirations. What it concretely may have meant for Abelard, so my hypothesis in this essay goes, is that as a semantic enterprise—and for all his perceived rationalism, Abelard was a man of letters as much as one of arguments—his works lacked a firm Sitz im Leben. For the modern historian reading Abelard this means that they represent themselves as freestanding structures, which to a certain extent they indeed are. But appearances are deceptive and this is true in the present case as

10 My observation about Abelard’s dissatisfaction here should be taken in a double sense. On the one hand, Abelard was indeed no longer satisfied with being “just” a monk; on the other hand, this personal dissatisfaction both entails and seems to have been conditioned by the view that there were no extant roles that could guarantee satisfaction, be it the role of monk, of abbot, or even of a successful schoolmaster. It seems to me that one way to explore the tension between Abelard’s role-playing and the problem of twelfth-century individualism more fruitfully would be to analyze his perception of self against the background of the various roles that he played.


12 As argued and demonstrated by Brian Stock in his analysis of “textual communities” in The Implications of Literacy: Written Language and Models of Interpretation in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries (Princeton, 1983), 88–240. However, in his chapters on Abelard and Bernard in the same study, Stock does not depart from the traditional views of seeing Abelard as a logician (pp. 362–403) and Bernard as a monastic thinker (pp. 403–454), thereby not allowing the similarity between them to shine through.
well. Part of the problem of reading Abelard is that in building his own semantic structure, he is at the same time trying to legitimize it,\textsuperscript{13} in a manner that is roughly comparable to how he tries to validate his various analogies of the Trinity by elaborating them. This makes the task of reading and interpreting Abelard all the more urgent, as a clear and unambiguous context for his work is lacking.\textsuperscript{14}

It is here that his self-imposed identity of \textit{moine manqué} is of crucial importance. Notwithstanding his confidence in the prayers of Heloise and her nuns, it appears as if Abelard’s entire \textit{œuvre} is driven by more than just the attempt to put forth ideas and develop these rationally, wielding the sword of his arguments by going from one battle to yet another. Underlying his discourse, while at the same time conditioning the voice of its author, is a deep longing to find some kind of balance in which wrongs can be made right and what is tilted to one side can be rearranged so as to reach a new and restored equilibrium. Put in other, more traditional monastic terms, what Abelard is after is reconciliation, atonement, satisfaction.\textsuperscript{15} While this is on the one hand a goal that he yearns to reach personally at all costs, as his complicated life story and relevant autobiographical details make clear, it is on the other hand also—and I would add in the end more so—a goal he sets himself professionally, as a thinker-cum-author who wants his Christian identity to be distinctive not just in the choice of topics (e.g., the Trinity), but also in the character, or even the texture, of his writing. In that sense I should indeed retract my accusation that monastic life was just a role to play for Abelard, replacing it with the statement that it was a fitting

\textsuperscript{13} Peter Cramer, \textit{Baptism and Change in the Early Middle Ages, c. 200–c. 1150} (Cambridge, 1993), 221–66, analyzes precisely this problem in his chapter entitled “The Twelfth Century or Falling Short”, where he talks about a sense of loss (p. 221) pervading the twelfth century and about Abelard’s “theology of failure” (p. 222). In both cases Cramer relates his comments to the period’s broader sacramental discussions about the Eucharist and baptism, while he does not hesitate to extrapolate from these to draw a broader conclusion about twelfth-century mentality.


\textsuperscript{15} This is a slight variation on Abelard’s own words in his \textit{Ethica} 1.51.2, ed. Rainer Ilgner, CCCM 190:51: “Tria itaque sunt in reconciliacione peccatoris ad deum necessaria: penitencia scilicet, confessio, satisfactio.” See the discussion ibid. 1.51–74, pp. 51–74.
functional choice. The burden of proof when trying to see how it functioned, however, should be in studying Abelard’s writings, not in dissecting the psychological elements of his life or the details of his self-description.\footnote{An important step forwards in this direction away from psychologizing Abelard was made by Mary McLaughlin, “Abelard as Autobiographer: The Motives and Meaning of his ‘Story of Calamities,’” \textit{Speculum} 42 (1967): 463–88.}

II \textit{Ethics, Personal Conscience and the Monastic Quest for Penitence}

The observation that monastic life represents above all a functional choice for Abelard leads us only so far. For what is interesting and indeed puzzling is that by trying to write an \textit{Ethica} Abelard signals to us that he is no longer simply content with revealing the meaning and value of atonement simply through the act of scholarly writing, be it of whatever kind.\footnote{This is the implication of his decision to differentiate between acts of whatever nature and intentions, whereby the judging of intentions becomes a divine affair. See \textit{Ethica} 1.25.1–3, p. 26: “Quid igitur mirum, si, ubi culpa precesserit, operacio subsecuta penam auget, apud homines quidem in hac uita, non apud deum in futura? Non enim homines de occultis, set de manifestis iudicare possunt, nec tam culpa reatum quam operis pensant effectum.”} In contrast to what I just argued above, it seems that it was the overall purpose of this work to go further by attempting to prescribe a precise recipe for atonement. This naturally and immediately raises the question whether he saw himself as the one most in need of such a recipe. It is almost as if what we have here is a case of the patient posing as a doctor, trying to help himself by acting as if he wants to try to help others. This view of things corresponds well with the subtitle of Abelard’s \textit{Ethica} which famously runs: \textit{Scito te ipsum}. In the context of twelfth-century thought, this Socratic motto might be described as “know yourself,” with a more autobiographical appeal, or alternatively as “one does well to know oneself,” in a more generic, anthropological sense.\footnote{See Cramer, \textit{Baptism and Change}, 234–41 on the motto “know thyself” in Abelard, especially on the tension between the ‘I’ of autobiography and the self of confession. Cramer argues that Abelard’s \textit{Ethica} bears out the privacy of moral judgment through the particularity of examples. Transposed to the autobiographical level, the \textit{Historia calamitatum} can be seen as a text where Abelard engages in introspection by turning the story of his life into a moral example to himself.}
Here I come to the ambiguity if not outright paradox that I see lying at the heart of Abelardian ethics. He seems deeply interested in trying to solve the problems of his own conscience, yet he clearly wishes to do so in a way that transcends the personal and the apologetic as if to exculpate him thereby from the charge of self-righteousness. On a higher and much more ambitious level, however, it seems he wants to extrapolate from the personal to the more broadly ethical, yet without sacrificing entirely the benefit of monastic role-playing, in which the individual’s link to the human conscience coram Deo is preserved. This is clear from his interest in and continued emphasis on intentio. The question in exploring Abelard’s ethics is how we can resolve this paradox, if it can be resolved at all. What my attention to the fraught monastic situatedness of Abelard’s self has meant to make clear is that in studying Abelard we have to be aware that the heart of the individual always lies close to the monastic persona from which on the one hand he longs to escape, but to which on the other hand he can turn in order to find refuge and consolation.

In light of the previously mentioned double meaning of Scito te ipsum, it is clear that we should not attempt to psychologize Abelard’s

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19 This is not to reject the point made by István P. Bejczy, “Deeds without Value: Exploring a Weak Spot in Abelard’s Ethics,” *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* 70 (2003): 1–21. Bejczy focuses on the contrast between Abelard’s explicit preference for an ethics of intention and his lasting but often unarticulated view that deeds should be evaluated. While endorsing Bejczy’s analysis, I want to explain the weak spots in Abelard’s ethics here by drawing attention to two points, namely 1) the fact that Abelardian ethics is broader than the views expressed in his *Ethics* and 2) the view that his sense of self, while complicating and compromising his clarity of thought, also opens up new avenues for moral self-inspection which build on the monastic tradition but continue it in a post-monastic sense through a kind of poetic exemplarism.

20 Abelard’s interest in the personal shows when he explains how God is the prover of the hearts and the reins (*probator cordis et remum*, cf. Jer. 11:20; 17:10; 20:12; Ps. 7:10), even as he underscores how human jurisprudence will always fall short of true divine justice. See *Ethica* 1.25.3–26.1, pp. 26–27 (following the text quoted in n. 17): “Deus uero solus, qui non tam, quae sint, quam, quo animo fiat, attendit, ut in intencione nostra reatum pensat et uero iudicio culpam examinat. Vnde et *probator cordis et remum dicitur* et *in abscondito uidere* (cf. Matth. 6:4, 6, 18). Ibì enim maxime uidet, ubi nemo uidet, quia in punciendo peccatum non opus attendit set animum, sicut nos econuerso non animum, quem non uidemus, set opus quod nouimus. Vnde sepe per errorem uel per legis, ut diximus, coactionem innocentes punimus uel noxios absolvimus. *Probator*, id est *cognitor* (cf. Dan. 13:42), *cordis et remum dicitur deus*, hoc est, ‘quarumlibet intencionum ex affectione animae uel infirmitate seu defectacione carnis proveniencium’.”
Ethica too quickly. But this does not mean that we should close our eyes to the remarkable echoes of personal recognition, which unmistakably rise up from the chosen examples that this work analyzes. Rather than interpreting them as personal reminiscences, we should filter them through the lens of a kind of monastic exemplarism.21 There is no denying that the example of the monk tied down on the featherbed speaks to the imagination of any reader who is vaguely familiar with Abelard’s life story. Yet it is too crude (and the example too obvious) simply to equate or even associate this monk in the text with Abelard, even though any sexual allusion will inevitably alert the reader to the story of the author’s life. This observation is even more true perhaps of the person who transgresses Christ’s injunction not to lust after a woman, insofar as to do so in one’s heart equals doing so in reality.22 But how can we get a handle on this exemplarism without privileging the personal above the impersonal, the autobiographical self above the paradigmatic moral self? What are the mechanisms that drive Abelard to pick the examples that he chooses?

Here a first ripple may make itself felt complicating a simple autobiographical reading of the Ethica. In my opinion it is not so much Abelard’s choice of examples that is revealing, since however real they may seem, there is at the same time a remarkably artificial and literate character to them, but rather his preference for and affinity with biblical passages throughout the work that appears decisive. Through his choice of biblical passages and examples he gives us subliminal clues, so it seems, to the direction in which his thoughts are going.23 Among all the things that can be said about Abelard’s adaptation and personal appropriation of biblical passages, we should not omit the curious phenomenon of his remarkably close and per-

21 For a broad analysis of twelfth-century exempla in the rhetorical tradition, see Peter von Moos, Geschichte als Topik: Das rhetorische Exemplum von der Antike zur Neuzeit und die historiae im “Policraticus” Johannes von Salisbury, 2nd ed. (Hildesheim, 1988). In Otten, “Fortune or Failure,” 370–72 (= From Paradise to Paradigm, 208–11) I have analyzed Abelard’s Ethica as a kind of alternative to monastic exemplarism.

22 For these telling but not necessarily autobiographical examples, see Ethica 1.12.6 and 1.15.4–5, pp. 13, 16. See further especially the example of having sex in church, ibid. 1.28.1, p. 28: “Ponamus enim aliquem coitu suo mulierem aliquam in ecclesia corrupisse,” which seems to have more personal overtones.

23 Interestingly, it seems Abelard’s affinity with biblical passages in his Ethica shows in his situational approach to them rather than in any personal application. The model of personal identification with biblical heroes is found instead in his Planctus and also in his description of female role models for Heloise in his Letter VI.
sonal identification with biblical figures. Not that Abelard attempts in any way to acquire a prophetic status thereby, but just as elsewhere he proves able to identify closely with crucial and traditional figures (Socrates drinking his own beaker of poison, Benedict almost poisoned by his own monks, the anchorite Anthony in the desert, or the scholar Jerome, disliked and persecuted for his clever but orthodox interventions), so in the _Ethica_ he seems to construct the identity of a sinner from various biblical passages. Collectively, the various biblical elements somehow contribute to his self-perception as a tragic hero of biblical stature rather than as the aspiring martyr or the Stoic sage, images with which any Abelard-reader is bound to be familiar.

In contrast to his reputation of *moine manqué*, however, the biblical profile of his sinners, which gives them such a personal touch, should not induce us to close our eyes to the stylized monastic aspect of his ethical quest. One way of doing so is to see his _Ethica_ as a quest for penitence, with penitence signalling a view of human life as exemplary rather than as individualized. In this regard it is interesting to dwell briefly on Abelard’s discussion of the important meaning of confession for which he goes to the famous passage of Jesus’ betrayal by Peter. Naturally, we should overcome our aversion to seeing Abelard somewhat shamelessly identify with Peter here, for his tendency to engage in the shameless personal appropriation of his role models has gained him a steady stream of critics until today. The more important question here is whether the modern dilemma between seeing Abelard either as the megalomaniac impostor or as the sinner saddened beyond consolation is not largely self-imposed, in the sense that this either/or choice seems to be a historical anachronism. If Bernard does not incur the same guilt by identifying himself with David battling Goliath in the fight against the heretical pair Arnold of Brescia and Abelard, or if he can disparagingly speak of the new gospel according to Peter, was it in fact not much more

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24 For Abelard’s identification with Benedict, whose monks likewise attempted to poison their abbot, see _Historia Calamitatum_, ed. Monfrin, 106; for Athanasius, who was persecuted by heretics, see ibid. 97; for Jerome, who was chased east out of envy, see ibid. 98,108.

25 See _Ethica_ 1.67–74, pp. 67–74 (“Quod non numquam confessio dimitti potest”).

traditional for Abelard to identify with figures whose stability in the canonical tradition of twelfth-century Christianity was uncontested? In that respect, Peter as his namesake would only be an obvious choice, and Christ, as the anchor of this very tradition, while definitely a far more risky one, was still not a choice which was totally outside the monastic repertoire. If so, one might seriously ask whether any abbot fulfilling his leadership task in the monastery or any priest celebrating mass was in fact not equally at fault. The fact that in Abelard’s case such identifications come across as heretical rather than selflessly heroic (as in Bernard’s case) has much to do with his monastic role-playing, which gives even his most intimate confessions an eerie and ironic sense of detachment.

The risk that Abelard obviously relishes presents itself to us most forcefully, both in his *Ethica* as elsewhere, when he employs the mode of identification as a literary rather than a liturgical method, thus allowing if not propelling him to break out of the strict enclosure of monastic space. Moreover, he does so in a time during which both the liturgy and the meaning of sacrament were becoming more fixed and more codified and, consequently, the range of their impact was growing more limited. Given the erection of such walls of orthodoxy, Abelard is indeed a sinner, one who protests the narrowing of the canon in ways that seem to foreshadow future paths of literary freedom, while simultaneously reflecting a broader and more traditional monastic outlook that was historically on its way out. How

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27 Donald K. Frank, “Abelard as Imitator of Christ,” *Viator* 1 (1970): 112, argues that Abelard’s emphasis on individuality “is heightened by a sense of his similarity to Jesus,” with his focus on Jesus’ earthly career adding to his positive affirmation of self. In my view Frank leaps too quickly from the literary use of a biblical motif to Abelard’s personal appropriation and application of such passages, skipping the intermediate level of (semi-)monastic exemplarism which I see as crucial for a historically contextualized understanding of Abelard.

28 Interestingly, Von Moos moves away from the debate on the authenticity of the correspondence between Abelard and Heloise by focusing instead on certain personal and monastic aspects. He calls this the *intentio operis*. See Peter von Moos, “Abelard, Heloise und Ihr Paraklet: Ein Kloster nach Mass: Zugleich eine Streitschrift gegen die ewige Wiederkehr hermeneutischer Naivität.” In: *Das Eigene und das Ganze: Zum individuellen im mittelalterlichen Religiosentum*, ed. Gerd Melville and Markus Schürer (Münster, 2003), 578.

29 In a rather different way but reflecting a similar empathy, Ivan Illich, *In the Vineyard of the Text: A Commentary to Hugh’s Didascalicon* (Chicago, 1993), calls the publication of Hugh’s *Didascalicon* as the first book on the art of reading a veritable “book-quake” instead of using Chenu’s older characterization of a landslide. See ibid., 84: “monastic reading done during the early Middle Ages and well into the
this could result in a confusing jumble of images and signals may be demonstrated by looking more closely at the example of confession and the role of Saint Peter.

In his *Ethica* Abelard shows us how three things are needed for the reconciliation of a sinner to God. They are repentance, confession, and satisfaction. Abelard goes on to discuss all three of those stages, distinguishing between fruitful and unfruitful repentance, and discussing confession and satisfaction at some length. His discussion of confession is most remarkable, and for that reason I want to dwell on it here. First of all, he makes clear how people give confession to one another and not to God, citing Jac. 5:16 (*Confitemini alterutrum peccata uestra et orate pro inuicem ut saluemini. Multum enim ualet deprecatio iusti assidua*), although the final aim is naturally to be saved by God. Nevertheless, God whom earlier in his *Ethica* Abelard has called “the inspector of the human heart and the reins” knows everything already, for which reason reason to him is not needed primarily. As Abelard states:

For many reasons the faithful confess their sins to one another, in accordance with the above quotation from the Apostle, both, that is, for the reason mentioned, that we may be more helped by the prayers of those to whom we confess, and also because in the humility of confession a large part of satisfaction is performed and we obtain a greater indulgence in the relaxation of our pance...  

The remedial function of inter-human confession is illustrated by the example of David whose sin was taken away by God upon his

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30 See *Ethica* 1.51.2, p. 51: “Tria itaque sunt in reconciliacione peccatoris ad deum necessaria: penitencia scilicet, confessio, satisfactio.” See also n. 15 above.

confession to Nathan the prophet (cf. 2 Reg. 12:13). In the following section, however, Abelard mentions that sometimes confession may be avoided altogether. For this he quotes the case of the apostle Peter in what may be called a biblical root-passage of the monastic office, as we see how in this citation the situational and the personal converge. For Peter, who had just betrayed Christ, tears apparently took the place of an actual declaration of guilt, as the Gospel nowhere tells us about his confession. In a passage that is simply too dense and too beautiful not to be quoted here, Abelard quotes Ambrose who had commented on this remarkable absence of confession in his *Expositio evangelii secundam Lucam*:

However, it should be known that sometimes by a wholesome dispensation confession can be avoided, as we believe was true of Peter, whose tears over his denial we know, although we do not read of other satisfaction or of confession. Whence Ambrose on Luke says of this very denial by Peter and of his weeping: “I do not find what he said; I find that he wept. I read of his tears; I do not read of his satisfaction. Tears wipe away a wrong which it is disgraceful to confess *with one’s voice* [italics mine] and weeping guarantees pardon and shame. Tears declare the fault without dread, they confess without prejudice and shame. Tears do not request pardon but deserve it. I find why Peter was silent, namely lest by asking for pardon so soon he should offend more.”

The literary attitude towards biblical tears displayed by Abelard’s reading of Ambrose here may offer us further clues as to how to interpret his semi-monastic or perhaps even post-monastic approach to ethics. For Ambrose, so it appears, Peter’s tears are not yet routinized in the monastic office of weeping (*flere*), but they still have a more spontaneously salutary, even salvific function related to the immediate context of this powerful biblical story. Through his remarks Ambrose signals to his readers that the omission of confession is

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acceptable only when premised on the sincerity of the tears. By integrating this Ambrosian example in his *Ethica*, with its overall focus on intention rather than deed, Abelard’s twelfth-century reading seems to veer in a similar direction, privileging personal consolation over formal duty. Lifting the quest for penitence out of the fixed monastic context in which he previously found it, he transfers it without hesitation to describe the state of mind that his ethical program requires from the sinner, namely that of exemplarist compunction.33

III  Poetry and Monasticism: Abelard’s Planctus as an Alternative Liturgy of the Hours

If we accept that the main goal of Abelard’s *Ethica* is indeed to reveal to his readers how he has shifted attention from deeds to intention, one might have expected confession to become more rather than less important. After all, the investigation of one’s motives and the entire process of self-scrutiny are aspects that deserve extra care when the deciding issue is intention. Furthermore, Abelard clearly considers confession to be something which one makes primarily to another human being, and not to God. So why not put special emphasis on confession, one could argue, in conformity with the program of sacramental institutionalization the church seemed to be undergoing anyway in the twelfth century? Here we seem to arrive at an intellectual junction in Abelard’s thought—one of those in which to my mind his thought abounds—where different strands of development come together, yielding a theological position which is rather remarkable. In this position the sacramental dimension, the depth of moral insight, and the attention for individual conscience and conduct all play their part. While Abelard’s position can as such be regarded as characteristic of his *Ethica*, by way of extension it also seems to reflect a broader view of penitence and forgiveness. As I will explain further below, I have chosen to label this view a kind of poetico-monastic exemplarism.

33 I leave out the immediate context of Abelard’s interpretation here which I find to some extent disappointing in the sense that he jumps at the occasion to lash out at the institutional church, making a transition to the problem of loosing and binding. See *Ethica* 1.74–83, pp. 74–84 (“Vtrum generaliter ad omnes pertineat prelatos soluere et ligare”).
Let us go back for a moment to the example of the apostle Peter and the quotation from Ambrose. If we take a closer look of the passage from the *Ethica* discussed above, the fact of Peter’s tears appears to be an immediate stumbling-block for his twelfth-century namesake to accept any kind of institutionalized authority for confession. Not that Abelard necessarily wants to undercut the authority of priests and/or the church, although he certainly likes to heap as many explicit criticisms on the personal mistakes of prelates as he can find. Rather, tears to him have a different function, as they facilitate above all the monastic quest for penitence. To illustrate this, one only needs to look at chapter 49 in the Rule of Benedict. In this chapter on the observance of Lent, it is said that the whole life of a monk should be a continuous Lent. But since perfection is uncommon, so the Rule continues, it is advised that especially during Lent one needs to engage in prayer with tears, in compunction of the heart, and in abstinence.34 Still, notwithstanding his subscription to the Rule and to standard monastic practice, Abelard’s hesitation in identifying tears with ready forgiveness may well indicate that for him the role of tears is different still, as it exceeds the bounds of monastic office. For all the conventional stress on compunction and the importance of the Lenten season reflecting a steady undercurrent of *contemptus mundi*, Abelard’s handling of tears reveals in my view how he regards the tears of monastic life primarily as tears of love for God. This view, which is not unusual in the twelfth century, is brought out especially by the famous passage from Cant. 2:5: “I am wounded with charity.”35 If we indeed accept the hypothesis that Abelard sees tears as primarily induced by love for God, his objection to formal confession can be construed as follows. By artificially isolating guilt from love, formalized confession would somehow stand

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35 The theme of “the wound of love” (*charitate tua vulnerata sum*) goes back to the Septuagint and Old Latin translation of Cant. 2:5. See Bernard McGinn, *The Growth of Mysticism: Gregory the Great Through the Twelfth Century* (New York, 1994), 137 and 479 n. 84.
in the way of the soul who, by humbling himself, is trying to make satisfaction to God directly. At the same time, however, the advantage of tears over confession becomes clear as well, inasmuch as it appears that tears allow Abelard fully to integrate guilt with love in a single act rather than artificially separating the two.\(^{36}\)

Yet despite all the above remarks on the monastic functionality of tears, we should not forget how tears are before all an expression of fundamental human emotions, especially of contrition.\(^{37}\) For all his reputation as a rationalist, it is remarkable indeed to what extent intentions have to do with emotions for Abelard. As a suitable and powerful vehicle of emotional expression, bypassing rational argument, tears have the ability to communicate a person’s unique sincerity of desire (\textit{intentio}) for penitence rather than representing the accomplishment or ‘deed’ of penitence itself. In order for this desire for penitence to be successful, however, it must be profound, even more than sincere, and universal at the same time. In an example from the pre-monastic, pre-ritualized view of the ascetic life, found succinctly expressed in the sayings of the Desert Fathers,\(^{38}\) we see how the power of tears was both expressed and enhanced, as it were, by putting an emphasis on their luring appeal as an almost unattainable goal. Thus, it is made clear that these tears themselves are the goal of salvation rather than a mere means to achieve it. Let us look at the following passage derived from the Latin systematic collection of the \textit{Verba seniorum}:

A brother asked an old man: “I hear the old men weeping, and my soul longs for tears: but they do not come, and my soul is troubled.”

And the elder said: “The children of Israel entered the Promised Land

\(^{36}\) On the role of love in Abelard’s \textit{Ethica} and its connection with guilt and intention, see Matthias Perkams, \textit{Liebe als Zentralbegriff der Ethik nach Peter Abaelard} (Münster, 2001), 170–203.

\(^{37}\) On the role of tears in Abelard, see Piroska Nagy, \textit{Le don des larmes au moyen âge: Un instrument spirituel en quête d’institution} (V\textsuperscript{e}–XIII\textsuperscript{e} siècle) (Paris, 2000), 270–73.

\(^{38}\) The reception of these sayings and their grouping into various collections, an alphabetical and a systematic one, is unbelievably difficult. Generally it is held that the systematic collection which I have used here goes back to a mid sixth-century Latin collection, even though it contains material from an oral tradition which is much older. No Greek original is extant. See on this Douglas Burton-Christie, \textit{The Word in the Desert: Scripture and the Quest for Holiness in Early Christian Monasticism} (Oxford, 1993), 76–88. For the use of tears in these sayings, see Nagy, \textit{Le don des larmes}, 75–94. According to Nagy, all the medieval monastic uses of tears are already present in these sayings, but without stratified order and hierarchy.
after forty years in the wilderness. Tears are like the Promised Land. If you have reached them already you will no longer be afraid of the conflict. For thus God wills that the soul be afflicted, that it may ever long to enter that country.”

There is an interesting twist to the connection between confession and tears here. Whereas in Ambrose tears have merit and thus deserve satisfaction, as a result of which Peter may actually dispense with confession altogether (a view Abelard adopts in slightly modified form), in the pre-monastic ambiance described here the tears themselves are considered the Promised Land. This makes the function of tears substantially different from the later Ambrose/Abelard position. In the *Verba seniorum* the tears represent the very arrival in the Promised Land, signifying the milk and honey one enjoys there, so to speak, and do not indicate (as one might have expected) the mere road leading to it. But if the tears are indeed held out as the Promised Land itself, as the *Verba* indicate, does this mean that for the sinner, unlike for the monk, the moment of their true flowing in this life must forever be deferred? For is that not what the image of Israel roaming about in the desert seems to suggest in this passage? If so, this means that in conformity with “the wound of charity” from Cant. 2:5, monastic tears possess a prophetic status that is rather unique, as they foreshadow a state of fulfillment that despite intense human longing remains forever out of reach for those outside monastic walls. After all, it is typical of the medieval monastic sphere that in moments of utter human grief, when tears abound, the heavenly kingdom can indeed become proleptically realized on earth. The power thus demonstrated of monastic tears is the mirror image of Bernard of Clairvaux’s kiss on the mouth in his famous *Sermones super Cantica*. There perfect charity, here perfect sadness. Yet in both cases the dynamics of the process is a purely internal one, without

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40 Cant. 1:1: “Osculetur me osculo oris sui.” In the first sixteen sermons of Bernard’s *Sermones super Cantica* this phrase is used as the overall metaphor for the relationship between God and man. See on this M.B. Pranger, *Bernard of Clairvaux and the Shape of Monastic Thought: Broken Dreams* (Leiden, 1994), 275–92, esp. 277.
a firm anchor in the outside world. What I want to suggest here, however, is that in my view Abelard goes even further than Bernard, as he appears to sacrifice the condition that this process be enclosed within the confines of monastic space. Perched on the walls of the monastery as his uneasy home, he is interested in transferring this process to become located instead in the single and intimate embrace of God and the monk.

So what about Abelard as the moine manqué, then, comparable to the brother who cannot weep and whose tears do not come? Should he be consigned to a life of infinite postponement, of monastic barrenness, as a kind of Moses who is never to reach the Promised Land? In a way, the answer to this question should indeed be in the affirmative, as this may well seem to be the case. It is indeed as if this other side of monastic life, the dimension of “not yet” rather than “already,” generally seems to claim more of a share in the twelfth century. This aspect of “not yet” can be witnessed also in the newly emerging handbooks for novices, as published by Aelred of Rievaulx and others. Yet the artificiality that has always been lodged in the medieval monastic enterprise presents itself to us not just in the form of practical questions and answers, but also in the opening up of new and far-reaching alternative solutions.

One of these is found in Abelard’s Planctus, a collection of six biblical laments that offer us interesting vignettes in poetic form of biblical sinners trying to find salvation, such as Samson. What is new in the Planctus, I want to argue here, is that these sinners are above all seen as victims. The tears shed by them range beyond the representation of either guilt or love, or even innocence, opening up a world of sheer sadness and grief. Contrary to what may perhaps have been expected, such tears of grief, especially when uttered by an innocent victim like Jephta’s daughter, do not confront us with the inevitability of fate. Instead, they seem to transport us to a state of mind where judgment is held at bay rather than being pronounced.

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41 See on this Caroline W. Bynum, Docere verbo et exemplo: An Aspect of Twelfth-Century Spirituality (Missoula, 1979), 99–199 (Part II: The Monastic Focus on the Individual as Learner).

It is as if the pungency of the tears being shed allows the final verdict somehow to be suspended. By creating emotional space in this way, these tears are able to kindle a kind of redemptive power for the readers, offering them consolation rather than drowning them in misery.\textsuperscript{43} Hence, the tears of literature begin to serve as an alternative Lent, a personalized code of penitence ritualized by reading rather than praying. As a consequence, the reading of Abelard’s \textit{Planctus} slowly takes on the contours of an alternative monastic office, the effect of which becomes enhanced even further by the use of a chorus, thereby criticizing the routine that creeps all too easily into monastic life. Whether the emotional momentum built up in the \textit{Planctus} is thus able to break through the monastic code altogether, granting us a direct peak into the author’s soul, as is argued to various degrees by Giuseppe Vecchi and Peter Dronke,\textsuperscript{44} remains rather questionable to my mind. After all, “authenticity” is a notoriously unsuitable historiographical category. Quite apart from the question whether or not we can see these laments as gravitating around central problems in Abelard’s personal life, I hold them to tell us impor-

\textsuperscript{43} On the poetic device of suspending judgment as an act of resurrection and moral self-affirmation, see Otten, \textit{From Paradise to Paradigm}, 215–55, esp. 248–55. On Abelard’s poetic treatment of the death of Jephta’s daughter, see Dronke, \textit{Poetic Individuality}, 115: “Jephta’s daughter, who in the Bible dies in woeful obedience to her father, becomes a heroine joyfully choosing the death in which she will find glory, who almost contumptuously compels her faltering father to keep his vow, “to be a man now in spirit as in sex, not to oppose my glory of your own.” Her death takes the form of a drawn-out ritual that increasingly is made to look like a black parody of a wedding-mime; for a moment the realization of this becomes unbearable to her and she cries out against it, then at once composes herself again, to die with queenly dignity.” While I have quoted this passage here to underline my point of the suspense of judgment in the \textit{Planctus}, recently Giovanni Orlandi, “On the Text and Interpretation of Abelard’s \textit{Planctus},” in \textit{Poetry and Philosophy in the Middle Ages: A Festschrift for Peter Dronke}, ed. John Marenbon (Leiden, 2001), 327–42, esp. 340, has criticized Dronke’s predilection for a strategy of a \textit{reductio ad absurdum} of misogyny in his \textit{Plaints}, stating that “if there were parody and satire in this \textit{planctus}, they could hardly have been appreciated by anybody.” Orlandi speculates instead that these \textit{planctus} on Old Testament themes suggest an unredeemed world and were supposed to have been followed by poems on New Testament themes.

\textsuperscript{44} While Dronke, \textit{Poetic Individuality}, 116–17, rejects the view of older scholars that Abelard’s \textit{planctus} “represent a poetic synthesis of his whole sorrowful life, in biblical dress, through allegory or symbol,” (see Peter Abelard, \textit{I “Planctus,”} ed. Giuseppe Vecchi [Modena, 1951], 5–18) he does hold that “[t]he individual portrayal and analysis of emotions in these three \textit{planctus} (Dinah, Jeptha’s daughter and Samson) is related to, and in part due to, the reverberations that their themes had for Abelard himself.” This may still be too strong. Also, it separates these three \textit{planctus} from the other three for no apparent reason.
tant things about the changed role and function of monastic life in the twelfth century. What is left for us to assess is how all this relates to the role and function of Abelard’s exemplarist *Ethica*, and what to say about the as yet unclear *Sitz im Leben* of this work.

IV Conclusion: Ethics as Poetry

To zoom in on Abelard a final time, I want to highlight in a concluding statement what is unique about his case. To provide both context and nuance, I want to precede this evaluation by an assessment of two other samples of innovative literary strategies drawn also from the twelfth century.

When Bernard of Clairvaux buried his brother Gerard, he kept his eyes dry and managed not to break down. But soon after he started sermon 26 on the Song of Songs, he had to interrupt his homily, for tears suddenly overcame him. As a realistic depiction of his emotions, as has been argued by Burcht Pranger, this literary turn of events seems rather contrived. This is especially so, if we consider how in sermon 27 Bernard continues with his series of sermons as if the interruption did not occur as an interruption, but unfolded more or less as a planned event. What is contrived about Bernard’s move is ultimately not his unleashing of emotions, since we can never be the judge of that, but his planned rhetorical style. For all his monastic austerity, this ebullient emotional outbreak proves to be something very much intended and controlled by the author. In Bernard, so much is clear, the unleashing of emotions is primarily used to strengthen the stability of his monastic setting.

When Bernard Silvestris treats of suicide in his poem the *Mathematicus*, he appears to be dealing afresh with an important and difficult ethical topic. Thus, we see him analyzing how the quest of a parental couple to prevent their child, fittingly named *Patricida*, from inevitably murdering his father has an unintended reverse effect. The poem results in an insoluble moral dilemma. Either the son, whom Rome wants to crown as its new hero after he liberated the

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city, is forced to kill his father, whose leadership has ended in failure, or he must renounce the senate’s offer of kingship and use the freedom thus gained to take his own life. The son’s suicide, paradoxically, seems to be the only way to spare his father’s life. For all the poem’s allure of tragic spontaneity, however, it is important to know that Bernard took his point of departure for this poem from a piece of forensic oratory by Pseudo-Quintillian. It is as if the emotional impact and dramatic intensity of the poem serve as important tools to help Bernard break through the prescriptive codes of medieval school poetry, in an attempt to mock and criticize its fixed style. Yet this should not mislead us into thinking that Bernard’s poetry is the product of original inspiration rather than artificial rhetoric. What I hold Bernard to be ultimately after is authorial poetic freedom through cultivation rather than negation of its stock character.47

Something to that same effect, in this case the skilled use of semi-monastic categories to launch an implicit criticism of the entire monastic enterprise, seems to drive Abelard when we consider not just his Ethica and his Planctus, but especially their joint effect. We have seen how in his Ethica Abelard tried to dispense with confession altogether, substituting for it the scrutiny of one’s own intentions. While he thereby seems to reinvigorate the concept of monastic life, including the office of weeping, he wants to dispense at the same time with the wear of its ritualized quality. In this regard Abelard’s interest in the tears of Peter betraying Christ is quite revealing. Still, it is clear that Peter is before all part of a literary canon for him, his image filtered through the fathers (Ambrose), rather than an immediate role model. In his Planctus, on the other hand, Abelard succeeds in identifying with biblical figures in their state of grief and loss in such a way as to make their victimhood ultimately more personal than exemplary, more lively than scripted. As in the cases of Bernard of Clairvaux and Bernard Silvestris, however, I hold that this makes his identification

47 See Peter Godman, The Silent Masters: Latin Literature and Its Censors in the High Middle Ages (Princeton, 2000), 228–93, esp. 271: “Ambiguity re-established as a cognitive attribute of poetic language, poetry thereby justified its claim to a place in the hierarchy of knowledge. The (a)equivocations and multivocations treated with such suspicion in his exegesis of Vergil and Martianus Capella now became, in the Mathematicus, the essence of Bernardus’s case for attributing philosophical value to his medium. It is difficult to imagine how, given his own categories, he could have constructed a more elegant answer to the objections that had been made to poetry by [among others] himself.” See also Otten, From Paradise to Paradigm, 215–55.
with biblical figures not less literary, but only more so, as he uses their literary potential slowly to change and erode the traditional understanding of monastic practice. For the effect of his poetry must inevitably be that biblical role models such as Peter, once lifted from their biblical script, can no longer function adequately as intercessors helping him to gain penitence in traditional monastic ways. As argued convincingly by Dronke, the *Planctus* are more than just plaints, as they also contain elements of parody and satire, and Abelard may well have composed them in part to venture his criticism against traditional morality. In this respect it is interesting that the biblical examples with whom they deal are all drawn from Genesis, Judges and the Book of Kings, as books according to the Rule (ch. 42) not suited for weak understandings and hence not to be read after vespers. Perhaps it has been Abelard’s unique success to have seized on the plaintive mode as his preferred “integumental” form, one that afforded him the chance to have even totally unsuited biblical heroes take on a penitential quality unknown to them and their readers before. Dinah. Samson, Jephta’s daughter, David, and Jacob, by shedding their tears on the page they are all somehow given a new life beyond the page, that is, beyond the confines of their standard biblical characters.

By allowing these biblical characters to reach beyond the scripted and scriptural page Abelard manages to bestow on his laments a new and redemptive quality. Building on his portrayal of Peter in the *Ethica*, his general intention throughout all this seems to be the larger project of how to weave new threads with which to connect old monastic liturgical practice with the changed needs of the historical

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48 But see above n. 43.
49 See *Regula Benedicti* 42, ed. De Vogüé and Neufville, 584: “Omni tempore silentium debent studere monachi, maxime tamen nocturnis horis. Et ideo omni tempore, siue ieiunii siue prandii: si tempus fuerit prandii, mox surrexerint a cena, sedeant omnes in unum et legat unus Collationes uel Vitas Patrum aut certe alid quod aedificet audientes, non autem Epitasticum aut Regum, quia infirmis intellectibus non erit utile illa hora hanc Scripturam audire, alii uero horis legantur.”
50 This is not to claim that these figures did not receive other treatment in the twelfth century. See e.g. the role of Dinah in Bernard of Clairvaux, *De gradibus superbiae et humilitatis* 10.29, *Sancti Bernardi opera* 3: 39, where she represents curiosity and is blamed for her loss of virginity, and Richard of Saint Victor’s *Beniamin minor*, where she symbolizes shame (*pudor*); for Richard, see Ineke van’t Spijker, *Fictions of the Inner Life: Religious Literature and Formation of the Self in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries* (Turnhout, 2004), 141. Compared to these spiritual uses of Dinah, Abelard’s view in his *Planctus* is rather different.
self in a context that is increasingly post-monastic. As for the attempt
to detect the *Sitz im Leben* of Abelard’s *Ethica*, I am afraid that in
the end that remains a difficult matter, although some directions in
which his ethical thought is tending can be pointed out. His con-
sistent attempt to design a moral system that stands apart from its
former monastic context, depending more on individual human judg-
ment than on institutional environment, offers future openings for a
more human and humane justice system, even as he leaves the tradi-
tional focus on divine forgiveness and redemption intact. In this
overall picture of Abelard’s ethical thought the *Planctus* seem to come
in sideways, forming a kind of poetic wedge, as they demonstrate in
*vignette* form how divine forgiveness and the human need for redemp-
tion have perhaps always been closer than traditionally thought.
Reflecting the ultimate consequences of his personalized “integu-
metal” liturgy of the hours, finally, these laments present us also
with the most daring poetic suggestion lodged anywhere in Abelard’s
ethical thought, as they seem to indicate that personal grief does not
just facilitate but may even bring about divine redemption. By doing
so, they put a radical end to any monastic prerogative.

Let me end with a quotation from David’s lament over Abner,
encapsulating this very suggestion in embryonic form. 51 It is one of
the more straightforward *planctus*, where penitential weeping begins
as always with a personal voice eventually to gather su-
icient momen-
tum to contain and convey the force of universal redemption.

*Dolus inexecrabilis, casus miserabilis*  
*Cogunt ad continuas hostem quoque lacrimas*  
*Dissolvitque pietas mentes adamantinas.*  
Inexorable pain, a miserable death  
force even the enemy to continuous tears  
and piety dissolves the hardest minds.

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In his *De institutione novitiorum* Hugh of Saint Victor addresses his novice-readers, who, as he says, obviously wish to return to God who has made them—that is, they wish to have real happiness. Hugh explains that this happiness can be achieved only by virtue, and virtue can be attained only if the *disciplina virtutis* is guarded. The practice of discipline directs the mind to virtue, and virtue leads to *beatitudo*. Hugh presents a parallel ternary of *bonitas, disciplina, scientia*, from the Psalms (Vulgate Ps. 118:66; cf. Ps. 119:66), where *bonitas* is that by which one arrives at happiness, knowledge being necessary for the discernment of what is good.¹ If this seems at first to imply a rather straightforward and simple view of the role of virtue in the monastic journey, in what follows in *De institutione novitiorum*, indeed in the rest of Hugh’s oeuvre, the question of virtue and goodness turns out to be more ambiguous.² Nor can their ambiguity and ambivalence be explained only in terms of the tradition originating in early Christian asceticism. From the beginning the distinction between vices and virtues, between real virtues and vices appearing as virtues, was at the heart of the ascetic striving for self-control and transparency. In Hugh, however, as well as being part of human

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² For an introduction to Hugh of Saint Victor and to the scholarship on him and his works, see Dominique Poirel, *Hugues de Saint-Victor* (Paris, 1998). Hugh obviously wrote his *Institutio novitiorum* for the novices of the community of canons of Saint Victor, who in following the Rule of Augustine tried to overcome the opposition between school and cloister and to combine learning and devotion. See on this combination Ralf M.W. Stammberger, “‘Via ad ipsum sunt scientia, disciplina, bonitas:’ Theorie und Praxis der Bildung in der Abtei Sankt Viktor im zwölften Jahrhundert,” in “Scientia” und “Disciplina:” *Wissenstheorie und Wissenschaftspraxis im 12. und 13. Jahrhundert*, ed. Rainer Berndt et al. (Berlin, 2002), 91–126. In the following I use the word “monastic” to refer to this aspect of the life of the canons.

psychology, the ambivalence of virtue is rooted in a comprehensive view of the world.³

Virtue figures in De institutione, but Hugh does not define virtue there, nor does he give a list of virtues. After discussing scientia and disciplina, he concludes his work not with a third part either on bonitas or on virtue, but ends with the recommendation instead that the reader, after he has learned about knowledge and discipline, pray to God to give him bonitas. Virtue, or bonitas, thus seems to be more elusive than Hugh’s introductory remarks to the novices may suggest—in De arrha animae its elusiveness is evoked when Hugh talks about the aromata virtutum as the last gift of Christ to the soul.⁴ It is also less crucial than one might think: again in De arrha animae Hugh explains that humility is better than proud virtue,⁵ while elsewhere, in his Annotationes in Threnos, Hugh explains that it is more perilous to pride oneself on one’s virtue than to lose it, because in the latter case one will immediately be aware of the danger one is in, while in the former case one does not even know one is in danger.⁶ Virtue, then, defies an easy categorisation within a broader system, be it of “ethics” or “theology,” even as these disciplines are part of Hugh’s theory of knowledge.

On the other hand, at several places in his works Hugh gives some definitions of virtue, depending on various contexts. To uncover the meaning of virtue in Hugh’s work, I shall start by investigating these definitions within the contexts in which they occur. Although Hugh does not present a coherent theory of virtue, nor a theory of ethics, these broader contexts form part of what is Hugh’s exegetical project, in which he presents the human and/or monastic condition. Virtues are an integral part of the uncertainties of monastic life with

³ For the tradition of the ambivalence of virtue see Richard G. Newhauser, “Zur Zweideutigkeit in der Moraltheologie: Als Tugenden verkleidete Laster,” in Der Fehltritt: Vergehen und Versehen in der Vormoderne, ed. Peter von Moos (Cologne, 2001), 377–402. Newhauser discusses the ambivalence of virtue from the perspectives of the distinction between private and public, the intentional and the unintended, as well as from an opposition between a religious elite, who claim the expertise in matters of distinguishing between these categories, and the laity, who, however, increasingly appropriate this expertise. Although, as we shall see, some of these categories are present in Hugh, they function within his comprehensive worldview.

⁴ Hugh of Saint Victor, De arrha animae, in L’Oeuvre de Hugues de Saint-Victor 1:270 (= PL 176:966C).

⁵ Ibid. 272 (= PL 176:976A).

⁶ Hugh of Saint Victor, Annotationes in Threnos, PL 175:315C.
its temptations. In his *In Threnos* Hugh explains how God permits virtues to perish, or to be damaged.\(^7\) Man and his virtue share in the world’s ambivalence. As far as virtue is concerned, ambivalence is connected as much with the delicate question of man’s free will versus divine grace as it is located in the ultimate ambiguity, that of man’s *affectus*.

**Virtue and Ethics**

Although in many twelfth-century writers a doctrine of virtue is part of the discipline of ethics, and although Hugh repeatedly talks about ethics, that is not the stance from which he discusses *virtus*. In his *De Scripturis et scriptoribus sacris* he dismisses traditional, pagan ethics as deficient. It fails precisely because of the way virtue is treated, namely without its root, charity.\(^8\) For his most elaborate treatment, we have to turn to Hugh’s *Didascalicon*, where ethics is part of Hugh’s system of philosophy.\(^9\) In a short summary in an Appendix to the work he connects virtue and ethics, or, as he calls it, practical philosophy. There are three things, wisdom, virtue and necessity (*sapientia, virtus, necessitas*), which form the remedies against the three evils of human life, ignorance, vice and infirmity (*ignorantia, vitium, infirmitas*). Hugh here defines virtue as “a habit of mind which in accordance with nature is adapted to reason” (*virtus est habitus animi in modum naturalis rationi consentaneus*).\(^10\) However, Hugh does not elaborate on this conventional definition, which is taken from Augustine and Cicero. The definition seems to be incorporated for the sake of scholarly

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\(^7\) Ibid., 318C–D.

\(^8\) Hugh of Saint Victor, *De Scripturis et scriptoribus sacris* 1, PL 175:9–10: “Ethicam quoque scripserunt gentilium philosophi, in qua quasi membra quaedam virtutum de corpore bonitatis truncata pinxerunt; sed membra virtutum viva esse non possunt sine corpore charitatis Dei. Omnes virtutes unum corpus faciunt; cujus corporis caput charitas est.” Hugh gives a more neutral description of ethics, as one of the parts of philosophy, in his *Commentaria in Hierarchiam coelesten* 1.1, PL 175:927B.


completeness, and virtue, here, is first of all one of the three remedies against the three evils which determine man’s existence after the Fall. Practical wisdom, or ethics, was invented for the sake of virtue,\textsuperscript{11} as part of the four branches of knowledge which Hugh had discussed more elaborately in the preceding parts of the \textit{Didascalicon}: the theoretical, practical, mechanical arts, and logic.\textsuperscript{12}

In the main presentation of the \textit{Didascalicon}, Hugh had hardly elaborated on practical philosophy. Neither did he refer to virtue in terms of the definition just given. Virtue figured as part of the means of restoration of humankind after the Fall. Right at the beginning of the \textit{Didascalicon} Hugh introduced two elements which are necessary for man’s restoration, knowledge and virtue.\textsuperscript{13} The necessity of the dual pursuit, of \textit{scientia} and \textit{virtus}, to restore the lost likeness of God runs through all of Hugh’s works, and betrays his Augustinian heritage as well as the embeddedness of his project in the long tradition of philosophy as a way of life.\textsuperscript{14}

The pursuit of knowledge and the right way of living, \textit{forma vivendi}, are intimately connected. When it comes to the study of Scripture Hugh shows that the Bible contains many instructions for a \textit{forma vivendi}, if only one knows how to decode them.\textsuperscript{15} Apart from some especially appropriate books, the \textit{forma vivendi}, or the knowledge of virtues is also the domain of tropological exegesis, as Hugh briefly explains, emphasizing that in the tropological understanding interpretation is based more on things and events than on words: contemplating what God has made, we come to acknowledge what we have to do. “All nature talks of God, all nature teaches man, all nature brings forth its reason, and thus in the whole universe nothing is unfruitful.”\textsuperscript{16}

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} \textit{Didascalicon} 6.14, p. 130: “... propter virtutem inventa est practica [sc. disciplina].”
\item \textsuperscript{12} See above, n. 9.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Ibid. 1.5, p. 12.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Hugh of Saint Victor, \textit{Didascalicon} Intr., p. 3.
\item \textsuperscript{16} Ibid. 6.5, p. 123: “contemplando quid fecerit Deus, quid nobis faciendum sit agnoscinus. omnis natura Deum loquitur, omnis natura hominem docet, omnis natura rationem parit, et nihil in universitate infecundum est.”
\end{itemize}
What resonates in this consideration of nature is Hugh’s cosmology and his view of history. In this view, which Hugh presented most elaborately in his magnum opus, *De sacramentis*, creation as it unfolds itself is an example, teaching man how to live—and containing the root of ambivalence.

The dual pair of knowledge of truth and love of virtue and their corresponding exegetical modes dominate *De sacramentis*. Allegory and tropology inform and aim respectively at the *cognitio veritatis* and *amor virtutis*, which both bring about the *reparatio* of man.17

The story of the creation of light and its separation from darkness, for example, taken in its tropological meaning, contains a lesson. When God saw the light, that it was good, and divided light from darkness, this means that He judges everything. However, even the evil angel at times transforms himself into an angel of light and tries to deceive the mind. This means that even the (metaphorical) light itself, in which we do our works, must first be cautiously considered.18

Thus, not only must we judge between day and night, that is between virtues and vices, but also between day and day, and night and night, to “understand what those impulses are which come to us under the appearance of virtues, as it were, by a different light,” and also to distinguish within true virtues what is good and what is better.19 What this amounts to is the *discretio* and *circumspectio* which Hugh recommends in his other works.


18 *De sacramentis* 1.1.12, 197A–B.

19 Ibid. 1.1.13, 198B: “Parum est enim ad perfectum inter diem et noctem judicare, parum est lucem et tenebras dividere: hoc est virtutes a vitiiis sequestrare, nisi sciamus etiam inter diem et diem judicare, et sciamus omnem diem judicare, ut sapiamus qui sint illi motus qui sub virtutum specie quasi luce aliena ad nos veniant, et qui sursum illi sint, qui veram virtutis claritatem praetendunt; et in ipsis quoque virtutibus non solum quae bona sint, sed etiam quae sint potiora probemus.”
A further explanation for the ambivalence which affects even virtue can be found in Hugh’s discussion of virtues that we find in the story of man’s creation and his position before the Fall. Here Hugh seems to offer a clear definition. I shall discuss this definition, but I hope to show that its definitional value is less important than the perspective on the human condition which it allows Hugh to develop. In the discussion of man’s state before the Fall, one of the questions is whether man had virtue. One can ask, Hugh says, whether man had virtues before sin, and whether they conferred merit—as virtues, it seems, cannot be without merit. To answer the question, Hugh first distinguishes between virtues according to nature and those according to grace. However, Hugh’s “natural virtues” are not the same as what was so called by other and later authors.\(^{20}\) I quote the definition:

> For virtue is nothing else than an affect (affectus) of the mind ordered according to reason, and such affects are said to be very numerous according to the various inclinations of the same mind, yet having one root and one origin, the will. For one will, according to how it inclines itself to various things either by seeking or avoiding, forms various affects and receives diverse names according to the same affect, although, however, all these things are in one will, and are one will.\(^{21}\)

This definition reveals an Augustinian view of man and the role of voluntas.\(^{22}\) Hugh’s view is reflected in other twelfth-century monastic writers. In Saint Victor, Richard of Saint Victor uses Hugh’s definition of virtue as an ordered affectus,\(^{23}\) and the idea can be found among

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20 See on the concept of natural virtue the article of István Bejczy in this volume.

21 De sacramentis 1.6.17, 273BC: “Virtus namque nihil aliud est quam affectus mentis secundum rationem ordinatus, qui secundum varias ejusdem mentis applicationes plurimi esse dicuntur, unam tamen radicem et originem habentes, voluntatem. Una enim voluntas secundum quod se ad varia vel appetendo vel fugiendo inclinat varios format affectus, et diversa secundum eodem affectus nomina sortitur, cum tamen omnia haec in una sint voluntate, et una voluntas.” See also Hugh’s definition in Miscellanea 1.57, PL 177:502CD: “Hoc interest inter virtutem et justiam, quod virtus magis esse videtur affectus rationalis voluntatis bene formatus, vel recte ordinatus; justitia autem forma vel ordinatio ejus. Tunc bene ordinatur mentis affectus, quando secundum Dei voluntatem movetur.” Cf. Summa sententiarum 3.9, PL 176:103D: “Et timere et amare simpliciter prolata, affectiones sunt: cum additamento [sc. timere Deum, amare Deum], virtutes.”

22 See on the importance of Augustine for the development of a theory of will Albrecht Dihle, The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity (Berkely, 1982), 123–44.

23 See Richard of Saint Victor, Beniamin minor 7, ed. Jean Châtillon and Monique Duchet-Suchaut (Paris, 1997), 108; see also Beniamin maior 3.23, ed. Marc-Aelko
Cistercians, such as Bernard of Clairvaux, William of Saint Thierry, Isaac of Stella and Adam of Perseigne. For these authors, as for Hugh, affectus are part of man’s nature, a part, though, which, after the Fall has become deeply problematic, in need of moderation and ordering. Hugh’s definition even recurs in thirteenth-century moral theology, where it is sometimes discussed among other definitions of virtue.

Affects, passions, and what are now generally called emotions have increasingly been the subject of interest among historians and philosophers. This interest reflects developments in science and psychology, which have led to a better understanding of the working of emotions from a neurological and psychological point of view. An awareness that contemporary Western culture with its widespread ideal of emotional directness and emotional transparency nevertheless has its own

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26 Isaac of Stella, *Sermo* 3.1, ed. Anselm Hoste (Paris, 1967), 114; *Sermo* 17.11, p. 318. Here and in his *Epistola de anima*, PL 194:1878D–1879A, Isaac, following Augustine, incorporates virtue within his discussion of the three aspects of the soul, rationabilitas, concupiscibilitas, and irascibilitas. The latter two are at the origin of the affectus, which constitute the “material” for virtues and vices.


codes or “emotional regimes,” differentiated according to age, class, gender, and other factors, might make it easier to overcome the difficulty of accessing the affective economies of the past.\(^{30}\) The specific context of monks and canons, of their literary and theological traditions, constitutes a code of its own, directly influencing discussions about virtue such as Hugh’s.\(^{31}\)

Hugh’s definition of virtue as an ordered affect moves away from the conventional definition as he had quoted it in the *Didascalicon*, namely of virtue as *mentis habitus*. Whatever may be the source for the definition, the discussion which follows it cannot be reduced to

\(^{30}\) In her conclusion to *Anger’s Past*, 246–47, Rosenwein distinguishes the history of the social use of an emotion from other possible histories, e.g. a history of representations of anger (as a deadly sin), or an intellectual history (about anger as a vice), or a literary history (of e.g. anger’s role in structuring narratives). This distinction partly meets the appeal of Newhauser, “Zur Zweideutigkeit,” 389, to take the medieval discussion about the “lability of all moral values” into account in discussing the place of a medieval emotion; however, not in all medieval contexts would the discussion about moral values be equally relevant. For a discussion of earlier periods of positive evaluation of “sentiments” see William M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge, 2001).

a problem of sources and influences.\textsuperscript{32} Hugh’s discussion recalls his efforts, earlier in \textit{De sacramentis}, to establish what makes a rational being (angel or man) a moral agent. In his examination of the \textit{conversio} or \textit{aversio} of the angels, Hugh had shown how free will turned out to be decisive: before the moment of the Fall, the angels were good and just and happy by a natural goodness and justice and happiness, not by their own free choice. However, these words, good, just, happy, referring to a state of innocence, do not have real meaning yet: goodness, Hugh explained here, implies virtue, justice implies merit, happiness refers to glorification.\textsuperscript{33} These words make sense only when the possibility of evil, injustice, unhappiness, is present—and has been refused by free will. Some angels did just this: refused evil, and thereby turned towards God; others by their own will turned away from God. In an inextricable knot of grace and free will the good angels were good voluntarily, while grace co-operated, the bad angels averted from the good as grace deserted them in the very moment of aversion.\textsuperscript{34}

In the analysis of virtues of man before the Fall, Hugh emphasizes, perhaps even more strongly, the role of grace (\textit{gratia reparatrix}). He concludes that man had indeed natural virtues in paradise, such as were implanted in him: affects ordered according to nature, by which he was naturally drawn to seek goodness and justice.\textsuperscript{35} If man wills according to nature, however, this does not imply merit outside of nature. The concept of virtues according to nature, thus, relates not to the issue of whether non-Christians can have virtue. It will come as no surprise that Hugh thinks that pagans cannot have real virtue, even though they can have the \textit{species virtutis}, although sometimes—e.g. in the \textit{Didascalicon}—he talks about the exemplary behaviour of

\textsuperscript{32} A shift in the vocabulary of virtue from \textit{habitus} to \textit{affectio} occurs in Boethius, \textit{In Categorias Aristotelis 2}, PL 64:220C: “quoniam virtus et vitia utraque sunt habitus, virtus enim est mentis affectio in bonam partem, et difficile commutabilis, vitium affectio in malam partem, ipsa quoque difficile mobili et diurnitate perdurans;” see also Pseudo-Augustine, \textit{Categoriae decem ex Aristotele deceptae} 12, PL 32:1433: “Habitus affectio est animi longo tempore perseverans: ut est virtus et disciplina . . . ;” \textit{sententia} no. 68 of the \textit{Liber Pancrisis} (c. 1120), ed. Odon Lottin, \textit{Psychologie et morale aux XII\textsuperscript{e} et XIII\textsuperscript{e} si\textec{c}les}, 6 vols. (Gembloux-Louvain, 1942–60) 5:59: “Is uirtutem habet, animi affectum; peccatum quod in eo est mortiferum, nisi uere penituerit, affectus animi eius non est.”

\textsuperscript{33} \textit{De sacramentis} 1.5.19, 254C–255A.

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid. 1.5.24, 257A.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid. 1.6.17, 274D.
pagan philosophers. At best, their virtue is ultimately deficient, because real virtue, as Hugh said in his De Scripturis, is defined by caritas and directed towards God. 36 In Hugh’s discussion of man’s pre-lapsarian situation the idea of natural virtue seems to confirm a state of innocence, outside man’s moral agency—an agency which is really bound up with the situation after the Fall and the issue of liberum arbitrium. As so often in his narrative of creation before the Fall, and almost unnoticeably, in this exploration of virtue Hugh shifts to a post-lapsarian perspective when he discusses virtue according to grace. Only if one wills something for the sake of God does this imply merit, by which man deserves a reward beyond nature: the presence of God. More than when he discussed the Fall of the angels, Hugh emphasizes the gratia reparationis, and insists that it is the Holy Spirit who first effects this “good will” and then co-operates with man. 37

What is equally important, but as we shall see later, is in the end equally elusive, is perseverance, perseverantia. Where Anselm of Canterbury had discussed this ultimate category in relation to the devil, who did not will till the end (non pervoluit), 38 Hugh, who is indebted to Anselm in many respects, uses the concept here, and later as we

36 See e.g. Didascalicon 3.14, p. 64, where Hugh refers his readers to the example of the philosophers of antiquity. In his Homiliae in Ecclesiasten 10, PL 175:178A–B, after sketching the pagans’ vain search for truth, Hugh allows for their often imitable behaviour, good in the sense that it is part of creation, but not in an ultimate sense, redirected by reparation. For the species virtutis, see e.g. ibid. 16, 230D–231B. In a similar way, William of Saint Thierry, Expositio in Canticum 21.101, p. 75 (a passage preceding that which was quoted above, n. 25) allows for an appearance of virtue among pagans.

37 De sacramentis 1.6.17, 274BC: “Sed in his virtutibus quae per gratiam reparationem sunt primum Spiritus sanctus bonam voluntatem operatur; deinde bonae voluntati moventi se et operanti cooperatur. Primum bonam voluntatem aspirat ut sit, deinde bonae voluntati inspirat ut moveatur, et operatur ut vacua non sit. Primum operatur eam, deinde operatur per eam. Bona enim voluntas instrumentum est, Spiritus sanctus est artifex.” Hugh goes on to explain that, as it is the Holy Spirit who first “works” the free will, and then works through it, a good work is good in man’s will, not because of it. For a similar view on natural virtues in relation to grace see In Threnos, 259A, 272A–B. Richard of Saint Victor (see above, n. 23), Beniamin maior 3.24, p. 83 (= PL 196:133CD) likewise sees the role of grace and of the Holy Spirit as decisive: “Absque dubio quidquid boni in bonorum cordibus agitur, septiformis ille Spiritus per inspirantem gratiam operatur... Nam sine cooperaente gratia omnino non sufficimus vel ad cognitionem veritatis vel ad amorem virtutis.”

shall see, in the context of humanity’s “falling short”. Hugh is not sure whether man, before the Fall, had virtues “according to grace”. However that may be, “even if man began to love his Creator, it was not at all praiseworthy, because he did not persevere, and the movement of incipient virtue was extinguished”. In this way, as so often in Hugh’s discussion of the world before the Fall, this Fall casts its shadow. Or rather, although on the level of doctrine man’s state before and after the Fall are distinguished, on the level of the reader’s reading experience, transcending the level of doctrine, here as in other works, the pre-lapsarian perspective is just that: a perspective, or a point of view which lights up for a moment, only to give way to the dark and ambivalent realities of life in this world.

**Virtue and Gratuity**

So, while discussing man’s situation before the Fall, Hugh seems to use the idea of virtue to establish man’s moral status. Natural virtues, in this context, really show a state of moral neutrality, of pre-lapsarian, pre-moral bliss. However, in Hugh’s view of man’s morality, even if man is a moral agent, there is no such thing as man’s autonomous exercise of virtue. Man’s moral agency is embedded in the role of grace and the working of the Spirit. That becomes obvious again in Book Thirteen of Part Two of *De sacramentis*, where Hugh presents a third “definition” of virtue. Here, in the context of his elaborate treatment of the sacraments (meaning all aspects of Christian life, including liturgical sacraments), Hugh discusses vices and virtues. In this context virtues are the medicine for the vices. Even the *vitia*, however, are subject to ambiguity: as long as man does not give his consent to what they propose, they are a weakness, which deserves pity, and to the extent that one abstains from a deed of iniquity, this act even deserves reward (*premium et corona*). Comparable to

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40 *De sacramentis* 1.6.17, 275A: “Etsi quidem amare creatorem suum coepit, hoc tamen omnino laudabile non fuit, quia non perseveravit; quia mutus incipientis virtutis extinctus est.”

41 A similar intermingling of a pre- and post-lapsarian view of man and his virtue, and of the respective roles of nature and grace, can be found in *In Threnos*, 271B–272A.
Abelard’s position on the subject, Hugh holds that for a vice to become a sin consent alone suffices, even when no external act is committed. (Later in *De sacramentis* Hugh, discussing penitence, will explain that not acting when one could act indicates that the will is not good.)⁴² Thus, vices become the matter for self-formation rather than just being evil.

After his discussion of vices, Hugh does not so much define as rather explain what virtue is, without direct reference to his other definitions: “Virtue is as it were a certain soundness and wholeness of the rational soul, whose corruption is called vice.”⁴³ If the definition in the *Didascalicon* seemed to serve a scholarly purpose, and the definition in the story of man’s pre-lapsarian state had a theological and anthropological meaning, Hugh’s discussion of virtue here is exegetical (and, as far as his work is meant to be used by priests, pastoral). This exegetical aspect is even more obvious in the short treatise *De quinque septenis*, which partly parallels the passage in *De sacramentis*, as Hugh comments on the five lists of seven things in scripture: *vitia*, *petitiones* of the Lord’s prayer, the *dona Spiritus*, virtues, and *beatitudines*, pursuing their connections via sometimes rather artful constructions.

Hugh distinguishes between virtue and the *opus justitiae*, just as he had distinguished between vice and actual sin, but he does not pursue the parallel.⁴⁴ Many virtues are listed in Scripture, says Hugh, especially in the Gospel, where they are presented as it were as *antidota* or *sanitates* against the corruption of the seven vices. Hugh mentions *humilitas*, *mansuetudo*, *mentis compunctio*, *desiderium justitiae*, *misericordia*, *cordis munditia*, *pax mentis interna*. The list of virtues which Hugh presents here is not a common one, corresponding as it does with the list of the seven beatitudes derived from the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. 5).

However, Hugh does not elaborate on these seven virtues. Rather—and this brings us back to the *affectus* in his earlier definition in *De

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⁴³ Ibid. 2.13.2, 526D: “Virtus enim quasi quaedam sanitas est et integritas animae rationalis, cujus corruptio vitium vocatur.”

⁴⁴ Ibid. 2.13.2, 526D. Cf Hugh’s definition of virtue in the *Miscellanea* (above, n. 21).
sacramentis—he goes on to discuss at length fear and love, timor and amor, which he says are “the two movements of the heart, by which the rational soul is impelled to whatever it does”.  

What Hugh presents here can be seen as an elaboration of the role of affectus in his earlier definition, where one single will, either trying to avoid something or to acquire it (appetendo or fugiendo), was the root of many affects. Through timor and amor we respectively avoid or desire something. They are both ambivalent, depending on what is avoided or desired, and thus they are the door to either death or life. Timor has four sorts: servilis, mundanus, initialis, filialis. While in servile fear one does things to please men, and in mundane fear one fears to displease men, in either case one is less in fear of one’s conscience than of the opinion of one’s fellow men. Only the last two, initial and filial fear, are good. In initial fear virtue takes a beginning and vice an end, when one tries to cleanse one’s thoughts as well as one’s actions, for fear of God who does not see just the outer actions, but also the inner. When charity is joined to it, fear becomes timor filialis. There is an aspect of punishment (poena) that comes along with this fear, as long as in this life we wander in uncertainty; and the state of life can still turn to either side.

The main subject of the remaining chapters of Book Thirteen is a lengthy discussion of caritas—that is the right sort of love. Hugh is not concerned to talk about its negative counterpart, which he called cupiditas earlier, but even without cupiditas there is enough ambiguity here. This ambiguity is only highlighted when Hugh sometimes seems to write drama rather than a scholastic summa. At one point, for instance, Hugh argues against people—the author of a short “sentence” De caritate, very probably Walter of Mortagne, held this position; Abelard held a similar view—who say that if one loves God because of oneself—that is, if one has any wish for divine rewards for human love—this shows that one’s love of God is impure, a mercenary, servile love, not filial love.  

Hugh presents his argument vividly: “They say they love God, but they do not seek him. That is the

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45 Ibid. 2.13.3, 527B: “Sane duo sunt motus cordis, quibus anima rationalis ad omne quod facit agendum impellitur. Unus est timor, alter amor.”

46 On the importance of this distinction between outer and inner (often called fama and conscientia) see Newhauser, “Zur Zweideutigkeit.” See on the duality of fame and conscience also Karl F. Morrison, Understanding Conversion (Charlottesville, 1990), 98–106.
same as saying that they do not care about him. I, a human being, would not want to be loved like that, and if you loved me like that I would not care about your love. Now you will see whether it is worthy to offer God something which a man would worthily reject.” If one seeks, not for something from God, but for God himself, one certainly loves him freely.\footnote{See De caritate, attributed to Walter of Mortagne, ed. R. Wielocks, “La Sentence De caritate et la discussion scolastique sur l’amour”, Ephemerides theologicae Lovanienses 58 (1982): 69–73. See John Marenbon, The Philosophy of Peter Abelard (Cambridge, 1997), 298–301, for a correction of the datation of this work (before 1126), which Abelard would have known, as well as for Abelard’s nuancing of this position and Heloise’s probable influence on Abelard’s idea of selfless love. See also Constant J. Mews, The Lost Love Letters of Heloise and Abelard: Perceptions of Dialogue in Twelfth-Century France (New York, 1999), 136–38. On the connections between Hugh and Abelard see Ralf M.W. Stammberger, “De longe ueritas uidetur diuersa iudicia parit:’ Hugh of Saint Victor and Peter Abelard”, Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 58 (2002): 65–92. See for further differences between Hugh and Walter of Mortagne Wielockx, “La Sentence De caritate”, Ephemerides theologicae Lovanienses 59 (1988): 33–34; Ludwig Ott, Untersuchungen zur theologischen Briefliteratur der Frühscholastik unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Viktorinerkreises (Münster, 1937), 340–85.}

Next, Hugh mentions the idea, which he himself had expounded in De Scripturis, that charity is a necessary condition for other virtues to have merit (in De Scripturis this was exactly why pagan ethical philosophy was found wanting): “They say that charity has such great and so much force (virtutem) that without it all other virtues could not have the merit of eternal reward with God, even though somehow they could be contained in a natural feeling (affectum) inclined towards the good.”\footnote{Ibid. 2.13.11, 539B–C: ‘Dicunt charitatem talem ac tantam virtutem habere, ut sine illa reliquae virtutes omnes quamvis aliquo modo secundum affectum naturae ad bonum proclivem inesse possint, meritum tamen aeternae retributionis apud Deum habere non possint.’} Hugh then answers the question (for some, a related question) as to whether one who has caritas can lose it.\footnote{See De caritate, ed. Wielocks, “La Sentence De caritate”, 82–83. See also Ott, Untersuchungen, 329–35. Abelard treats the issue in his question 138 in Sic et Non, ed. Blanche B. Boyer and Richard McKeon (Chicago, 1976–77), 471–84.} Hugh insists that love, the head of all virtues, can be lost, but that does not mean that it was not real love. Hugh’s admission of the
possibility of loss seems to be in contrast with a contemporary Aristotelian philosophical position on virtue as a *habitus*, which cannot be lost easily.\(^{51}\) In other places Hugh talks about how virtues are strengthened and grow from a weak beginning, but he never allows his reader to lose sight of the ultimate gratuity of it all.\(^{52}\) Those who say that love cannot be lost, Hugh argues, are wrong. Why not say similarly that those who are bad cannot be good? Hugh again points to the ambivalence which defines man’s position: “We live in time, where everything turns around in uncertainty, and from time you make an eternity for me?”\(^{53}\) The opponent, as Hugh shows in the end, has not understood the simple truth that for something to disappear it must have been there in the first place.\(^{54}\) This argument may not satisfy the opponent’s wish for unambiguous clarity, but, Hugh insists, here on earth, as long as there is change, a good person can become evil and an evil person can be good.\(^{55}\)

That becomes obvious when Hugh answers those who say that this *dilectio* which did not last maybe should not be called *caritas*. The one word is Latin, the other Greek, but both words mean the same thing, as Scripture tells us. If they say that charity is that love which is perfect, the next question is what is this perfect love, and if they say: well, the love that cannot be lost, they are caught in a circle.\(^{56}\) Hugh points to David and asks where his “perfect charity” was when he killed and committed adultery. If they who do such things have charity, and if it is also true that those who have charity can do what they wish, as is said in the famous *habe caritatem et fac quod vis*, surely it is proven that whatever they do is not sin. Hugh rejects this absurd position: “Let them go then with their charity, as they have great defenders, some holding that they do not lose charity, others even conceding that they do whatever they do with charity.”\(^{57}\)

Another question which Hugh discusses and which throws some
further light on his views on the matter of virtue and affectus concerns a certain piousness which one can somehow feel, while having consented to sin. Hugh refers again to the example of David, and Peter, when he denied Jesus. Nobody should mistake this affectus for love of God. In the reverse case, where someone has turned to God but still has some affections which have to do with past evil, if such a person is established in good purpose, these memories are not held against him. The decision of the will, or the consent of the mind, determine the quality of one’s actions. Without the good purpose of the will, such feelings of piety, originating maybe from practice, or nature, cannot have the merit of justice. Thus, such an affectus is far from decisive.58 It cannot be decisive, as not only our temporal world is uncertain and a place of ambivalence, but the very affectus itself is often the locus of ambiguity.

**Virtue and Ambiguity**

This is what Hugh had explained already in his *De institutione novitiorum*, when he recommended circumspection: the wise always learn by doing, and increase in greater knowledge of virtue by the practice of good works.59 Through the experience of what they do they become more cautious as to what they will do. Things are not necessarily what they seem, as it often happens that the good intention with

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58 Ibid. 2.13.12, 548B–C: “De affecto vero pietatis quem hujusmodi peccantes nonnumquam habere videntur, quando simul et peccare consentiunt, et tamen quodammodo in peccato quod non deserunt, dolore quodam affici non desistunt; cavedunt tamen est omnino ne dilectionis Dei nomine dignus existimetur. Si enim in ipsis qui ab iniquitate ad justitiam convertuntur, affectus quidam et dilectiones praeteritorum malorum remanent; qui tamen in bono proposito constitutis ad iniquitatem non imputantur; quare non similibar in ipsis qui ad iniquitatem declinaverunt ex usu praeteritae virtutis etiam in malo proposito affectiones quaedam amissi sive corrupti boni aliquando superesse dicantur, quae quidem sine proposito bonae voluntatis ex usu sive ex natura inesse possunt; sed sive ipso meritum justitiae habere non possunt. Unum enim hoc est propositum scilicet voluntatis sive consensus animi ex voluntate surgens cui soli judicium est cum Deo, et hoc solum si bonum est non est ad malum quidquid in homine est sive bonum sit sive malum; item si malum est, non est ad bonum quidquid reliquum est sive bonum sive malum.” See on this passage also Ott, *Untersuchungen*, 337. For the insufficiency of “natural piety” in the *Liber Pancrisis* see *sententia* no. 68, ed. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 5:59. See on the affectus for the good as insufficient also above, n. 36, where Hugh talks about the reprobate and pagan philosophers.

59 *De institutione novitiorum* 9, p. 44 (= PL 176:934B).
which, as one believes, a work is begun, turns out to be deceptive. Only the outcome shows what the real intention was, as the affectus animi can be ambiguous. Rather than taking one’s intention for granted, one should consider carefully to what end the mind’s affection tends (ad quem finem tendat mentis affectio): what seemed to be virtue, turned out to be vice.60

If the affectus is not unambiguous, neither is it left to itself. As Hugh explains in other works, the affects are touched by the visible things in the world, which in itself is good, as long as it leads to love of the invisible good.61 After the Fall this is not naturally the case. That is the state of affairs which Hugh not only explains, but also tries to remedy, or helps the reader to remedy, following the biblical writers whose works he presents in his exegesis. Thus, for example, the Book of Ecclesiastes, says Hugh, is completely intended to move the affects of the human heart.62 According to Hugh’s exegesis, in the words in which the Ecclesiast tells of our misery he also attracts our affect.63 In his commentary on Ecclesiastes as well as in his other works, this is exactly what Hugh intends the reader to accomplish: to somehow focus and order his affects—as well as his thoughts, as these strengthen the affects. In Hugh’s view affectus and cogitationes are closely connected, and they mutually generate each other.64 The ambiguity of thought depends on the affectus which is at its root: we think most of what we love, as is easily shown through


61 See e.g. De arrha animae, p. 228; In Ecclesiasten 2, 142D.

62 In Ecclesiasten 1, 133A–B.: “...cum totus ad commovendos affectus cordis humani intendat...”

63 Ibid. 2, 133B–C: “Hoc ergo erat quod in illis verbis, quae nostram recitabant miseriam, nostrum traxit affectum.”

64 See e.g. De verbo dei, in Hugues de Saint-Victor: Six opuscules spirituels, 68: “Quod vero desideria cogitationes gignere diximus, nemini qui seipsum cognoscat ignotum esse potest, quia illius profecto saepius in cogitatione volvimus cuius amore plus affecti sumus... Rursus quod cogitationes desideria generent, Psalmista ostendit dicens: In meditatione mea ardescet ignis, quia cuius rei cogitatio animo frequenter insederit, illius amor aceror in corde exardescit.” See also In Threnos, 318B: “Quia enim, ut saepe dictum est, cogitationes ab affectibus prodeunt, dum ex corruptis cogitationes corrumpuntur, quasi ex infecta radice rami amaritudinem trahunt.”
each of the vices and virtues. Yet, by concentrating on thought, in meditation, the reader strengthens his love of God.\textsuperscript{65}

This view of the relation between affectus and cogitatio is at the root of Hugh’s efforts to present his reader, in his work, with a way out of his post-lapsarian unrest. Thus, in his work on the Ark, Hugh wants the reader to build an inner Ark, out of the material of his own thoughts. Just as everything has been made by God, so can everything be the object of sinless thought. Thus, thoughts are not to be judged according to what they are about, but according to the affect that they produce, and a thought cannot pollute the mind if delight in it does not corrupt the conscience.\textsuperscript{66} The close connection between virtue, affectus, cogitatio, and exegetical reading is clear in many works. In \textit{De archa} Hugh explains the three mansions of the Ark as representing stages of right, useful and necessary thinking, respectively. Thinking about the virtues of the saints is right, but not useful, if it is not followed by thinking about how I can make the virtues which I admire in others my own.\textsuperscript{67} In the last stage of thinking Hugh seems to point again to a possible ambiguity, this time of outer versus inner, when he urges the reader to have not only “the works of virtue”, but also the virtues themselves, as they will appear not to people, but to God. Here as elsewhere, virtus seems to be something internal, not so much generating works of virtue, but defining the ultimate quality of this work.\textsuperscript{68} In his explanation of the three mansions he concludes by saying that one virtue is necessary above all, namely charity. Thus, the Ark comes together in one point, “where we have one thought, one expectation, one desire, our Lord Jesus Christ,” and Hugh refers back to the

\textsuperscript{65} In \textit{Threnos} 290D–291A.
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid. 2.5, p. 40–41.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid. 2.5, p. 41: “Restat tertium, ut cum cepero habere opera uirtutum elaboarem quoque ipsas uirtutes habere, hoc est ut quod foris demonstro in opere intus possideam in uirtute. Alioquin non multum michi prodest habere opera, nisi etiam uirtutes operum habeam. Si ergo ad hoc cogitationem cordis mei instituo, ut quicquid boni in me foris humanis apparat aspectibus diuinis intus satagam presentare obtutibus, tunc ascendi in tertiam mansionem, ubi uirtutes sunt quae sunt necessarie.” As Hugh says in an exegesis of the tree of wisdom, symbolized by the colon in the middle of the ark, it is through virtue that the tree carries fruit, even if it has already flowered through good works (3.13, p. 81). However, just as in his story of pre-lapsarian man, this virtue will not be of any benefit without patience and perseverance (3.14, pp. 81–82).
triad from the Psalm which had been the point of departure of his *Institutio novitiorum*.69 *Bonitas*, and by consequence virtue, is not first of all a *habitus* or *affectus* or even *sanitas*, but is associated with the outcome, or maybe the grace, of inner concentration, the monk’s ongoing but ever receding goal.

To conclude, I return once more to the chapters on charity in Book Thirteen of the Second Part of *De sacramentis*, and the question as to whether charity can be lost. As we saw, Hugh thinks that this is the case, yet it does not imply that there was no true charity. Thus, the persistent opponent asks, what if David had died while in sin, would he have been damned? And what about those who really had charity but lost it without then regaining it, as David did? Here, Hugh, quoting Augustine, appeals to predestination, acknowledging that he has let himself in for unsolvable questions: “Here, if I am asked why God did not give them perseverance, I reply that I do not know.”70 To the end Hugh maintains that one can have real charity and can also lose it. This does not mean that it was simulated, but that one did not persevere in it. It means that one is among those who have been called, but not chosen. However, just as pre-lapsarian bliss shines through *De sacramentis* as the obverse side of reality, so the dark and unambiguous shadow of predestination, at this point in the middle of Hugh’s discussion of the remedies for man’s guilt, can halt the reader only temporarily.

In *De sacramentis*, the book following the one on the lofty questions of love and predestination is about confession and penitence—

69 Ibid. 2.5, p. 41: “Sed inter has omnes precipue una est necessaria (id est caritas), que nos Deo coniungit. Et ideo in supremo archa ad unum colligitur, ut iam unum cogitemus, unum expectemus, unum desideremus: Dominum Iesum Christum. In prima ergo mansione est cognitio, in secunda opus, in tertia uirtus, in supremo premium uirtutis: Dominus Iesus Christus. Hos gradus habes in Psalmo ubi dicit: ‘Bonitatem et disciplinam et scientiam.’ Si conuertas: ‘Scientiam et disciplinam et bonitatem doce me Domine Iesu Christe.’” Cf. the ternary in *De institutione*, see above, p. 75 and n. 1. A very similar ternary seems to resonate earlier in *De archa* 1.3, p. 10, where Hugh talks about the Ark of Noe as an example to build an inner ark: “Videbis ibi colores quosdam, formas et figuras que delectent uisum. Sed scire debes ideo hec posita esse, ut in eis discas sapientiam, disciplinam atque uirtutem que exornent animum tuum.”

70 *De sacramentis* 2.13.12, 550A: “Hic si a me quaeratur cur eis Deus perseverantiam non dederit: qui eam qua christianae viverent dilectionem dedit; me ignorant respondeo;” Augustine, *De correptione et gratia* 8.17, PL 44:925D–926A. Abelard quotes the same passage in *Sic et Non* 138, p. 481.
perhaps more relevant to the ordinary monastic reader. At one point, Hugh returns to the issue of the will. Hugh reassures his reader and tells him not to despair, even if he does not have the opportunity to do penance. Explaining why, if the will is what determines merit, good works should follow if at all possible, he once more evokes ambiguity: “Such is the heart of man that by his work he becomes more ardent either towards loving the good, if it is right, or loving malice, if it is evil. Thus, on each side the affection is nourished, and the work has merit because of the will, but the measure of merit depends on the measure of the will.”

We are reminded of Hugh’s *In Threnos*, where he explained how God permits virtues to perish, or to be injured. As one does not know whether God sends his temptations as a means of correction or as part of the way to ultimate, predestined ruin, the reader always has to fear danger. However, even here under the large-looming shadow of divine anger, the words of the prophet: “You, God, have not pitied”, nec misertus es, express not despair, but fear, timor, the point of departure in the monastic salvation-economy. Here, as in *De sacramentis*, Hugh continues, among other things, to recommend penitence. As long as he is in this life, man must recall the evil he has done, so as to frighten himself into penitence. Better, then, for the monastic reader of Hugh’s work, in the shadows of both prelapsarian innocence and the predestined end, to just carry on, even without a coherent theory of virtue, and try to persevere till the end.

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71 Ibid. 2.14.6, 560CD.
72 Ibid. 2.14.6, 561BC: “Sed dicis iterum: Si totum meritum in voluntate est, nihil amplius ex opere est, etiam quando ipsum cum voluntate est; quare ergo opus requiritur si pro opere merito hominis nihil adjicitur vel aurrertur? Audi quare. Ideo post voluntatem etiam opus requiritur, ut ipso opere voluntas augeatur. Tale est cor hominis ut opere suo amplius inardescat, sive ad bonitatem amandam si rectum est; sive ad malitiam si pravum est. Ita utrinque affectus opere nutritur, ut crescat, et amplior sit; ut vix fieri potest ut voluntas opere suo non augeatur. Quantum ergo voluntas crescit, tantum meritum crescit, et tantum ipsum opus voluntati aut prodest in bonum, aut in malum nocet quantum ipsum voluntatem ad affectum bonitatis, sive malitiae, accendendo exercet.”
73 *In Threnos*, 318CD.
74 Ibid., 520C.
BERNARD OF CLAIRVAUX’S *DE GRADIBUS HUMILITATIS ET SUPERBIAE* AND THE POSTMODERN REVISIONING OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY

John Kitchen

Fascination with contradiction, admissions of bafflement, even hints of exasperation mark some of the most insightful guides to the work of Bernard of Clairvaux. G.R. Evans, for instance, begins and ends her treatment of this twelfth-century Cistercian by emphasizing how paradoxes (ultimately resolved) conditioned not only Bernard’s mode of thought but also his way of life.¹ More telling is Thomas Merton’s succinct articulation of the central problem facing Bernard-scholarship. In a sentence revealing both the frustration with and the acceptance of gaining, at best, an imperfect knowledge of his subject, Merton opens his treatment of Bernard on a cautionary note: “The enigma of sanctity is the temptation and often the ruin of historians.”² Perhaps Bernard would concur, for his own assessment of his place in the history of his time conveys the anxiety of a person so perplexed by his disparate activities that he likens his conflicted roles in life to the figure of a mythical beast composed of mismatched parts: “I am a kind of chimera of my age, neither cleric nor layman. I have long stripped off the way of life, but not the habit, of the monk.”³

The great attraction among contemporary scholars to Bernard the chimera and to the several writings comprising his extensive literary corpus has itself drawn the attention of one of the leading monastic researchers in our time. Jean Leclercq notes how the study of Bernard’s complex life has led to the discovery of multiple Bernards. There is, for instance, a Bernard of theology and another of politics; one of psycho-analysis, another of sociology; even a Bernard of Marxist

³ On Bernard as chimera, see Caroline W. Bynum, *Jesus as Mother: Studies in the Spirituality of the High Middle Ages* (Berkeley, 1982), 81.
In addition to these Bernards, along with several others that could be mentioned, the title of this paper raises the question of whether it is fitting to offer a Bernard of postmodernism, specifically a Bernard viewed through the lenses of a postmodern ethics.

To address the issue within the limited scope of my discussion, let me stress at the outset that, instead of treating the question in either/or terms, as opposing alternatives of interpretation, I propose to try to utilize the postmodern literature in a way that builds on the more specialized scholarship of medievalists. In other words, I do not intend to “bracket-out” the twelfth century, to reinterpret Bernard’s thought only for the sake of making him palatable to postmodern tastes, much as certain Neo-scholastics had once sought an existential retrieval of Thomas Aquinas’s thought. I maintain that

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5 The very notion of a “postmodern ethics” is problematic and requires explanation. Addressing the issue is Edith Wyschogrod, Saints and Postmodernism: Revisioning Moral Philosophy (Chicago, 1990), xiii: “A postmodern ethics? Is this not a contradiction in terms? If postmodernism is a critical expression describing the subversion of philosophical language, ‘a mutant of Western humanism,’ then how can one hope for an ethics when the conditions for meaning are themselves under attack? But is not this paradox—the paradox of a postmodern ethic—just what is required if an ethic is to be postmodern? Does not the term postmodern so qualify the term ethics that the idea of ethics, the stipulation of what is to count as lawful conduct, is subverted? And is a postmodern ethics then not an ethics of the subversion of ethics so that ethics turns into its opposite, a nihilism that is unconstrained by rules? Yet if postmodernism succeeds modernism as the term implies, nihilism in not postmodernism in any straightforward chronological sense because it flourished in the nineteenth century and, as a species of antinomianism, has ancient roots in Greek Sophism and Roman Cynicism. The matter therefore is not simple. The word postmodern prefixed to ethics as its qualifier becomes neither the mere negation of what has, at various times, been interpreted as lawful conduct nor the sign of a dialectical reverberation between normative ethics and its opposite, the negation of the defiance of norms. This is because the term postmodern is not an innocuous modifier, a word that is subordinated to the word it modifies. The relation between ‘ethics’ and ‘postmodernism’ is complex and requires a radical rethinking of the syntactic and semiotic possibilities of each. A postmodern ethics must look not to some opposite of ethics but elsewhere, to life narratives, specifically those of saints, defined in terms that both overlap and overturn traditional normative stipulations and that defy the normative structure of moral theory.”

6 Redressing the negative reception of postmodernism among certain scholars is Philipp W. Rosemann, Understanding Scholastic Thought with Foucault (New York, 1999), ix: “… despite its characteristic emphasis upon methodology and theory, the postmodern approach does not at all neglect the ‘facts.’ Its ‘reliance on theory’ is not at the expense of the ‘evidence.’” However, note that the question of historical con-
Bernard’s writing is intrinsically fascinating regardless of—perhaps even in spite of—one’s methodological orientation. More to the point, I am fully aware that Leclercq, while enthusiastically supporting new approaches to Bernard’s work, also cautions against utilizing methods that neglect the traditional research of philologists, theologians and historians, who hold for Leclercq a privileged place—whether deserved or not—among Bernard scholars.7

With Leclercq’s observation in mind, then, I propose to begin with a textual analysis of a well-know tract written early in Bernard’s career, a piece ostensibly composed for a monastic audience. The work takes as its starting point the Benedictine Rule, specifically the seventh chapter on humility, one of the “most marvelous virtues” as Bernard calls it.8 In my treatment of Bernard’s De gradibus humilitatis et superbiae, I shall dwell at length on one passage, considered within contemporary trends in the study of twelfth-century religion, specifically the research exploring the period’s so-called “discovery of the individual” and the question of the distinctiveness of the Cistercian life at a time in which religious orders fiercely contested each other’s claim to re-capture the spirit of primitive Christianity. Such issues, as I shall suggest, lead to broad, crucial considerations of how twelfth-century thinkers constructed their identity, envisaged the function and purpose of their religious orders, as well as articulated vital issues in the era’s theology, including the understanding of the Incarnation. Finally, after considering certain key features of humility in Bernard’s De gradibus along with the insights of the relevant research, I wish

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7 See Leclercq, “Toward a Sociological Interpretation,” 30–31: “...the Bernard of history and the Bernard of theology contribute most surely to our knowledge of the true Bernard.”

to reposition my discussion of the source and the scholarship within the perspective of Edith Wyschogrod’s recent study *Saints and Postmodernism: Revisioning Moral Philosophy*. Obviously, drawing on Wyschogrod’s insights to engage Bernard’s text marks a departure from the traditional approaches favored by Leclercq. Such a move, however, is not without precedent: the substantial, far-reaching studies by J. Joyce Schuld and Philipp W. Rosemann currently exemplify the potential of postmodern analysis for the investigation of medieval thought.9

**Defining Humility**

Naturally, Bernard’s definition of the virtue of humility offers the obvious starting point. Most apparent is the reflexive nature of Bernard’s characterization, for the intensive and reflexive pronouns, along with the use of the superlative, emphatically convey that self-knowledge is the foundation of this virtue. Indeed, the references to the self in this short sentence have a prominence that exceeds the Platonic imperative “Γνώθι σαυτόν,” to which aspects of Bernard’s thought have been likened: “humility is a power on the basis of which a man, in his own eyes, through the truest recognition of himself, is worthless.”10

The definition pre-supposes that the self is knowable, and knowable in a quite specific way, for this virtue is a cognitive power (*virtus*) that reveals to a person her or his genuine state, worthlessness. The definition thus comprises two aspects, that the kind of knowledge associated with humility is the most certain (*verissima*) knowledge of the self and that the acquisition of such knowledge induces a contempt for what one is. In other words, self-knowledge entails self-loathing. The marks of transgression are, as it were, inscribed on


the soul, making its appearance hideous, like a portrait deformed by sin.\textsuperscript{11}

Clearly, underlying Bernard’s understanding of humility is an epistemology tied to a fallen world, to a knowledge of the self as sinful. What is intriguing, perhaps even paradoxical, to echo Evans, is the way the definition expresses a confidence in the knowledge of a worthless being. In other words, if we consider the fullest implication of Bernard’s definition, we come to the recognition that, on the first step of the ladder of humility, epistemological certitude and human fallibility are interdependent. The virtue of humility, as opposed to the vice of pride discussed extensively in the book’s second portion, is a guarantor of truth, imparting the most accurate knowledge possible of one’s condition.

Yet the humble need not stay stuck in vileness. On this point consider M.B. Pranger’s illuminating chapter dealing specifically with the De gradibus. By bringing out the textual ambiguities arising from Bernard’s treatment of Benedict’s biblically based image, he has shown how the ladder is both a structure and an illusion of structure, how the steps are also states, and, most important, how ascent and descent are entwined. Hence we can have no doubt that this virtue is dynamic, not only in terms of its increase but also in terms of its decrease. The monk moves up and down the ladder, ascending its height to a vision of eternal life as well as descending into the abyss of death as the consequence of pride. As Pranger astutely notes, “[o]n whatever step of the ladder the monk finds himself on his way up, his caricature laughs in his face when he looks into the mirror of his own progress, just to watch himself tumbling down.”\textsuperscript{12}

However, for the purposes of the present discussion the question of how virtue and vice are interconnected are of less concern than the social dimension of humility as a second stage up the ladder once worthlessness has been recognized. In other words, it is clear from the description Bernard offers that the ascension entails a movement from a cognitive humility to an affective humility, and an

\textsuperscript{11} The comparison with Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray (Harmondsworth, 1985), 191, is apt, given that Dorian’s moral perversion, which appears to mar his portrait, as if the picture were his soul, while he himself retains his youthful beauty, is explicitly attributed to humility’s counterpart: “The prayer of your pride has been answered.”

\textsuperscript{12} M.B. Pranger, Bernard of Clairvaux and the Shape of Monastic Thought: Broken Dreams (Leiden, 1994), 99.
understanding of the latter is crucial to the argument that will be formulated later with regard to the virtue’s relation to ethics.

The Other as Another Myself

In terms of how ascending the ladder facilitates moral awareness, note that arising out of the consciousness of one’s own worthlessness is a generalizing recognition of others in the same situation, a recognition, that is, of a fallen humanity. As we shall see in a moment, this recognition of pervasive “wretchedness” (miseria) is moral since it elicits “compassion” (misericordia) for others and generates the desire to cease their suffering. Hence, when viewed in light of humility’s ascending movement, self-knowledge is not an end but a means of experiencing and absorbing the pain of others in the lapsed condition.13 To put the matter in another way, this higher rung of humility, unlike the first one, does not lead to a contempt for the carnal and spiritual afflictions now coming into clear view; rather it induces a charitable response, a desire to alleviate human ills. At this point an ethics of humility becomes discernible, for now there appears not only the wretched condition of humanity but also its remedy—the example of Christ’s saving work. As the following passage indicates, “making the moves” of the Redeemer, showing compassion for others in misery, entails an actual experience of their suffering, a heart-felt identification with their plight that makes the other in need indistinguishable from the humble person, who is now compelled to moral action as mandated by the example of the incarnated Savior.14 In short, for both God and man humility informs the moral response to a fallen world. Given how significant the passage’s rhetoric and ideas are to certain debates in the study of twelfth-century religion as well as to the question of a postmodern ethics, it will be quoted at length:

The healthy one does not know what the sick one feels, nor does the one who has had his fill know what the hungry one suffers. The closer the sick one is to the sick, the hungry one to the hungry, the more

13 Gilson, La théologie mystique, 96.
intimately they suffer with each other. For just as pure truth is seen only with a pure heart, so the misery of a brother is more truly felt with a miserable heart. But to have a miserable heart on account of another’s misery, you need to know your own heart, so that you may find your neighbor’s mind in your own, and know from yourself how to help him, namely by the example of our Savior, who willingly suffered to know how to be compassionate, who willingly became miserable to learn how to be merciful. As it has been written of him, “he learned obedience from the things which he suffered” (Heb. 5:8), so too he learned mercy. Not that he did not know how to be merciful before, he whose mercy is from eternity to eternity; but that which he knew by nature from eternity, he learned in time by experience.15

Based on the quotation, the ethics of humility comes into play through the experience of another’s suffering as one’s own suffering. The identity of the neighbor is so subsumed in the affective expression of humility that the mind of the one in need becomes inseparable from the mind of the one filling that need. The neighbor has become a kind of second self, with the mark of his identity, his *miseria*, absorbed by the humble heart and mind. In other words, while Bernard’s treatise exhibits the tendency of twelfth-century religious life and thought to search the “interior landscape,” to seek the “inner-self,” that internal gazing described in the *De gradibus* leads to an intense awareness of and identification with others.

In making that last point we may find grounds for asserting that Bernard’s understanding of humility as expressed in the passage just quoted confirms Caroline Walker Bynum’s contention that the construction of the self is occurring through identification with others. Based on the way Bernard articulates the operations of humility, it is the misery of another and the example of Christ—not a unique autonomous self—who come into view when the interior landscape is scrutinized. Her position is mentioned because several medievalists from different fields view the twelfth century as the era in which

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the self comes to take on a guise that we can recognize as virtually modern, as “an individual.” Against this position, Bynum reminds us that, historically speaking, the term *individuum* pertains to medieval logic rather than to psychology.\textsuperscript{16} More to the point, she highlights how twelfth-century religious sources reveal the construction of the self as occurring through types, especially as these types are represented in the lives of saints and, most important from the perspective of the passage just quoted, in the life of Christ. In other words, the sources convey no such notion as that of an autonomous person, an individual in our sense of the word, and hence such terminology should be abandoned.\textsuperscript{17}

In advocating the elimination of that terminology, Bynum does not neglect to acknowledge the importance of her adversaries’ work. As part of what has been called “the revolt of the medievalists,” the pinpointing of the twelfth century as the time of the individual’s emergence offers a valuable critique of long-lasting views of historians like Michelet and Burckhardt, who saw the Renaissance as the high point of Western civilization, to the detriment of the preceding period. But the sources themselves, in Bynum’s view, suggest something quite different from what most researchers imply when using the term individual, for the texts show religious figures turning to models and to communities in constructing their identities.

Another relevant point emerges in connection with Bynum’s corrective to the historiography on twelfth-century religion. Notice how Bernard’s text emphatically describes the divinity as becoming an obedient learner through the experience of assuming human form. While it is certainly true that twelfth-century authors generally speak of learning through experience (think of the beginning of Abelard’s *Historia calamitatum*), the reference to Christ as learner has a resonance that is group-specific.\textsuperscript{18} Ever since Herbert Grundmann’s innovative study of 1935, one of the most crucial and challenging issues to settle in the history of religious movements of the High Middle


\textsuperscript{17} Bynum, *Jesus as Mother*, 82–109.

Ages is how to distinguish one religious order from another, especially when new religious organizations are being founded, each with its claim to be leading the most genuine Christian life possible. Among the various orders are two groups, Cistercians and regular canons, which at times prove difficult for historians to distinguish, so much so that one tendency in the scholarship maintains that no fundamental difference exists between them. Again, Bynum’s analysis of the material offers one of the key insights into how white monks and canons saw themselves as different from each other. On the basis of studying the characteristic rhetoric deployed in the sources representing each group, Bynum argues that the canons consistently envisage their function as teaching *verbo et exemplo* while the monks emphasize learning and obedience, with the latter group “uncomfortable” with the canon’s “new interest in service of neighbor.”

By taking into account the divergent rhetoric associated with the two groups, we may uncover an underlying feature of the quoted passage designating Christ as the example of humility. By contextualizing that passage within the contentious atmosphere of twelfth-century religious orders, Bernard’s portrayal of the Incarnation has a quite specific ring to it, for the text is describing Jesus not simply as the world’s Savior but also as embodying key monastic virtues, obedience and learning. Thus the rhetoric here offers more than an expression of Christian soteriology; it functions as the mouthpiece of monastic polemics by attributing to Christ the distinctive traits of the ideal monk. Bernard implicates the Incarnation with the very characteristics of a virtuous Cistercian.

Given the findings of Bynum and other scholars, perhaps it comes as no surprise that Bernard’s conception of Christ as the model of humility is conditioned by historical circumstances arising from the tensions between religious organizations. Yet there is more here than simply veiled monastic polemics. In the description of how humility operates, the humble person seems to dissolve the distinction between himself and the “suffering Other,” to use the language of Wyschogrod, with the latter becoming the content of the former’s identity. For

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20 For the historiographic trends and scholarly literature see Bynum, *Jesus as Mother*, 22–58, 66–68.
21 Ibid., 71–75, 40–58.
that reason, it was suggested that Bernard’s description of the inner-workings of affective humility lends support to Bynum’s position on the debate over the individual. But this way of framing the issue brings to light only a partial picture of the role of identity in moral relations. Moreover, how the construction of identity relates to the period’s ethics is, understandably, not extensively explored in her relatively brief treatment of the individual.22 When considered from the perspective of ethics, the corrective to research on the twelfth-century “individual” leaves us with some challenging questions concerning the nature of identity in moral relations. If the self is being constructed through others, then what has become of the identity-status of those others? Have they ceased to be discrete selves in their own right? Perhaps in focusing so much on how the construction of the twelfth-century self occurred, both Bynum and the researchers she engages have not been attentive enough to the question of whether the identity of the other is irretrievably lost. It is a significant question, directly related to moral philosophy—significant because we are now faced with the task of considering the implications of a twelfth-century ethics that obliterates the distinction of the Other, that reduces the Other to “another myself.” If, as the passage suggests, humility is the great equalizer, then the ethical dimension of this virtue really dissolves not a self but the difference between one’s self and another. Humility creates symmetry instead of maintaining difference, a point emphatically made at the fundamental level of the passage’s rhetoric and syntax (though, admittedly, a rhetorical strategy characteristic of Bernard’s work in general). In short, Bernard’s affective humility entails the denial of alterity, and the denial of alterity, the conceiving of the Other as a second self, is one of the characteristics of a moral philosophy that Wyschogrod exposes as categorically inadequate for conducting moral discourse and practice.

Yet my aim is not to dismiss as inadequate the ethics underlying the passage from Bernard’s De gradibus. Wyschogrod’s analysis rests on a distinction between a genuine (postmodern) “saintly” altruism, which maintains alterity, and the kind of (modern) altruism associated with rationalistic moral philosophies, which break down alterity. There is no doubt, then, that the kind of “radical altruism” Wyschogrod

22 Note, however, that elsewhere the question of identity does receive sustained treatment by Bynum (though not primarily in the context of ethics): The Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 200–1336 (New York, 1995).
advocates depends on the primacy of alterity in moral relations. As she asserts, “[t]he other person opens the venue of ethics, the place where ethical existence occurs.” This “Other” is “the touchstone of” as well as “the precondition for moral existence.” Indeed, she goes so far as to describe the saint, the person “totally at the disposal of” those suffering, in terms of an actual “hostage to the Other.”

While Wyschogrod’s treatment turns to both pre-modern traditional and contemporary non-traditional hagiographic narratives to make her case for the primacy of the Other, she is nonetheless engaging a position in moral philosophy (altruism) that is itself a development of the modern era. Hence it is hardly worthwhile to critique Bernard’s ethics on Wyschogrodian grounds, grounds that do not correspond with the state of moral consciousness in the twelfth century. Rather than offer an anachronistic critique of Bernard, the present task is to examine Wyschogrod’s rationale for assaulting an ethics conceiving of the Other as another myself. By proceeding in this manner, the insights of Wyschogrod may be useful for pinpointing not the insufficiencies of Bernard’s ethics but a conceptual tension in the way he configures ethics and moral relations in De gradibus. In other words, Wyschogrod’s analysis, when viewed in light of the relevant research on the period, allows us to address the reason why Bernard makes the Other another myself as the above passage suggests.

Monasticism and the Conditioning of the Other’s Identity

Consider Wyschogrod’s critique of rationalistic philosophies of altruism, philosophies that are strikingly similar to the thought underlying the passage we have been examining. When treating the moral theory of Alan Gewirth, she observes:

[His] view presupposes the symmetry of self and Other so that features of the self relevant to a given moral context are also features attributed to an analogous Other. The agent extends the conditions of agency to the Other as a matter of course because the Other is another myself.

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24 For comments that may challenge or lead to qualifying this view, see Burch in Bernard of Clairvaux, The Steps of Humility, 108.
25 Wyschogrod, Saints and Postmodernism, 70.
Note what immediately follows, for as her critique continues we find it describes not only implications entailed by Gewirth’s moral philosophy but also key aspects of the humility-ethics expressed in the passage from *De gradibus*:

The freedom and well-being granted to another are ceded to a repositioned self, numerically distinct from, but otherwise identical to, oneself. Unless the distinction between self and Other is radically drawn, the difference between prudential and moral judgments is blurred. Because in law multiple persons and interests must be considered, the parity of self and Other is a necessary fiction. When moral rather than judicial relations are considered, the term Other loses its force unless there is an incommensurability, an asymmetry between self and Other.26

Wyschogrod’s critique rests largely on the premise that the conceiving of another person as a second self “entangles” moral relations in self-preservation and self-interests. As an alternative to this position, she turns to the nature of moral relations expressed in hagiographic literature. As a form of narrative, hagiography can subvert modern moral philosophy, especially the latter’s reliance on theories, theories that throughout modern intellectual history have shown themselves to be incapable of inducing moral action. She argues that, when retrieved through a postmodern analysis, the lives of saints—as opposed to moral theorizing—preserve the primacy of others, the radical alterity needed for a genuinely altruistic response to those in need. As previously indicated, Wyschogrod’s postmodern revisioning insists that for a moral philosophy to be compelling it must be founded on alterity, otherwise moral actions really amount to securing the well-being of the self rather than the Other. Indeed, recognizing the primacy of the Other is “constitutive” of the postmodern ethics she proposes:

If the starting point of ethics is not the self but the Other, the conditions of agency, conditions stemming from one’s own freedom and well-being, cannot provide the criteria of moral action. Beginning with the Other entails not only constraints on freedom and well-being, but the recognition of the constitutive character of alterity for the moral discourse and practice presupposed by these constraints... [S]aintly lives presuppose that the Other places a demand on them rather than that the Other is a second self to whom the conditions of agency are to be extended.27

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26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., 70–71.
When we consider Bernard’s *De gradibus* in light of such a statement, we find a correspondence between Wyschogrod’s postmodern, revisioning critique and the historical assessment of how Cistercians viewed service of others in the world. My point is this: it is not a coincidence that an ethics viewing the Other as another myself—precisely the kind of ethics represented by Bernard’s expression of affective humility—emerges within a religious outlook that subordinates the service of others to the perfection of one’s soul. The *De gradibus* itself assumes that the goal of life is not alleviating the suffering of others, but union with God. In other words, the Bernardian conception of ethics is actually a stage on the journey to personal salvation, a form of monastic ascesis, a way of purging and perfecting oneself so that divine contemplation may be achieved. Putting aside for the moment the work’s second part dealing with communal monastic relations, we may say that the conception of ethics underlying the previously quoted passage from *De gradibus* presupposes the legitimacy of privileging the monk’s ultimate self-interest, his salvation (hardly surprising for a thinker whose discourse on moral relations, historically speaking, cannot be expected to be anchored in altruism). But can we detect also a consciousness on Bernard’s part of conceiving ethics in another way, in a way that might problematize the legitimacy of personal salvation as the aim of moral thought and practice?

As already mentioned, Bynum has emphasized the tension between religious orders that taught by word and example in the world as a way of serving others and those such as the Cistercians, who emphasized personal virtue acquired through obedient learning and charity within the monastic walls. Indeed, the second part of *De gradibus*, with its farcical depictions of pride-stricken monks, treats extensively what can only be described as the social world of monasticism, vitiated by the deleterious influence of the *superbi*. So clearly the question of morals in monastic communal relations concerns Bernard, with his lively depiction of flawed monks socially interacting offering a sharp contrast to the more internalized world represented in the book’s first part. If, on the one hand and with respect to personal salvation, the ethics underlying the previously quoted passage from *De gradibus* may be said to serve the monk’s ultimate self-interest, we must also acknowledge that, on the other hand and in the same

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28 Gilson, *La théologie mystique*, 94.
work, Bernard clearly aims to curtail other expressions of self-interest, especially the unbridled, self-directed desire for knowledge, that is, the sin of curiosity.

Other comments in Bernard’s literary corpus are also telling, especially his observations treating the issue of charitable work outside of monastic walls. Although Bernard praises the active life of bishops as the “better” and “more manly” expression of Christianity, he nonetheless discourages monks from pursuing such an option, as it exposes the *viri religiosi* to “a multitude of sins” and “temptation.”

Note, too, that, even though the last stage of humility, the attainment of truth in itself, is identified with charity, that charity finds its highest expression in a spiritualized form cultivated within a monastery rather than in the world. He will of course say elsewhere, in a manner reminiscent of the allegory of the cave, that the wise man must go into the world to help others through preaching. Yet this worldly excursion itself arises out of the monastic experience; it is also exceptional and temporary, waning as soon as the “taste of contemplation” returns the monk with eagerness to his normal life.

Thus, as Bynum suggests, the issue of service in the world is not treated consistently by Bernard, who occasionally offers qualifications to his otherwise clear preference for monastic contemplation over worldly service. In short, what the sources qualifying Bernard’s position on worldly service reveal most of all is a consciousness of the moral tension and ambiguity arising out of a monastic life that represents one mode of Christian expression among several in twelfth-

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30 Bynum, *Jesus as Mother*, 74: “This monastic tendency to emphasize the spiritual condition of the individual rather than its implications for other men is the frame within which the Cistercian sense of community appears.”

31 Bernard, *Sermones super Cantica* 57.9, in *Sancti Bernardi opera* 2:124–25: “Hoc siquidem vera et casta contemplatio habit, ut mentem, quam divino igne vehementer succederit, tanto interdum repleat zelo et desiderio acquirendi Deo qui eum similiter diligant, ut otium contemplationis pro studio praedicationis libentissime intermiat; et rursum potita votis, aliquatenus in hac parte tanto ardentius redeat in idipsum, quanto se fructuosius intermisisse meminerit; et item sumpto contemplationis gusto, valentius ad conquendam lucra solita alacritate recurrat.” See also ibid. 41.5–6, 1:33–34.

32 Bynum, *Jesus as Mother*, 68.
century religion. The previously quoted passage in *De gradibus*, I am arguing, addresses that tension and ambiguity by trying to resolve them through a notion of humility that removes the distinction of identity in moral relations. In other words, if we consider his moral philosophy from the perspective of humility’s function in the construction of another’s identity, then we can detect a tendency in Bernard to downplay alterity, a move he is predisposed to make because the goal of monasticism is self-perfection achieved through contemplation. Naturally, it is not the only tendency in Bernardian or monastic ethics as we know from the communal context of the work’s second and longer portion on pride and as we might surmise from the period’s other monastic authors, such as Aelred of Rievaulx, whose writings highlight the importance of friendship and the collective salvation of the monastic community. What deserves our attention here, what emerges most strikingly from the way Bernard’s characterization of humility entails the dismantling of alterity, is the fact that a particular conception of the religious life is conditioning how the Other’s identity-status is constructed.

On this point, Marie-Dominique Chenu has given us a remarkably simple but far-reaching insight, on the basis of which it is possible to tie together the historical circumstances surrounding twelfth-century religious movements with the divergent ways of conceiving ethics brought to light by Wyschogrod’s analysis. To explain what is meant, consider the ladder itself as the key for deciphering moral views, for determining which twelfth-century positions may actually lend support to a postmodern ethics and which ones stand against it. In discussing Alan of Lille, Chenu writes:

> If the *vita apostolica*, in the literal sense of the term, was the decisive force and model of these new groups, it was because the word of God took priority in their thought as in their zeal. Alan of Lille, in his brief tract on the art of preaching, undoubtedly based on his missionary experience among the Cathari (after 1185), placed preaching at the top of his ladder of perfection, as the seventh degree, over the investigation of doubts (fifth degree), and the exposition of sacred scripture (sixth degree), a marked change for those familiar with the usual categories of the classical ladder.33

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Added to that last sentence in the English translation is an editorial footnote revealing what is at stake in the way the steps of the ladder are arranged and conceived. More than anything else, the meanings given to the ladder reveal how religious writers envisage their goal in life as well as their way of viewing and relating to others. It is in this note that we discover how historical circumstances and the clash of ethics along Wyschogrodian lines come into view: “The ladders, for example of St. Benedict, St. Bernard, and Hugh of Saint-Victor, though not identical, have in common their goal of personal perfection, whereas the ladder of Alan has a social orientation.”34 In other words, the grades of the ladder express religious values that are group-specific; they convey modes of Christian life that entail ethical positions regarding the role of service; these positions, in turn, lead to specific ways of constructing the identity status of the self and the Other.

In light of what has been said, the argument should be clear: for Bernard the goal of personal salvation entails the dismantling of the Other’s alterity. That is not to say all monasticism or even mysticism and morals are in conflict, for Wyschogrod discusses figures whose intensely personal religious experience, whose mysticism, still maintains the Other’s alterity, figures such as Catherine of Siena and Teresa of Avila;35 and, as previously mentioned, the second part of De gradibus treats the broader monastic network of moral relations at the communal level, thus highlighting the importance of the monastic Other. But, if the previously quoted passage is put into the context of twelfth-century religious movements, we have reason to assert that, when articulating the interconnectedness of humility, identity and morality, Bernard is grappling with the kind of ethics associated with the active life, particularly with respect to how its representatives construct the identity of the Other and regard the serving of others in the world. Hence, it is not simply a matter of a conflict between “the active” and “the contemplative,” for what comes with divergent expressions of religious life are concomitant and, on key points, contrary notions of Christian ethics. Based on our analysis of De gradibus, and on the observations noting the divergency in the way writers treat (or don’t treat) the social question in their depiction of “the ladder,” it is apparent that notions of Christian ethics are tied directly to particular

34 Ibid., n. 7.
35 Wyschogrod, Saints and Postmodernism, 36–39.
kinds of religious expressions in the twelfth century. By positing the Other as another myself in *De gradibus*, Bernard is attempting to resolve the tension between Cistercian monasticism and a more socially-oriented, “worldly” Christianity, a tension that undoubtedly marked the lives of monastic practitioners given the open religious polemics between the various groups. By conceiving of the Other as another myself, the monastery can serve as the locus of ethics, for the monastery, the place of paradise regained, condenses not only space and time, as Pranger has suggested, but also, as I now assert, identity: rather than encountered in the world and in a condition of alterity, the wretched of the earth are found within monastic walls; not just in the similitude of a brother wearing the same garb and sharing the same punctuated activities and routines of ritual, but in the monk’s heart and mind.36 Thus, with the distinction between monk and “neighbor” dissolved in humility, the sphere of ethics can become, literally, self-contained and, simultaneously, all encompassing. Mentally enclosing the Other functions as a conceptual strategy that legitimizes the care of one’s contemplative self by representing monastic introspection as a mirror for viewing the broader network of social and moral relations. It is a strategy that lends an expansiveness to monastic ethics, that gives an almost metonymical quality to the nature of moral relations: humility’s vision exposes the suffering of all humanity within the contemplative’s gaze—to treat a (monastic) part of it is to treat the whole.

The Incarnation and the Postmodern Revisioning of Ethics

We may continue to pursue, along Wyschogrodiian lines, another dimension of humility in Bernard’s ethics by turning from the issue of identity in moral relations to the way in which Bernard characterizes the Incarnation. As we shall see, there is an ethics of the Incarnation insofar as Christ’s becoming human expresses God’s response to a world mired in sin and needing salvation.37 In addition, the way the

36 Here I am simply extending Pranger’s observations on monastic space and time to the construction of identity; see, in general, his *Bernard of Clairvaux* and his more recent *The Artificiality of Christianity: Essays on the Poetics of Monasticism* (Stanford, 2003).

37 William O. Paulsell, “Ethical Theory in the Sermons on the Song of Songs,”
Incarnation itself is conceived has implications for understanding the ethical positions of a twelfth-century thinker, just as the ladder, as a semiotic structure, reflects different views of theologians on the question of Christianity’s social orientation. More important, when we turn to Bernard’s teaching on the Incarnation in De gradibus, we begin to see that it offers the most fruitful place for engaging a post-modern ethics, with respect to the issues of alterity, time, knowledge and corporeality (the actual body of Christ).

On the matter of alterity, note that, despite the several references in De gradibus to Jesus’s sharing of our misery, to how the Redeemer makes the fallen sons of Adam his brothers—despite, that is, the similitude that the Incarnation forges between God and man—Bernard insists on maintaining a fundamental distinction between Christ and humanity. The distinction has engaged thinkers from late antiquity to modernity, with the fifth-century writer Cassian showing its full implications. Indeed, lurking behind Cassian’s lengthy treatment of monks anxious over whether they may take holy communion after innocently experiencing “nocturnal emissions” is the question of Christ’s full humanity, or to put it in another way: did Jesus have wet dreams?38 In our time, Milan Kundera’s novel The Unbearable Lightness of Being grapples with a similar issue, though less obliquely than Cassian’s discussion: “...either man was created in God’s image—and God has intestines!—or God lacks intestines and man is not like Him.”39 As we all know, in formulating a response to the problem of Christ’s full humanity, Christian thinkers maintain that the Savior experienced temptation but not sin.

The distinction is a crucial one for Bernard and for our understanding of his ethics, for no less than three times in the De gradibus

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38 John Cassian, Collationes 22.1–16, ed. Michael Petschenig, CSEL 13:614–36. Cassian’s discussion addresses a number of issues arising from such incidents: human physiology, diabolical influence as well as the question of Christ’s humanity.

does he refer to Christ’s impeccableness. Significantly, the insistence on impeccableness occurs in the very places highlighting the similitude between Christ and humans. If we treat Christ and the Incarnation from the perspective of the postmodern ethics proposed by Wyschogrod, then we are compelled to acknowledge the prominence of alterity in the understanding of Bernardian soteriology. Not only do we have humanity separated from God in a fallen state, in a world of mud, in “a land of unlikeness” (as Gilson and Lowell remind us);\(^4^0\) we also have a restoration undertaken by a God who, however much he humbles himself to save the world, nonetheless remains unstained even in his human form. Thus, the redemption, the moral reparation of the fallen, is predicated on and achieved through a Savior who maintains the alterity of humanity by not sharing its sin, as Bernard suggests in the qualifying statements arising from his treatment of key Scriptural passages bearing on the Incarnation:

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\ldots \text{it was fitting and necessary that, subject to like passions as we are, he should experience all kinds of our miseries, except sin. If you ask what was the necessity, it is answered, “that he might be merciful” (Heb. 2:18). And why, you ask, cannot this rightly refer to the body [viz., the Church as “Christ’s body”]? But hear what follows directly: “For in that he himself hath suffered being tempted, he is able to succor them that are tempted.” I do not see what can better be understood from these words, than that he wished to partake of the same suffering and temptation and all human miseries except sin...}^4^1
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Significantly, what occurs with a soteriology that maintains alterity is exactly the kind of situation Wyschogrod says obtains when the starting point of ethics is not the Other as another myself. As already stated, “beginning with the Other entails not only constraints on freedom and well-being, but the recognition of the constitutive character of alterity for . . . moral discourse and practice.” Bernard’s characterization of the Incarnation brings to light the full implications of


\(^4^1\) Bernard, *De gradibus*, 3.8, p. 21: “… id est oportuit ac necesse fuit ut similis nobis passibilis, nostrarum omnia, excepto peccato, genera miseriarum percurreret. Si quaeris: ‘Qua necessitate?’ Ut ‘misericors,’ inquit, ‘ieret’ ‘Et hoc,’ ais, ‘cur non recte ad corpus referri potest?’ Sed audi quod paulo post sequitur: ‘In eo enim, in quo passus est ipse et tentatus, potens est et eis qui tentantur auxiliar.’ In quibus verbis quid melius intelligi possit non video, nisi quod ideo pati ac tentari, omnibusque ‘absque peccato’ humanis voluit communicare miseriis...”
Wyschogrod’s observation. When treating the foreshadowing of Christ’s passion, Bernard refers to Isaiah’s “man of sorrows,” and he likens the Savior to that class of persons whose very freedom has been denied—the slave. Notice, too, how Bernard qualifies the consequence of Christ the slave taking on human form. Here and elsewhere he is careful to use the comparative adverb *proprior*. Humanity is brought closer to Christ but it is not indistinguishable from Christ because the latter is without sin. In other words, Bernard’s understanding of the redemption entails the constraints on freedom and well-being, along with the alterity that Wyschogrod claims is the basis for a genuine altruism:

Wherefore Isaiah calls him “a man of sorrows, and acquainted with grief” (Is. 53:3). And the Apostle says, “For we have not an high priest which cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities,” and explains this by adding, “But was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin.” For the blessed God . . . before he had made himself of no reputation and taken upon him the form of a slave . . . did not know mercy or obedience by experience. He knew them intuitively, but not empirically . . . Through this experience, however, not his knowledge, as I said, but our boldness was increased, when he from whom we had long been astray was brought nearer to us by this sort of worldly image.42

The passage just quoted reveals another aspect of Bernard’s thought that goes to the heart of a postmodern ethics. Notice that the status of knowledge is undercut in his understanding of the Incarnation. A priori knowledge is inadequate for solving the world’s ills. By his divine nature Christ knows the world’s sorrow but that is clearly not sufficient grounds for inducing moral action, for compelling him to save humanity. Carnal knowing, experience, is what is needed to actually repair the fallen condition. It is Christ’s experience of suffering—not his eternal knowing—that actualizes redemption. Thus, moral reparation takes place at the material level, with a flesh and

42 Ibid. 3.9, p. 23: “Unde Isaias ‘virum’ eum appellat ‘dolorum, et scientem in firmitatem.’ Et Apostolus: ‘Non enim habemus,’ inquit, ‘pontificem, qui non poscit compati infirmitatis nostris.’ Unde autem possit, indicans adjungit: ‘Tentatum autem per omnia pro similitudine, absque peccato.’ Beatus quippe Deus . . . priusquam se exinanisset formam servi accipiens . . . sic misericordiam vel oboedientiam experi-mento non noverat. Sciebat quidem per naturam, non autem sciebat per experientiam . . . Per quam tamen experientiam, non illi, ut dixi, scientia, sed nobis fiducia crevit, dum ex hoc misero genere cognitionis, is a quo longe erraveramus, factus est proproi nobis.”
blood God, as an *experimentum*, an experience of learning humility and mercy, a kind of soteriological education steeped in the misery of humanity but different from it with respect to the divine learner’s sinless state. This way of understanding the Incarnation and redemption decentralizes the place of God’s knowledge by making the experience of human suffering the touchstone of Christ’s saving work.

There is still more. The distinction between Christ’s eternal knowledge in heaven and his experience of suffering on earth brings to mind Wyschogrod’s and Bernard’s preoccupation with time. In a long discussion that resists easy summary, Wyschogrod claims that saints experience time differently than the rest of us. Because the saint is always vulnerable to the needs of others, is constantly at their disposal, time is experienced as pain. Saintly time “throbs.” In a manner not unlike the signs of aging, (what Wyschogrod calls) the “dark diachronicity” of saintly time leaves marks of suffering on the holy person’s body.43

In treating the issue of time, I refer once again to the previously quoted passage in which Bernard makes a distinction between the time of Christ’s eternity and the time of his Incarnation. As he expresses it: “not that he [Christ] did not know how to be merciful before, he whose mercy is from eternity to eternity; but that which he knew by nature from eternity, he learned in time by experience.” The reference to Christ’s learning in time by experience, what may be called Incarnational time, corresponds exactly with Wyshogrod’s understanding of saintly time, for it is during the Incarnation that time is inscribed on Christ’s body. As the following passage explicitly shows, in his earthly life the redeemer feels time as the onset of pain:

Since, then, you see that Christ in one person has two natures, one by which he always was, the other by which he began to be, and always knew everything in his eternal essence but temporally experienced many things in his temporal existence; why do you hesitate to grant that, as he began in time to be in flesh, so also he began to know the ills of the flesh by that kind of knowledge which the weakness of the flesh teaches.44

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44 Bernard, *De gradibus* 3.12, p. 25: “Cum igitur videas Christum in una quidem persona duas habere naturas, unam qua semper fuit, alteram qua esse coepit, et secundum sempiternum quidem suum esse, semper omnia nosse, secundum temporaliter vero, multa temporaliter experimentum fuisse, cur fateri dubitas, ut esse ex
Conclusion

When the Incarnation is considered as God’s moral response to fallen humanity, we find Bernard’s understanding of alterity and time converging with a postmodern ethics. The point is especially significant in light of a (noticeable) silence in Wyschogrod’s study, a silence that nonetheless reveals the potential of her insights for reconsidering key theological themes in medieval thought. While she raises the issue of how the example of Christ could problematize saintly existence (*imitatio Christi* as an imperative and an impossibility), she does not address the question of whether the incarnated Savior fits her criteria of a saint.45 As we can see, Bernard’s representation of Christ’s saving work coincides precisely with Wyschogrod’s understanding of a saint, someone putting himself “totally at the disposal of the Other.” Therefore, with respect to the Incarnation, *De gradibus* reveals those very attributes of saintly existence, and hence moral life, that Wyschogrod identifies as the salient features of a revised ethics. Viewed in this light, Bernard’s *De gradibus* offers us a way of theologically explicating a postmodern moral philosophy.

Also striking, and in keeping with a key move made by Wyschogrod, is the fact that the kind of ethics associated with Christ’s saving work comes out of the narrative of Christ’s passion or, as Bernard puts it, “that cross, mocking, spitting, and flagellation” recounted by the gospels.46 Significantly, Bernard’s ideas coincide with Wyschogrod’s when the story of Christ’s life and death come to the foreground (albeit often filtered through Pauline lenses). When that narrative assumes the central place in Bernard’s understanding of ethics, when his ideas are tied to that story, his thought displays affinities with a postmodern ethics. As already mentioned, Wyschogrod’s revisioning also turns to narrative, hagiography, as a way of challenging moral theorizing.

Finally, if we consider the different ways in which Bernard approaches ethics, keeping in mind Wyschogrod’s insights as well as the scholarly literature treating the period, we are able to detect three strands of ethics underlying the passages presented. One, only

46 Bernard, *De gradibus* 3.7, p. 21.
alluded to here, is the ethics related to the life of the monastic community as a whole, the fraternal relations seen most vividly in the work’s second portion. The other arises out of an understanding rooted in the biblical account of Christ’s ministry and passion. This ethics looks radically outward. Though not elaborated on in De gradibus, this ethics entails social implications such as those associated with the vita apostolica mentioned by Chenu. In contrast to the ethics derived from the story of Christ’s life and death, is one that may be considered nomistic, that is, based on religious law, the Benedictine Rule. This ethics is radically internalized, in keeping with the Rule’s “very few references to service.”

Thus, if put in the context of its ethical implications, the dissolving of alterity in human wretchedness, when juxtaposed to the example of Christ, leaves an unsettling dilemma that must have struck at the heart of monastic life. What De gradibus underscores is the human vulnerability to sin driving a wedge between moral relations, for sin both forecloses the possibility of fully imitating Christ as well as necessitates the dire need to conform with that example. Bernard’s De gradibus, then, indeed offers a paradox but it is a paradox that, in my mind—and contrary to the scholarship insisting on the unity of his thought—remains unresolved.

47 Bynum, Jesus as Mother, 75–76.
In order to understand the concept of virtue in the twelfth century, an appropriate starting-point would be to study its definition. A current definition of virtue in the twelfth century was the following: *virtus est habitus mentis bene constitutae*, i.e., virtue is the condition or disposition of the well-ordered mind. This formula appears in the writings of Boethius¹ and the introduction of this definition into the ethical discourse of the Latin West should go to his credit. In the twelfth century, the formula was adopted by a variety of authors, including theologians (Anselm of Laon, Peter Abelard), monastic writers (Isaac of Stella, Pseudo-Augustine’s *De spiritu et anima*) and even civil lawyers.²

In the last few years, the connection between virtue and the concept of *habitus* has received systematic attention in the work of Cary Nederman and Marcia Colish.³ This paper will focus on another element of Boethius’ definition and examine the notion of the *mens bene constituta*, the “well-ordered mind”.

Several twelfth-century thinkers attempted to clarify the meaning of the phrase *bene constituta*. According to one author, who may or may not be Hugh of Saint Victor, the mind becomes well-ordered when it submits to the will of God.⁴ Gandolph of Bologna took the

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¹ Boethius, *De differentiis topicis* 2, PL 64:1188C–D; cf. *In categorias Aristotelis* 3, PL 64:220C.
⁴ Hugh of Saint Victor (?), *Miscellanea* 1.52, PL 177:502C–D: “virtus magis esse
view that a well-ordered mind is oriented towards doing good.\(^5\) Alan of Lille and Simon of Tournai added to this idea by claiming that *bene constituere* consists not only in properly exercising one’s duty (*officium*), but also in having the right purpose (*finis*) behind one’s actions.\(^6\) Other authors treated nature as the criterion of virtuousness. According to the *Tsagoge in theologiam*, the mind becomes well-ordered when the measure (*modus*) of nature is being followed, its transgression resulting in vice.\(^7\) The Porretan master Hubertus defined political virtues, which humans can acquire through natural reason, as *habitus mentis bene constitutae*;\(^8\) by contrast, Catholic virtues, inspired by grace and procuring salvation, belong to a mind not *bene* but *optime constituta*.\(^9\)

Twelfth-century moral theology and philosophy thus contain several conflicting views as to the principle according to which human beings should order or organize their minds. However, the method by which humans should acquire and apply the principle of virtue is generally neglected. How exactly should one proceed in order to become virtuous? I shall try to answer this question by studying one

\(^5\) Gandulph of Bologna, *Sententiae* 3.122, ed. Iohannes de Walter (Vienna, 1924), 365: “*habitus mentis...bene constitutae, id est...a d operandum, quod valeat ad vitam, facilis et promptae.*”


\(^7\) *Tsagoge in theologiam*, ed. Artur M. Landgraf, *Écrits théologiques de l'école d’Abélard: Textes inédits*. (Louvain, 1934), 74: “*Modus enim nature per vicium exceditur... Unde Poeta: Virtus est medium viciorum et utrimque redactum...Tunc enim bene constitu-tuta mens nostra, cum modum nature sectatur.*”


\(^9\) Ibid., 202, n. 127. In a similar vein, Peter Abelard characterized virtue as a *habitus optimus* in order to exclude non-Christian conceptions of virtue; see the contribution by István Bejczy to this volume, p. 138, n. 21.
particular text, which has a spiritual rather than a scholarly focus: *De claustro animae* by the Augustinian canon Hugh of Folieto (c. 1095–c. 1172).

*De claustro animae*, written sometime between 1153 and 1172, is generally considered Hugh’s most important work. It consists of four books, of which the third bestowed its name on the entire treatise, probably because it was deemed the most important. While the first book contains an apology for the religious life, the last three books lay down the principles of moral and spiritual life of the religious. Although the manuscript tradition of *De claustro animae*, as well as the details of Hugh’s life, are fairly well documented, surprisingly little has been written regarding the contents of this work.

Although Hugh does not quote Boethius’ definition, the development of virtue through a proper organization of the mind is one of his primary concerns, especially in the third book. Before analysing this book, I should first point out that Hugh, as many other authors in his day, made a rather indifferent use of the concepts of *mens* (“mind”) and *anima* (“soul”). According to a famous definition by Isidore of Seville, cited in the twelfth century in such influential works as the *Glossa ordinaria* on the Bible and Pseudo-Augustine’s *De spiritu et anima* (c. 1170), the notion *anima* referred, strictly speaking, to the life-giving principle of the human being, whereas it was called *mens* in so far as it was capable of knowing (*Dum ergo vivificat corpus,*...
De claustro animae and De spiritu et anima share another particular feature, namely, the claim to an analogy between soul and community. The compiler of De spiritu et anima depicts the human soul as the city of God, in which the citizens, that is, the intellectual, rational and sensual powers of the soul, live together in concord and peace. This civic harmony is brought about by the virtue of charity. In the same way as charity regulates and harmonizes the relation of human beings with their neighbours and with God, it creates a unity of the mind, eliminating any possible conflict between the lower, bodily powers of the soul and its higher faculties. Similar comparisons between the virtuous soul and a well-ordered community can be found in the treatises on the virtues by the Parisian bishop William of Auvergne and the Dominican friar William Peraldus, both composed around the middle of the thirteenth century.
As for *De claustro animae*, its third book is built up around a tropological interpretation of the cloister. Hugh presents the cloister not only as an image of the soul, but also as a source of inspiration for moral reform. Although several other twelfth-century authors compared the human soul to a house (*domus interior*) or even to a cloister (*claustrum spirituale*), Hugh’s attention to the social aspects of monastic life is quite special. In *De claustro animae*, it is not only the cloister building, but foremost the communal life of the religious which serves as a model for the human soul. The individual mind achieves moral reform by imitating the organization of monastic society. It is Hugh’s comparison between soul and community, then, which suggests an answer to the question of how a well-ordered mind is to be acquired. The ideally organized life of the religious community provides clues for the appropriate moral constitution of the soul.

Hugh exemplifies the analogy between the religious community and interior man by using several specific comparisons. The dormitory, for instance, stands for mental tranquillity and peace. Hugh explains that peace exists in a community where superiors not only teach discipline to their subordinates, but also enforce discipline whenever necessary. The lesson which Hugh draws from this observation is that true peace of mind is only achievable when one’s heart-felt emotions are in accordance with one’s speech and behaviour.

Equally telling is Hugh’s tropological interpretation of the chapter of the monastery. Just as the brethren flock together at the chapter at fixed hours in order to correct their errors, reason convokes various thoughts to the intimacy of the heart in order to expel the incorrigible, to correct the unstable and to reform the negligent. In the

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20 Hugh of Folieto, *De claustro animae* 3.9, PL 176:1102D.
21 Ibid. 3.6, 1093C–D.
spiritual chapter of the heart, reason holds the place of the abbot, while conscience denounces one’s faults. Vices are like evil brethren who oppose the rules of the monastery, while the virtues obey them.22 Although Hugh’s exhortations may in themselves seem hardly remarkable, the important point is that he aims at the moral perfection of the individual by taking monastic society as a model, thus offering a concrete method of virtuously organizing the mind.

However, Hugh also derives hints for moral reform from the architecture of the cloister. The columns of the ambulatory, for example, are ideally without any irregularities. One such interior “column” is polished whenever the virtue of equanimity is kept, the vices of pride and anger are suppressed and, among other things, one’s heart is disposed in a friendly manner toward one’s neighbour.23 In short, the interior cloister finds itself embellished whenever one tries to improve one’s attitude toward other people.

Apparently, Hugh connects interior and exterior discipline. Interior discipline aims at correcting one’s moral disposition, while exterior discipline relates to one’s outward behaviour. Sometimes, Hugh explicitly argues, exterior discipline brings forth interior discipline. It is, then, by behaving or acting in certain ways that it becomes possible to acquire mental peace and reform one’s soul in the image of Noah’s ark.24 Submitting to exterior discipline also allows the soul to be modelled on the example of the temple.25 In much the same vein, accordance between virtuous behaviour and a virtuous mental disposition is necessary to give the interior tabernacle, that is, the virtuous soul, sufficient strength.26 Although the ark, the temple and the taber-

22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., 3.3, 1089D.
24 Ibid., 3.6, 1094B: “Lamech Noe genuit, id est disciplina requiem. Interpretatur enim Lamech percutiens, quod proprium est disciplinae: Noe vero requies interpretatur, quae nascitur, quando mens ab exterioribus per disciplinam reprimitur. Hic est Noe, qui construit arcam, id est aedificat animam, quae irrationabilia animalia in inferioribus ordinat, homines et volatilia in superiori parte locat, id est, motus carnales subjicit, spiritales superponit.”
25 Ibid., 3.12, 1114A: “Misit etiam Hiram artifices, quia de claustris excelse ventionum ad alia clastra mittuntur quandoque religiosi frates, qui arte regendi et disciplina discretionis aedificantes domum Domini”; 3.11, 1113C: “Potest itaque hoc templum referri ad ipsum Christum . . . Pertinet etiam ad ipsam Ecclesiam, vel moraliter ad quambilbet fidelem animam.”
26 Ibid., 3.4, 1090A–1091B: “Aedificavit Moyses tabernaculum, quod moraliter designat claustrum animae . . . Tabulae, quae disposuntur per circuitum, designant moraliter ordinem virtutum. Binae vero incastrautae, quae erant in singulis tabulis,
nacle appear as alternative metaphors for the well-constructed soul, one is allowed to put them on the same plane as the cloister: Hugh expressly states that, morally understood, the tabernacle signifies the cloister of the soul (moraliiter designat claustrum animae). Disciplined conduct is therefore in Hugh’s system of thought a necessary step towards the construction of the interior cloister, which, in its turn, brings about interior discipline and virtue.

The idea that a disciplined mind should be the result of disciplined behaviour was not uncommon in twelfth-century monastic literature, as Stephen Jaeger has made clear. Hugh’s namesake and confrere Hugh of Saint Victor, for example, taught in his *De institutione novitiorum* that outward discipline brings about inward discipline, which ultimately leads to virtue. Moreover, outward discipline was to be learned in a communal setting. Novices were expected to acquire discipline by imitating the behaviour of their more advanced brethren and by accepting their correcting guidance.27

As exterior discipline is apparently indispensable in creating a properly organised mind and, consequently, in the development of virtue, Hugh of Folieto devotes a large part of *De claustro animae* to it. His practical exhortations show exactly through which actions virtue is most effectively acquired. Remarkably enough, his focus is on what man can do himself in order to acquire virtue, although he never denies the necessity of the assistance of divine grace.

According to Hugh, the whole point of creating a well-ordered mind, and therefore the reason why virtue should be acquired, is to be able to contemplate the divine secrets. “The cloister of the soul is called contemplation,” Hugh states, adding, however, that this spiritual building is enclosed by the wall of good works.28 Indeed, Hugh urges his readers not to limit themselves to contemplating celestial affairs. One should turn from contemplation now and then, and care for one’s neighbour. He compares descending from contemplation to action to leaving one’s bedroom and entering one’s living quarters,

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28 Hugh of Folieto, *De claustro animae* 3.1, 1087A–D: “Animae claustrum contemplatio dicitur... Hujus claustri ambitus... muro boni operis... ambiuntur.”
going out to the porch, entering the village and, finally, going out to work in the fields. According to Hugh, the bedroom signifies contemplation, the living quarters are to be understood as the meditation on the Scriptures, the porch refers to the remembrance of one’s faults, the village designates neighbourly compassion and, finally, the fields signify the act of caring for one’s neighbour. Strikingly, in this routine the mind’s eye beholds Christ not during contemplation, but during work in the fields. Actually, those who are willing to support their neighbours by the labour of their own hands are those who regularly relive the death of Christ in their hearts, as every faithful Christian should. Moreover, it is Christ the gardener who plants the seeds of virtue in the garden of neighbourly care. Labouring for the benefit of one’s neighbour, thus, not only enables the mind to share Christ’s suffering, but also makes it susceptible to the acquisition of virtue. Consequently, Hugh considers the practical care of one’s fellow brethren of paramount importance for moral and spiritual life in the monastery.

Furthermore, loving one’s neighbour and expressing this love through actual care prepares the mind for loving God. In the same way as approved external conduct brings forth interior moral goodness, charitable acts produce real charity. To order the mind according to charity, it is therefore necessary to act as if one already possesses this virtue. Hence, charitable behaviour toward fellow human beings helps the individual to acquire the virtue itself and apply it in his relation with God. Love of God is therefore preceded, as regards chronology, by love of one’s neighbour. Hugh illustrates this view with the moral exegesis of Solomon’s temple which, like the spiritual cloister, stands for the human soul, but also signifies the house of God, situated within every faithful Christian. Only after one has learned to hold oneself in contempt, to ignore worldly desires, to...
subdue the devil and to love one’s neighbour has the time come to start constructing the spiritual temple. It is, thus, inappropriate to try to receive God in one’s heart, without first loving one’s neighbour.  

A similar lesson is to be drawn from Hugh’s moral interpretation of the four walls surrounding the monastery. The first wall, Hugh declares, faces the west. The setting sun, which can be observed from this wall, represents the daily basis on which each individual commits his many sins. Beholding this repeated show of moral weakness leads to contempt of the self. The northern wall faces the quarter where the sun hides at night. The nocturnal darkness brings to mind the many abuses which exist outside the cloister and produces contempt of the world. However, the next morning the sun rises, and while observing this scene from the eastern wall, the soul is warmed and incited to love of one’s neighbour. When finally the sun is situated in the south and shows itself in all its glory and majesty, the soul inflames in direct love of God. Therefore, in a similar way as the morning sun rises from the east and reaches its summit in the south, love of one’s neighbour elevates man to the love of God.

The above examples are to a large extent representative for Hugh’s subject matter. From this, it appears that the virtuous mental condition which enables man to love God is brought about by putting the precepts of fraternal love into practice. At this point, I would like to recall to mind Boethius’ definition of virtue: *virtus est habitus mentis bene constitutae*. According to the Aristotelian ethics from which this concept was originally derived, a *habitus* was developed by education and practice. Since man is by nature a civic being, this practice, as a matter of course, takes place in a social context. Yet,
philosophers and theologians generally disregarded this pragmatic aspect of virtue and concentrated instead on the inner motives of moral agents. Peter Abelard, for instance, “does not move beyond vague phrases like “application” (applicatio) in explaining the process by which moral qualities are acquired”, to quote Cary Nederman once more.\(^{38}\) By contrast, the regular canon Hugh of Folieto offers a detailed answer to the question of how good conduct leads to the acquisition of virtue. As in twelfth-century moral philosophy, neither divine guidance nor unconscious natural impulse occupies the centre stage.\(^{39}\) But whereas philosophers regarded \textit{habitus} as the concept most worthy of their attention, Hugh is much more concerned with unremitting \textit{applicatio}. Abelard appears to have believed that a \textit{habitus}, once acquired, resisted alteration and therefore did not require constant attention;\(^{40}\) by contrast, Hugh insists on continuous human practice to guard the virtuous disposition of the mind. In this sense, Hugh emphasizes the anthropocentric aspects of virtue even more than did the majority of contemporary philosophers.

As we have seen, Hugh’s preferred form of \textit{applicatio} is expressing fraternal love in good works. Creating a well-ordered mind therefore necessitates the presence of other monks or canons. Accordingly, Hugh distinguishes four different ways in which spiritual progression is to be made: by living the good life oneself, by teaching one’s neighbour, by heeding the admonitions of one’s superior and by correcting one’s subordinates.\(^{41}\) Quite in accordance with Augustine’s\(^{36}\) and Aquinas’s interpretation of human happiness,\(^{35}\) in the \textit{De caelo et mundo} (1117a7–9), the chief human good is not only described as “happiness” (eudaimonia), but also as the full realization of human potential. Although man is first and foremost a rational creature, he is a civic being as well. Therefore, man requires the presence of other men to experience perfect happiness, i.e. to fully realize his potential for being rational (ibid., 9.9, 1169b4–1170b19, 236–8).


\(^{39}\) Ibid., 97–98.

Praeceptum, which governed Hugh’s community,42 Hugh explains that correcting subordinates as well as accepting correction by a superior should proceed from charity. Fellow brethren who have committed a sin should first of all be received with compassion, and any necessary correction should instil love rather than fear within the offender.43 As enforcing discipline is beneficial to the spiritual welfare of those who find themselves being corrected, it gives clear evidence of the possession of fraternal love. Submitting to discipline should not be devoid of love either. After all, the superior is specifically instructed to make sure that offenders accept his correction, lovingly and without bitterness.44 Thus, fraternal love is put into practice by either obeying or giving orders, dependent on the—assumed—moral stature of the person to be dealt with.

We are now able to give an answer to the initial question of how, and according to what principle, human beings should order their minds. Hugh of Folieto shows how the organization of the monastic community, dominated by charity, can serve as a model for ordering the individual mind. For this reason, Christiania Whitehead’s recently published view that Hugh of Folieto’s use of the cloister allegory was inspired by “a new strength of attention directed toward the condition of contemplation”45 is in need of qualification. Although contemplation is for Hugh the ultimate goal of religious life, it seems to me that he employed his cloister metaphor to reflect the idea that a well-ordered mind is ultimately acquired in a process of social interaction, of the nature that can be found in well-ordered monasteries. Significantly, he compares the final steps, by which the soul prepares itself for contemplation, to the construction of the temple of Solomon.46

43 Hugh of Folieto, *De claustro animae* 3.5, 1093A.
44 Ibid., 1093A–B.
46 Hugh of Folieto, *De claustro animae* 3.11–29, 1113B-1130D. This part of Hugh’s treatise is heavily dependent on Bede’s *De templo*. 
Obviously, living according to the principles of monastic discipline also has a direct moral effect. Literally, as well as metaphorically, the monastery acts upon the formation of morality and virtue. On both levels, charity is the key concept, but it is a concept of human proportions. The works of love required by monastic discipline prepare the mind for loving God and contemplating the divine truths; in sum, good acts lie at the base of virtue rather than the reverse. Describing in detail the social practice by which humans acquire virtue, Hugh actually puts greater stress on the anthropocentric aspects of virtue than happens in contemporary moral philosophy. Thus, although traditionally depicted as conservative, twelfth-century monastic moral thought nevertheless appears on some points to be quite compatible with Aristotelian ethics.
SCHOLASTIC THOUGHT
THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL VIRTUE

István P. Bejczy

I

From its earliest beginnings, Christianity claimed a monopoly of moral goodness. In his Epistle to the Romans, Paul boldly declared that whatsoever is not of faith is sin (Omne quod non ex fide peccatum est, Rom. 14:23), while according to the Epistle to the Hebrews it is impossible to please God without faith (Sine fide impossibile placere [Deo], Heb. 11:6). These statements leave little room for the existence of goodness, let alone of virtue, outside the realm of Christian religion. Indeed, the Latin Church Fathers who took an interest in ancient theories of virtue, notably in the conception of the cardinal virtues, attempted to appropriate the virtues in the name of Christendom, arguing that only Christians could understand their true meaning (as Ambrose claimed in De officiis) and that the virtues were instances of charity which would survive even in heaven (as Augustine insisted in several writings).

The patristic appropriation of the virtues initially worked very well. The view of Julian Pomerius that all virtues were gifts of God appears to have constituted early medieval orthodoxy.¹ Most authors discussing or mentioning the virtues considered even the cardinal virtues as genuine Christian concepts. Few of them seem to have been aware of the non-Christian origin of these virtues, and those who were

mostly denied that pagans had any real knowledge about them. Yet, the idea that human beings possessed a natural penchant for virtue never died out, while the idea of natural virtue found support in the work of Martin of Braga, Bede and Alcuin of York. In his treatise on the cardinal virtues for the Suevic king Miro, which may go back to a lost text of Seneca, Martin formulated moral rules which lay people could observe “even without the precepts of divine Scriptures... under the natural law of human intelligence.” Bede conceded in his commentary on Luke that in the apostolic era, many converted to Christ driven by natural virtues (virtutes naturales), with Cornelius the Centurion as the most prominent example; in the same time, legends depicting the Roman Emperor Trajan as a virtuous pagan started to circulate from Bede’s homeland. Finally, Alcuin expressed his surprise in his Rhetorica that pagan philosophers cultivated the virtues whereas many Christians neglected them, in spite of their being promised an eternal reward for observing them. Up to the twelfth century, however, the Christian character of virtue never met serious challenge. In fact, Alcuin omitted his reference to pagan philosophers in the chapter on the cardinal virtues in De vitiis et virtutibus, which resumed the discussion in his Rhetorica and was to enjoy far greater popularity, whereas Martin of Braga’s treatise remained largely disregarded until about 1100.

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4 Bede, In Lucae evangelium expositio 2, ed. David Hurst, CCSL 120:156 (on 7:8); repeated: Sedulius Scottus, Kommentar zum Evangelium nach Matthäus 1, ed. Bengt Löfstedt, vol. 1 (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1989), 244 (on 8:9).


7 Id., De vitiis et virtutibus 35, PL 101:637B–638A.

8 Barlow, in Martin of Braga, Opera, 210–17, mentions twelve MSS dating from before 1000 A.D.; the total number of medieval MSS is about 700. The first text I know which extensively cites the Formula presents Martin’s precepts as an exhor-
In the course of the twelfth century, the situation changed dramatically. Scholars who debated the virtues turned with renewed interest to ancient moral philosophy and started to take its non-Christian perspective seriously, asking themselves if human beings could attain goodness and virtue by natural means, unaided by grace and revealed truth. It is the aim of this essay to analyse this development and to determine in particular to what extent natural virtues found recognition in Christian thought by the end of the twelfth century.

II

In order to avoid terminological misunderstandings, I should stress that I shall not discuss the inborn mental abilities of human beings which twelfth-century authors sometimes called *virtutes naturales*. Acknowledging these abilities does not in any sense imply a recognition of non-Christian moral virtues. My argument centres around the question of whether human beings can acquire moral virtues through natural means (by natural reason, through repeated action), without divine help. The Church Fathers gave a negative answer, and to most early medieval authors the question simply never occurred. From the last decades of the eleventh century, however, the Christian monopoly on virtue came under increasing pressure. To be sure, tradition had its staunch supporters. Bruno of Segni and Rupert of Deutz, two Benedictines who were active around 1100, indignantly rejected the idea that pagans had any familiarity with virtue; the ancient philosophers merely knew the names of the (cardinal) virtues, without understanding anything of their contents. But the fact that both authors felt the need to defend tradition at all is significant, and their rancorous tone is an eloquent sign that they met serious opposition.
Where, then, did the challenge to tradition come from? One can point to two different sorts of writings, one concerned with literary education, the other with philosophy and theology.

The study of ancient authors by aid of anthologies had always formed part of instruction in the arts. Collections of wise sayings of good authors were believed to stimulate the literary and moral development of pupils. The best known example is the *Disticha Catonis*, a work which in the Later Middle Ages was often interpreted in the light of the cardinal virtues. Around 1100, several other works focusing on ancient morality and virtue appeared which quickly gained acceptance in the schools. The didactic poem *Quid suum virtutis* probably dates from the eleventh century; the first half of the twelfth century yielded the famous *Moralium dogma philosophorum* as well as some writings of lesser renown. In addition, many scholarly commentaries on ancient works of thought and literature appeared in the same period, some of which concentrated on moral themes. Typically, the challenge of these works to the Christian conception of virtue remained indirect, precisely because of their predominantly non-Christian perspective: they usually elucidated ancient pieces of moral thought without confronting these with Christian ideas.

A much greater challenge was posed by philosophers and theologians who wrote from a Christian perspective but seemed to recognize that virtue was no exclusively Christian possession. I know of one such author in the eleventh century: Goswin of Liège. In a letter dating from 1066/70, Goswin wrote that not only Christian theologians but also many pagan philosophers and other great men had known and observed the virtues, partly as a gift of nature, partly as

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12 *Quid suum virtutis: Eine Lehrdichtung des XI. Jahrhunderts*, ed. Anke Paravicini (Heidelberg, 1980). The work was written before 1107, possibly as early as the first half of the eleventh century.


a result of study. Goswin’s statement presents an isolated but most remarkable instance of intellectual audacity which may have impressed scholarly circles in Liège long enough to stir the feelings of the local hero Rupert of Deutz a few decades later.

As for the early twelfth century, two authors enjoy today an undeserved reputation as promoters of natural ethics: Hildebert of Lavardin and Peter Abelard. According to Hildebert’s principal biographer, his ethical thought centred around the natural goodness of humankind: disregarding those precepts of the Gospel which exceeded the demands of nature, human beings should develop virtues on the basis of their natural goodness in order to realize the ideal of human life, that is, happiness on earth. An unbiased reading of Hildebert’s writings would not confirm these views. Actually, his biographer not only admits that Hildebert ventured to make faith the foundation of his natural ethics, but concedes that in Hildebert’s view human beings cannot do any good without God’s aid and depend on grace in order to bring their virtues to perfection.

The case of Abelard is more complicated. There can be no doubt that Abelard admired the ancient conception of the virtues. In his *Theologia christiana* he stated that the ancients described the (cardinal) virtues with so much accuracy that they must have known them by experience, so that the Christians were right to borrow their views; accordingly, he staged a non-Christian philosopher in the *Collationes* to whose definitions of the virtues his Christian collocutor is at least partly indebted. At the same time, the Christian collocutor emphasizes that virtue, understood in its proper sense, amounts to charity and acquires merit with God. This latter statement is congruent with Abelard’s general line of thought: in his view, only intentions informed

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17 Ibid., 281, 289.


by charity could count as virtuous and hence as meritorious—a view which he shared with contemporary thinkers such as Hugh of Saint Victor, for whom the standards of morality and of salvation essentially coincided.\footnote{See István P. Bejczy, “Deeds Without Value: Exploring a Weak Spot in Abelard’s Ethics,” Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales 70 (2003): 3–5. Ineke van ’t Spijker has called my attention to Hugh of Saint Victor, Homiliae in Ecclesiasten, 16, PL 175:230D–231A: “Possumus tamen et hoc ipsum de reprobis quibusque non inconvenienter dictum accipere: qui etsi aliquando ad amorem boni, secundum quemdam affectum, speciem virtutis habentem, quasi ad amplexum sapientiae approximare videntur, tamen quia mentem a desideriis carnis et cupiditatibus terre- nis non dividunt, cito ad solita relapsi, in eo ipso quod approquinasse videbantur, longe fiunt.” Here, Hugh seems to recognize a flickering of goodness and even of virtue in the damned, but immediately denies its value.} If Abelard should really have sustained the idea that human beings could acquire virtue by natural means, as is often stated in scholarly literature,\footnote{See e.g. Odon Lottin, Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles, 6 vols. (Louvain-Gembloux, 1942–60) 3:103ff; id., Études de morale, histoire et doctrine (Gembloux, 1961), 68–71; David E. Luscombe, introduction in Peter Abelard, Peter Abelard’s Ethics, ed. transl. David E. Luscombe (Oxford, 1971), xxv, repeated in “The Ethics of Abelard: Some Further Considerations,” in Peter Abelard, ed. Eloi M. Buytaert (Leuven, The Hague, 1974), 71; Wieland, Ethica, 233; Cary J. Nederman, “Nature, Ethics, and the Doctrine of ‘Habitus:’ Aristotelian Moral Psychology in the Twelfth Century,” Traditio 45 (1989/90): 94–98. Cf. also Lambertus M. de Rijk, “Abelard and Moral Philosophy,” Medioevo 12 (1986): 22: “Abelard even presents some sort of naturalistic theory of ethics.” Lottin, locc. cit., considers the definition of virtue as “habitus mentis bene constitutus” an invention of Abelard expressing the idea of natural virtue. In reality, the definition stems from Boethius, De differentiis topicis 2, PL 64:1188C–D, whereas Abelard often spoke of habitus optimus in order to exclude non-Christian virtues: see Collationes, pp. 128–30; Sententiae Abaelardi 32, PL 178:1750A; Sententiae Parisienses, ed. Artur M. Landgraf, Ecris théologiques de l’école d’Abélard: Textes inédits (Louvain, 1934), 51; cf. Ysagoge in theologiam, ed. ibid., 73. Accordingly, the Ysagoge understands “bene constitutum” as referring to the natural good (ibid., 74): “Tunc enim bene est constituta mens nostra, cum modum nature sectatur.”} this would imply that he was something worse than a Pelagian: Christians as well as non-Christians would have the possibility to bring about their own salvation. I do not think that Abelard defended this position. First, he did not believe that man could earn merit without grace; claims to the contrary by his contemporaries and by modern commentators are not borne out by the evidence.\footnote{See David E. Luscombe, The School of Peter Abelard (Cambridge, 1969), 128–30 (qualifying the view “Quod liberum arbitrium per se sufficiat ad aliquod bonum,” imputed to Abelard by the Council of Sens, as “a caricature of Abelard’s teaching”); Marcia L. Colish, Peter Lombard (Leiden, 1994), 489.} True, Abelard adhered to the Aristotelian view of virtues as qualities developed into habits, but this is not to say that he acknowledged natural virtues. One can find a similar view even
in the work of Peter Damian in the eleventh century. The point is whether or not human beings can develop virtuous habits without grace, and Abelard never said that they could. Second, although Abelard stated in his *Theologia christiana* that some ancient philosophers possessed the virtues and were saved, he did not say that they acquired the virtues by natural means. Abelard’s point is that since the ancients had the virtues, one must assume that God divulged to them the principles of the faith. Hence, Abelard did not extend the virtues beyond the realm of faith and grace; he rather extended faith, grace and the virtues beyond the world of the chosen people. As for the New Testament era, Abelard explicitly restricted salvation to the Church; in the *Ethica* he observed that Cornelius the Centurion, for all his apparent goodness and charity, would not have earned eternal life without baptism. Abelard, then, did not recognize natural virtues. But he did recognize a certain degree of natural goodness, and in this respect he appears to have been more generous than many of his contemporaries.

Three other authors living in the first half of the twelfth century actually went further than Abelard and recognized in so many words the existence of natural virtue. The first of these authors is Anselm of Laon’s brother Ralph, who composed the *Glossa ordinaria* on the Gospel of Matthew. Some of Ralph’s glosses refer to the existence of natural virtues; one of them was taken from Bede’s abovementioned

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25 Id., *Ethica* 1.44.3, ed. Rainer M. Ilgner, CCCM 190:143. Abelard adapted the Trajan legend accordingly, introducing the story that Trajan was resuscitated and converted to Christianity before being saved for his virtue; see Colish, “The Virtuous Pagan,” 56ff.

26 See also *Ysagoge in theologiam*, p. 73: “Quidam habitus boni sunt, non tamen virtutes;” likewise Bernard Silvestris (?), *Commentary on Martianus Capella*, p. 166. Lottin, *Etudes de morale*, 71 comments: “c’est en vain qu’on chercherait ici une dissociation entre l’honnêteté morale naturelle et le mérite surnaturel.” I cannot follow Lottin’s argument; dissociating natural goodness from (meritorious) virtue is exactly what happens here. The *Ysagoge* and the commentary on Martianus Capella may have been written by the same author: see Michael Evans, “The *Ysagoge in theologiam* and the Commentaries Attributed to Bernard Silvestris,” *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 54 (1991): 1–42.
commentary on Luke. Obviously, Ralph’s glosses did not immediately alter the doctrinal landscape, but they functioned as arguments in favour of the existence of natural virtues from the late twelfth century.

Our second author is Gratian of Bologna. The *Decretum Gratiani* opens with the statement that humanity is governed by morals and by natural law. Natural law is exemplified by the Golden Rule as presented in the Gospel of Matthew. Twelfth-century commentators on the *Decretum* identified the Golden Rule with the cardinal virtue of justice as defined by Martin of Braga; some of them interpreted the Rule as an instance of *iustitia naturalis*, a phrase Augustine used for the attitude of the gentiles who did by nature the things contained in the law (Rom. 2:14). The phrase *iustitia naturalis* does not

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28 See below n. 69.


30 See Augustine, *De spiritu et littera* 27.48, ed. Carolus F. Vrba and Josephus Zycha, CSEL 60:202; *Contra Julianum* 4, PL 44:750. For secular applications of the phrase in the early twelfth century, see Peter Abelard, *Theologia christianana* 2.52, p. 153 (referring to the public spirit of the ancients); John of Salisbury, *Metalogicon* 2 prol., ed. John B. Hall and Katherine S.B. Keats-Rohan, CCCM 98:56 (referring to laws which serve the common good).
occur in the *Decretum* itself, but Gratian nevertheless admitted that non-Christians could really possess virtues, though no “real virtues” having a salvific effect.\(^{31}\)

Even more remarkable is the position of William of Saint Thierry. Whereas Bernard of Clairvaux consistently treated the cardinal virtues as ingredients of Christian morality and only once deigned to reject the idea that pagan philosophers had any true knowledge about them,\(^{32}\) William asserted in *De natura corporis et animae* that the rational soul consisted *naturaliter* of the four cardinal virtues, just as the body consisted of the four elements.\(^{33}\) The concept of natural virtue occasionally recurs in William’s letter to the brothers of Mont-Dieu, which also credits the ancients with an *affectus virtutum naturalis*.\(^{34}\) At the same time, William subscribed to the idea that virtue depended on faith and had its unique source in Christ, while he denied that the apparent virtues of the pagans had real significance.\(^{35}\) His letter to the brothers


explains at length that virtue is a perfection of reason and will brought about by God; not only monastic virtues such as humility, patience and obedience, but also the cardinal virtues are informed by grace and rest on charity.\textsuperscript{36} One can save the appearances by assuming that for William virtue had its origin in nature but its perfection in grace; what makes him exceptional is his recognition of virtue on a natural level. A still greater ambiguity marks the work of another intimate of Bernard of Clairvaux, Aelred of Rievaulx. Time and again, Aelred insisted in his work that virtue sprang from charity and faith, and meanwhile he sneered at the ancients for their lack of these qualities.\textsuperscript{37} In one sermon, however, he admitted that pagan philosophers understood by reason the four cardinal virtues instilled by Wisdom.\textsuperscript{38} The concept of natural virtue is absent from his writings, but Aelred recognized the existence of a natural love for virtue in the rational soul.\textsuperscript{39}

The idea of natural virtue finds even stronger support in a collection of questions attributed to Hugh of Saint Victor and considered at least partially authentic by modern commentators.\textsuperscript{40} Discussing the creation of man in God’s image, the author claimed that God impressed the outlines of the cardinal virtues on the human mind. The virtues were therefore naturally present in human beings, but in an imperfect state, in contrast to God’s perfect possession of them. Natural virtues lacked merit, however, and even contracted guilt unless they were directed to God by charity and grace.\textsuperscript{41} In my opinion, these views do not reflect Hugh’s authentic thought. Hugh left no room in his genuine works for the idea that non-Christians pos-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{36} Id., \textit{Epistula ad fratres} 50–51, pp. 184–86; 227–30, pp. 326–28; cf. \textit{Speculum fidei} 4, p. 64: “Virtus namque est recta vel perfecta ratio.”
\item \textsuperscript{38} Id., \textit{Sermones} 22.20, p. 181: “primae generationes Sapientiae, quattuor scilicet principales uirtutes, quas etiam gentiles philosophi potuerunt ratione docente cognoscere.”
\item \textsuperscript{39} Id., \textit{Genealogia regum Anglorum} Praef., PL 195:712D: “animae rationali naturaliter inest amor virtutum, odium vitiorum.”
\item \textsuperscript{41} Hugh of Saint Victor (?), \textit{Quaestiones} (1959), p. 196; (1960), pp. 47–48.
\end{itemize}
sessed any virtue, whereas the author of the *Quaestiones* considered the virtues a common possession of mankind, even if only Christians were capable of perfecting them. Hugh used the term *virtutes naturales* only in the sense of mental abilities, pointing out that these were no virtues in the proper, moral sense.\(^{42}\) In addition, Hugh refrained in *De sacramentis* from confirming the current view that the first man possessed the virtues before the Fall, whereas the *Quaestiones* seem to imply such a confirmation.

A last figure whose views need consideration in this context is John of Salisbury. The term *virtutes naturales* does not occur in his work, but the term *iustitia naturalis* does.\(^{43}\) More important, John’s *Policraticus* contains explicit praise for the virtue of ancient Roman rulers, notably of Trajan.\(^{44}\) John even allowed himself academic doubt about the Stoic, Peripatetic and Epicurean theories of virtue, and once compared the cardinal virtues which the philosophers considered the main streams of *honestas* to the four rivers of Paradise flowing from the Holy Spirit.\(^{45}\) However, presenting John’s conception of virtue in purely Aristotelian terms (that is, as a permanent *habitus* formed by repeated action alone) is pushing things too far.\(^{46}\) John repeatedly stated in the *Policraticus* that true virtue depended on faith and grace and constituted the *via regia* to beatitude, conceding, however, that natural endowment and mental exercise could produce a laudable *virtutis imago*, especially in case of the ancients who displayed so many good qualities.\(^{47}\) Thus, John appears to have distinguished true, Christian virtues on the one hand and something like natural

\(^{42}\) Hugh of Saint Victor, *De sacramentis* 1.6.17, PL 176:274A–D; see also Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 3:100; id., *Etudes de morale*, 71–73.

\(^{43}\) See n. 30 above. The term *virtutes naturales* occurs only in Pseudo-John of Salisbury, *De septem septenis* 5, PL 199:954C: “Et notandum quod virtutum aliae sunt naturales, aliae meritoriae, quae majoris meriti sunt quam naturales, quia naturalis virtus potest in homine cum vitio naturae cohabitare.”


virtues on the other, more or less like Gratian, while he overtly recognized the moral goodness of the ancients and showed a remarkable sympathy for their practices and theories of virtue.

By 1150, then, some ground-breaking work for the acceptance of natural virtues had been done. Although scholars agreed that virtue in its truest sense required grace, the Christian monopoly on moral goodness had been broken. The morality of the ancients, most notably of the philosophers, found recognition with a variety of authors, even in monastic circles. Some authors went a step further and tentatively described the goodness of the ancients in terms of virtue. A much fuller recognition of natural virtue was achieved during the second half of the twelfth century.

III

Peter Lombard is traditionally depicted as a conservative thinker, especially in the field of ethics. Marcia Colish has qualified this view, and with good reason. The Lombard undeniably restricted the notion of virtue to qualities bestowed by grace. But the fact that in his Sententiae he defined virtue as a qualitas, introducing an Aristotelian concept in his otherwise Augustinian terminology, permitted his commentators to connect his ethics with ancient moral thought. Even more important, Peter explicitly rejected the Pauline idea that a non-Christian life consists of nothing but sin. Only human intentions directed by faith were meritorious, argued Peter, but other intentions could also count as good: Jews or sinful Christians who assisted the poor out of a natural compassion (naturali pietate ductus) did a

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good deed and possessed a good will. Although Peter’s modern commentators have noticed his extending the notion of moral goodness beyond the limits of faith, they have not fully grasped the polemic nature of his statement. First, Peter contradicted his principal source text, the Summa sententiarum, which denied that unbelievers could possess a natural good will. Second, I believe that Peter’s example of natural compassion is directed against Hugh of Saint Victor, who carefully distinguished between virtuous compassion on the one hand, inspired by charity and leading to heaven, and natural compassion on the other, proceeding from inborn piety and merely neutral from a moral point of view. Peter Abelard even dismissed natural compassion altogether as a potential source of injustice. Thus, the Lombard’s declaration in favour of natural goodness (though not in favour of natural virtue) set the intransigence of a preceding generation aside and opened the door to a sincere acceptance of pagan morality. His view that unbelievers could perform good acts was echoed by his early commentators such as Peter of Poitiers, Peter of Poitiers, Sententiae 2.16, ed. Philip S. Moore, Joseph N. Garvin and Marthe Dulong, vol. 2 (Notre Dame, 1961), 210: “si quis infidelis inopiam indigentis

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51 Ibid. 2.41.2, p. 564: “Solaque illa intentio remunerabilis est ad vitam, quam fides dirigit; sed non illa sola bona est, ut aiunt. Nam, si quis Iudaeus vel malus Christianus necessitatem proximi relevaverit naturali pietate ductus, bonum fecit, et bona fuit voluntas qua illud fecit.” Peter quoted Prosper of Aquitaine’s dictum (see n. 48) ibid. 2.41.1.3, p. 562, and at Collectanea in Epistolae Pauli Rom. 14:23, PL 191:1520A.

52 Lottin, Etudes de morale, 74; Colish, Peter Lombard, 484.

53 Summa sententiarum 3.9, PL 176:104B: “Et tamen potest dici quod etiam mali naturaliter volun bene; et ita videtur quod ante susceptam gratiam aliquis habeat velle bonum.” However, a bad person who pretends to will the good “naturaliter appetit bonum; sed eum non delectat bonum;” hence, he does not really will it (104B–C).

54 Hugh of Saint Victor, De quatuor voluntatibus in Christo, PL 176:844A–B (natural compassion “nec culpam habet, quia ex natura est; nec praemium, quia ex virtute non est”); cf. id. (2), Miscellanea 1.180, PL 177:577A–B: “compassio ex natura” is “irreprehensibilis,” “compassio ex virtute” is “laudabilis.”

55 See Peter Abelard, Collationes, p. 140 (Philosopher speaking), opposing clementia as a rationabilis affectus (a concept borrowed from Seneca) to compassio or misericordia as natural sympathy with fellow human beings which may impede justice if extending to criminals. Marenbon, The Philosophy of Peter Abelard, 308–09, thinks that Abelard depicted the Philosopher on purpose as being unwilling to temper his sense of justice by (Christian) mercy. But elsewhere Abelard identified the misericordia required of human beings in doing justice with Seneca’s notion of clementia, distinguishing it sharply from “compassio...ex infirmitate animae” (Problemata Heliosiae 14, PL 178:700D–701B); moreover, in Sermo 14, ed. Paola De Santis, I Sermoni di Abelardo per le monache del Paraclete (Louvain, 2002), 217 he suggested that human beings, like God, should forgive injustice only if the evildoers repented their acts.

whereas Maurice of Sully, who succeeded the Lombard as bishop of Paris, admitted that wicked people could not only do what is good (bonum facere) but even do well (bene facere), although this would not bring them into heaven.\textsuperscript{57}

Peter the Chanter went one step further, arguing that the good works of unbelievers, though not meritorious, pleased God, since they proceeded from some sort of natural virtue (ex aliqua uirtute naturali fiunt).\textsuperscript{58} Introducing the concept of natural virtue, the Chanter moved beyond Peter Lombard’s system. In his unedited Summa Abel, he actually restricted the Lombard’s definition of virtue as a divine gift to faith, hope and charity, which he called Catholic virtues in contradistinction to the four cardinal, political or philosophical virtues.\textsuperscript{59}

The Chanter’s distinction clearly alludes to the Porretan theory of the virtues, mainly known from the work of Alan of Lille but also recurring in the largely unedited summae of Simon of Tournai and some later Parisian masters as well as in several collections of questions.\textsuperscript{60} Typical for the theory is the idea that human beings possess virtues natura, in habitu and in usu. Naturally possessed virtues are not real virtues, as the Porretans pointed out themselves, but inborn capacities which could be developed into steadfast habits at an adult age. When this happened, virtues existed in habitu; when the virtues were actually employed, they manifested themselves in usu. All this

\textsuperscript{57} Maurice of Sully, sermon cited in Jean Longère, Oeuvres oratoires des maîtres parisiens au XII e siècle, 2 vols. (Paris, 1975) 2:231 n. 28: “Faciunt bene enim multi reprobis, sed quoniam ea ex dilectione Dei non faciunt, pro suo merito premium beatitudinis non accipiunt.”

\textsuperscript{58} Peter the Chanter, Summa de sacramentis et animae consiliis 89, ed. Jean-Albert Dugauquier, vol. 2 (Louvain-Lille, 1957), 87–88: “Dici autem potest quod huiusmodi opera malorum, licet non fiant ex caritate, non sunt tamen mala, nec sunt meriotira. Placent tamen Deo quia ex aliqua uirtute naturali fiunt, et ut ostendat Deus illa sibi placere, dat Deus ex gratia sua aliqua ipsis malis, non ob meritum quod nullum est, sed in signum quod ipsorum opera Deo placuerint.”


was not incompatible with mainstream twelfth-century moral thought. The Porretans believed, however, that developing inborn capacities to virtuous habits did not necessarily require grace. Human beings, including Jews and pagans, were capable of acquiring political virtues through natural reason alone. Political virtues, a concept borrowed from Macrobius’ commentary on the *Somnium Scipionis*, were directed towards the well-being of earthly society and did not earn merit. Only Christian believers could develop Catholic virtues through the cooperation of reason and grace. The Porretans defined Catholic virtues *secundum debitum finem* (they were directed towards God) and *secundum debitum officium* (they followed the rules of the Church); their reward was heaven. These views had Augustinian roots but constituted a novelty in twelfth-century ethics, even though the work of some earlier authors (Gratian, William of Saint-Thierry) alluded to a distinction between natural, non-salvific virtues on the one hand and true, salvific virtues on the other. The Porretans transformed these allusions into a doctrine, acknowledging not only the goodness but also the virtues of non-Christians and thereby dismantling the prevailing identification of virtue, grace and merit. Between the categories of divinely inspired virtues leading to heaven and natural qualities leading nowhere, the Porretans introduced a new category of natural virtues which did not appeal to man’s celestial destination but at least encouraged civilized life on earth.

For all its apparent clarity, the Porretan theory suffered from complications which its first adherents did not solve in a coherent way. First, the position of faith, hope and charity in their ethical system was unstable. For Alan of Lille, all virtues existed on a political and on a Catholic level. Even faith, hope and charity existed as political virtues, as subspecies of religion, which in turn was a species of justice. By contrast, Simon of Tournai appears to have considered

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62 Alan of Lille, *De virtutibus et de vitii et de donis Spiritus sancti* 1.2, ed. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 6:54. See also Heinzmann, *Die Summe*, 210: for Hubertus, faith was a species of prudence, hope of fortitude, charity of justice.
faith, hope and charity as merely Catholic virtues. Second, the Porretans took different positions on the transition of the virtues from a political to a Catholic level. According to Alan, grace transformed the inborn moral capacities of Christians directly into Catholic virtues. The transition from political to Catholic virtues only took place if a Jew or heathen who possessed political virtues converted to Christianity. Conversely, Simon conceived of political virtues as propaedeutic qualities even for Christians. Whereas Alan left little room for Christians observing political virtues (but what about Christian politicians disregarding religion?), Simon imagined that all Christians developed political virtues before entering the stage of grace (but what about monks, hermits and saints unconcerned with politics?). Third, Alan rejected the current opinion that infants received the virtues upon baptism. Simon, however, believed that baptism conferred the Catholic virtues—a curious stance, as it precluded the possibility of developing the propaedeutic political virtues first.

63 In Simon’s view, it is the theological virtues (and not charity alone, as Alan taught) which inform the political virtues (see below n. 65); religion is not a species of justice, but a virtus lateralis (Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 3:316 n. 1). Wieland, *Ethica*, 227, states that in contrast to Simon, Alan did not consider political virtues a category of its own. In reality, Alan did so more consistently than Simon.
67Simon of Tournai, *Disputationes* 90.1, ed. Joseph Warichez (Louvain, 1932),
The inconsistencies of the Porretans sprang to a great extent from the problematic relation between natural and supernatural virtue. On the one hand, the Porretans considered natural virtues as second-rank concepts, representing a stage of earthly concerns which humans should overcome in order to secure salvation. On the other hand, they believed that natural and supernatural virtues were essentially identical: through grace, natural virtues reached their perfection. But how could grace deprive natural virtues of their non-religious officium and finis while leaving them essentially intact? And how could natural virtues, untouched by grace and not directed to God, at all be relevant in the economy of salvation?

In the last decades of the twelfth century, the Porretan theory underwent an important modification. Many Parisian theologians came to believe that grace produced not only the supernatural virtues but also the natural virtues known by the ancients and alluded to in the Bible. It was quite possible for these virtues, which already had God as their final goal, to be further elevated by grace and become instruments of salvation. The Parisian masters thus accounted

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258: “Principalis effectus baptismi est remissio peccatorum... Secundarius vero baptismi est collatio virtutum;” Summa, cited in Lottin 3:129 (also in Landgraf, Dogmengeschichte 3.1:327 n. 96); “dicimus parvulos recipere fidem et ceteras virtutes catholicas in baptismo non in persona sua, sed in persona ecclesie.”

68 See Alan of Lille, De virtutibus 1.3, p. 120: Catholic virtues are “simpliciter virtutes;” p. 121: “Patet ergo quod primo dicitur quis habere uirtutes, quando per gratiam Spiritus sancti habitis rededitur ut debito officio utatur hiis que naturaliter ei insunt.” Hubertus opposed political and Catholic virtues as virtues “minus proprie” and “proprie,” respectively; see Heinzmann, Die Summe, 197.

for the transition of the virtues from a natural to a supernatural level, but in their case the transition appears to have been a matter of degree, an intensification of an already present grace. What seems to have bothered them about the original Porretan theory was not so much the fact that non-Christians were granted virtues (this they conceded without difficulty) as the radical separation of nature and grace: if natural virtues were relevant to salvation, one had to assume that they were somehow touched by grace (unlike the natural, inborn capacities of human beings which could never become virtues, quite in contrast to what the Porretans had taught). The old idea that even in the era of natural law a few just men existed, driven by the Holy Spirit to the love of God, may have stimulated subsuming natural virtues under grace. As a consequence, the Parisian masters could accept the Porretan distinction between political and Catholic virtues without the danger of setting virtue and grace apart.

The *Speculum universale* which Radulfus Ardens († c. 1200) composed near the end of his career breathes a slightly different spirit. While insisting that there can be good morals but no virtues without faith, Radulfus also admitted that virtues had their origin in
nature. His explanation is that the virtues were given to man at his creation and are therefore natural. After the Fall, however, man lost the virtues, which he could only recuperate through grace. Radulfus’ *Summa* passed largely unnoticed in its day, but shows once more that by 1200, theologians paradoxically tried to save the concept of natural virtue by connecting it to grace.

### IV

Leaving aside Parisian theology, the idea of natural virtue was at stake in one other academic field: the study of Roman law, concentrated in Bologna. The opening paragraphs of two integral parts of the *Corpus iuris civilis*, the *Institutiones* and the *Digesta*, contain the definition of justice by the Roman lawyer Ulpian (170–228): *iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuens.* Starting with Irnerius, the father of the study of Roman law at Bologna, the glossators interpreted justice thus defined as a cardinal virtue and took pains to bring Ulpian’s words into conformity with Boethius’ definition of virtue as *habitus mentis bene constitutae.* Medieval moral thought thus entered the field of Roman law, quite independently from the preoccupations of canon lawyers.

In the twelfth century, no jurist made such extensive use of moral thought as Martin Gosia († 1158/66), the second of the ‘Four Doctors’ of civil law who taught in Bologna. In his commentary on the

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75 The following paragraphs summarize the final section of Bejczy, “Law and Ethics.”


Institutiones, Martin elucidated the notion of justice with a long extract from Macrobius on the distinction between political virtues, purgatorial virtues, virtues of the purged mind and exemplary virtues. According to Plotinus, to whom the distinction goes back, political virtues regulate the earthly concerns of man; by purgatorial virtues, man tries to detach himself from these concerns; virtues of the purged mind define contemplative life; finally, exemplary virtues reside in the mind of God. Significantly, Martin declared that Ulpian’s definition merely related to justice as a political virtue, thus introducing this concept some decennia before the Porretans. However, Martin defined justice in the same text as a fruit of equity, while equity itself resided in God and could even be identified with him. If divine equity became the permanent object of the human will, it constituted justice; law (ius) was the expression of this will in a particular regulation.

These apparently conflicting views—justice as a political virtue and justice as divine equity interiorized by human beings—may be reconciled in the following way. Martin Gosia was and still is reputed for his view that unwritten equity could annul the letter of the law. Assuming the existence of a lower form of justice inherent in the law and a higher form of justice exterior to it enabled Martin to measure any given law against the divinely inspired ideal of justice. If laws served their politically just aims in agreement with the virtue of justice grounded in divine equity, their validity was assured; if their application went against this virtue, they could and even should be ignored. My interpretation finds support in the fact that Martin’s numerous adversaries likewise related justice and equity to the divine, but considered written law the genuine expression of these concepts. Rather than assuming an opposition between divine and legal justice, they played down the difference between the two, leaving no exterior criterion for the validity of laws.

79 Ibid., 5: “Diffinitur autem hic iustitia secundum quod est politica.”
80 Ibid., 4: “justitiae fons et origo est equitas . . . equitas est rerum, idest obligationum conveniencia, que in paribus causis, idest negotiis, paria iura desiderat. idest Deus, secundum hoc quod desiderat, equus dicitur. nihil enim aliud est equitas quam Deus. si tali equitas in voluntate hominis perpetuo sit, iustitia dicitur. que talis voluntas redacta in preceptionem, sive scriptum, sive consuetudinariu ius dicitur.”
Martin Gosia’s ideas display several parallels with the Porretan theory of virtue. Martin and the Porretans both recognized elementary, political virtues on the one hand, and divinely inspired virtues representing the highest moral (and for Martin, legal) obligations of human beings on the other. The acknowledgment of political virtues allowed them to conceive civil life in moral categories without conflating politics and religion. While in theology this led to an increased respect for the moral values of Jews and pagans, it offered a protection against legal tyranny in the field of law.

V

Natural virtue was acknowledged in Western moral thought in the course of the twelfth century, but two reservations must accompany this conclusion. First, twelfth-century scholars believed without exception that virtue in its truest sense could not exist without salvific grace and hence was only attainable for Christians. Recognizing the existence of second-rank virtues outside Christendom, the Porretans went as far as Christian scholars could go at the time; meanwhile, their connection between nature and grace remained problematic. Second, natural virtue mainly found recognition in the limited environment of Parisian theology and Bolognese legal studies. The fact that Western moral thought chiefly owes the recognition of non-Christian virtues to Christian theologians is highly interesting in itself, but one should keep in mind that the majority of contemporary Western authors continued to consider virtue in exclusively Christian terms. Among Benedictines and Cistercians in particular, opposition to natural virtues remained strong; many authors rejected the value or even the existence of virtue uninformed by grace.81 Against this

background, the late twelfth-century corrective of the Porretan theory
gains importance. The idea that the rudiments of grace were present
even in the natural virtues allowed the recognition of virtues outside
Christendom, while it could appease the opposition to accepting such
virtues outside the academic world. The underlying conviction that
virtue required some form of grace might seem a conservative stance,
but a comparison with Abelard may reveal a different perspective.
Abelard argued that if the ancients possessed the virtues, they must
have possessed the faith. The later Parisian masters argued that if
the ancients possessed the virtues, grace must be active even apart
from faith. Only this latter reasoning permitted acknowledging nat-
ural virtues without annexing them to Christendom.

nomine judicatur indignus;” William of Auberive, De sacramentis numerorum, cited in
Jean Leclercq, “L’arithmétique de Guillaume d’Auberive,” Analecta monastica 1 =
culpa non tollitur, sine te nomine suo uirtus abutitur.” See also Peter of Blois (?),
Carmina 4.1 (O miranda fides) l. 3–6, ed. Carsten Wollin, CCCM 128:510: “fundam-
enta fides uiitutum continet in se, / qua sine nulla potest uirtus fore uera realis . . . /
Qui caret ergo fide, uiitutem non habet ullam;” Radulfus Ardens, Homiliae in Epistolas
et Evangelia dominicalia 1.60, PL 155:1884D: “fides, spes, charitas, sapientia, justitia,
fortitudo, temperantia et caeterae virtutes, caeteraque Spiritus sancti dona . . . gra-
tuita dona, sive gratiae, dicuntur per excellentiam, quoniam gratos homines et bonos
efficient, et a malis nec haberi nec usurpari possunt.”
For Jews and Christians, lying is a sin: the ninth commandment of the Decalogue forbids bearing false witness (Ex. 20:16). The early Christian writer who analyzes lying most fully is Augustine. He treats lying in his *De magistro*, *De doctrina christiana*, *De trinitate*, and *Enchiridion*, devoting two treatises, *De mendacio* and *Contra mendacium*, to this topic alone. In each of these works, Augustine concludes that all lies are sinful. Modern scholarship on the high medieval understanding of lying has viewed the period as an unadulterated *aetas Augustiniana*. Yet, an alternative patristic tradition on lying existed, summed up in Latin by Ambrose of Milan. Not only does it justify some lies as permissible, it even regards them as righteous. This essay argues that, albeit with little express citation of Ambrose, this second patristic tradition made a deep impression on some high medieval thinkers. Starting in the twelfth century, they came to Ambrose’s conclusion: some lies are not only acceptable, but commendable; such lies are not vicious but virtuous. At the same time, skilled in the scholastic technique of testing and criticizing inconsistencies in their authorities, they wielded Augustine against Augustine in attacking his claim that all lies are sinful.

The four Augustinian works that merit attention here are the *De magistro*, *De mendacio*, *Contra mendacium*, and *De trinitate*. In *De magistro*, Augustine argues that, although they signify their referents naturally, a teacher’s words, in religious instruction, have a purely instrumental effect on his student. They may remind him of something he already knows, or point him toward knowledge he seeks. But, since the normative type of knowledge in this field is faith, the student can acquire it only if Christ, the Interior Teacher, enables him to grasp and

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embrace the truth of his teacher’s words. While this thesis limits the powers of language, Augustine acknowledges that words signify both extramental realities and the speaker’s inner intention, and considers lying, distinguishing lies from falsehoods. Although both lies and falsehoods fail to accord with objective reality, what distinguishes them is the liar’s deceptive intention. Indeed, the liar’s intention is so central that a speaker’s wish to deceive makes his statement a lie even when it is objectively true.

This conclusion gives rise to another question: Do people who do not say what they mean invariably lie? Augustine says “no,” conceding four exceptions. First, there is the familiar pedagogical situation in which a teacher expounds a doctrine to his students, one with which he disagrees. No lie occurs, because his intention is not to present his own opinion but to represent accurately someone else’s. In the other three cases, the speakers’ words may admittedly be incorrect. But they do not reflect the desire to deceive; hence, they are not lies. Speakers may repeat words they have previously memorized, by rote, in a state of absence of mind. Whether true or not, their words do not express their inner intentions. Or, they may inadvertently commit a lapsus linguae. Or, they may commit a barbarism or a solecism. In these three cases, inattention, accident, and error are involved. Although a falsehood may be spoken if the statement made is objectively untrue, these exceptions do not count as lies.

The same definition of lying informs De mendacio, where Augustine also argues that the liar’s intention to deceive transcends the crite-

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4 Augustine, De magistro 13.41, p. 199.

5 Ibid. 13.41–43, pp. 199–201.
rion of the objective truth or falsity of his statements: “For a person is judged to be lying, or not lying, on account of his own mental intention, not on account of the truth or falsity of the matters themselves . . . Indeed, the fault of the liar lies in his desire to deceive in expressing his thought.” With this principle in mind, Augustine cites eight kinds of lies, arranged in order of decreasing seriousness. But before doing so, he notes three exceptions. One of them, uttering a falsehood based on an error made in good faith, he also exempts from his definition of lying in *De magistro*, as we have just seen. The other two exceptions are new, and they will recur in the sequel. They are “jocose lies” and statements that mix fact and fiction. Speakers use jocose lies and mix fact and fiction in order to entertain others. Both they and their hearers are aware of this fact; hence, all are amused and no one is deceived. Moving on to his hierarchy of lies, Augustine begins with the most reprehensible kind of lie, the lie told in the propagation of religion. Confronted by lies told and deceptions practiced by biblical worthies, he reclassifies them as mysteries or *figurae*. Next on his list is the lie that injures someone unjustly; next is the lie that benefits someone while injuring another. Although it is not the most serious kind of lie, the lie after that is quintessentially Augustinian, “since it is told for the sheer joy of lying, and this is intrinsically vicious.” Next is the lie told to please others, followed by the lie that harms no one and benefits someone. Then comes the lie that harms no one and protects someone from harm; at the bottom of the list is the least culpable lie, the lie told to protect someone—oneself or someone else—from sexual assault. Thus, Augustine concludes, while we can certainly grade lies in their seriousness, all lies *per se* are sins and no lie is permissible, whatever the provocation.

6 Augustine, *De mendacio* 3.3, ed. Josephus Zycha, CSEL 41:415: “Ex animi enim sui sententia, non rerum ipsarum veritate vel falsitati mentiens aut non mentiens iudicandus est . . . Culpa vero mententis est in enuntiando animo suo fallendi cupiditas.” My trans. here and elsewhere unless otherwise indicated. See also ibid. 2.2, p. 414.

7 Ibid. 3.3, pp. 414–15.

8 Ibid. 2.2, p. 414: “iocis mendacia.”

9 Ibid. 11.18, p. 437.


11 Ibid. 5.5–6.9, 15.26–18.37, pp. 411–27, 446–58.

12 Ibid. 21.42, p. 464: “propter mendacii libidinem, quae per se vitiosa est.”
The same eight-fold catalogue of lies recurs in *Contra mendacium*, where the occasion for the treatise explains a shift in focus. Augustine wrote this work in response to a Spanish Catholic concerned by the Priscillianist heretics in his country. The Priscillianists were notorious for lying about their beliefs so as to escape detection and persecution. Given that fact, was it acceptable for Catholics to dissemble their own faith, penetrating the heretics’ cell groups in order to disabuse them of their errors and convert them to orthodoxy? Augustine’s answer was an unequivocal “no.” Since the Priscillianists hold that their own beliefs are true, they do not lie but profess falsehoods when they state them openly; when they lie about their beliefs and profess Catholicism, their lie consists in their intention to deceive.\(^\text{13}\)

As for Catholics who dissemble their faith, despite their good intentions they sin more egregiously than the Priscillianists, and for two reasons: Their words are both objectively and subjectively false. And, in imitating the Priscillianists, they abandon their own moral high ground and thereby lose their credibility. The Catholics’ pious fraud is therefore inexpedient as well as sinful.\(^\text{14}\) Lies told in the cause of religion remain the worst kinds of lies. The ends do not justify the means. The new wrinkle in *Contra mendacium* is that Augustine argues his case on pragmatic grounds as well as on principle.

A final new element in the Augustinian doctrine of lying emerges in *De trinitate*. After elaborating four analogies of the Trinity in the human mind in the work’s second half, Augustine explains how they all fall short in its final book. Observing that, while we can lie, although God cannot, he specifies three types of human lying: lies of speech, lies of thought, and lies of action.\(^\text{15}\) All of them involve both objective untruth and a deceptive intention. Regarding lies of speech, Augustine reprises what he says in earlier works. Since he regards thought as interior speech, lies of thought can be annexed to the analysis of verbal statements already provided. Thus, thoughts are lies when they fail to correspond with objective reality and are,

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\(^{15}\) Augustine, *De trinitate* 15.10.17–15.11.20, ed. W.J. Mountain and Fr. Glorie, CCSL 50A:483–89.
none the less, deliberately maintained, or when a thinker deliberately compasses evil in his mind, whether or not he expresses his false and evil thoughts externally. Lies of action consist of hypocritical behaviors or simulated modes of self-presentation that aim to deceive. In comparison with Augustine’s earlier doctrine of lying, here he expands his conception of lying beyond the boundaries of articulate speech and into the realms of thought and action.

Largely supportive of Augustine is Gregory the Great. In his *Moralia*, he agrees that lying is intrinsically evil and, indeed, that lying to God was Adam’s first sin after the Fall. At the same time, he singles out the lie that hurts no one and helps someone as a sin so slight that the punishment it merits is easily “purged by pious deeds.” In this connection, he cites one of Augustine’s examples of biblical liars, the Hebrew nurses in Exodus who lied to the Pharaoh concerning their charges, thereby saving their lives (Ex. 1:21). He thinks it fallacious to claim that their lie was not sinful, even though their pious intention made it minimally so. At the same time, he thinks that they were also motivated to lie in order to save their own necks. This, Gregory concludes, is why they were granted earthly rewards but denied a heavenly recompense. As we will see, this text also drew the attention of high medieval commentators.

The modern scholarship on these high medieval developments falls under two headings, examinations of church fathers and scholastics alone, and studies that also treat vernacular texts and pastoral literature such as sermons and manuals for confessors. While conceding

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17 Ibid.: “pia operatione purgari.”
18 Ibid. 18.3.6, p. 889. Cf. Gregor Müller, *Die Wahrhaftigkeitspflicht und die Problematik der Lüge* (Freiburg, 1962), 88, who claims that Gregory admits pious fraud.
19 Müller, *Die Wahrhaftigkeitspflicht*, 27–179. This work is problematized by its focus on two issues remote from medieval ethical considerations, situation ethics and the problem of truth-telling vs. lying in a totalitarian dictatorship.
that lay vernacular authors may have been more flexible, the consensus position sees theologians as unanimous in support of Augustine on lying. Indeed, scholars agree that a cultural shift starting in the late twelfth century promoted a new and more intense concern with the sin of lying. A heightened preoccupation with preaching to the laity and hearing confessions led to the placement of a new category of sins, “sins of the tongue,” on the agenda of Christian ethics, gathering increasing attention after that time. From the late twelfth century onward, “sins of the tongue” were discussed in two forms, commentaries on the Ten Commandments under the heading of false witness, and ethical works framed in terms of the seven deadly sins. In the latter scheme, “sins of the tongue” were subdivided into oral sins involving what enters the mouth, such as excess in food and drink, and oral sins involving what issues from the mouth, including lying. Sometimes these two schemata were combined in a single work. Another genre in which lying was roundly condemned, following Augustine, was canon law treatises, in which lying was typically redefined as perjury and treated as a crime as well as a sin. The shift, in the high Middle Ages, is thus seen as quantitative, not qualitative, as more and more authors and literary genres joined the pro-Augustinian chorus.

One topic left to the side here is “sins of the tongue” in monastic literature. Well before the emergence of monastic communities that mandated the rule of silence, monastic authors developed a detailed rationale for the morality of speech and for silence. Silence was

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22 For an overview of this literature, see Richard G. Newhauser, *The Treatises on Vices and Virtues in Latin and the Vernacular* (Turnhout, 1993), 193–97; for a typical treatise in which spoken “sins of the tongue” are paired with gluttony/drunkenness, see ibid., 87.


24 A detailed survey is provided by Claudia E. Kunz, *Schweigen und Geist: Biblische...
promoted under the heading of custody of the senses and as a mode of prayer. The difficulty of enforcing it can be illustrated by the monastic rule of Columbanus. In governing his monks, who had all evidently kissed the Blarney Stone, he shows how hard it was, for an Irishman, to practice the virtue he enjoins:

By thy words thou shalt be justified, and by thy words thou shalt be condemned. Justly will they be damned who could not say just things when they could, but preferred to say with garrulous loquacity what is evil, irreverent, empty, harmful, dubious, false, provocative, disparaging, base, fanciful, blasphemous, rude, and tortuous.25

Incapable of containing his own garrulous loquacity, Columbanus requires fourteen adjectives to denote the “sins of the tongue” he wants his monks to shun. Entertaining as this example is, it suggests that, as a moral issue, “sins of the tongue” well predates the pastoral and canonical concerns that surfaced in the late twelfth century, which current scholarship views as unanimously pro-Augustinian on lying.

Even setting aside monastic literature, there is a more basic reason for revising this scholarly consensus position. For there was another ancient and patristic tradition on lying that challenged Augustine, even while sharing some of his concerns. As we have seen, Augustine is sensitive to the ethos of a speaker, in relation to the ethos of his hearer, in affecting the persuasiveness of his words. This insight derives from the anti-sophistic rhetorical tradition. A leading figure in that tradition was Quintilian. Quintilian deals specifically with the morality of lying. Lying, he maintains, is permissible when used for rhetorical effect, and it may be meritorious when we lie to shield the sensibilities of a hearer too weak or ill to bear the truth. Quintilian’s prime consideration is the upright moral intention of the speaker
who withholds the truth for this reason.\(^\text{26}\) Among early Christian writers, there was also a tradition that defended lying and dissimulation for various reasons. These include the desire to save souls, the desire to persuade a highly qualified candidate who is reluctant to accept ordination, and the desire to profess humility by refusing to vaunt one’s own virtues and achievements. The warrant cited for such pious lies is St. Paul, becoming all things to all men to win souls (1 Cor. 9:20). Purely worldly justifications for lying and dissimulation also play a part in this tradition, as when one lies to escape death, when a physician withholds a negative prognosis knowing that it will worsen his patient’s condition, the more general desire to protect someone from harm, and the specific military exception allowing a commander to deceive his enemy since all’s fair in war. Early Christian and patristic authors aligning themselves with these positions include Pseudo-Maximus, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Hilary of Poitiers, John Cassian, John Chrysostom, Dorotheus of Gaza, Palladius, John Climacus, and Paulinus of Nola.\(^\text{27}\) Linking them together is the view that deceit is acceptable when it serves a greater good.

Curiously, the scholarship that has unearthed this second patristic tradition omits Ambrose, who is a very rich source for the justification of the self-protective lie, the lie by which a person Pretends to be other than he is, and, above all, for the pious fraud. His two chief examples of the deceptive presentation of self are Judith and Jacob. He cites the action of Judith, the chaste widow, setting aside her widow’s weeds and donning her “glad rags” \(\text{vestem iocunditatis}\), masquerading as a woman of easy virtue in order to gain access to Holofernes, so as to ply him with wine and kill him, as a moral example for widows and consecrated virgins. For widows, she is a model of courage above all, and also of sobriety, in not matching Holofernes cup for cup, and of modesty, after her victory.\(^\text{28}\) For


\(^{27}\) See, in particular, Benjamin Ramsay, “Two Traditions on Lying and Deception in the Ancient Church,” \textit{The Thomist} 49 (1985): 515–30; see also Thomas D. Feehan, “Augustine on Lying and Deception,” \textit{Augustinian Studies} 19 (1988): 132 n. 1. Curiously, Müller, \textit{Die Wahrhaftigkeitspflicht}, 30–31, refers to some of these figures, but without budging from the view that Augustine’s position was normative in the patristic period.

\(^{28}\) Ambrose, \textit{De viduis} 7.37–42, ed. Ignatius Cazzaniga, transl. Franco Gori (Milan,
virgins, Judith’s venture was an act that “she undertook for religion, not love . . . she served religion . . . and the fatherland.” This is to remind virgins that true chastity is a state of soul, not a matter of externals, and that public service is one aspect of their calling.

The case of Jacob leads Ambrose to recast the text of Genesis. His own Jacob is passive, not proactive, in acquiring his brother’s birthright, and is at first perturbed by his mother Rebecca’s advice that he impersonate Esau, because it would wrong both his brother and his father. Aside from recognizing that Jacob is morally worthier than Esau, Rebecca’s rationale is that she is activating the divine prophesy concerning her twin sons given to her during her pregnancy. As Ambrose sees it, her advice, and Jacob’s acceptance of it despite his initial misgivings, are acts of piety. Ambrose is well aware of the fact that, in posing as Esau, Jacob is committing dolus, an act that, in Roman law, aimed at defrauding, deceiving, or cheating someone. He uses this technical term in describing Isaac’s response when he discovers Jacob’s ruse, expressly defining it as dolus and, at the same time praising him for it: “For deceit (dolus) is good when the plunder is without reproach. Now the plunder of piety is beyond reproach.” It is worth noting that, in praising Jacob’s dolus as virtuous, Ambrose clearly distinguishes his actions from the immoral and criminal fraus and dolus perpetrated by his father-in-law, Laban.

1984), 278–82. The quotation is at 7.38, 7.42. Müller, Die Wahrhaftigkeitspflicht, 42–43 treats Ambrose as agreeing with the Augustinian position on lying. He does not consider either this work or the patriarch treatises.


31 Ambrose, De Jacob 1.2.6, 1.2.8–10, 2.1.2–3, 2.3.11, pp. 236–42, 274–76, 284, on Rebecca’s moral comparison between her sons; ibid. 2.2.8, pp. 280–82, on the divine prophesy and the piety of Jacob and Rebecca.

first in substituting Leah for Rachel as Jacob’s first wife and then
in repeatedly cheating Jacob, crimes for which Jacob castigates him
when taking his leave.

There are other cases of deception in the lives of the patriarchs,
not involving impersonation, that Ambrose finds just as praise-
worthy as Jacob’s action. When Jacob and his household leave Laban,
Rachel steals her father’s household gods, hiding them in her saddle-
bags. When Laban comes after their party in search of the gods and
enters Rachel’s tent, Rachel does not rise from the saddlebags, on
which she is seated, explaining that she is menstruating; not finding
his gods, Laban departs confounded. The Book of Genesis offers no
cue as to whether Rachel is telling the truth or not. For his part,
Ambrose credits her with concocting a fine deceit. He also dismisses
categorically the notion that she lacks filial piety in failing to rise in
her father’s presence: “When the cause of religion was at stake, faith
had a just claim upon the judgment seat and unbelief like a defend-
ant deserved to stand.” And, he similarly praises Joseph for the
ruse by which he persuades his father to send Benjamin to him in
Egypt, “having fabricated a pious fraud.”

Ambrose also justifies lies told for self-protection and lies told to
spare the hearers’ feelings. He commends Abraham for seeking to
pass off his wife Sarah as his sister in Egypt and in the land of
Abimelech, agreeing that the rulers of those countries would have
killed Abraham in order to marry her had they known that she was
his wife. For Ambrose, these lies are unproblematic and completely
defensible. Abraham also lies to the servants who accompany him
and Isaac to the place of Isaac’s sacrifice. As father and son depart
for the final stage of their journey, Abraham tells the servants to

33 Ambrose, De viduis 15.90, p. 318: “primo sponsam habuit, . . . nec fraus exclusit
affectum.”
34 Id., De Jacob 2.5.24, p. 294: “Quare, si quid agnoscis vitiorum tuorum et crimi-
num. Nihil mecum abstuli fraudum tuarum dolique consortia nulla habeo.”
35 Ibid. 2.2.25, p. 296: “Ubi causa agebatur religionis fides debuit sedem habere
judicii et quasi rea stare perfidia.” Trans. McHugh in Ambrose, Seven Exegetical
Works, 161.
36 Ibid. 2.3.10, 2.5.25, pp. 282, 294–96: “pia commento fraudis.”
37 Ambrose, De Abraham 1.2.6–9, 1.7.59, 2.4.15–18, ed. transl. Franco Gori (Milan,
dèle? L’opinion des Pères dans les premiers siècles de l’église,” Bulletin de littérature
ecclesiastique 97 (1996): 353–54; Elizabeth A. Clark, Reading Renunciation: Asceticism and
Scripture in Early Christianity (Princeton, 1999), 157–58.
stay where they are, remarking that he and Isaac will rejoin them later. Abraham actually believes that he will return alone; but, Ambrose observes, he thinks that the servants would have been upset had he said so. Ambrose cites this episode with approval, as an index of Abraham’s thoughtfulness.38

The patristic legacy on the merits and demerits of lying, and the strategies adopted for explaining the lies and deceptions of biblical worthies, are thus more diverse than scholars arguing for Augustinian unanimity admit. The same is true for the high medieval sequel. Looking at theologians and canonists in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, we can certainly find thinkers who adopt Augustine’s definition of a lie as a false statement made with the intent to deceive, his eight-fold classification of lies, his notion that lies are always sinful, and that the lies of biblical worthies are mysteries. The leading defenders of these views are the author of the Summa sententiarum, Peter Lombard, Gratian, Robert of Melun, Bandinus, Simon of Tournai, and the authors of the Summa Halensis.39 While, on lying, these are the Augustinian hard-liners, some of them introduce qualifications that suggest the availability of alternative approaches to the subject. Gratian adds to his analysis the factor of ignorance, which may lessen or heighten the culpability of the liar or perjuror.40 In classifying lies, Peter Lombard, Simon of Tournai, and the Summa Halensis consider some lies mortal sins and others venial.41 Along the same lines, Bandinus classifies lies according to whether they aim at hurting other people, whether they hurt no one and help someone,
or whether they are jocose lies that deceive no one. The *Summa sententiarum* refers to the *De mendacio* definition of the lie as a statement in conflict with the speaker’s knowledge, belief, or conscience, whether factually true or not. Reflecting the philosophical advances of the day, Simon of Tournai draws a distinction between the truth of Aristotle and the truth of Christ. The truth of Aristotle means logical consistency; the truth of Christ means what is factually the case. A lying statement may conflict with the former, with the latter, or with both truths.

Even more striking are a number of departures from Augustine within this group, departures made by declassifying certain lies as lies at all and thus contradicting Augustine’s view that all lies are sins. Noting with Augustine that the lies of Jacob and Joseph are mysteries, the *Summa sententiarum* concludes, against Augustine, that not all lies are sins. The *Summa Halensis* cites the *Glossa ordinaria* on the Hebrew nurses, indicating that the glossator criticizes Gregory the Great, on two points. First, the glossator thinks that the nurses’ lie was not really a lie; and second, he holds that the nurses merited and received an eternal as well as an earthly reward: “on account of their virtues, they rested in heavenly peace.” The same text, citing Ambrose as the authority, argues that Abraham’s lie to his servants was not really a lie even if his words took the form of a lie, since, in the event, he did return to them in Isaac’s company. And, the *Summa Halensis* joins Robert of Melun and the *Summa sententiarum* in stating that the jocose lie is not a sin. Augustine himself exempts it from his classification of lies, so he contradicts himself in saying that all lies are sins.

This exemption of the jocose lie from the taint of sin, the disagreement with Gregory the Great’s assessment of the lie of the Hebrew nurses, and the exculpation of Jacob and other biblical figures serve as points of entry widening the range of untruthful state-

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42 Bandinus, *Sententiae* 3.38, PL 192:1088C.
43 *Summa sententiarum* 4.5, PL 176:122D.
44 Simon of Tournai, *Disputationes* 69.2, p. 194.
45 *Summa sententiarum* 4.5, PL 176:122D–123A.
47 Alexander of Hales, *Summa theologica* II.II.3.2.2.6.1 (404), p. 408.
48 Ibid. 6.2, p. 405; *Summa sententiarum*, 4.5, PL 176:123D; Robert of Melun, *Questiones de epistolas Pauli*, p. 325 (2 Cor. 1:17).
ments and deceitful actions taken to be sinless, and even commendable, on the part of thinkers who do not take the hard Augustinian line, instead showing themselves open to the alternative patristic tradition on lying represented by Ambrose. As is well known, the Glossa ordinaria, just mentioned, which turns the lie of the Hebrew nurses into a virtue, was produced in the circle of Anselm and Ralph of Laon. It is therefore no surprise to find that Anselm and his followers support the same position. Further, Anselm or someone in his circle groups the jocose lie, understood as no lie at all, with irony, parable, and other forms of figurative speech, noting that Christ Himself, and the biblical authors, used this type of language. Hugh of Saint Victor strongly supports this position, and his judgment is confirmed later in the twelfth and in the early thirteenth century by Stephen Langton, Godfrey of Poitiers, William of Auxerre, and Alexander of Hales. As Hugh puts it, “Jocose lies, ironies, and parables are not lies. Otherwise, the saints would be found reprehensible, since they said many things in ironies and parables. And Christ Himself spoke in parables . . .” Hugh adds that some statements indeed are lies, but are not sins, as when, out of humility, a person declines to acknowledge his own merits and talents. Peter Abelard takes up the theme that the jocose lie is no lie at all, citing Augustine on Genesis against Augustine on lying. One of his followers, the author of the Ysagoge in theologiam, reviewing the cases of Abraham, Jacob, and Joseph, dismisses the charge of lying that

52 Hugh of Saint Victor, De sacramentis 1.12, PL 176:357B.
can be made against them but without calling their lies mysteries. In his view, the only criterion that counts is intentionality; “if, then, the intention is good, the act is also good.”54 Taking another tack on the same issue, Stephen Langton, Geoffroy of Poitiers, and Praepositinus of Cremona and his followers say that Jacob’s lie was not a lie because he truly believed that he was the first-born son in merit.55 Further, reflecting Ambrose’s influence, Stephen Langton describes and approves Jacob’s lie as a “pious fraud.”56

Two early commentators on Peter Lombard’s Sentences, departing from their master, enlarge the list of permissible lies from another direction. Both the author of the Pseudo-Peter of Poitiers gloss and Gandulph of Bologna delete from the Augustinian canon not only the jocose lie but the officious lie, that is, the lie that harms no one and benefits someone; they are joined, in the early thirteenth century, by Alexander of Hales and John of Rupella.57 Picking up on Simon of Tournai’s distinction, Alan of Lille draws one of his own. For him, the truth of Aristotle includes realities in the natural world as well as logic, while the truth of Christ refers to supernatural realities. Logical fallacies are not lies, he states. Lacking either falsity or a deceptive intent, a statement is not a lie. A false statement truly intended is not a lie. Alan gives as an example St. Paul’s remark to the Corinthians that he planned to return to Corinth, which, in the event, he did not do. Nor did the Apostle lie, Alan concludes. Stephen Langton, Praepositinus of Cremona, Robert of Courçon, and Richard Fishacre agree with Alan that a logical fallacy is not a lie.58

In the second half of the twelfth century, an interest in semantic theory joins the earlier interest in the defense of figurative language


56 Ibid., 219: “pia fraus.”

57 For the Pseudo-Peter of Poitiers gloss and John of Rupella, respectively, see Landgraf, “Die Enschätzung,” 131, 135; Gandulph of Bologna, Sententiae 2.143–44, ed. Iohannes de Walter (Vienna, 1924), 230–32; Alexander of Hales, Glossa 3.38.3 and 8.3, pp. 492, 494–96.

58 Alan of Lille, De virtutibus et de vitii et de donis Spiritus sancti 2.1, ed. Lottin, Psychologie et morale 6:73; for the other figures noted, see Landgraf, “Definition und Sündhaftigkeit,” 79–82.
in the thought of scholastics who declassify the lies of biblical worthies as actual lies. Following an argument first made by Peter of Poitiers, Peter of Capua and his followers assert that, when Jacob identified himself to his father as the first-born son, he spoke metaphorically (transumptive, in similitudine). Master Martinus agrees, and so does Robert of Courçon, followed by William of Auxerre, John of Treviso, Odo Rigaud, Guerric of Saint-Quentin, Herbert of Auxerre, and Richard Fishacre. Peter of Poitiers reveals a trace of Ambrosian influence, as does Stephen Langton. In his analysis of Jacob’s lie which, he agrees, was not really a lie, Peter notes, as Ambrose does, that Jacob was initially disinclined to masquerade as Esau. But obedience—to God as well as to Rebecca—overruled his misgivings. Peter also supports the Glossa ordinaria’s disagreement with Gregory the Great on the Hebrew nurses, as a corrective to Augustine. The nurses’ action, he says, was highly praiseworthy; it was in no sense culpable; it was motivated by charity; and the nurses merited and received an eternal reward. Stephen agrees, with the proviso that the nurses agreed not to lie thereafter. Alexander of Hales follows suit. The nurses, he says, received the reward of eternal life “because they merited it.” Their lie was an officious one, which, in his estimation, is even further removed from the concept of sin than the jocose lie, for, of the three kinds of goodness, goodness in general, goodness ex circumstantia, and goodness gratiae, the nurses’ goodness displayed the first two kinds.

Here we see, in the same generation that produced the first summae confessorum and the mendicant orders committed to popular preaching and the hearing of confessions, the same generation that launched the church’s pastoral concern with “sins of the tongue,” a substantial number of thinkers whose goal, in treating lying, was to undermine Augustine’s position, to reduce the number of lies that had to be viewed as sins, and to rationalize the lies of biblical worthies, turning

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60 Peter of Poitiers, Sententiae 4.5, PL 211:1155B–1156B.
63 Alexander of Hales, Glossa 3.38.8 (AE text); 3.38.18 (L text), pp. 494–96, 504–07.
them into truths and virtues. Even, leaping ahead to the third quarter of the thirteenth century, we find some of these same concerns given a hearing by Thomas Aquinas, deemed to be the leading defender of Augustine on lying among the high scholastics. While he does support Augustine in general, Thomas also departs from him in interesting ways. Thomas asks whether playing down the truth, failing to tell the whole truth, can be virtuous. He answers “yes,” when we are reticent, out of humility, about our own endowments. While he holds that we may not lie to save someone from harm, we may, however, “prudently mask the truth under a kind of dissimulation.” With respect to the Hebrew nurses, he thinks that they are praiseworthy for their benevolence and fear of God. And, Thomas holds, the jocose lie is no lie at all; it is acceptable because it is not deceptive. The same is the case, he adds, for figurative language, such as hyperbole, for its function is to entertain, or to promote understanding.

Or to promote understanding. In reflecting on Thomas’ last remark, we should recall that he was a brilliant liturgical poet as well as a theologian and exegete. As with some of his immediate predecessors, he understood that language that is not literally true can signify and impart the truth. It is also worth recalling that the period addressed in this paper witnessed the revival of philosophical poetry, or, as Barbara Newman has recently called it, “imaginative theology,” in texts that engage deeply with theological, cosmological, anthropological, and ethical themes by means of images, myths, allegories, and fables. Newman joins a distinguished array of scholars who have studied such texts, mixtures of fact and fiction, in both Latin and the vernaculars. Well before Dante decided to reject his

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64 Müller, *Die Wahrhaftigkeitspflicht*, 158–77, even though he notes one of the exceptions flagged here, 172.
66 Ibid. 110.3 ad 4, p. 425: “Licet tamen veritatem occultare prudenter sub aliqua dissimulatione.”
67 Ibid. 110.4 ad 4, p. 427.
68 Ibid. 110.3 ad 6, p. 426.
own early view that poetic allegory was a bella menzogna,70 twelfth-century authors such as Bernard Silvester had laid out the theory as well as exemplified it in poetic practice.71 However, for our purposes, since his concerns are not cosmological but political and ethical, a better example of the mixture of fact and fiction, and of the revaluation of lying which it involves, is John of Salisbury.

John is forthright on the subject of fable, fiction, and lying as compelling ways of expressing the truth, both in his poetic and prose writings. In his *Entheticus maior*, he observes, by way of authorizing this practice in his own work, that the Bible “wraps truths in secret figures.”72 He defines lying as the passing off of the doctrines of others as one’s own ideas,73 or, as we would call it, plagiarism, as well as the use of figurative language. The rationale for this practice, he explains, is public service:

> Truth lies concealed under various figures
> for public law forbids that sacred things be made public....
> Sometimes the deception of words may cover up something true.
> As long as the truth is there under the surface, the figure remains true.
> It is false indeed in the appearance of the word, yet trustworthy in the mind, since it causes faith to dwell in hidden things.74

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74 Ibid. 1.15.186–187, 193–196, 1:116–19: “Vera latent rerum variarum tecta figuris;/nam sacra vulgari publica iura vetant.... /Rem veram tegat interdum fallacia verbi;/dum res vera subest, vera figura manet;/falsa tamen verbi facie, sed mente fidelis,/dum facit arcanum rebus in esse fidem.” I have altered the translator’s punctuation and capitalization slightly in the English version in the text.
The public good is also John’s ethical focus in his *Policraticus*. There, he uses this criterion as his justification not only for lying but also for citing a fictitious authority, the *Institutio Traiani*, a work written by himself which he attributes to Plutarch. As he asserts, “I confess that it is my duty to make use of lies . . . and of fictitious authorities.” As in the *Entheticus maior*, John offers in the *Policraticus* an authoritative warrant for this practice. Citing Cicero’s *Somnium Scipionis*, he observes that “our authorities make use of fictions, if they serve the public interest.”

With this foundation laid, and despite his condemnation of the deplorable use of deceits, frauds, and masquerades by sycophants, toadies, and hypocrites, John offers countervailing evidence of lies and deceptions used for morally upright ends. His two chief examples are the same personages Ambrose cites for committing what Augustine would call lies of action as well as lies of speech, Jacob and Judith. John finds Jacob’s deception of his father entirely acceptable. He does not tackle this issue by defining Jacob’s lie out of existence, as some of his contemporaries do. Rather, he argues that Jacob’s action was ordained and blessed by God, thus transcending all other considerations, and that Jacob used acceptably the graces he received. And, with Ambrose, he hails Judith as the savior of her people and the defender of religion. But John puts his own construction on her actions. Before he arrives at the point in the *Policraticus* where he introduces Judith, he considers how a person living under a tyrant should behave. John has a ready answer: “It is one thing to live with a friend, another to live with a tyrant. While it is not licit to fawn on a friend, it is licit to charm the tyrant’s ears. For it is licit to flatter him whom it is licit to kill.”

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78 Ibid. 8.16, ed. Webb 2:343.

79 Ibid. 3.15, ed. Keats-Rohan 230: “aliter cum amico, aliter uiuendum est cum
of justice to kill a tyrant, it is also an act of justice to behave deceptively in order to do so.

It is in this context that John brings forward the example of Judith, who gained access to Holofernes “by weaving a pious fraud.” In addition to classifying her prime virtue as justice, rather than courage, John goes into far more detail than Ambrose does in describing her toilette, adhering closely, even verbatim, to the Book of Judith. We see Judith putting off her widow’s weeds, bathing, anointing herself with rich perfume, dressing and ornamenting her hair, putting on her “glad rags,” adorning herself with jewelry and flowers, and telling Holofernes, once admitted to his presence, that she is at his service, not only with respect to her person, but also that she can convey military intelligence that will facilitate his conquest of Jerusalem.

John’s interpretation of Judith’s behavior is as positive as Ambrose’s; it is written in the same key even if orchestrated to the tune of a different cardinal virtue. John is emphatic: “That is not fraud (dolus) which serves the faith... for the liberation of the people;” in justly deceiving and killing the tyrant, Judith acted “not out of lust but out of virtue.”

Thus, both as a poet, a political theorist, and an ethicist, John joins the ranks of contemporary thinkers who abandon the uncompromising Augustinian view that all lies are sins, instead revaluing some lies and frauds as righteous. For Augustine, the cause of religion is the worst possible reason for lying; but John yokes it, as a justification for lying, to the cause of public service. In so doing, he shares the concerns of Ambrose, the leading Latin proponent of the non-Augustinian patristic view of lying, using the same examples and legal terminology. The heightened appreciation of the didactic uses of fable and figures of speech that marks the literary sensibility of the twelfth century, the intentionalism of its approach to ethics, and its renewed concern for civic spirit, thus converge to make this revaluation of lying in John, and in those contemporaries who agree with him, an authentic index of twelfth-century culture.
BEYOND STOICISM AND ARISTOTELIANISM:  
JOHN OF SALISBURY’S SKEPTICISM AND  
TWELFTH-CENTURY MORAL PHILOSOPHY  

Cary J. Nederman

In his widely read and influential book, After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre describes the predicament of ethics during the Middle Ages generally as one of eclecticism bordering on fragmentation, a situation engendered by the multiplicity of available sources and contexts for the flourishing of ideas of virtue. Drawing his examples mainly from the twelfth century, MacIntyre argues that a struggle is evident, in particular, between the “interiorization of the moral life” (derived from the New Testament and, especially, Stoicism) and the political and teleological ethic of Aristotelianism.1 The former he associates particularly with Abelard, the latter with John of Salisbury and Alan of Lille.2 Ultimately, MacIntyre concludes, the Aristotelian conception of virtue as public action toward a common good proved victorious: “The medieval moral stage in that tradition [of moral theory and practice] was in a strong sense Aristotelian.” Such medieval Aristotelianism was, admittedly, “various and untidy”—hence, MacIntyre’s plausible claim that Aquinas’s “strict Aristotelianism” renders him “a highly deviant medieval figure”—but it still privileged the external and the active over the interior and the contemplative, as represented by Stoicism and its Christian appropriation.3

Given the broader intellectual agenda directing MacIntyre’s highly provocative historiography of medieval ethical theory, it might be easy to dismiss his account as whimsical. But I think that he captures in brief compass a pronounced tendency implicit in a wide range of recent scholarship: the view that philosophical ethics during the High Middle Ages was bifurcated between Abelardian (Stoic/

2 Ibid., 170–71.
3 Ibid., 180, 178.
Christian) and Aristotelian understandings of natural virtue. In my view, this dichotomous characterization of ethical theory in the twelfth century fails to acknowledge the eclecticism of the actual thinkers and the diversity of their espoused views. A case in point is John of Salisbury. John provides perhaps a more difficult case than MacIntyre credits him with. On the one hand, MacIntyre is certainly correct in saying that John adopts distinctively Aristotelian constructions, not least in his moral psychology, according to which the formation of one’s character derives from “external” sources: the repetition of specific sorts of actions until a fixed disposition toward virtue (or vice) is ingrained. Yet John also demonstrates a Stoic/Christian mood, by proposing that the realm of political activity (which he knew intimately) was fraught with moral danger and that the earthly sumnum bonum resides outside the public domain in the life of withdrawn contemplation. In sum, John displays strong elements of both the Stoic and the Aristotelian traditions, without any apparent awareness of a contradiction between them.

I have little doubt that many scholars will determine this to be simply another instance in which John may be found guilty of the philosophical incoherence of which he often stands accused. It is my contention, however, that such a conclusion constitutes an unwarranted rush to judgment. I shall argue instead that John’s moral philosophy represents an attempt to cope with ostensibly contradictory visions of ethical life (such as those identified by MacIntyre) by charting a third way: specifically, a strategy of philosophically-informed eclecticism and non-dogmatism derived from his self-professed New Academic adherence to moderate skepticism, stemming from his reading of Cicero. This moral doctrine has a specific, albeit chastened, content built around the promotion of two paramount values: first, that individuals enjoy a right, and perhaps a duty, to intellectual liberty in judging for themselves about matters of right and wrong (an “internal” dimension); and second, that the yardstick of human action

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should be “modest moderation,” conduct constrained so as to eliminate the desire for tyranny and zealotry of all kinds. John would not deny that there is a truth content to ethical life—that values are ultimately right or wrong. But he maintains that the discovery of such truth arises from “the clash of ideas” rather than the systematic and uncritical imposition of a single moral framework upon human beings. We might say that John’s skeptical position shares with Aristotelianism the emphasis on morality manifested through public action, but lacks its teleological dimensions. Thus, John’s Ciceronian orientation reveals how MacIntyre’s dichotomous positioning of Aristotelianism versus Stoicism covers over the occasions on which additional rival versions of moral inquiry played a role on the twelfth-century stage.

Salisburian Skepticism

John of Salisbury’s knowledge of skeptical doctrines derived from his familiarity with the doctrines of the Academic School of philosophy that were propounded in several works by Cicero available during the Latin Middle Ages. Cicero’s defense of a version of Academic philosophy known as the “New Academy” (sometimes filtered through his Christian critics Augustine and Lactantius) was the primary brand of skepticism with which medieval thinkers were familiar. In a number of his treatises (including *De natura deorum*, *De officiis*, and the two versions of the *Academica*), Cicero professed a moderate skepticism regarding matters in which probability rather than dogmatic certitude seemed the best course. Cicero thus distanced himself from the more radically skeptical method of the so-called “Old Academy,” which denied that anything whatsoever could be known with certainty. The fundamentals of Ciceronian skepticism are too well known to require lengthy rehearsal. Cicero succinctly states his guiding principle in the Prologue to *De natura deorum*:

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8 In addition to MacKendrick’s work cited in the previous note, see Olof Gignon, “Cicero und die griechische Philosophie,” in *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt*,
The philosophers of the Academy have been wise in withholding their consent from any proposition that has not been proved. There is nothing worse than a hasty judgement, and nothing could be more unworthy of the dignity and integrity of a philosopher than to adopt a false opinion or to maintain as certain some theory which has not been fully explored and understood.  

As Cicero explains in the *Academica*, this is not to deny the possibility of the human mind attaining truth (pace the Old Academy), but only to insist that the criteria for knowing truth and falsity are not inborn or intuitive and that the senses can be deceptive. Cicero’s skeptical stance, hence, has the character of anti-dogmatism, not of absolute doubt.

Surprisingly, scholars have made little of John’s abiding dedication to the teachings of the New Academy, despite the fact that he expressed such devotion repeatedly and quite openly throughout the body of his writings. Thus, Hans Liebeschütz’s 1950 exposition of John’s thought makes only a single passing reference to “the later Academy” and declares, “Not even in the field of moral philosophy did John become the definite champion or antagonist of a distinct school of ancient philosophy.” More recently, none of the contributors to 1984’s *The World of John of Salisbury* pay any sustained attention to his self-avowed Academic proclivities. Birger Munk-Olsen, in an otherwise admirable treatment of John’s Ciceronianism, makes only passing mention of the importance of the New Academy to his thought. More remarkably still, one commentator who has con-
centrated on John’s knowledge and use of skeptical ideas, Charles Schmitt, concludes, “On the whole, . . . his treatment has little philosophical sophistication.”\(^{14}\) Such scholarly neglect of John’s own cherished and explicitly enunciated position requires correction.\(^{15}\)

It should be stressed, first, that John had a quite complete knowledge of the philosophical issues associated with skepticism. For example, he clearly grasped the difference between moderate and rigorous skeptical stances. In his early didactic poem *Entheticus de dogmate philosophorum* (the second section of which, containing a discussion of the Academy, may have been written while studying in Paris during the 1130s and 1140s, but was probably not finished any later than 1155),\(^{16}\) he chides the radically skeptical Academic view that “the human race is deprived of light.”\(^{17}\) Instead, he prefers the alternate position of the more enlightened Academic that

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\text{one should hesitate in all things except those which are proved by living reason . . . These things, he declares, are known; he passes doubtfully on other things, of which more certainty is to be had from experience. For the usual course of events makes probable what you always see under a similar pattern. Yet, since it sometimes happens otherwise, these things are not sufficiently certain, and yet not without evidence. What he, therefore, affirms to be true, he thinks to be necessary; for the rest, he says “I believe” or “I think it to be.”}\(^{18}\)


\(^{15}\) An exception to this general trend of scholarship is Peter von Moos, who foregrounds John’s skepticism in *Geschichte als Topik: Das rhetorische Exemplum von die Antike zur Neuzeit und die historiae im “Policraticus” Johannes von Salisbury*, 2nd ed. (Hildesheim, 1996).


\(^{17}\) *Entheticus* l. 1138: “. . . genus humanum luce carere facit.”

\(^{18}\) Ibid. ll. 1143–44, 1147–54: “Hæsitat in cunctis, nisi quae ratione probantur, viva . . . / Asserit haec sciri; dubianter cetera tradit, / in quibus ex usu maior habenda fides. / Nam solutis rerum cursus facit esse probanda, / quae semper simili sub ratione vides. / Haec tamen interdum, quoniam secur accidit esse, / ono sunt certa satis, nec tamen absque fide. / Ergo quod affirmat verum, putat esse necesse; / in reliquis dicit: ‘credo,’ vel ‘esse puto.’”
Thus, John clearly recognizes the epistemological underpinnings of the rival versions of skeptical philosophy. This fact has been missed, for instance, by Schmitt, who, concentrating only on the later *Policraticus*, concludes that John “really gives us little detail regarding those aspects—e.g., sense deception or the fallibility of normally accepted logical doctrine—which were central to ancient writings on skepticism.” On the contrary, if John in his later writings did not dwell on these epistemological issues, it is only because he had previously acknowledged and examined them in the *Entheticus*.

John’s treatise on the current state of scholastic education, the *Metalogicon* (completed in 1159), reiterates the Academic position articulated in the *Entheticus*. He repeatedly proclaims his explicit commitment to the philosophical program of the New Academy. In the prologue, he announces, “Being an Academic in matters that are doubtful to the wise person, I cannot swear to the truth of what I say. Whether such propositions may be true or false, I am satisfied with probable certainty.” John again distances his own version of skepticism from more radical views that deny the possibility of knowing truth (or at any rate, very many truths). But he admits that, even if truth is susceptible to human comprehension, the process of achieving knowledge is troublesome. Echoing a remark by Cicero in the *Academica*, John observes, “It is difficult to apprehend the truth, which (as our Academics say) is as obscure as if it lay at the bottom of a well.” Although he demonstrates some sympathy for Augustine’s criticisms in *Contra Academicos* of Ciceronian skepticism, John returns often in the *Metalogicon* to Cicero’s methodological injunction against embracing insufficiently substantiated truth-claims too hastily in the quest for knowledge.

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21 Ibid. 4.31, p. 168.
22 Ibid., 2.13, p. 76: “... veritatem apprehendere quae ut iunt Academicici nostri tanquam in profundo putei latet magnum est.”
23 Ibid. 4.34, p. 172.
John of Salisbury’s most extensive discussion and use of the Ciceronian New Academy occurs in his massive work on the moral-religious dimensions of public life, the *Policraticus* (finished in 1159). The *Policraticus* once again contains repeated self-identification of its author with the teachings of the Academy, its prologue echoing the words of the *Metalogicon*:

In philosophy, I am a devotee of Academic dispute, which measures by reason that which presents itself as more probable. I am not ashamed of the declarations of the Academics, so that I do not recede from their footprints in those matters about which the wise person has doubts.  

Indeed, this is raised to the level of an evaluative standard in Book Seven of the *Policraticus*, which contains a lengthy recounting of the major schools of Greco-Roman philosophy, the stated aim of which is to discover the valuable lessons in each approach as well as to demonstrate the limitations inherent in all of them.  

The treatment of the Academic School is given pride of place, opening Book Seven’s critical history of pagan philosophy. Even as he admits his own devotion to the Academy, John stresses the divide that exists within the School between an extreme skepticism which proclaims the utter fallibility of the human mind and his own moderate Ciceronian stance. In this connection, he offers a kind of *reductio* argument against the radically skeptical position:

Yet I do not say that all those who are included under the name of Academic have upheld the rule of modesty, since even its basic creed is in dispute and parts of it are open as much to derision as to error... If the Academic is in doubt about each thing, he is certain about nothing... But he possesses uncertainty about whether he is in doubt, so long as he does not know for certain that he does not know this doubt itself.

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26 Ibid. 7.2, p. 96: “Non tamen omnes, qui Achademicorum censentur nomine, hanc dico modestiae regulam tenuisse; cum et professio scissa sit et pro parte tam risui pateat quam errori... si de singulis Achademicis dubitat, de nullo certus est... Sed an dubitet incertum habet, dum hoc ipsum nescit an nesciat;” transl. Nederman, 150.
Extreme doubt, which refuses any criteria for knowledge, leads to a vicious circle in which the doubter must doubt even his own uncertainty and must thereby admit at least of the possibility of never attaining valid knowledge about certain matters. Radical skepticism cannot even attain to the mantle of philosophy, John says, for the philosopher’s love of wisdom requires the admission that one may know what is true (even if this is difficult to achieve).27

By contrast, John’s moderate skepticism, consciously modelled on the lessons of Cicero, accepts that there are three reliable foundations for knowledge: faith, reason, and the senses.28 Thus, it does not behoove the philosopher to question his faith in the existence of God, nor the certainty of certain postulates of mathematics, nor a number of other first principles which “one is not permitted to doubt, except for those who are occupied by the labors of not knowing anything.”29 It might seem, then, that John’s skepticism is not so very skeptical after all, in the sense that he seems willing to countenance as certain a wide range of knowledge-claims stemming from a number of different sources. But this turns out not to be the case. John in fact generates an extremely lengthy list of “doubtful matters about which the wise person is not convinced by the authority of either faith or his senses or manifest reason, and in which contrary claims rest on the support of some evidence.”30 The topics subject to doubt which John enumerates include major issues of metaphysics and cosmology, natural science, and theology, as well as ethics. Among the ethical topics that John cites as susceptible to doubt, and thus open to rational debate, are “the uses and end and origins of virtues and vices, whether a man who has one virtue has all the virtues, whether all sins are equal and are punishable equally.”31 The entire list, which goes on in Webb’s critical edition of the Policraticus


29 Ibid. 7.7, p. 115: “. . . dubitare non licet nisi his quorum labor in eo versatur ne quid sciant;” transl. Nederman, 154.


31 Ibid.: “. . . de usu et fine ortuque virtutum et vitiorum, an omnes virtutes habeat qui unum habet, an omnia sint peccata aequilia et aequaliter punienda . . .;” transl. Nederman, 152.
for 24 lines, is clearly meant to be illustrative rather than inclusive. In sum, John opens up to rational dispute an extraordinarily broad array of topics which for him are by no means settled and are thus appropriate for philosophical discourse. In confronting all such debatable subjects, John counsels adherence to the Academic method, since “the Academics have doubts regarding these matters with so much modesty that I perceive them to have guarded diligently against the danger of rashness.” Unique among all schools of philosophy, the Academy resists the temptation to replace open discussion of uncertain matters with prematurely closed dogma. In John’s view, the moderate skepticism of the New Academy alone defends the liberty of inquiry that he evidently regards to be necessary to the quest for truth.

Although the Polieraticus does not restate the epistemological bases of intellectual fallibility addressed in the Entheticus and Metalogicon, it clearly takes for granted that the human mind is furnished with only weak powers for comprehending truth. Hence, John rejects the Augustinian claim that even Cicero’s moderate skepticism “piles up darkness from some hidden source, and warns that the whole of philosophy is obscure, and does not allow one to hope that any light will be found in it.” Indeed, in a surprising twist, John attempts to enlist Augustine himself in support of those who evince Academic doubt: “Even our Augustine does not assail them, since he himself somewhat frequently employs Academic moderation in his works and propounds many matters as ambiguous which would not seem to be in question to another arguing with greater confidence and just as safely.” On John’s reading, Augustine practiced the Academic method even while he excoriated it in principle. The validity of this interpretation aside, John seeks any evidence whatsoever to bolster his own view that “mortals can know very little,” as he puts it in the Entheticus.
Skepticism and Liberty

The epistemological premises of New Academy skepticism stand at the philosophical core of John’s approach to human morality, constituted in particular by the connection between virtue and liberty. John believes that both personal virtue and good political order assume extensive freedom of choice and expression, and that such freedom must be respected and indeed protected by other individuals as well as by the healthy public body. But why is such freedom necessary at all? The answer must lie with the fallibility of human intellect: since we cannot be certain in many matters connected with human goodness and earthly well-being what the correct action may be, we must respect persons who have different conceptions of goodness and who seek to realize them in different ways. If there were some sure standard for the moral or public good which could be known and imposed infallibly, respect for liberty would not be necessary. But because such matters are difficult to ascertain and subject to debate, due to the nature of the human mind itself, John requires the exercise of forbearance.

John himself is aware of the connection between his Academy-influenced skepticism and the necessity for a wide band of free judgment and expression. In prefacing his critical history of philosophy contained in Chapter Seven, wherein he seeks to trace the “footprints of philosophers,” John explains the operative principle of the Academic School:

If these inquiries seem to approach formal philosophy, the spirit of investigation corresponds to Academic practices rather than to the plan of a stubborn combatant, so that each is to reserve to oneself freedom of judgment in the examination of truth, and the authority of writers is to be considered useless whenever it is subdued by a better argument.37

The approach of the Academy requires that in all matters not settled beyond reasonable doubt, it is the force of the evidence alone that should prevail. Authorities themselves should not be granted superior wisdom if a more cogent viewpoint opposes them. Likewise, the

determination of what position seems most plausible or defensible lies with the individual. In view of his skeptical predilections, John raises the priority of individual judgment to a universal principle.

That John recognized this implication of his adherence to the Academy is signalled by his statement on more than one occasion in the *Policraticus* that freedom of judgment is a *ius*, a right that pertains to human beings. The history of rights language during the Middle Ages is a complex one, much debated in present scholarship.\(^{38}\) At minimum, the medieval understanding of *ius* entailed acknowledgement of a fixed and defensible sphere of activity whose exercise is independent of external infringement or control. This seems to be precisely what John has in mind when insisting upon the right of free inquiry and determination: “The Academy of the ancients bestows upon the human race the leave that each person by his right may defend whatever presents itself to him as most probable.”\(^{39}\) Or as he remarks in another passage, “It is a very ancient rule of the Academics that each person may of his own right defend that which presents itself to him as most probable.”\(^{40}\) The source of this right is surely neither political nor (except indirectly) divine; it is not granted from above and therefore subject to limitation or removal. Rather, one’s right to assert one’s freedom to form one’s own judgments apparently derives from the fallible nature of the human mind and the uncertain character of many knowledge-claims. It is, in short, a result of the human predicament.


\(^{39}\) John of Salisbury, *Policraticus* 2.22, ed. Keats-Rohan, 134: “Hanc autem humano generi indulget Academia antiqua licentiam ut, quicquid unicuique probabile occurrit, suo iure defendat.” Interestingly, immediately following this statement, John refers to “Paripateticus Palatinus,” that is, Peter Abelard, for an example of how logical probability poses important issues of individual judgment. John, who studied with Abelard at Paris, may well have taken his thought as a model for his own belief in intellectual freedom and forbearance. It is becoming evident that Abelard, in turn, was far more influenced by Cicero than has generally been credited; see Constant J. Mews, “Peter Abelard on Dialectic, Rhetoric, and the Principles of Argument,” in *Rhetoric and Renewal in the Latin West 1100–1540*, ed. Constant J. Mews, Cary J. Nederman, and Rodney M. Thomson (Turnhout, 2003), 37–53 and Mews’s forthcoming book on Abelard, the manuscript of which he kindly shared with me.

\(^{40}\) *Policraticus* 7.6, ed. Webb 2:114: “…Achademicorum antiquissima regula est ut quisque quod sibi occurrat probabile suo iure defendat.”
In turn, if we each enjoy a right to draw conclusions and construct arguments regarding those matters open to rational disagreement, then it follows that others (regardless of their status or power) likewise have a duty to respect our thoughts even if they do not endorse them. This is underscored in the *Policraticus* by John’s remark that, regarding unsettled issues, “one is free to question and doubt, up to the point where, from a comparison of views, truth shines through as though from the clash of ideas.”41 Such a statement suggests that John understood very well the implications of his skeptical philosophy: the quest for truth in matters of practical as well as philosophical import demands the maintenance of openness and dissent. It is the responsibility of the wise person, not to mention the wise ruler or prelate, to uphold and defend the grounds of public debate. The realization of truth is hampered, not aided, by the suppression of divergent positions and the persecution of their adherents.

As a consequence of his skeptically-informed commitment to freedom of judgment, John maintains a central role for human liberty in his moral and political thought. The force of his claims made on behalf of such liberty is evident in his *Policraticus*. John defends there a conception of open personal expression that is vast even judged by far later standards. He counsels a doctrine of “patience” for the opinions and deeds of others.

The best and wisest man is moderate with the reins of liberty and patiently takes note of whatever is said to him. And he does not oppose the works of liberty, so long as damage to virtue does not occur. For when virtue shines everywhere from its own source, the reputation of patience becomes more evident with glorious renown.42

The patient man respects the liberty of others to state their own honest opinions, and he attempts to improve himself by patiently regarding his fellows. “The practice of liberty,” John observes, “displeases only those who live in the manner of slaves.”43 Free men are

41 Ibid. 7.8, p. 122: “De quibus dubitare et quaerere liberum est, donec ex collisione propositionum quasi ex quaddam rationum collisione veritas illucesat;” transl. Nederman, 160. The phrase “rationum collisione” is also used at 7.6, p. 113.
42 Ibid. 7.25, p. 219: “Viri tamen optimi et sapientissimi est habenas laxare libertati et quaelibet dicta eius patienter excipere. Sed nec operibus se opponit, dum virtutis iacturam non incurrat. Cum enim per se ipsam virtus quaeque resplendeat, patientiae titulus gloriosiori fulgore clarescit;” transl. Nederman, 177.
reciprocally respectful of the freedom of others, even when they are the objects of criticism. John praises the Romans for “being more patient than others with censure,” since they adhered to the principle that “whoever loathes and evades [criticism] when fairly expressed seems to be ignorant of restraint. For even if it conveys obvious or secret insult, patience with censure is among wise men far more glorious than its punishment.” The Politicus supports this claim in characteristic form with numerous exempla of wise people who spoke their minds straightforwardly and of wise rulers who permitted such free expression to occur.

At one level, John’s praise of liberty of thought and speech reflects his conception of decorum and “civility”: the refined person permits civilized speech in his presence, and such speech may involve personal criticism and admonitions. But more is at stake than simple good manners. John posits an intimate relationship between liberty and morality.

[Virtue] does not arise in its perfection without liberty, and the loss of liberty demonstrates irrefutably that virtue is not present. And therefore anyone is free according to the disposition of his virtues, and, to the extent that one is free, the virtues are effective.

Freedom makes virtue possible, for no one who is unfree (i.e., unable to make decisions for one’s self) can ever be counted as capable of moral action. A virtuous (and also presumably a vicious) act is one that an individual has intentionally chosen to do, and, thus, is one for which he can be held responsible. But no such intentional choice is possible in the absence of liberty; the slave merely does as he is told, so that it is his master who must bear the blame for his conduct.

John therefore denies that it is possible to achieve virtue through coercive means. Enforced virtuous actions are not really virtuous at all and do more harm than good to subjects. It is for this reason that he condemns the immoderation (and immorality) of zealous...
rulers who compel their subjects to perform good deeds and who excessively punish evildoers. But does this not imply the view that “every man has the right to go to hell in his own way”? By no means. While John upholds the idea that there must be a realm of personal discretion in decision-making with which no one may interfere, he also insists that patient endurance of the liberty of others must be matched by a liberty of critical speech. John asserts that “it is permitted to censure that which is to be equitably corrected.” If we may not properly force people to do good, then we must equally be respected and tolerated when we point out the error of their ways. In other words, if you are free to do wrong, then I must also be free to correct or reprove you. John emphasizes this point: “Liberty . . . is not afraid to censure that which is opposed to sound moral character . . . Man is to be free and it is always permitted to a free man to speak to persons about restraining their vices.” The *Policraticus* indeed practices what it preaches. John describes an encounter between himself and Pope Adrian IV, in which he had recounted to the pontiff all the evils that were commonly ascribed to the Roman Church and curia. Moreover, John does not shy from lamenting at great length the many sins and vices committed by priests, monks and members of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. In fact, John claims that his liberty to censure is not merely a privilege: “It is not necessary to obtain confirmed permission for such remarks which serve the public utility.”

47 Indeed, John rejects explicitly this position at *Policraticus* 8.9, where he attacks the Roman tribune who once proclaimed in a speech that there is no value to “liberty if it is not permitted to those who desire to ruin themselves by luxury.” Such “liberty” would have been regarded by John to be instead “license;” see Cary J. Nederman, “The Aristotelian Doctrine of the Mean and John of Salisbury’s Concept of Liberty,” *Vivarium* 24 (1986): 139.
society, whether spiritual or temporal, parallels the legitimate liberty to act without restraint.\textsuperscript{53}

Of course, the extent of the liberty proposed by John is by no means unlimited. He asserts that the “vices” of individuals which we ought to endure, if we are unable to correct them through free speech, must be distinguished from “flagrant crimes,” that is, “acts which one is not permitted to endure or which cannot faithfully be endured.”\textsuperscript{54} Similarly, he acknowledges that statements made “rashly,” that is, without respect for the persons to whom they are addressed and with the intent of harming another’s reputation, are deserving of censure and condemnation.\textsuperscript{55} The intent must be pure for liberty of action and expression to be tolerated; manifestly irreligious or dishonorable conduct and words have no claim on our patience. Such an emphasis on intent accords with an essentially “interiorized” conception of virtue that MacIntyre associates with the Christian/Stoic outlook.

\textit{Liberty and Moderation}

John’s admiration for temperate Academic skepticism also supports another key theme of his moral theory: modestia or moderatio. He was a convinced adherent of an Aristotelian-tinged doctrine that virtue necessarily consists in the mean, and that moderation in all things is therefore the most valid standard for judging human thought and action. As John points out in the \textit{Entheticus}, the Academic stance is consonant with “a modest mind... that no one may accuse it of being guilty of falsehood; it thus tempers all words with qualifiers, so that it should always be rightly credible.”\textsuperscript{56} John stresses that the possessors of such a modest mind “restrain their words according to condition, time, cause, and manner, [and] they avoid speaking with too much simplicity.”\textsuperscript{57} Academic moderation results in rhetorical as

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid. 1.5, ed. Keats-Rohan, 44–45.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid. 6.26, ed. Webb 2:78: “Vitia enim flagitiis leviora sunt; et sunt nonulla quae non ferri licet qui quae fideliter ferri non possunt;” transl. Nederman, 140.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid. 7.25, p. 218, 223–24; transl. Nederman, 176–77, 179.
\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Entheticus} ll. 1155–58: “Mensque modesta solet sic castigare loquelam, / ut falsi nullus arguat esse ream; / sic adiectivis sermonem temperat omnem, / debeat ut merito semper habere fidem.”
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid. ll. 1161–62: “... conditio, die, causaque, modoque coercent / verba, cavent nimia simplicitate loqui.”
well as intellectual humility, if not caution, consistent with the virtuous mean.

The counsel of moderation as crucial to any form of virtue permeates John’s later corpus. In the *Metalogicon*, he insists that education has a definite ethical component that requires recognition and examination. As he acknowledges in his prefatory remarks to the *Metalogicon*,

I have purposely incorporated into this treatise some observations concerning morals, since I am convinced that all good things read or written are useless except insofar as they have a good influence on one’s manner of life. Any pretext of philosophy that does not bear fruit in the cultivation of virtue and the guidance of one’s conduct is futile and false.58

Making men virtuous is not a distinct enterprise from making them intelligent or knowledgeable; it is of no value to be well educated if one is unable to apply this learning in the service of moral rectitude. Moreover, the very techniques one employs in the acquisition of knowledge are subject to ethical evaluation and judgment. Proper learning is not defined merely by the quantity of the knowledge inculcated, but also by the quality of the educational experience. Specifically, John believes that the doctrine of moderation and the virtuous mean that he upholds in the *Policraticus* is also essential to any pedagogy which takes seriously its duty to mold morals as well as intellect.

The theme of moderation appears most prominently in the *Metalogicon’s* discussion of the correct attitude that the student ought to adopt toward his subject matter. In general, John advocates the principle that people must find a middle ground between an absence of intellectual curiosity and an overzealous pursuit of all topics. Intellectual discipline, John feels, arises out of adherence to a mean course between excess and defect: “Once we go beyond the proper limits, everything works in reverse, and excessive subtlety devours utility.”59 One should strive always in one’s studies to exercise a vig-

58 *Metalogicon* Prol., p. 11: “De moribus vero non nulla scirete inserui, ratus omnia quae leguntur aut scribuntur inutilia esse nisi quatenus afferunt aliquod adminiculum vitae. Est enim quaelibet professio philosophandi inutilis et falsa, quae se ipsam in cultu virtutis et vitae exhibitione non aperit.”

59 Ibid. 2.8, p. 67: “Si autem moderatio desit, omnia haec in contrarium cedunt. Subtrahitur nameque subtilitati utilitas.”
ilance that “tempers them lest anything becomes excessive.” What this means in large measure is that the intellect ought not to wander into those regions that are inappropriate to it. On the one hand, the mind must discriminate among its potential subjects of study in order to eliminate those that are unsuited to it, namely, matters that pertain to God alone as well as “whatever is noxious, such as images that encourage melancholy, anger and lust, or what follows from them, envy, hate, calumny, luxury, and vanity.” Yet, on the other hand, excessive caution yields an intellect that resists inquiry into new or foreign territory at all. Should the mind be inclined to be “overly cautious, it risks becoming timid, whereas if it grows too incautious, it is in peril of becoming foolhardy.” John thus maintains that proper philosophical investigation demands careful reflection upon the boundaries of one’s intelligence. There are some topics with which the human mind is unprepared to deal, and to inquire after these is to court danger in the present world and in the afterlife. Nonetheless, John does not wish to discourage the correct application of the powers of reason. It is just as wrong to waste those capacities that God has granted by presuming that intellectual prowess bestows carte blanche to seek after any subject at all.

It is well enough to say that moderation should be the guide in planning and pursuing one’s intellectual instruction. But how does this precept apply to pedagogical practice? It is fortunate that John filled the *Metalogicon* with relevant examples of the usefulness of moderation in education. In the first place, John believes that a moderate attitude towards study is manifested in the very extent of the materials one consults. The *Metalogicon* warns that “to study everything that everyone, no matter how insignificant, has ever said, is either to be excessively humble and cautious, or overly vain and ostentatious.” The well-trained scholar will survey those authorities who are deserving of respect, but ignore works that do not merit effort

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60 Ibid. 4.17, p. 155: “... exercitium temperat, ne quid nimis.”
61 Ibid. 4.10, p. 149: “Itaque ad compescendos motus illicitos, parit imaginatio cautelam, quae nociva declinet ut sunt ex quibus dolor, ira, cupiditas, et sequelae istorum, puta invidia, odum, detractio, luxuria, vanitas. Dum vero nomis cavet, ad formidinem, dum parum, ad temeritatem accedit.”
62 Ibid. 4.40, pp. 180–81.
63 Ibid. 1.24, p. 53: “Siquidem persequi quid quis unquam vel contemptissimorum hominum dixerit, aut nimiae miseriae aut inanis iactantiae est et detinet atque obruit ingenia, melius aliis vacatura.”
and attention. Another consequence of the principle of moderation as used by John is that learning ought not to be an all-consuming and exclusive way of life. Those scholars who are unable to turn their minds to other pursuits manifest the weakness of their educations by exceeding the mean. How much better it is that “study should be moderated by recreation, so that while one’s natural ability waxes strong with the former, it may be refreshed by the latter... While innate ability proceeds from nature, it is fostered by use and sharpened by moderate exercise, but it is dulled by excessive work.”

Constant study is a hindrance, rather than a boon, to the intellect. The overzealous scholar, no less than the too enthusiastic prince or prelate, courts counterproductive conduct if not the peril of his soul. The notion that wisdom entails a moderate cast of mind appears to form the basis for John’s criticism of pedagogical techniques current in the schools of his own day. “Anyone who makes an effort to be moderate in word and action,” the Metalogicon complains, “is judged to have hidden motives.” In this regard, John feels that the classroom is no different from the royal court; the temper of the times discourages observation of the mean. Thus, instructors prompt students to all manner of intellectual excess. Disputations are conducted without concern for time, place, or topic, in spite of the fact that “the excesses of those who think dialectical discussion consists in unbridled loquacity should have been restrained by Aristotle.” It is on grounds of immoderation that John objects to the unrestrained use of the verbal duel: “The tongue of man... throws our life into confusion, and, unless it is checked by the reins of moderation, it hurls our entire person into the abyss.” He has observed this situation, he says, at first hand. Given the opportunity to visit with his old associates from school days, and to gauge the progress of their thought, John reports that he came away sorely disappointed. Over the years, these former companions had acquired no greater wisdom and had benefited not at all from the potential fruits of philosophy.

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64 Ibid. 1.11, p. 31: “...studii quam remissionis moderatione excolendum est ut ab altero convalescat, ab altero confortetur... Ingenium a natura profisciscitur, usu ivatur, immoderato labore retunditur, et temperato acuitar exercitio.”

65 Ibid. Prol., p. 9: “Qui modestiam sequitur sermonis et operis, cesetur factiosus.”

66 Ibid. 2.8, pp. 68–69, 68: “Debuerat Aristoteles hanc compescuisse intertempriem, eorum qui indiscretam loquacitatem dialecticae exercistium putant;” “Linguae... conturbat vitam et totum hominem nisi moderationis viniculo refrenetur, agit in praeceps.”
Indeed, “they had changed in but one regard: they had unlearned moderation; they no longer knew restraint.” Wanton license substitutes for modest Academic liberty. Precisely for this reason, the *Metalogicon* urges re-evaluation of the contemporary practices associated with philosophical studies. When logic and dialectic are employed without any regard for the pursuit of wisdom, when their practice moves beyond the mean, they will be sterile and pointless. The path to wisdom, which philosophy purports to chart, demands that philosophers recognize the limitations of their own techniques and methods. When philosophy becomes immoderately fond of its own image, the goal of wisdom ceases to be paramount.

Although space does not permit me to explore the topic fully, the connection between liberty and moderation is also firmly constructed by John in the context of his political philosophy. In the *Policraticus*, he contends in Aristotelian fashion that the golden mean is a structural feature of all the virtues which individual persons may acquire; justice, courage, and the like are middle points between dual vices of excess and deficiency. For this reason, John insists throughout the *Policraticus* that while many sorts of conduct (such as hunting, banqueting, drinking, gaming, and so on) are vicious if performed often or regularly, they may be condoned if done in moderation for the purpose of recreation. “If moderation is displayed,” John remarks, “I do not judge it disgraceful for a wise man to dwell occasionally on these pleasures of the senses; as is oftentimes said, nothing is proper without the mean. It is appropriate for even the wise man to enjoy leisure occasionally . . . in order that he may be to some extent reinvigorated and revived.” In sum, moderation is the touchstone of a morally correct (and ultimately, happy) life. Only very rarely does John insist that an activity associated with courtly frivolity is entirely wrong or forbidden. One example of this is his condemnation of occult and astrological practices that seem to have

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67 Ibid. 2.10, p. 73: “Profecerat in uno dumtaxat, dedidicerat modum, modestiam nesciebant.”
68 On this theme, see Nederman and Brückmann, “Aristotelianism in John of Salisbury’s *Policraticus*,” 210–16.
enjoyed popularity during his time. To attempt to foresee the future, he reasons, is to claim for oneself the sort of knowledge that God alone enjoys. Our minds are capable of knowing only in a contingent and fallible way that prevents us from attaining certain truth about future events on earth. His unusually strenuous rejection of all divination and related practices stems from their roots in human pride and arrogance. They are incompatible with the limits of human intellect and thus admit of no golden mean.

Moderation simultaneously constitutes the salient characteristic of the good ruler in the *Policraticus*. John’s king exercises power in a moderate fashion, neither releasing his subjects wholly to the caprice of their own volition nor controlling their behavior so strenuously that they become incapable of using their legitimate free will. Royal moderation is equivalent to respect for the proper sphere of liberty that belongs to each and every member of the political community. John stresses that even a zealous insistence upon the virtue of subjects is a violation of the terms of moderate government. Readers of the *Policraticus* who encounter the description of the king as the “image of the divine majesty” and a creature of “God’s ordination” may be tempted to ascribe to John a doctrine of the “divine right of kings.” But John is careful not to exalt the king too greatly: the good ruler must still restrain himself with the bridle of law and hold back his will, and he must maintain humility in his relations with his subjects. The king is defined by moderation in all his deeds and decrees—the very embodiment of the New Academic attitudes endorsed by John.

**Conclusion**

It should be evident, then, that John of Salisbury displays aspects of both intentionalist (Christian/Stoic) and teleological (Aristotelian) moral philosophy, the deployment of which is guided by a philosophical warrant grounded in a third school of thought, namely, New Academic skepticism. Substantively, John’s skepticism promotes

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70 Ibid. 2.21, ed. Keats-Rohan, 119–25.
72 Ibid. 4.7, pp. 254–58; transl. Nederman, 46–49.
the values of liberty and moderation. Methodologically, adherence to the New Academy permits him to draw on diverse and competing philosophical approaches as seems rationally defensible to him. These observations should lead us to an historical and a conceptual point. The first is the recognition that MacIntyre’s imputed dichotomy between “interiorized” and “external” moral theories during the twelfth century is narrowly drawn, if not simply inaccurate. The second is that the attempt to treat Christian Stoicism and Aristotelianism as closed, hermetically sealed, and perhaps incommensurable systems of thought—a direct inference of MacIntyre’s interpretation of medieval moral theory—is deeply flawed.

Admittedly, John’s consistent espousal and application of skepticism spawned no renaissance of New Academic philosophy in his own time or later. While his writings, especially the *Policraticus*, were read and appropriated by later generations of medieval authors, it was for their substantive ideas, such as the conception of the body politic, that they were mined. Yet I do think that the values promoted by John’s anti-dogmatic attempt to learn from diverse schools of moral theory under the guise of the New Academy bore fruit. In slightly later works, such as Alan of Lille’s *Anticlaudianus*, we find similar emphasis on the moderation and self-restraint that were hallmarks of John’s skeptical ethical theory. Indeed, the very absence of a later formal “school” of New Academic thought may itself be a testament to John’s success in promoting an anti-dogmatic outlook in approaching moral ideas.

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THE CONFLICTVS VITIORVM ET VIRTVTVM
ATTRIBUTED TO STEPHEN LANGTON

Riccardo Quinto

for Hilary

Introduction

There exist a number of works attributed to Stephen Langton († 1228) which bear in one or another manuscript copy the title De uitiis et uirtutibus.¹ In this contribution I shall review the different works, focusing then in particular on the Conflictus uitiorum et uirtutum transmitted in Laon, Bibliothèque Municipale MS 133.

Distinctiones

The first work to take into consideration is a collection of distinctiones transmitted by two Paris manuscripts: BnF lat. 393, fols. 22r–31v, and lat. 14526, fols. 161ra–174ra.² Although the character of this work is clearly that of a collection of distinctiones—indeed, for one consistent

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¹ The first attempt to classify Langton’s works was made in Palémon Glorieux, Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIIIe siècle, 2 vols. (Paris, 1933–34) 1:238–60 (no. 104); see esp. 253–54 for the works relevant to this paper. I have revised the list in Doctor nominatissimus: Stefano Langton († 1228) e la tradizione delle sue opere (Münster, 1994), 58–90. A further contribution is Richard Sharpe, A Handlist of the Latin Writers of Great Britain and Ireland before 1540 (Turnhout, 1997), 624–32 (no. 1669). For a more detailed study of the works listed at the beginning of this article, see Riccardo Quinto, “Stephen Langton: Theology and Literature of the Pastoral Care,” in In principio erat verbum: Mélanges offerts en hommage à Paul Tombeur par des anciens étudiants à l’occasion de son éméritat, ed. Benoit-M. Tock (Turnhout, 2005), 301–55.

² Both copies transmit 86 distinctiones (numbered 1–90 in MS lat. 14526, jumping from 84 to 89). Titles and beginnings of these 86 distinctiones are listed in Quinto, Doctor nominatissimus, 62–71 (cf. Sharpe, A Handlist, 630–31); a further list of titles was discovered recently in MS München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek clm 27329, fol. 1r–v; cf. Quinto, “Stephen Langton: Theology and Literature,” 338–41.
section, *distinctiones* on the Psalms (74:1 to 94:2)\(^3\)—it is worth mentioning it here because in one of its copies (MS lat. 14526, fol. 161ra, mg. sup.) the collection bears a contemporary attribution which says “Archiepiscopi Cantuariensis de ui<tiis -rtutibus?\>”. Perhaps for this reason, in the article devoted to Langton in his *Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris*\(^4\), Palémon Glorieux listed this work under the heading “Summa de viiis et virtutibus”, without however distinguishing it from the text we are going to analyse in the second place.

*Summa de diuersis*

A second work by Langton sometimes referred to as *De uitiis et virtutibus* is quite a popular compilation, transmitted in different arrangements by some 15 MSS. At least one medieval rubric, namely that in Rouen, BM MS 657, fols. 1–24, entitles this work *Summa magistri Stephani Cantuariensis archiepiscopi de uitiis et virtutibus*. As I have tried to show on another occasion, the work does not fulfil the minimal requirements to belong to the “virtues and vices” genre. Although in most of the versions the second chapter is devoted to the seven deadly sins (*inanis gloria, inuidia, ira, tristitia, auaritia, ventris ingluuies, luxuria*), these do not provide a structure for the whole work, which remains an inconsistent collection of chapters dealing with different issues. I therefore propose to distinguish it with the alternative heading introduced by Glorieux, namely *Summa de diuersis*. I consider this item to be the most important among Langton’s numerous writings contributing to the literature of pastoral care, as it enables us to glimpse in a condensed form his attitude regarding the most important theological and pastoral issues of his time.\(^5\)

To complicate the puzzle further, there exists one substantially different arrangement of the *De diuersis* material in two more MSS, in which the work bears the title *Generalitates*: München, BSB clm 27329, fols. 3r–66r (211 chapters), and Cambridge, UL MS Ff.I.17, part

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\(^3\) Cf. Quinto, *Doctor nominatissimus*, 61.

\(^4\) Glorieux, *Répertoire* 1:253–54 (item 104 f).

II, fols. 153–195 (131 chapters). The Munich copy has inserted as chapters 153 and 154 the two parts of Alan of Lille’s *De virtutibus et de vitiis et de donis Spiritus sancti* which deal respectively with the four cardinal virtues and the seven deadly sins.

These parts of Alan’s treatise, which also circulated independently, accompany Stephen’s *De diversis* in one codex: Venezia, Biblioteca dei Redentoristi (S. Maria della Fava) MS 43.

The *Distinctiones* and the *Summa de diversis* are both important sources of the *Compilatio secundum Nicolaum Tornacensem*. The author, Nicholas of Tournai, was a canon of his native town and a secular master in Paris who died after 1242/44. Out of the 230 chapters of the *Compilatio*, 45 abridge items of *De diversis* and a further 42 depend directly upon Langton’s *Distinctiones*. In contrast to the *Summa de diversis*, which lacks a clear structure, the *Compilatio* displays a reasonable arrangement of its chapters, which can be grouped in homogenous sections: divine law (Holy Scripture) (ch. 1–10), faith and its opposite sins (ch. 11–14), prelates and preachers, with their duties (ch. 15–54), the devil (ch. 55–60), the seven deadly sins with their opposed virtues (ch. 61–130), the first movements of the soul (ch. 131), the sacrament of penance (ch. 132–37), the conversion of the sinner (ch. 138–70), praying, fasting, and wakes (ch. 171–78), the deeds of mercy (ch. 179–83), the gift of fear and theological virtues (ch. 184–86), the mysteries of Christ’s life (ch. 187–96), last things (ch. 197–203), and ascetic and allegorical themes (ch. 204–30). The only manuscript that transmits the name of the author is Douai, BM MS 434, III fols. 62r–74v; two other MSS of the text that I have been able to discover are Paris, BnF MS Nouv. acq. lat. 999, fols. 335r–354va, and Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska MS 291, fols. 368v–383v.

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11 Cf. Quinto, “Il codice 434 di Douai,” 257–85 (list of the chapters according to the Douai MS), 312–17 (tabulation of the chapters from the Douai and Paris MSS).
Summa magistri Stephani de Langedon Archiepiscopi de uiciis et uirtutibus

A third work, rubricated Summa magistri Stephani de Langedon Archiepiscopi de uiciis et uirtutibus, survives in Cardiff, Central Public Library MS 3,833, fols. 150ra–164ra.12 I have briefly analysed the work elsewhere.13 The question of its authenticity remains open, even if repeated inconsistencies make the attribution to Stephen Langton quite unlikely.

Conflictus uitiorum et uirtutum Parisius elucidatus secundum magistrum Stephanum de Longue Tonne Cantuariensem archiepiscopum

A fourth potential Langtonian treatise on vices and virtues is contained in Laon, BM MS 133, fols. 109vb–117va (hereafter L).14 The scheme of the seven deadly sins provides an overall structure for the treatise, which the manuscript rubric clearly attributes to Langton. I will examine this work in the remainder of this article and present an edition of it at the end.

State of transmission of the Conflictus

The text transmitted by L is defective: between fol. 112vb and fol. 113ra one folio is missing. Consequently, the last lines of chapter 8 (De inuidia), the whole of a hypothetical chapter on charity, and most of a chapter on wrath (with the exception of its final lines on fol. 113ra) are missing. There exists, however, in Oxford, Bodleian Library MS Laud. misc. 544, fols. 4va–8ra (hereafter M),15 a text bearing the

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12 Bloomfield et al., Incipits, no. 5449. Thanks to the courtesy of Joseph Goering, I have been able to read a complete transcription of the Cardiff text with a good analysis of the sources, carried out by Barbara Tarbuk. An edition of the text by Richard G. Newhauser and myself will appear in Medioevo 31 (2006).


15 Siegfried Wenzel, “The Continuing Life of William Peraldus’s Summa viitiorum,” in Ad litteram: Authoritative Texts and Their Medieval Readers, ed. Mark D. Jordan and Kent Emery (Notre Dame, London, 1992), 162 n. 77, distinguishes the text at fol. 4v (Vedi de mari) from the text at fols. 5r–8r, which should bear a rubric Hec sunt que generaliter de VII uiciis dici possunt; in reality, these words are the final lines of the
The same incipit as chapter 2 of the *Conflictus* ("Vidi de mari bestiam ascendentem habentem capita septem et cornua decem. Verba sunt Iohannis in Apokalipsi. Bestia diabolus est, a uastando sic dicta"). M in fact transmits a considerable part of our treatise, and we have actually used it for establishing our text. Since the final lines of the chapter on *ira* in M do not match those preserved in L, this chapter is published in an appendix to our edition.

The Oxford text bears a rubric *De septem uiciis principalibus. primo de superbia*. There is no attribution to any author. The first item in the text (fols. 4va–5vb) corresponds to chapters 2 to 6 of the *Conflictus*, that is, the whole prologue and the chapter about pride. Five more items devoted to capital vices follow: *inuidia* (fols. 5vb–6ra = *Conflictus* ch. 8), *ira* (fols. 6ra–b; missing, but for the very last lines, in L), *avaritia* (fols. 6rb–vb = *Conflictus* ch. 13), *castrimargia* (f. 6vb–7rb = *Conflictus*, Ch. 15), *luxuria* (f. 7rb–8ra = *Conflictus*, Ch. 17). From this short description we can gather that the text in M is not a “conflictus”, since it deals with the vices but not with the remedial virtues. Moreover, it does not even correspond perfectly to its own title, as it deals only with six principal vices instead of seven.

The Oxford text is listed in Bloomfield’s famous incipitarium under no. 6450 (inc.: *Vidi bestiam ascendentem...*) without an indication of the relevant folios. Bloomfield’s entry appears to be a very composite one. Along with M many other MSS are listed, including L (which is also, and more properly, listed under no. 5927), and the treatise beginning *Vidi bestiam ascendentem...* is identified as Pseudo-Bonaventure’s *Tractatus de VII vitiis capitalibus*, or *Liber de septem vicis capitalibus criminalibus per auctores*, or *De septem mortalibus peccatis*, or *Summula septem vitiorum capitalium*. I have checked these indications against Distelbrink’s catalogue of authentic, doubtful, and spurious Bonaventure writings; moreover, I have looked for a similar text in early editions of Bonaventure’s opuscules, all with negative results. It would seem that the prologue (see the edition below, ch. 5, l. 18 app.). The text at fols. 8r–16r mentioned by Wenzel (inc. *Superbia est elacio uiciosa*; Bloomfield et al., *Incipits*, no. 5905) is also found in MS Venezia, Biblioteca dei Redentoristi 28, fols. 189r–199r.

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16 A coloured capital is placed at the beginning of the part corresponding to ch. 6 of the *Conflictus*, but it has no rubric of its own.

link between this text and the Seraphic Doctor is purely imaginary. Bloomfield does not give any clue to assert whether this text was ever printed, nor can I offer any further indication. I have not been able to check all MSS listed by Bloomfield, but my impression is that Bloomfield’s no. 6450 heaps together different texts with similar incipits.

Possible models for the Conflictus

The genre of the conflictus of virtues and vices is well known in medieval Latin literature, but early examples of this genre are generally versified compositions, while our Conflictus is a plain prose text. Actually, we can find an antecedent to our Conflictus in the Libellus de conflictu uitiorum et uirtutum by Ambrose Autpertus († 784), abbot of S. Vincenzo al Volturno. The manuscript tradition of the Libellus is very rich, and the text circulated under the names of celebrated fathers such as Ambrose of Milan, Augustine, Leo the Great, Gregory the Great, and Isidore of Seville. We know that Ambrose Autpertus was known in the circle of Peter the Chanter to which Langton belonged, since he is mentioned in Thomas of Chobham’s Summa de commendatione uirtutum et extirpatione uitiorum. A comparison between our Conflictus and Ambrose’s Libellus reveals several links between the two works. However, both works depend upon Gregory the Great’s Moralia, and some of the similarities between them can be explained thanks to this common source. For example, Ambrose’s Libellus incorporates a typical element of the medieval conflictus, namely, the personification of the vices and virtues, who exchange arguments according to the rhetorical device called prosopopea. In this, Ambrose followed Gregory, who presented each vice through the words it said (dicit, seven times repeated); Ambrose let the virtues speak as well, which does not happen in Gregory’s account. In the Laon Conflictus, however, the technique of prosopopea has disappeared, each vice being

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20 Thomas of Chobham, Summa de commendatione uirtutum et extirpatione uitiorum 5.1, ed. Franco Morenzoni, CCCM 82B:204.

21 Cf. Gregory the Great, Moralia in Job 31.45.90, pp. 1611–12.
presented in chapter 3 with a plain description in which the essential part of Gregory’s account of the vice is briefly summarised. Another difference between Ambrose’s *Libellus* and our *Conflictus* is that the latter respects the scheme of the seven capital vices, while the former presents a much longer list of vices and opposing virtues, without putting any particular stress on those constituting Gregory the Great’s septenary. By contrast, the seven vices and the opposing virtues determine the structure of another of Ambrose’s works, the *Oratio contra septem uitia*; its arrangement of the vices and virtues is not very dissimilar from that of the *Conflictus.*

**Contents of the Conflictus**

The *Conflictus* is divided into 17 chapters. We can divide these chapters into two groups: chapters 1 to 5 constitute a kind of introduction, while chapters 6 to 17 treat single vices and opposing virtues.

The first chapter contains a couple of inconsistencies. First of all, it presents eight capital vices with the virtues opposed to them, following John Cassian’s scheme of the eight vices rather than the septenary of Gregory the Great which dominates the rest of the treatise. The list of eight vices plays no role in the remainder of the treatise. A second inconsistency is that, despite its title (*De uiciis capitalibus et surculis eorum, de uirtutibus et surculis earum*), it connects the eight principal vices with many other vices, but it gives no subdivision for the eight opposing virtues, so it provides no offshoots (*surculi*) for them. Each enumeration of one principal and its many secondary vices finishes with the mention of the virtue which can defeat them, in order to let the character of *conflictus* appear more clearly. Below, I will discuss the status of this chapter and its sources in detail.

Chapters 2 to 4 constitute a real prologue, built around one biblical verse, namely Apoc. 13:1, evoking the seven-headed beast rising from the sea. From the choice of this symbol, it is already evident

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22 In his *Oratio*, Ambrose Autpertus opposed *inanis gloria* to *humilitas*, *inuidia* to *caritas*, *ira* to *patientia*, *tristitia* to *futurae beatitudinis laetitia*, *auaritia* to *mundi contemptus*, *ventris ingluuiæ* to *escarum abstinentia*, *luxuria* to *castitas*. Our *Conflictus* opposes *superbia* to *humilitas*, *inuidia* to *caritas*, *ira* to *patientia*, *accidia siue tristitia* to *sollicitudo* and *timor*, *auaritia* to *paupertas spiritualis*, *castrimargia* to *abstinentia*, *luxuria* to *castitas*.

that the author intended to adopt a septenary scheme of vices, allowing the octonary scheme of Cassian to disappear. The rest of chapter 2 confirms this intent, for it centres around many biblical texts, all of them sharing the number seven. The author also avoids any discussion of the relationship between pride and the seven vices which, according to Gregory, derive from it. In the Conflictus, superbia simply takes over the role of vainglory as the first of the seven.

Chapters 3 begins with a list of the seven vices, providing for each one the name of the opposing virtue which can heal it; the offshoots arising from each capital vice are listed in chapter 5. Both chapters reproduce the Gregorian septenary, and are consistent with each other as well as with the remainder of the treatise. Moreover, chapter 3 attributes the power of healing the vices not only to the virtues, but also to the seven sacraments, the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit and the seven petitions of the Pater Noster, not unlike De quinque septenis by Hugh of Saint Victor: 24

The seven vices wound the soul, blind, and blemish it. To the seven wounds one can apply the poultice of the seven sacraments of the Church, which the heavenly physician mixed with the blood of his passion and the oil of mercy. The blindness is healed by the seven lights, i.e. the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit. The seven spots can be washed out by the seven petitions of the Pater Noster (if we recite it in prayer) with tears and devotion (l. 5–11).

After this amplification (in which we can already notice a shift from the barely “moral” treatment of the vices towards a more “pastoral” approach), the author goes back to the Gregorian presentation of the vices and discusses their interconnection, that is, the way the vices are born one from another. The short chapter 4 (Quomodo texuntur uincula peccati) further develops this theme through an imaginative metaphor: the seven vices are the single elements of a thick rope made up of seven strings; according to the endurance of the sinner, this rope has the solidity of hemp, wood, iron, and finally of diamond, which represents desperation. Chapter 5 closes the introduction by going back to the image of the apocalyptic beast, which has not only seven heads but also ten horns. The author sees in the horns the

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24 Hugh’s work contrasts the capital vices with the petitions of the Lord’s Prayer, the gifts, the macarisms (i.e., the mental preparations for the beatitudes) and the beatitudes themselves.
“other vices” which rise from the principal seven and presents a list of them. A rather strict, though not absolutely complete parallel to this list appears in the *Oratio Ambrosii Autpertii contra septem uitia*.25

The bulk of the treatise, represented by chapters 6 to 17, alternates chapters devoted to one vice with chapters devoted to the opposing virtue. If we look closer, however, we can see some inconsistencies (apart from the disappearance of the chapters on charity and wrath through the loss of one folio, as a result of which *invidia* in chapter 8 is followed by *patientia*, the virtue opposed to wrath, in chapter 9).

The fourth vice (*accidia siue tristitia*, ch. 10) is followed by two opposing virtues which are treated in two different chapters, namely *solicitude* (ch. 11) and *timor* (ch. 12), whereas the last chapter (17) deals with both *luxuria* and its opposing virtue, *castitas*.

The presence of two different virtues opposed to sloth is not without interest for the history of that vice. *Accidia*, the latinisation of Greek ἀκηδία, was a vice typical of eremitism which lost some of its relevance when cenobitic communities became the rule in the Latin West. Gregory the Great, therefore, replaced *accidia* with one of its species, *tristitia*. *Accidia* continued nevertheless to be influential through the *Conlationes* and the *Institutiones coenobiticae* of John Cassian, and a compromise between the two notions is evident in Peter Lombard’s *Sententiae*, which incorporates *accidia siue tristitia* in the list of capital vices.26 Around 1300, *accidia* was to lose its essentially monastic character and to become a vice concerning lay people as well, expressing some kind of laziness in performing general religious duties.27

In our *Conflictus*, *accidia siue tristitia* appears neither as a purely monastic nor as a general Christian vice. The first virtue opposed to it, *solicitude*, which is compared to the care of a wet-nurse for her children (2 Thess 2:7), relates primarily to the clergy active in pastoral life. Sloth, then, seems to be considered here as a vice connected with

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27 See Carla Casagrande and Silvana Vecchio, *I sette vizi capitali: Storia dei peccati nel medioevo* (Turin, 2000), 78–95; Siegfried Wenzel, *The Sin of Sloth: “Acedia” in Medieval Thought and Literature* (Chapel Hill, 1967). One can anyway observe that already in the High Middle Ages *accidia* was not an exclusively monastic virtue, since it is present in mirrors for princes in the Carolingian period (Alcuin’s work is an example here).
secular clerics in particular. As far as I know, this connection remains up to now undocumented. It offers, moreover, an argument for Langton’s authorship of the text, as the English archbishop always insisted on the importance of pastoral care. In his view, the prelate must have, first, a strong, fearless will for preaching; second, he must love Holy Scripture and have an intimate knowledge of it, acquired through both sapiential, personal reading and scholarly study; third, he needs an exemplary life which adds dignity to his preaching.28 All these features are present in the chapter on solicitude through quotations from the Church Fathers and from the Glossa ordinaria, but it is also implied by the image of the staves used for transporting the Ark which must always remain in their rings (i.e., the prelate must always remain in meditation of the sacred Word). Other biblical references in this chapter—the restless walking of Jesus in the Holy Land (Matt 21:18), the exhortations of the Apostle to the bishops (2 Tim 4:2), the watching of the shepherds over their flocks when they went to adore the new-born Jesus, the frequent evocation of the trumpet in the Holy Scripture (e.g. Is 58:1), the admonition to pay attention to oneself and to the whole flock (Act 20:28), the image of the walls of Jerusalem guarded by sentries (Is 62:2)—are likewise used by Langton to remind the clergy of their duties.29

Another striking parallel between the Conflictus and Langton’s authentic works can be found in the last chapter, about lust and chastity. The biblical image used for chastity is that of the fine twined linen used for the curtains and the ornaments of the tabernacle (cf. Ex 28:6): the different operations needed to prepare flax fibre for weaving represent the long ascetic purification which leads from lust to chastity. Exactly the same idea is found in the summa De diversis, in a chapter about good prelates.30

The first chapter and its sources

There are some reasons to believe that the first chapter is not an authentic part of the Conflictus. First, the chapter employs the scheme of eight capital vices, differing in this respect from the rest of the

29 For references see below, 246–48.
30 For a reference see below, 265 n. 364.
Conflitctus. Second, it appears before the section beginning *Vidi de mari bestiam ascendentem* which matches the contents of the Conflitctus quite well and may, thus, constitute its original prologue. Third, the chapter occurs only in L, not in M. Yet, in L the Conflitctus gives the impression of a uniform whole: it is copied by one hand, and ornamented capitals of the same type appear at the beginning of each chapter, including the first. Moreover, chapter 1 is preceded by the general rubric entitling the work Conflitctus uitiorum et uirtutum and attributing it to Stephen Langton.

A reason to support the unity of the text as presented in L can be gained from the sources of the chapter. At first sight, the text seems to be a mere transcription of one chapter from a *Libellus precum* published in Migne’s *Patrologia Latina* as an appendix to the works of Alcuin of York. On closer inspection, however, the nearest parallel is to be found in Alcuin’s *Liber de virtutibus et vitiis*. The following tabulation of the three texts may shed light on their relation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflitctus uitiorum et uirtutum</th>
<th>Libellus precum in Appendice ad Opera Alcuini</th>
<th>Alcuin, De virtutibus et vitiis liber ad Widonem comitem (PL 101:613–638)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;1&gt; De vitiis capitalibus et surculis eorum, de uirtutibus et surculis earum.</td>
<td>De octo vitiis principalibus, quorum nomina hec sunt (PL 101:1410D–1411A)</td>
<td>XXVII (633A–B)...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.1) Superbia: inobedientia, presumptio, pertinacia, contentiones, hereses, arrogantia.</td>
<td>De superbia nascitur omnis inobedientia, omnis praesumptio, omnis pertinacia, contentiones, haereses, arrogantia.</td>
<td>Ex ipsa vero nascitur omnis inobedientia, et omnis praesumptio, et omnis pertinacia, contentiones, haereses, arrogantia...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superbia uincitur humilitate.</td>
<td>Quae omnia mala vera humilitas famuli Dei perfacile vincere [Ms. curare] poterit.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflicitus uiciorum et uirtutum</td>
<td>Libellus precum in Appendice ad Opera Alcuini</td>
<td>Alcuin, De virtutibus et vitis liber ad Widonem comitem (PL 101: 613–638)</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.2) Gula: inepta letitia, scurrilitas, levitas, uaniloquium, immunditia corporis, instabilitas loci uel mentis, ebrietas, libido.</td>
<td>De gula nascitur inepta laetitia, scurrilitas, levitas, uaniloquium, immunditia corporis, instabilitas mentis, ebrietas, libido.</td>
<td>XXVIII (633D) . . . De qua gula nascitur inepta laetitia, scurrilitas, levitas, uaniloquium, immunditia corporis, instabilitas mentis, ebrietas, libido . . .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gula uincitur abstinentia.</td>
<td>. . . quae per jejunia et abstinentiam, et operis cujslibet assiduitatem optime uincitur . . .</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fornicatio uincitur castitate.</td>
<td>Quae vincitur per castitatem et continentiam consuetam, et recordationem ignis aeterni, et timorem praesentis sempiterni Dei . . .</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.4) Auaritia: inuidie, furta, latrocinia, homicidia, mendacia, peruria, rapine, uiolentie, inquietudo,</td>
<td>De avaritia nascitur invidia, furta, latrocinia, homicidia, mendacia, peruria, rapina, violentia, inquietudo,</td>
<td>XXX (634BC) Avaritia . . . Cujus genera [Ms. germina] sunt invidia, furta, latrocinia,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflictorum et virtutum</td>
<td>Libellus precum in Appendice ad Opera Alcuini</td>
<td>Alcuin, De virtutibus et vitiis liber ad Widonem comitem (PL 101: 613–638)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>iniusta iudicia, contemptus ueritatis, future beatitudinis obliuo, obduratio cordis, contraria misericordie.</td>
<td>injusta judicia, contemptus veritatis, futurae beatitudinis oblivio, obduratio cordis.</td>
<td>homicidia, mendacia, perjuria, rapinæ, violentiaæ, inquietudo, injusta judicia, contemptus veritatis, futurae beatitudinis oblivio, obduratio cordis. Quae fit [Ms. quae est] contraria misericordieæ . . .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avaritia superna uincitur caritate.</td>
<td>Quae uincitur per timorem Dei, et per fraternalis caritatem, et per opera misericordiaæ, et per elosynas in pauperes, et per spem futurae beatitudinis . . .</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.5) Ira: tumor mentis, rixe, contumelie, clamor, indignatio, presumptio, blasphemie, sanguinis effusio, ulciscendi cupiditas, iniuriarum memor&lt;ia&gt;.</td>
<td>De ira pullulat tumor mentis reæ, contumelieæ, clamor, indignatio, præsumptio, blasphemia, sanguinis effusio, homicidia, ulciscendi cupiditas, iniuriarum memoriae.</td>
<td>XXXI (634D) . . . De qua, id est ira, pullulat tumor mentis, rixe et contumelie, clamor, indignatio, præsumptio, blasphemiae, sanguinis effusio, homicidia, ulciscendi cupiditas, iniuriarum memoriae.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ira uincitur patientia.</td>
<td>Quae uincitur per patientiam et longanimitatem, et per rationem intellectualem . . .</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.6) Accidia: somnolentia, pigritia operis boni, instabilitas loci, peruagatio de loco ad locum, tepiditas laborandi, tedium cordis, murmuratio,</td>
<td>De acedia nascitur somnolentia, pigritia operis boni, instabilitas loci, peruagatio de loco in locum, tepiditas (!), laborandi tedium, cordis</td>
<td>XXXII (635AB) Accidia . . . De qua nascitur somnolentia, pigritia boni operis, instabilitas loci, peruagatio de loco in locum, tepiditas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confictus uiciorum et uirtutum</td>
<td>Libellus precum in Appendix ad Opera Alcuini</td>
<td>Alcuin, De virtutibus et vitis liber ad Widonem comitem (PL 101: 613–638)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>uaniloquium.</td>
<td>murmuration, et inaniloquia.</td>
<td>laborand, taedium cordis, murmuration et inaniloquia . . .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accidia uincitur boni operis instantia.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Quae vincitur per studium lectionis, per assiduitatem operis boni, per desiderium futurae praemiorum beatitudinis, per confessionem tentationis . . .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.7) Tristitia huius saeculi:</td>
<td></td>
<td>XXXIII (635C) Tristitiae duo sunt genera: unus salutiferum, unum pestiferum. Tristitia salutaris est, quando de peccatis suis animus contristatur peccatoris . . . Alia est tristitia hujus saeculi . . .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>malitia, rancor animi, pusillanimitas, amaritudo, desperatio, presentis vitae sepe nulla delectatio.</td>
<td>De tristitia nascitur malitia, rancor animi, pusillanimitas, amaritudo, desperatio.</td>
<td>Ex ipsa nascitur malitia, rancor, animi pusillanimitas, amaritudo, desperatio. Saepe etiam et praesentis vitae nulla delectatio.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tristitia mala uincitur letitia spirituali.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Quae vincitur per laetitiam spirituali . . .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.8) Vana gloria: iactantia, arrogantia, indignatio, discordia, inanis glorie cupido, hypocrisis.</td>
<td>De cenodoxia, id est vana gloria, inde jactantia, arrogantia, indignatio, discordia, inanis gloriae cupido, et hypocrisis, id est simulatio boni operis.</td>
<td>XXXIV (635D–636A) Vana gloria . . . inde jactantia, arrogantia, indignatio, discordia, inanis gloriae cupido, et hypocrisis, id est, simulatio boni operis . . .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vana gloria uincitur caritate dei.</td>
<td></td>
<td>(636C) Cujus morbi medicina est recordatio divinae bonitatis, per</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From a structural point of view, the closer parallel is between the *Conflictus* and the *Libellus precum*: both works present the eight vices in one short chapter which lists the parts of each vice and its remedial virtue. But some readings of the *Conflictus* cannot be explained by the *Libellus precum*. The readings *contraria misericordie* (1.4), *tristitia huius seculi* and *presentis uile sepe nulla delectatio* (1.7) are only clarified by a comparison with Alcuin’s *Liber de virtutibus et vitiis*. The virtue which defeats sloth, *boni operis instantia* (1.6), has a verbal parallel both in the last lines of the *Libellus* chapter and in Alcuin’s *De virtutibus et vitiis*. Chapter 1 of the *Conflictus* can therefore be thought of as either a copy of the chapter *De octo vitiis principalibus* from the *Libellus precum*, but intercalating the final lines concerning the remedial virtues, or a summary of chapters 27 to 36 of Alcuin’s *De virtutibus et vitiis*, extracting from them only the names of the vices, their species, and the remedial virtues. In either case, the author rearranged his
material in conformity with the *conflictus uitiorum et uirtutum* genre which determined the remainder of the *Conflictus* as well. Hence, the whole text as found in L, chapter 1 included, corresponds to a single model and may be characterized as part of the unity of its composition.

**The Conflictus and Nicholas of Tournai**

Like Langton’s *Distinctiones* and the *Summa de diuersis*, the Laon *Conflictus* is among the main sources of Nicholas of Tournai’s *Compilatio* (if Nicholas did not rather use *De septem uitiis principalibus* as preserved in M and maybe in other MSS as well). The *Conflictus* is almost entirely integrated in the long vices and virtues section of the *Compilatio*: chapters 61–130 of this work follow the *Conflictus* step by step, despite considerable abridgments and omissions. Actually, we can sometimes emend the Laon copy with the help of the parallel parts of the *Compilatio*.31 The strictest parallelism between both texts is to be seen in chapters 2 to 5, as the following comparison shows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><em>Conflictus uicitiorum et uirtutum</em></th>
<th><em>Nicolaui Tornacensi Compilatio</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Laon, BM 133, f. 110(^{\text{vb}})</td>
<td>Douai, BM 434, III f. 65(^{va}) [D]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxford, BL Laud. misc. 544, f. 4(^{va})</td>
<td>Paris, BN Nouv. acq. lat. 999, f. 340(^{va}) [P]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<2> *De vii uiciis capitalibus*  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><em>Vidi de mari bestiam ascendentem</em></th>
<th><em>Ixi(^{32}) — de septem uiciis capitalibus</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>habentem capita septem et cornua decem.</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verba Iohannis in Apocalipsi(^{13}, 1).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bestia ista diabolus est, a uastando sic dicta. Est enim serpens in aquis, idest in luxuriosis, unde dictum est ei: Pectore et uentre repes, quia per libidinosam cogitationem et ingluuiem incitat ad libidinem uel luxuriam. Est</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{31}\) See below, edition, ch. 10, l. 26 app. A comparison extended to the rest of the *Conflictus* is found in Quinto, “Stephen Langton: Theology and Literature,” 341–45.  

\(^{32}\) Ixi D (praeceeden caputum item Ixi numeratur): lxiii P  

\(^{33}\) bestiam P: stellam D
etiam auis in aere, idest in superbis et in inconstantibus, quos duabus alis attollit, scilicet diuitiis et dignitatibus. Dicitur etiam draco et leo in terra, idest in cupidis: draco occulte inficiens per dolos et usuras, leo aperte seuiens per rapinam et injurias manifestas. Hec bestia surgit de mari, idest de mundo, cuius est princeps.

Mundus enim comparatur mari, quia tumet per superbiam, spumat per luxuriam, feruet per iram et inuidiam, nubilosus est per tristiciam, omnia in se recipit per cupiditatem, maior piscis minorem deuorat per rapinam, mortuos ad litus eiciit, uinius attrahit et submergit, quia despicit eos qui mortui sunt mundo et uiuunt Christo.

Hec est bestia fera que frequenter deuorat Ioseph. Septem habet capita, scilicet septem criminalia peccata, quae sunt hec: superbia, inuidia, ira, accidia, auaritia, castrimargia, luxuria.

Hec sunt vii demonia que eiecit dominus de muliere peccatrice.

Hii sunt vii nequissimi spiritus quos immundus spiritus quando exierit ab homine assumpsit ad impugnandum hominem.

Hec sunt ille gentes quas filii Israel eiecerunt de terra promissionis; Hec bestia fera que frequenter deuorat Ioseph vii habet capita, scilicet vii criminalia peccata.

Hii sunt nequissimi spiritus quos inmundus spiritus quando exierit ab homine assumpt ad impugnandum hominem.

Hii sunt illi gigantes eiecti de terra promissionis; de hiis dicitur in

---

34 spiritus P: om. D
35 exierit P: -rint D
de hiis dicitur in Deuteronomio 28, 7: Deuteronomio: Per unam viam
Per unam viam uenient ad te uenient ad te hostes tui et per vii hostes tui et per septem fugient a fugient a te; per solam enim uoluntatem incurrimus omnia mortalìa, sed septem uis fugiunt, quia septem omnipotentis dei uirtutibus curantur.

Set vii uiis fugiunt, quia septem oppositis uirtutibus curantur:

Superbia per humilitatem, inuidia per caritatem, ira per patientiam, accidia per timorem et sollicitudinem, cupiditas per paupertatem spiritualem, castrimargia per sobrietatem, luxuria per castitatem.

Ista autem uitia uulnerant animam, excecant et maculant.

Septem | uulneribus apponitur emplastrum septem sacramentorum ecclesie, que summus medicus sanguine suo et oleo passionis distemperauit.

Cecitatem expellunt vii luminaria, iedest septem dona spiritus sancti.

Septem maculas abluunt vii petitiones dominice orationis cum lacrimis et deuotione.

Et ita patet quod per vii uias fugiunt inimici.

Hec autem uitia sibi inuicem connectuntur, unde Iob 40, 12: Nerui testiculorum Vehemoth perplexi sunt, et propheta dicit: Congregati sunt milui alter ad alterum. Ex superbia enim mortalia D: mor (?) P peccata add. P

per humilitatem D: om. P

uitia P: mala D
superbia enim que est initium omnis peccati nascitur invidia. Superbus enim quoniam neminem uellet habere parem uel superiorem, et idcirco dolet de successibus aliorum, letatur de infortunii proximorum. Qui autem inuidus est facile irascitur, maxime illi cui inuidet, et ita ex inuidia oritur ira, que postquam inueterata est odium nuncupatur. Ex ira autem nascitur accidia, quando de eo cui irascitur sumere non potest ultionem. Et quoniam talis homo iam amisit consolationem interius et gaudium in spiritu, querit solatium exteriorius in exterioribus, et ita inhiat de possessionibus acquisitis: ecce quo modo ex tristitia nascitur cupiditas. Postquam cupidus multa acquisuit ait intra se: Anima mea, habes multa bona reposita in annos plurimos, et ita oritur castrimargia. Et quia uenter mero estuans facile despumat in libidinem, et quia uenter et genitalia uicina sunt, de castrimargia oritur luxuria.

---

39 parem ex panem corr. interl. P
40 nuncupatur D: dicitur P
41 siue tristitia D: om. P
42 scilicet D: om. P
43 iam P: om. D
44 postquam P: om. D
45 Et P: om. D
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Conflictus uiciorum et virutm</strong></th>
<th><strong>Nicolai Tornacensis Compilatio</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Laon, BM 133</td>
<td>Douai, BM 434, III [D]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxford, BL Laud. misc. 544</td>
<td>Paris, BnF Nouv. acq. lat. 999 [P]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Et ita contextur funis septiplex, qui *ffi* difficile rumpitur, unde psalmista:  
Funes peccatorum circumplexi sunt me. Hiis uinculis ligatis manibus et pedibus proicitur in tenebras exteriores.

Et ita oritur funis septuplex, qui *ffi* difficile soluitur, unde psalmus:  
Funes peccatorum circumplexi sunt me.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>&lt;4&gt; Quomodo texuntur uincula peccati</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Hec uincula primo sunt stupea in voluntate, postea lignea in opere,  
tertio ferrea in consuetudine,  
tandum adamantina in desperatione,  
unde: Solue uincula colli tui,  
captiua filia Syon. Vere captiuus quia superbia reddit inflatum,  
inuidia liuidum, ira turbidum,  
accidia pigrum, auraria cecum,  
ingluuies canem, immunditia  
libidinis porcum: per superbia  
enim cor inflatur, per inuidiam et  
iram inflammatur et arescit, per  
auraritiam dispergitur per tristitiam  
conteritur et quasi in puluerem  
uertitur, per gulam inicuitur et  
 quasi humectatur, per luxuriam  
conculcatur et in lutum redigitur  
 ut possit dicere: Infixus sum in limo  
profundi etc.

Vere captiuus quia amisit deum,  
proximum et se ipsum: superbia  
enim auwert deum, inuidia  
proximum, ira se ipsum.

Hec uincula primo sunt stupea in voluntate, postea lignea in opere,  
tercio ferrea in consuetudine, ultimo  
adamanetina in desperatione, unde  
Ysaia852.2 Solue uincula colli tui,  
captiua filia Syon; uere captiuas  
quoniam superbia reddid inflatum,  
inuidia liuidum, ira turbidum, accidia  
pigrum, auraria cecum, ingluuies  
canem, inmunditia libidinis porcum;

Vere captiuus quia amisit deum,  
proximum et se ipsum: superbia  
enim auwert deum, inuidia  
proximum, ira se ipsum.

---

46 *difficile D: difficile P*
47 *soluitur D: disoluitur (!) P*
48 *psalmus P: om. D*
49 *stupea P: stupa D*
50 *lignea D: linea P*
51 *deum: et add. D*
### Table (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflictus viciorum et virtutum</th>
<th>Nicolai Tornacensis Compilatio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Laon, BM 133</td>
<td>Douai, BM 434, III [D]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxford, BL Laud. misc. 544</td>
<td>Paris, BnF Nouv. acq. lat. 999 [P]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>&lt;5&gt; De surculis uiciorum.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ex hiis capitibus oriuntur decem cornua, idest alia uitia, quibus impugnantur homines ne obseruent decalogum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex superbia enim nascitur inanis gloria, inobedientia, iactantia, ypocrisis, arrogantia, noutatum presumptiones.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex inuidia nascitur exultatio in adversis, tristitia in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ira triplex: in corde latens, in uerba prorumpens, in iniurias excrescens;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex accidia siue tristitia oriuntur malitia et desperatio, pusillanimitas, torpor circa precepta, euagatio mentis circa illicita.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex auaritia oriuntur obduratio cordis, uiolentia, inquietudo, periuria, fraus, proditio.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex castrimargia oriuntur hebetatio sensus, immunditia, multiloquium, scurrilitas, mala et inepta letitia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex luxuria oritur cecitas mentis, inconsideratio, inconstantia, precipitatio, amor sui, odium dei, affectus presentis seculi, desperatio futuri.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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32 idest alia uicia D: om. P
Authorship and date of the Confictus

The evidence adduced here contains several arguments in favour of Langton’s authorship of the Confictus. First, we have the clear attribution in the manuscript itself, not weakened by any alternative attributions in MSS listed by Bloomfield under no. 6450 (as far as I can gather from catalogue descriptions). Second, there is the circumstance that, like two other authentic works by Langton, this Confictus was used by Nicholas of Tournai for his Compilatio. Nicholas did not just quote the Summa de diversis and the Distinctiones, but actually rewrote these works in an abridged and more systematic form, better suited for use by a preacher. This method also characterizes his use of the Confictus. It would seem, then, that Langton provided the essential materials with which Nicholas worked out his purpose. A third argument are the examples of parallel thought that we can find in the Confictus and some works by Langton. This argument admittedly suffers from a certain degree of subjectivity, but a certain familiarity with Langton’s published and unpublished works leads me to affirm that these show a strong thematic consistency. Finally, the sources of the Confictus which I have been able to discover are compatible with an attribution to Langton. The work refers to Augustine, Jerome, Gregory, and Isidore (mostly mediated through the Glossa ordinaria). Moreover, the author quoted from Martin of Braga’s (Pseudo-Seneca’s) Formula vitae honestae and Alcuin’s Liber de uirtutibus et uitiis; he probably knew the two little works by Ambrose Autpertus (or parts of them conflated in an anthology); and he made ample use of the Liber scintillarum. Recognizable twelfth-century sources, always silently used, are Hugh of Saint Victor’s De quinque septenis, Bernard of Clairvaux, John of Salisbury’s Metalogicon and Policraticus, Peter the Chanter’s Verbum abbreviatum and Alan of Lille’s Summa de arte praedicatoria. All this points to the environment of the secular masters around Peter the Chanter. So, if the author of the Confictus is not Stephen Langton, to whom the work is attributed in the manuscript, he must be a theologian very similar to him, living in the same environment at the same time, working with his methods and thinking like him.

A further small clue is provided by the sentence Secundo fit quando consentit operi nec stat per eum si haberet facultatem (ch. 17, l. 54–55). I

understand this sentence as follows: “[Luxury] is put into effect in a second way when someone offers his interior consent to the deed, and this will not find an obstacle in him, if he has favourable conditions to perform it”. The Latin for “will not find an obstacle in him” is *nec stat per eum*. This quite unusual expression finds a parallel in a published sermon by Langton concerning the translation of the relics of Thomas Becket.54

I even dare to go a step further: I think the work was written by Stephen Langton as a young man. At least twelve biblical quotes are introduced in the *Conflicte* with the mention of the biblical book and the chapter.55 Not once does the number of the chapter correspond to the actual chapter numbering. Now, Langton is credited with having introduced the chapter numbering still in use,56 which he always employed in the *Distinctiones*57 (in *De diversis* and in the *Quaestiones theologiae* only the biblical books are quoted, with no mention of the chapter). Moreover, his great commentary on Leviticus preserved in Paris, BnF MSS lat. 384 and 385 is divided according to modern chapter numbering. On the contrary, Peter the Chanter’s commentary on the same book appears to have been articulated through the old, pre-Langtonian chapter division.58 For this reason, the *Conflicte* probably goes back to a time, say in the 1180s, before the new division of the biblical books was completed that had been initiated at the instigation of Peter the Chanter († 1197).59

Another argument for an early date is the fact that chapter 12 of the *Conflicte* on the fear of God simply consists of a chain of quotations, most of them occurring in the same order in the *Liber scintillarum*. In his maturity, Langton wrote three long theological questions

55 See below, edition, ch. 6, l. 108, 113, 122, 126; ch. 7, l. 3, 12; fragment *De ira*, l. 35; ch. 10, l. 50, 53, 55; ch. 11, l. 18; ch. 13, l. 63.
58 Cf. id., “La parabola del Levitico,” 204.
59 Cf. d’Esneval, “La division de la Vulgate,” 560. The details concerning the date of the completion of the new division and its introduction into use need further study.
on the fear of God,\textsuperscript{60} introducing a subdivision of this concept into six species which remained popular until the 1230s, since we find it in William of Auxerre’s \textit{Summa aurea} and in the first great Dominican works, such as the \textit{Summa} by Roland of Cremona and Hugh of Saint Cher’s commentary on the \textit{Sententiae}.\textsuperscript{61} As there is no attempt in the \textit{Conflictus} at a theological elaboration of the idea of fear, I think it would be wise to date it before the composition of Langton’s \textit{Quaestiones}\textsuperscript{62} and his commentary on the \textit{Sententiae}.

Finally, the \textit{Liber scintillarum} is the most frequently quoted single source in the \textit{Conflictus}. This \textit{Liber}—regarding whose author, date, and geographic origin the scholarly debate has been recently reopened\textsuperscript{64}—is a compilation which contains a minimum of theological elaboration, since it just assembles biblical and patristic quotations on various subjects. Several chapters of the \textit{Conflictus} are constructed by simply borrowing from the \textit{Liber scintillarum}, while in others, such as those on \textit{accidia}, \textit{sollicitudo} and \textit{luxuria}, the author


\textsuperscript{62} I consider as probable the completion of a first “edition” of Langton’s \textit{Quaestiones} before his appointment as archbishop of Canterbury (elected in December, 1206, and consecrated by Innocent III on 17 June, 1207). If the same \textit{Quaestiones} were used in Andrew Sunesen’s \textit{Hexaemeron}, they must have existed even before 1193; cf. Quinto, \textit{Doctor nominatissimus}, 20, 132–36.


\textsuperscript{64} The text, preserved in over 350 MSS and many early editions, has been ascribed to “Defensor,” a Benedictine monk at Ligugé c. 700; cf. Henri-Marie Rochais, “Defensor,” in \textit{Dictionnaire de spiritualité ascétique et mystique} 3:88–90. Felice Lifshitz, “Demonstrating Gun(t)za: Women, Manuscripts, and the Question of Historical ‘Proof’,” in \textit{Vom Nutzen des Schreibens: Soziales Gedächtnis, Herrschaft und Besitz}, ed. Walter Pohl and Paul Herold (Vienna, 2002), 85–96, points out that the oldest MS, placed by the editor at the top of his stemma (MS Würzburg, Universitätsbibliothek M.p.th.f. 13), is to be connected with a \textit{scriptorium} in East Francia, while copies attested in the region of Poitiers (close to Ligugé) are posterior to the tenth century and derive from those originating east of the Rhine. In the Würzburg region of the eighth century, all the cultural conditions for producing a florilegium like the \textit{Liber scintillarum} were available. I wish to thank Rob Meens (Utrecht) for alerting me to Lifshitz’s paper.
expressed his more personal views. This makes me think of the composition of this work as some kind of school exercise, in which the author is chiefly concerned with getting acquainted with the principal tools of the theological and exegetical workshop. This likewise points to an early stage in his career.

Conclusion

One could ask whether it is really worth violating the peaceful centuries-long sleep of modest school-works such as the *Conflictus*, which seem to have escaped destruction by chance. Let us go back to the vice of *accidia* as described in our treatise. Before entering the lay world, the sin of sloth, newly freed from the monasteries, became—along with greed for worldly goods—a typical fault of secular clerics hardly zealous for their flocks, against whom other secular clerics, nourished with a new intellectual vision, addressed their criticism. In the cathedral schools of the second half of the twelfth century, and chiefly in Paris, these secular clerics elaborated a new, complete project of clerical training, which was intellectual-theological, moral, and pastoral at the same time, and provided all the tools needed to implement it, from a new edition of the Bible to a complete commentary on it, from a new, successful theological manual (Peter Lombard’s *Sententiae*) to a series of methods for keeping theological teaching up-to-date with the new pastoral needs, from a set of tools for exegesis to a wide range of aids for preaching, from a sophisticated sacramental theology to a rich literature of practical theology for promoting the practice of confession. These men took a decisive step in the evolution of “scholastic theology,” understood as a precise intellectual-theological project linked to a complete theological *cursus*, in a climate of spiritual

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66 I am thinking of the updating of the *Glosa ordinaria* through Peter Lombard’s *Magna glosatura* on the Psalms and the Pauline epistles, as well as Peter the Chanter’s and Stephen Langton’s extensive biblical commentaries.
re-awakening which had apostolic life at its centre. Their attitude preceded and prepared the Fourth Lateran Council, and the flourishing of the mendicant orders would have been hardly thinkable without their achievements. Yet, if we follow the well-trodden path (iter trium) of consolidated historiography, we hardly get an articulate idea of this group comprising masters such as Peter Comestor and Peter the Chanter, Stephen Langton and Geoffrey of Poitiers, John of Abbeville, Nicholas of Tournai and Richard Poore. Only recently have scholars turned their attention to figures such as Thomas of Chobham and William de Montibus. Even Martin Grabmann, who invented the label of “Biblico-moral school” for this otherwise dispersed group, was too anxious to move on to the age of “high scholasticism” to recognise the specificity of this period, being mainly interested in the progress of “speculative theology”. But what is typical of the attitude of these late-twelfth-century secular masters is the interconnection of different theological specialities, the pastoral destination even of exercises such as speculation about the attribution of divine names in theological questions and in the first chapters of theological summas, or the rules for solving apparent contradictions in the sacred page, as found, for example, in Peter the Chanter’s De tropis loquendi.

From this perspective, studying and editing the modest Conflictus probably written by Langton as a young man can be worthwhile if it contributes to uncovering a historical phenomenon otherwise lost in the hurried transition to periods and figures already consacrated by official historiography. In historical research too, nihil volitum quin ante praecognitum. But philology, sometimes, gives us the freedom to look for something new.

71 See Joseph Goering, William de Montibus (c. 1140–1213): The Schools and the Literature of Pastoral Care (Toronto, 1992).
73 On this work, see Luisa Valente, Phantasia contrarietatis: Contraddizioni scritturali, discorso teologico e arti del linguaggio nel De tropis loquendi di Pietro Cantore († 1197) (Florence, 1997).
Principles of the edition

The published text is basically that of L, since this MS is the only one that transmits a *Conflictus uitiorum et virtutum*, bearing the form of a “battle” between vices and virtues and attributed to Stephen Langton. Nevertheless, I have integrally collated L with *De septem uiciis capitalibus* as preserved in M, because it greatly contributes to establishing a better text. In this sense, our edition is a transcription of L, revised with the help of M, the sources which could be discovered and the critical skill of the editor, who has tried to judge the linguistic and conceptual consistency of each sentence. Possibly, some other MSS listed by Bloomfield under no. 6450 might contain *De septem uiciis capitalibus* as well and might thus have been useful for editorial purposes, but investigating all these MSS would have delayed the completion of the edition indefinitely. Saying this, I admit that I leave two problems unsolved: the relation of *De septem uiciis capitalibus* to the *Conflictus* (is it an extract from the *Conflictus*, a first redaction of this text, or a different use of a common source?) and the incoherence of *De septem uiciis capitalibus* as preserved in M, which contains a rubric promising the treatment of seven vices, but which in reality discusses only six of them. I will limit my analysis below to the textual relationship between L and M. A comparison between L and M will clarify to what extent M can contribute to establishing a better text of the *Conflictus*. The comparison follows the chapter division of the *Conflictus* as found in L.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 1</th>
<th>Only in L. It presents a series of inconsistencies with the rest of the <em>Conflictus</em> and has particular sources.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapters 2 to 5</td>
<td>In L and M. They find a further witness in chapter 61 of Nicholas of Tournai’s <em>Compilatio</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 6</td>
<td>In L and M. The MSS part ways towards the end of the chapter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>De superbia</em></td>
<td>Only in L (M does not discuss virtues)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 7</td>
<td>In L and M. In L, it is incomplete through the loss on one folio. M is used to complete the chapter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>De humilitate</em></td>
<td>Missing in L through the loss of one folio; not in M (which does not discuss virtues).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[De ira]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing for the greatest part in L through the loss of one folio; only the last few lines are preserved. Present in M, but the final lines of this section do not match those found in L (in fact, the MSS always part ways near the end of the chapters on the vices). The lines preserved in L appear as the end of an acephalous chapter on wrath in the edition, while the text of M appears in an appendix.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only in L (M does not discuss virtues)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 9 De patientia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only in L; M only discusses six vices, this one is missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapters 11 De sollicitudine</td>
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<tr>
<td>Only in L (M does not discuss virtues)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chapter 12 De timore</td>
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<tr>
<td>Only in L (M does not discuss virtues)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chapter 13 De avaritia</td>
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<tr>
<td>In L and M. The MSS part ways towards the end of the chapter.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chapter 14 De paupertate spirituali</td>
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<td>Only in L (M does not discuss virtues)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chapter 15 De castrimargia</td>
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<tr>
<td>In L and M. The MSS part ways towards the end of the chapter.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chapter 16 De abstinentia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Only in L (M does not discuss virtues)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chapter 17 De luxuria</td>
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<tr>
<td>In L and M. The MSS part ways towards the end of the chapter.</td>
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For the chapters occurring in L alone, the text of L has been retained, though repaired in case of evident omissions and mistakes, normally in accordance with the sources. All editorial interventions have been noted in the apparatus. For the parts witnessed by both MSS, L offers the basic text. In some cases, only the concurrent use of both MSS made it possible to offer the reader an understandable text (e.g. ch. 6, l. 66–68). All rejected variants have been noted in the apparatus. Whenever the comparison of L and M did not enable me to reconstruct an acceptable reading, a lacuna impossible to fill in by diuinatio is indicated with the sign <***>. 
I have respected the orthography of L but without reproducing the inconsistent use of c/t before i + vowel. Hence, always uitium, auaritia, tristitia, patientia, pretiosus, otium, otiosus etc., but always iudicum, pertinacia, addicio (verb), conspirium, officium, gazophylacium. At had obviously to be distinguished from ac, since the “graphic” variation leads to the transition to a new lemma (e.g., in ch. 6, l. 132 the reading at has been established with reference to the source that is quoted and could in no way be inferred from a purely graphic analysis). I have also followed L in its peculiarity of quoting the Bible in highly abbreviated form (M tends to complete biblical citations). When quotes had to be expanded for the sake of clarity, the integration is marked by < >.

A number of readings deserve to be discussed singularly:

1. *Benedicite maledicentibus uos* (ch. 9, l. 36–37): Luke 6:28 has *uobis*. The use of the accusative after *maledicentibus* is attested in patristic literature.\(^75\)

2. (. . .) *ita est de scientia sine caritate sicut de folle vel uesica turgente et inflata* (ch. 6, l. 102–03). Classical Latin would require *turgenti* in the attributive position, but the morphological distinction between the predicative and attributive function tends to collapse in the language of authors such as Peter the Chanter and Stephen Langton (not to mention Thomas Aquinas).\(^76\) Likewise, in *quid prodest tibi, si tandem caro uernibus et anima demonibus foret cruciata sine finem cum diuite epulante splendide, nec a Lazaro guttam aque ualenti impetrare* (ch. 13, l. 57–59), *diuite* is linked once to *epulante* and once to *ualenti*, both with an attributive function, but morphologically different.


\(^{76}\) See Quinto, “La parabola del Levitico,” 204 n. 5.
3. L uses the abbreviation *Iherem*. very often in introducing quotations. This abbreviation stands sometimes for the prophet Jeremiah and sometimes for Jerome. It has been resolved in accordance with the identified source as *Iheremias* or *Iheronimus*.

**Sigla**

L  Laon, BM, 133, f. 109r–117va (*Conflictus uitiorum et uirtutum*)
M  Oxford, BL, Laud. misc. 544, f. 4ra–8ra (*De septem uitiis capitalibus*)
D  Douai, BM, 434, vol. III, f. 62r–74v (*Compilatio secundum magistrum Nicolaum Tornacensem*)
P  Paris, BnF, Nouv. Acq. lat. 999, f. 335r–354va (*idem*)

**Signa**

| ] | consensus codicum non laudatorum |
| †scrurrilitas | uox inintelligibilis |
| <***> | lacunam textui subesse puto |
Incipit conflictus uitiorum et uirtutum Parisius elucidatus secundum magistrum Stephanum de Longue Tonne Cantuariensem archiepiscopum.

De uitiis capitalibus et surculis eorum, de uirtutibus et surculis earum.


Gula: inepta letitia, scurrilitas, leuitas, uaniloquium, immunditia corporis, instabilitas loci uel mentis, ebrietas, libido. Gula uincitur abstinentia.

Fornicatio: cecitas mentis, inconstanta oculorum, periculum uite, lasciuia, ioca, petulantia, incontinentia, oodium mandatorum dei, mentis enervatio, inuste cupiditates, neglegentia future, presentis uite delectatio. Fornicatio uincitur castitate.

Auaritia: iniuidie, furta, latrocinia, homicidia, mendacia, periuaria, rapine, uiolentie, inquietudo, inusta iudicia, contemptus ueritatis, future beatitudinis obliuoio, obduratio cordis, contraria misericordie. Auaritia superna uincitur caritate.

Ira: tumor mentis, rixe, contumelie, clamor, indignatio, presumptio, blasphemie, sanguinis effusio, ulciscendi cupiditas, iniuriarum memor<br/>. Ira uincitur patientia.

Accidia: somnolentia, pigritia operis boni, instabilitas loci, peruaagatio de loco ad locum, tepiditas laborandi, tedium cordis, murmuratio, uaniloquium. Accidia uincitur boni operis instantia.

Tristitia huius seculi: malitia, rancor animi, pusillanimitas, amaritudo, desperatio, presentis uite sepe nulla delectatio. Tristitia mala uincitur letiitia spirituali.

Vana gloria: iactantia, arrogantia, indignatio, discordia, inanis glorie cupidio, ypocrisis. Vana gloria uincitur caritate dei.

2. Vidi de mari bestiam ascendentem habentem capita septem et cornua decem. Verba Iohannis in Apocalipsi 13:1. Bestia ista diabolus est, a uastando sic dicta. Est enim serpens in aquis, idest in luxuriosis, unde dictum est ei:<sup>2</sup> Pectore et

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For the sources of this chapter see above, pp. 206–11.

uentre repes, quia per libidinosam cogitationem et ingluuiem incitat ad libidinem uel luxuriam. Est etiam auiis in aere, idest in superbis et in inconstantibus, quos dubius alis attollit, scilicet diuitiis et dignitantibus. Dicitur etiam draco et leo in terra, idest in cupidis: draco occulte inficiens per dolos et usuras, leo aperte seuiens per rapinam et iuriae manifestas.

Hec bestia surgit de mari, idest de mundo, cuius est princeps. Mundus enim comparatur mari, quia tumet per superbiam, spumat per luxuriam, feruet per iram et inuidiam, nubilosus est per tristitiam, omnia in se recipit per cupiditatem, maior piscis minorem deuorat per rapinam, mortuos ad litus eicit, uivos attrahit et submergit, quia despicit eos qui mortui sunt et uiuunt Christo.

Hec est bestia fera que frequenter deuorat Ioseph. Septem habet capita, scilicet septem criminalia peccata, que sunt hec: superbia, inuidia, ira, accidia, avaritia, castrimargia, luxuria.

Hec sunt vii demonia que eiecit dominus de muliere peccatrice. Hii sunt vii nequissimi spiritus quos immundus spiritus quando exierit ab homine assumpsit ad impugnandum hominem.

Hec sunt ille gentes quas filii Israel eiecerunt de terra promissionis; de hiis dicitur in Deuteronomio 28:7: «Per unam uiam uenient ad te hostes tui et per septem fugient a te»; per solam enim uoluntatem incurrimus omnia mortalia, sed septem uiis fugiunt, quia septem omnipotentis dei uiuritatem curantur.

Qua uirtute quodlibet uitium curatur

Superbia per humilitatem, inuidia per caritatem, ira per patientiam, accidia per timorem et sollicitudinem, cupiditas per paupertatem spiritualem, castrimargia per sobrietatem, luxuria per castitatem.

Ista autem uitiae uulnerant animam, excecant et maculant.

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3 Cf. Gen. 37:20; Peter the Chanter, Verbum abbreviatum 11, PL 205:52B (cf. textus confitatis 1.9, ed. Monique Boutry, CCCM 196:70).
4 Cf. Alan of Lille, De virtutibus et de vitius et de donis Spiritus sancti 2.1, ed. Lottin, Psychologie et morale 6:69.
6 Cf. John Cassian, Collationes 5.25.1, p. 149; Peter Lombard, Sententiae 2.42.6, 1:570; Alan of Lille, De virtutibus et vitius 2.1, p. 69.
Septem | uulneribus apponitur emplastrum septem sacramentorum ecclesiæ, que summus medicus sanguine passionis sue et oleo misericordie distemperauit. Ccecitatem expellunt vii luminaria, idest septem dona spiritus sancti. 

Et ita patet quod per vii uias fugiunt inimici. 

Hec autem uitia sibi inuicem connectuntur, unde Iob40:12: «Nerui testiculorum Vehemoth perplexi sunt», et propheta dicit:7 «Congregati sunt milii alter ad alterum». Ex superbia enim que est ininitum omnis peccati nascitur inuicem. Superbus enim quoniam neminem uellet habere parem uel superiorem, iccirco dolet de successibus alicorn, letatur de infortuninis proximorum. Qui autem inuicem est facile irascitur, maxime illi cui inuicem, et ita ex inuicem oriunt ira, que postquam inueterata est odium nuncupatur. Ex ira autem nascitur accidia <siue> tristitia, quando de eo quod irascitur sumere non potest ulitionem. Et quoniam talis homo iam amisset consolationem interius et gaudium in spiritu, querit solatium exterius in exterioribus, et ita inhiat | possessionibus acquirendis: ecce quomodo ex tristitia nascitur cupiditas. Postquam cupidus multa acquisivit ait intra se.8 «Anima mea, habes multa bona reposita in annos plurimos<: requiesce, comede, bibe, epulare?», et ita oriunt castrimargia. Et quia uenter mero estuans facile despumat in libidinem, et quia uenter et genitalia vicina sunt, de castrimargia oritur luxuria.9 

Et ita contextutur funis septiplex, qui difficile rumpitur, unde psalmista118:6: 

«Funes peccatorum circumplexi sunt me». Hiis uinculis «ligatis manibus et pedibus»10 proicitur «in tenebras exteriores».11 

<4> Quomodo texuntur uincula peccati 

Hec uincula primo sunt stupea in uoluntate, posteae linea in opere, tertio ferrea in consuetudine, tandem adamantina in desperacione, unde:12


7 Is. 34:15. 
8 Luc. 12:19. 
9 For this section cf. Gregory the Great, Moralia in Job 31.45.89, p. 1611. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Is. 52:2.
«Solue uinclua coli tui, captiuia filia Syon». Vere captiuus quia superbia reddit inflatum, inuidia liuidum, ira turbidum, accidia pigrum, auaritia cecum, ingluuies canem, immunditia libidinis porcum: per superbia enim cor inflatur, in inuidiam et iram inflammatur et arescit, per auaritiam dispergitur, per tristitiam conteritur et quasi in puluerm ueritet, per gulam inficetur et quasi humectatur, per luxuriam conculcatur et in lutum redigitur, ut possit dicere:13 «Infiusus sum in limo profundi» etc.

Vere captiuus quia amisset deum, proximum et se ipsum: superbia enim aefert deum, inuidia proximum, ira se ipsum.14

<5> De surculis uitiorum
Ex hiis capitisb oriuntur decem cornua, iste alia uitia, quibus impugnantur homines ne obseruent decalogum.
Ex superbia enim nascitur inanis gloria, inobedientia, iactantia, ypocrisy, arrogantia, noutatun presumptiones.
Ex inuidia nascitur exultatio in aduersis, tristitia in | prosperis, detractio, sussurratio, murmuratio, rancor.
Ira triplex: in corde latens, in uerba prorumpens, in iniurias excrescens; |
ex hac oriuntur rixe, contumelie, indignatio, clamor, blasphemie, lites, odio, homicidia.
Ex accidia siue tristitia oriuntur malitia et desperatio, pusillanimitas, torpor circa precepta, euagatio mentis circa illicita.
Ex auaritia oriuntur obduratio cordis, violencia, inquietudo, periuria, frus, proditio.
Ex castrimargia oriuntur hebetatio sensus, immunditia, multiloquium, scurrilitas, mala et inepta letitia.
Ex luxuria oritur cecitas mentis, inconsideratio, inconstantia, precipitatio, amor sui, odium dei, affectus presentis seculi, desperatio futuri.

<6> De superbia
Legitur in Iob:17 quod Chaldei fecerunt tres turmas ut auferrent Iob res suas. Iob, id est dolens,15 Christus est, qui dolores suos <et> nostros


13 Ps. 68:3.
15 Cf. Jerome, Liber interpretationis Hebraicorum nominum, ed. Paulus de Lagarde,
portaut, qui sterquilinio nostre paupertatis et fragilitatis insidens testa humilitatis rasientem perpeccatorum nostrorum, cui nituntur Chaldei et feroces, idest demones, aufere res suas instaurando circa eum tres turmas, quam primam duicit mundus tamquam signifer, habens secum duos exercitus, scilicet superbia et cupiditatem; in secunda signifer est caro, transfens secum duos similiter exercitus, scilicet castrimargiam et luxuriam; tertiam turmam duicit ipse diabolus habens secum tres exercitus, scilicet inuidiam, iram et accidiam.

Prima turma habet tela curua et attrahentia quantum ad unum exercitum, scilicet avaritiam, sed quantum ad alium exercitum, scilicet superbiam, agilia, uacua et quasi arundinea habet iacula. Secunda turma habet sagittas sulfureas in summitate mellicatas. Tertia turma habet spicula acuta, accensa et felle toxicata. Mundus enim sua|det inania, caro dulcia, dyabolus amara.

Primus hostis, scilicet mundus, sophisticus, et ideo magis cauendus. Secundus, <scilicet caro>, domesticus, et ideo magis timendus, quia nulla pestis efficacior ad nocendum quam familiaris inimicus. Tertius hostis, scilicet dyabolus, hostis antiquus, et ideo magis odiendus. Mundus eleuat nos supra nos per superbiam; caro deprimit nos infra nos per luxuriam; dyabolus trahit nos extra nos per inuidiam et iram.

Sic ergo dyabolus tres habet exercitus ex una parte, mundus et caro inuidior, de quibus Amos propheta: «Super tribus sceleribus Moab et super iiiioe non conviertam eum».
Quilibet autem istorum septem exercituum vii modis impugnat, quilibet enim istorum vii modis habet fieri: primo occurrit cogitatio mala; secundo locutio prava; tertio operatio mala, que si fieri: primo occurrit cogitatio mala; secundo locutio prava; tertio operatio mala, que si fieri: primo occurrit cogitatio mala; secundo locutio prava; tertio operatio mala, que si fieri: primo occurrit cogitatio mala; secundo locutio prava; tertio operatio mala, que si fieri: primo occurrit cogitatio mala; secundo locutio prava; tertio operatio mala, que si fieri: primo occurrit cogitatio mala; secundo locutio prava; tertio operatio mala, que si fieri: primo occurrit cogitatio mala; secundo locutio prava; tertio operatio mala, que si fieri: primo occurrit cogitatio mala; secundo locutio prava; tertio operatio mala, que si fieri: primo occurrit cogitatio mala; secundo locutio prava; tertio operatio mala, que si fieri: primo occurrit cogitatio mala; secundo locutio prava; tertio operatio mala, que si fieri: primo occurrit cogitatio mala; 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tra deum, extensis in altum manibus, uult eum impugnare edificando turrim in Babylone que possit contingere celum; unde Zacharias: "Vastata est Iordanis superbia"; Iordanus interpretatur ‘humilis descensus’. quasi diceret: “superbia humilium—idest eorum qui deberent esse humiles, ut clerici—iam iudicata est”; Gregorius: "Cor quod uulnerauerat elatio superbia curat abiectio humilis uite”.

Nonne solet depingi cornuta et cum uno pede? Vno enim cornu aggregit deum et alio proximum; set non habet nisi unum pedem, unde cito corrupt, iuxta illud: "Frangit deus omne superbum.”

Fulgur enim cadit super montes, quia “Deus superbis resistit, humilibus autem dat gratiam”. De hoc pede dicit psalmista: "Non ueniat michi pes superbie”. Superbia enim est quasi mons interpositus non sinens uenire ad nos radios ueri solis, unde comparatur montibus Gelboe super quos nec ros diuine misericordie nec pluuia doctrine Christi descendit, sed permanent sici sine humore gratie tamquam puluis quem proicit uentus a facie terre. Econtra «ualles—idest humiles ad quos defluat humor—habundabunt frumento”.

Comparatur etiam fumo, qui quanto plus ascendit tanto plus evanescit, quia “Qui se exaltat humiliabitur”, unde: "Inimici mox ut honorificati fuerint et exaltati, deficientes quemadmodum fumus"


31 Cf. Peter the Chanter, Verbum abbreviatum 10, PL 205:46A (where the statement is wrongly attributed to Prudentius).
32 Prudentius, Psychomachia 285, ed. Mauritius P. Cunningham, CCSL 126:160; Peter the Chanter, Verbum abbreviatum 10, 46A (textus conflatus 1.8, p. 56).
33 Iac. 4:6; 1 Pet. 5:5.
34 Cf. Peter the Chanter, Verbum abbreviatum 10, 49B: “Hieronymus: Superbia est mens positus inter nos et solem, qui non permissit nos videre solem justitiæ.”
35 Cf. 2 Reg. 1:21.
36 Ps. 64:14 (iuxta Gr.).
38 Ps. 36:20 (iuxta Gr.).
deficient», sicut patet in olla, cuius unda quanto magis elevatur ad ignem, tanto magis aqua minoratur; assimilatur etiam uento, unde Iheremias\(^{39}\) de Effraym superbō dicit «Effraim pascit uentos»; delectatur etiam inanis gloria, sicut pharisei qui uolunt uocari ab hominibus rabbi et | primas habere caðedras in sinagogis et primas salutationes in foro;\(^{40}\) de hoc uento dici-
tur:\(^{41}\) | «Quisquis alias uirtutes sine humilitate congregat quasi puluerem in uentum portat».

Comparatur etiam palee propter leuitatem et inconstantiam, unde filii Israel serviebant pharaoni\(^{42}\) in palea superbī\(^{43}\) et in luto luxurie\(^{44}\) et latere auaritie, unde Iheronimus:\(^{45}\) Dum paleam sequeris palea e Pharaohem; palea es et non times ut ardeas? Comparatur etiam superbūs uesice inflate, que plena est uacuitate et uacua plenitudine; hec uesica dum modice febris <***> uel aculeo mortis pungitur ad nichilum redigitur; scriptum est enim:\(^{46}\) «Dominus concidet ceruices peccatorum», idest ceruicosos peccatores qui Multum referunt de Mecenate superbō.\(^{47}\)

Cum enim quedam peccata quarundam sint partium, superbia totius corporis est. Quidam enim staturam corporis adiuuauit pedibus, uentose

\(^{39}\) In fact Os. 12:1.
\(^{41}\) Gregory the Great, \textit{In evangelia homilite} 1.7.4, PL 76:1103A.
\(^{42}\) Cf. Ex. 1:11–14; \textit{Biblia latina cum glossa ordinaria}, vol. 4 (Strasbourg, 1480/81; repr. Turnhout, 1992), 113a (ad loc.): “Israel populum christianum, Pharao Zabulum (!) signifer qui luti et lateris imponit grauissimum iugum, servitutem scilicet terrae et luterari operis admixtis paleis, id est, leuibus & irrationabilibus factis, omnibus onere peccatorum oppressis, nemo sit qui regnum eius disperdat aut vincat.”
\(^{44}\) Cf. ibid. 116.7, CCSL 103:486: “quid prodest, si bonis operibus abluimur, et in luto luxuriae denuo volutamur?”
\(^{46}\) Ps. 128:4; Peter the Chanter, \textit{Verbum abbreviatum (textus confatus)} 1.8, p. 56.
incedunt; quidam pretiose armati; quidam extento collo, quasi affixo palo, unde Ysã-3:16: «Pro eo quod eleuate sunt filie Syon et ambulauerunt extento 85 collo et nutibus oculorum ibant ludendo» etc.

Comparatur etiam huiusmodi monstrum cornicule, quae assumpsit sibi pennas aliarium aium et inde superbiebat, quibus ablatis remansit turpis et nuda;\(^{49}\) similiter tu amoris uestibus tuis et aliis ornamentis quibus superbus turpis eris; non enim tua sunt sed aliena. Item superbia eiecit de celis 90 angelicam dignitatem, humilitas leuauit humanam infirmitatem;\(^{50}\) per superbiam enim Lucifer est dyabolus factus, Adam de paradyso eiecit,\(^{51}\) phariseus reprobatus.\(^{52}\) Hec gigantum linguas confudit;\(^{53}\) Nabugodonosor in bestiam transformavit.\(^{54}\)

«Quid superbis terra et ciniso»,\(^{55}\) | sperma fetidum et uas stercorum, L 112
95 esca uermium, cuius conceptus culpa et nasci pena, uita labor, necesse

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\(^{48}\) Cum enim... ludendo: cf. Peter the Chanter, Verbæm abbreviatum 10, 50B (cf. textus conflatus 1.8, pp. 68–69).


\(^{50}\) Cf. Pseudo-Augustine (Augustinus Belgicus), Sermo 12, PL 40:1255: “Superbia gloriæm de coelis deiecit angelicam: sed humilitas ad coelos ascendere fecit infirmitatem humanam;” Peter the Chanter, Verbæm abbreviatum 10, 45A: “Haec est quæ angelum de subtîmi ordïne et gloria angelorum deiecit in aerem caliginosum deputatum eum in carcerem usque in diem judicii;” Alan of Lille, De arte praedicatoria 10, 131D–132A: “Superbia ex angelis daemones fecit; humilitas autem hominum sanctis angelis similes facit.”

\(^{51}\) Cf. Gen. 3:23–24.

\(^{52}\) Cf. Luc. 18:14; Peter the Chanter, Verbæm abbreviatum 10, 44D–45A.

\(^{53}\) Cf. Gen. 11:7; for the idea that giants rather than men built the tower, see, e.g., Faustus of Riez, De spiritu sancto 1.13, ed. August Engelbrecht, CSEL 21:128: “...s per gigantes in caelum turrem molirentur erigere, patris persona proloquitur: uenie descendamus et confundamus lingus eorum.”

\(^{54}\) Cf. Alan of Lille, De arte praedicatoria 10, 132D: “[superbia] Luciferum de coelo eiecit, Adam Paradiso privavit, Nabuchodonosorem in bestiam transformavit.”

\(^{55}\) Ecli. 10:9.
morit? Postermo nec Christi humilitas, «nec mors, nec crux, nec clavi, nec aliqua eius opera possunt prodesse superbia», que humilitatem et eius opera nititur destruere.

Nascitur autem superbia quandoque ex bonis nature, sicut ex pulchritudine uel ex fortitutudine; sed contra, «dominus contemptibilia elegit ut forta queque confunderet»; ad Corinthios: «Noli altum sapere set time»; item: «Scientia inflato», et ita est de scientia sine caritate sicut de folle s uel uscica tur gente et inflata, uento plena, que nichil habet soliditatis; sed adueniente caritate illud consolidat et roborat. Gregorius: «Superbia natione celestis celestes mentes appetit et memorans unde ceciderit semper nititur ad proprios ortus euolare». Item superbia laxat habenas conte tui, non equat potestatem uoluntati, nec attendit quid possit sed

96 mori] resistte si potes modice pulici ut dormias, nedum diuine maiestati, quasi contra stimulam recalcitrans. M 97 eius L: humilitatis M 100 fortitutudine] uel parentela. M uel ex scientia scripsi: om. LM 101 confuderet] quandoque provenit ex bonis fortune, scilicet ex diuitiis et dignitatisus, unde apostolus diuitibus huius mundi precipice (!) non alta sapere nec sperare in merito diuitiarum. quandoque nascitur periculosius ex bonis gratie, unde beatus Gregorius: qui de [M 5vb] uiutiusus se extulerit non gladio set medicamine se interficit. fit autem viuem modis huiusmodi superbia: primo quando aliquis bona que non habet credit uel dicit se habere, quod est iactantia; uel quando de hiis que habet querit laudem hominum, quod est inannis gloria; uel quando credit habere a se et non refert ad deum, quod est quasi quedam rapina, sicut dicebant philosophi: labia nostra a nobis sunt, quis noster dominus est [Ps. iuxta Gr. 11, 5]; uel quando se credit habere a deo, set supra alios, sicut ille dicebat: non sum sicut ceteri homines [Lc. 18, 11], que species superbie dicit singularitas; septimus modus quando credit se habere a deo set meritis suis exigentibus, que est presumptio: M, qui reliqua usque ad finem capituli omitit 107 contemputi scripsi: contentui L; cf. Bernardus, de div. serm. 14, 5 (Opera 6,1:138): «ut tanto liberius quanto desperatus peccans, totas in concupiscientias laxet habenas, tuo impetu feratur in praeceptis, sicut scripsum est: Peccator, cum venerit in profundum malorum, contentui».


57 Peter the Chanter, Verbum abbreviatum 10, 48B: “. . . superbis nec mors Christi, nec crux, nec lancea, nec clavi, nec huiusmodi prosunt, cum humilitati obvient.”

58 Cf. ibid., 47C.

59 Cf. ibid., 47D.

60 1 Cor. 1:27–28 (mixtim).

61 In fact Rom. 11:20.

62 1 Cor. 8:1.

63 follis stands here for a pair of bellows, a ball inflated with wind, or a leather bag.

64 In fact Hildebert of Le Mans, Ep. 10, PL 171:165C–D; Peter the Chanter, Verbum abbreviatum 10, 44D (attributed to Jerome; cf. textus conflatatus 1.8, p. 55).

65 In fact Defensor (2), Liber scintillarum 17.25, ed. Henri-Marie Rochais, CCSL 117:78–79 (attributed to Ambrose), actually derived from Julian Pomerius, De vita contemplativa 3.3.1, PL 59:478A–B.
66 Defensor, Liber scintillarum 17.32, p. 79, from Isidore of Sevilla, Sententiae 2.38.7, PL 83:639D–640A.
68 Defensor, Liber scintillarum 17.21, p. 78 (wrongly attributed to Augustine).
69 Ibid. 17.22, p. 78 (wrongly attributed to Jerome).
70 Ibid. 17.25, p. 79.
71 Cf. Isidore of Sevilla, Sententiae 2.38.3, 639C.
72 Gal. 6:3.
73 Defensor, Liber scintillarum 46.15, p. 163, from Isidore of Sevilla, Synonyma 2.62, PL 83:859C.
74 Not found; cf. Gregory the Great, Moralita in Iob 2.1.1, CCSL 143:59: “...Iob descriptur temptatione auctus sed Daud temptatione prostratus, ut et maiorum vir- tuit spem nostram foveat et maiorum casus ad cautelam nos humiliatis accingat.”
75 In fact Biblia latina cum glossa 4:412b (1 Tim. 6:17).
76 Ibid.; Peter Lombard, Collectanea in epistolás Pauli, PL 192:361D, from Augustine, Sermo 36.2, ed. Cyrillus Lambot, CCSL 41:435: “Magnus est ergo dives. qui non se ideo magnum putat quia dives est; qui ideo se magnum putat, superbus et egenus est; in carne crepat, in corde mendicat; inflatus est, non plenus.”
mortisque fomentum; arescunt riuuli si fontis uena prescinditur nec rami conualescunt radice succisa; deficiunt uitiae si elatio iuguletur at si stercora radici congregentur pinguescunt rami et arentium sterilitas resiluescit. Si fonti liquentia superfundas, accessio transit in riuulos. Si camino addicias ignem, in ligna reuiuiscit incendium. Sic uitiate nature elationis innate toxico-foueas quin uitalia ipsa mortiferum uirus infundat, nec si uolueris impedire».77 Ad Chor. τεταρταῖς: «Quis te discernit, quid habes» etc. Superbia quanto magis crescit, tanto sibi minor uidetur: Secundo Machabeorum:78 Eleazar interficiens elephantem sub eo succubuit; Gregorius79 super illud: Hiis «qui uitia superant et sub illis superbiendo succumbunt». Idem:80 «Sub 

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<7> De humilitate

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Huiusmodi uirtutis solus deus auctor est; | hec dicitur primogenita filia summi regis, «sal et condimentum aliarum uirtutum».96 «Sunt autem tria que radicant et nutriunt humilitatem: assiduitas subiections, consideratio propri e fragilitatis et comparatio uiri melioris».97 Gregorius:98 «Tanto humiliorum se considerat ex munere quanto se obligatiorem conspicit in red-denda ratione». Gregorius in moralibus:99 «Humilitas est titulus Christi sicut superbia titulus dyaboli».

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88 Gregory the Great, Moralia in Job 18.50.82, CCSL 143A:945.
90 Biblia cum glossa 4:203b (Luc. 18:16).
91 Ps. 103:10.
92 Ioh. 4:14.
93 In fact Defensor, Liber scintillarum 4.42, p. 21.
94 Ibid. 4.44, p. 21.
95 Ex. 3:11.
96 Luc. 14:10.
98 Bernard of Clairvaux, Sententiae 2.88, in Sancti Bernardi opera 6.2:42.
99 Defensor, Liber scintillarum 48.9, p. 165.
L 112<8> De inuidia
M 5<8>

Scriptum est\(^{101}\) quod «inuidia dyaboli mors intrauit in orbem terrarum». Hec est que Caym armavit contra Abel,\(^{102}\) filios Iacob contra Ioseph,\(^{103}\) Iudeos contra Christum,\(^{104}\) Babylonios contra Daniele.\(^{105}\) Hec pestis prius sibi nocet quam aliis. Sicut enim urmis corrodit lignum et tinea uestem, ita hoc uitium inuidentem. Quid enim inuidis miserius, qui bonis aliorum fiunt deteriores, que si in aliis diligerent sua facerent,\(^{106}\) qui moriuntur bono odore sicut serpentes? Quid miserius inuidis quos conspecta felicitas afficit, pena nequiores reddit, «qui alieno profectu deficiunt, aliena exultatione tabescunt».\(^{107}\) Cum enim alia uitia habeant quandam perfunc-tionem delectationem, pestis ista est tormentum sine refrigerio, morbus sine remedio.\(^{108}\) Hec est uermis de manna ebulliens,\(^{109}\) bruchus qui terre ui-rentia consumit,\(^{110}\) quia 

«Summa petit liuor».\(^{111}\) Hec est uermis qui Ione hederam consumpsit,\(^{112}\) cum prosperitati aliorum mordendo detrahit. Inuidia est uitium directe oppositum summo bono, ergo est summum malum: est enim peccatum in spiritum sanctum, quia

\(^{8}\): LM 1 inuidia] sequitur de secundo uitio quod est inuidia, per quam mors intrauit in orbem terrarum, sicut scriptum est \(add. M\) 2 quod \(L\): om. \(M\) 3 contra] deum \(add. L\) 6 inuidenten \(L\): inuidi mentem \(M\) 7 fiunt deteriores \(L\): \(im\). \(M\) 8 quos] dum \(add. M\) 10 tabescunt \(L\): thabescunt \(M\) 11 delectionem \(M\): dilectionem \(L\) (cf. Alan. ars praed. 8, PL 210:128 D) est tormentum \(L\): \(im\). \(M\) 12 de manna ebulliens \(L\): ebulliens de manna \(M\) 15 consumpsit \(L\): -mit \(M\) 16 Inuidia est uitium \(L\): hoc uitium est \(M\) bono] idest caritati \(add. M\) 17 ergo \(L\): unde patet quod \(M\)

\(^{101}\) Sap. 2:24; Peter the Chanter, *Verbum abbreviatum* 11, 51C (cf. textus conflatus 1.9, p. 70).

\(^{102}\) Cf. Gen. 4:5–8.

\(^{103}\) Cf. Gen. 37:4.

\(^{104}\) Cf. Peter the Chanter, *Verbum abbreviatum* 11, 52B (cf. textus conflatus 1.9, p. 71).

\(^{105}\) Cf. Dan. 6:3–7.


\(^{107}\) Gregory the Great, *Regula pastoralis* 3.10, p. 310.

\(^{108}\) Cf. Alan of Lille, *De arte praedicatoria* 8, 129A.

\(^{109}\) Cf. Ex. 16:20; Alan of Lille, *De arte praedicatoria* 8, 129A: “Legimus filiis Israel coelitus manna datum, ex quo servato scatebat pluralitas vermium: sic ex coelesti gratia collata fidelis, occasionaliter in animo superbi nascitur invidia.”


\(^{112}\) Cf. Ion. 4:7; Alan of Lille, *De arte praedicatoria* 8, 129A.
persequitur tam bona naturalia quam gratuita, de quo\textsuperscript{113} «dedit erugini fructus corum»; erugo uitium est quod in fructibus aura noxia latenter \textit{operatur}.\textsuperscript{114} hec est inuidia, que bonum alterius adurit et consumit.

De hoc dicit beatus Augustinus:\textsuperscript{115} «Sciendum quod cum per omne uitium antiqui hostis uirus humano cordi infunditur, in zelo inuidie tota uiscera sua serpens concutit». \textit{Zelus iste modum non habet, permanens iugiter sine fine. Cum alia sclera finiantur, quantoque ille cui inuidet successo meliore profecerit, tanto inuidus in maius incendium liorius ignibus inardescit. Hinc uultus minax, toruous aspectus, pallor in facie, in labiis tremor, stridor in dentibus, uerba rabida et effrenata conuiicia, \textit{et manus ad uioventiam prompta, et si gladio est interim uacua, tamen odio furiate mentis est armata».\textsuperscript{16}

\textit{De caritate} ………………………………………………………………………

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\textit{De ira}……………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………… <lin>guam non tenuerit tempore ire nec passionem sui corporis poterit aliquando sustiner.\textsuperscript{117} In Prouerbiis\textsuperscript{16:32, xvii}.\textsuperscript{118} «Melior est qui uincit iram quam qui uincit ciuitatem».

\textit{De patientia} «Beati pacifici quoniam filii dei uocabuntur»,\textsuperscript{119} Matheus:\textsuperscript{120} «In patientia uestra possidebitis animas uestras». Iacobus i°: «Patientia opus perfectum habeat ut sitis perfecti et integri in nullo deficientes»; «Beatus uir qui suffert temptationem»\textsuperscript{121} etc. In Prouerbiis\textsuperscript{16:32}: «Melior est homo patiens

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{113} Ps. 77:46.
\item \textsuperscript{114} Cf. \textit{Biblia cum glossa} 3:1029C (Ps. 77:46): “Aerugo, quam alii rubiginem interpretantur, nocet occulte... Aura enim noxia hoc in fructibus operatur latenter, sic in moribus occulta superbia;” cf. Augustine, \textit{Enarrationes in psalmos} 77.27, CCSL 39:1087.
\item \textsuperscript{115} In fact Gregory the Great, \textit{Moralia in Iob} 5.46.85, CCSL 143:281–82.
\item \textsuperscript{116} Cyprian, \textit{De zelo et licore} 7, ed. Manlio Simonetti, CCSL 3A:79.
\item \textsuperscript{117} Cf. John Cassian, \textit{Collationes} 16.6, p. 443.
\item \textsuperscript{118} Cf. \textit{Testimonia divinae scripturae (et patrum)} 13.6, ed. Albert Lehner, CCSL 108D:68: “Melior est uir patiens quam fortis, nam qui retinet iram, melior est quam qui ciuistatem capit,” from Prov. 16:32: “Melior est patiens uiro forti, et qui dominatur animo suo, expugnator urbium.”
\item \textsuperscript{119} Matt. 5:9.
\item \textsuperscript{120} In fact Luc. 21:19.
\item \textsuperscript{121} Iac. 1:12.
\end{enumerate}
uiro forti, et qui dominatur animo suo expugnatore uribum». Gregorius:122 «Per patientiam possidemus animas nostras, quia dum nobis ipsis dominari discimus, hoc ipsum incipimus possidere quod sumus». In psalmo123 «Patientia nostra non peribit in finem». Gregorius:123 «Sepe quod impleri quam cito petimus, ex ipsa melius tarditate prosperatur; sicut herbarum semina gelo pressa solidantur, et quo in superciem tardius exunct, eo ad fructum multipliciora consurgunt». Augustinus:124 «Qui uero fuerit patientior ad in-iuriam, potentior constituetur in regno»; «Quantum patiens deus noster in sustinendis delictis nostris, tantum seuior erit in discutiendis actibus nostro-

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sumus, | si patientiam in animo ser-uamus».129
«Tolerare simul et odisse non est uirtus mansuetudinis sed uelamentum furorise».130 Ysidorus:131 «Grauius torquetur impius quam iustus tolerando aduersa; qui enim bona mundi diligit, uelit, nolit, timoris et doloris pene succumbit». Item:132 «Sagittas contumelie patientie clipeo frange. Contra lingue gladium patientie prebe scutum». «In uitas patrum: patiens homo fons bibulus est et omnibus exhibens delectabilem potum».133 20 Iob13:15: «Etiam si occiderit me sperabo in <ipso>». Christus non

122 Gregory the Great, In evangelia homiliae 2.35.4, 1261D.
123 Id., Moralia in Iob 26.19.34, CCSL 143B:1291.
126 Ibid. 2.18, p. 8, from Jerome, Ep. 17.1, ed. Isidorus Hilberg, CSEL 54:70.
127 Ibid. 2.20, p. 8.
128 Ibid. 2.22, p. 9
129 Ibid. 2.25, p. 9.
130 Gregory the Great, Homiliae in Ezecielem 1.7.12, p. 91; 2.5.14, p. 287; also in Defensor, Liber scintillarum 2.28, p. 9.
131 Isidore of Sevilla, Sententiae 3.59.2, 731A.
132 Defensor, Liber scintillarum 2.48, p. 11.
133 Ibid. 2.59, p. 12.

Iheronimus:138 «Gloriosus est iniuriam tacendo fugere quam respondendo superare». Gregorius:139 Magna laus est homini cum inter flagella deum beneficet.

<10> De accidia siue tristitia

«Super tribus sceleribus Moab et super iv non con<uertam>»;140 tria scelera, idest prima superbia, inuidia, ira, spoliating hominem. Nam superbia auertit deum, inuidia proximum, ira se ipsum. Quartum spoliatio flagellat. Quintum flagell<at>um eicit. Sextum eictum seducit. Septimum seductum conculcat.141 Cum enim spoliatus homo nihil habeat unde gaudeat, per tristitiam flagellatur, cui auaritia succedit que flagellatum eicit, quia interno gaudio amissum quae vel consolationem compellit. Postea succedit gula que uariis oblectationibus illicit. Sequitur luxuria que illectum seruituti subicit,142 et ita miser homo de uitio in uitium corruens per latam
et spatiosam uiam ad mortem trahitur;\textsuperscript{143} que uia est mortuosa\textsuperscript{144} per superbiam, tenebrosa per inuidiam, asperea per iram, ruinosata per tristitiam, spinosa per auaritiam, lutosa per gulam, lubrica per luxuriam. Ideo «dilatauit infernus animam suam»\textsuperscript{145} et singulis uitiis singula parantur hospitia.

Cum dictum sit sufficierent de tribus primis, dicendum est de quatuor alis, et primo de tristitia, de qua dicit apostolus:\textsuperscript{146} «Tristitia seculi mortem operatur». Necessae autem est tristes esse pigros, somnolentos, indeuotos, tepidos, de quibus dominus in Apocalips\textsuperscript{13}: «Vtinam omnes calidus aut frigidus, sed» etc.; «hylarem enim datorem diligit deus»,\textsuperscript{147} non tristem, non pigrum, quia «nescit rerum molimina spiritus sancti gratia»:\textsuperscript{148} pigros enim et otiosos increpat dominus in euangelio\textsuperscript{149} dicens: «Hic hic statis tota die otiosi?». Otiosus seruus et piger abscondit pecuniam domini sui, it ideo condemnavit est.\textsuperscript{150} Non est autem maius damnum quam tempus amittere, quia non est recuperabile, unde Iheronimus:\textsuperscript{151} «Semper aliquid operis facito» etc., unde poeta:\textsuperscript{152}

«Queritur Egistus quare sit factus adulter, 
In promptu causa est: desidiosus erat».

Otium etiam eneruat animos, unde propheta:\textsuperscript{153} Habundantia panis et otium fuit causa peccati Sodomorum, et David in otio factus est adulter,\textsuperscript{154} unde Salomon:\textsuperscript{155} «Qui operatur terram suam saturatur panibus» etc.; item:\textsuperscript{156

\textsuperscript{13} lubrica ex lutosa corr. mg. L. 17 somnolentos; et add. L. 8 tepidos scripsi: trepidos L. 18 Vtinam scripsi: utinam L. 24 Iheronimus scripsi: Iherem. L. 26 Eglitus scripsi cum fonte necnon Nicolai Compilatione (P, f. 343\textsuperscript{3}, D, f. 67\textsuperscript{7}): Egyptus L.


\textsuperscript{144} mortuosa: cf. Augustine, Sermo 97.3.3, PL 38:590 (in a footnote, from a Colbert MS): “Finierat dives ille aegritudinem deliciosam, venit ad mortuosam (ed.: tortuosam).”

\textsuperscript{145} Is. 5:14.

\textsuperscript{146} 2 Cor. 7:10.

\textsuperscript{147} 2 Cor. 9:7.

\textsuperscript{148} Cf. Ambrose, Expositio euangelii secundum Lucam 2.19, p. 39.

\textsuperscript{149} Matt. 20:6.


\textsuperscript{151} Jerome, Ep. 125.11, CSEL 56:130: “fac et aliquid operis, ut semper te diabolus inueniat occupatum.”

\textsuperscript{152} Ovid, Remedias amoris 161–62, p. 251; also in John of Salisbury, Policraticus 1.8, p. 54; Alan of Lille, De arte praedicatoria 7, 126B; id., Sententiae, PL 210:249C; Peter the Chanter, Verbum abbreviatum 81, 246D (cf. textus conflatus 1.79, p. 552).

\textsuperscript{153} Cf. Ez. 16:49 (ad sensum).

\textsuperscript{154} Cf. 2 Reg. 12.2–4.

\textsuperscript{155} Prov. 12:11, 20:30, 28:19.

\textsuperscript{156} Prov. 20:4.
«Piger propter frigus arare non potuit in hyeme» etc.; cui dicitur: \[157\] «Ite potius ad uendentes et emite uobis» etc., unde Ecclesiastes 9:4: «Melius est canis uiuus leone | mortuuo», idest peccator strenue penitens aliquo qui multa fecit bona et inde confidens negligit operari. \[158\] «Surgite ergo mortui 35 de sepulchris uestrís», \[159\] de sepulchris ignauie. «Vsquequo piger dormis, quando surges a sompno?»; \[160\] «Considera formicam»; \[161\] nam sicut dicit Salomon. \[162\] «Per agrum hominis pigri transiens etc. u<rtice> et spi<ne>» idest praeu praetiones at præsta opera, quia scriptum est in codem: \[21\] «Desideria occidunt pigrum», scilicet præu praetiones. Quando enim lac 40 calidum est fugiunt musce, quando tepidum appropinquant: ita qui fer- uentes sunt in seruitio diuino abiciunt praetiones cogitationes, sed tepidos musce cogitationum infestant. Hii bene comparantur Balaam qui dixit: \[163\] «Moriatur anima <morte iustorum>»; non tamen uolebat uiuere sicut ili qui dicunt: “Bonum est mori in religione”, nec tamen uolunt ibi uiuere; de 45 hiis «Piger uult et non uult»: \[164\] uult gloriari uel premium, sed non uult laborem uel meritum; teste enim codem: \[165\] «Manus ponit sub assellas et

De sollicitudine

58 uestrum scripsi: utrum L malitia: enim add. L 11: L

166 Cf. Defensor, Liber scintillarum 52.9, p. 176.
167 Eccli. 30:26: “Zelus et iracundia minuit dies et ante tempus sancetam adducit cogitatus.”
168 Biblia cum glossa 2:776a (Eccli. 30:26, ad “zelus”).
169 Ibid. 2:776a (Eccli. 31:4, ad “inops”).
170 Ibid. 2:783b (Eccli. 38:19, ad “flectit ceruicem”).
172 Matt. 4:23: “Circumibat Iesus totam Galilaeam.”
173 Biblia latina cum glossa 4:16b (ad loc.): “Circumibat <Iesus totam Galilaeam>. Coadiutoribus vocatis praedicationi insistit, docens impigrum esse debere doctorem.”
176 Cf. Luc. 2:8: “Et pastores erant in regione eadem vigilantes et custodientes vigilias noctis super gregem suum.”
tuam”;\textsuperscript{177} in actibus apostolorum\textsuperscript{20:20}; «Attendite uobis et uniuerso <gregi>»;\textsuperscript{178} Ysa.68:2: «Super muros Ierusalem consitui custodes»;\textsuperscript{179} Seruus Abrahe considerabat Rebeccam tacens,\textsuperscript{180} ita prelati debent considerare quid agant subditi sibi. Vectes quibus deferebatur archa semper erant in annulis;\textsuperscript{181} Glossa:\textsuperscript{182} Quia necessarium est ut qui aliis predicant celestia numquam mentem a memoria sacre scripture\textsuperscript{183} uel manus ab obseruantia mandatorum contincant.\textsuperscript{184} Gregorius.\textsuperscript{185} Sacerdotis officium est deo orationem fundere pro


\textsuperscript{180} Cf. Gen. 24:21.

\textsuperscript{181} Cf. Ex. 26:29.

\textsuperscript{182} Not literally found, but cf. \textit{Biblia latina cum glossa} 1:165b (Ex. 25:27): “Vt mit-tantur vectes etc. Beda. Per circulos mittuntur vectes ad subuehendam mensam, quia doctores vt verbis scripturae auditores reficient, necesse est vt mentem in euangelica lectione dignant, vt ad fidem & senum illius omnem interpretationis & doctrinae suae intentionem dirigant, ne aliquid aliud agendum & sperandum amandum ex scripturis docent, quam in whatuo libris euangelii inuenitur, qui dum omnia scripturae verba ad fidem & dilectionem euangelii referunt, quasi totam domini mensam cum panibus & vasis in whatuo circulus portant.”


\textsuperscript{184} Cf. \textit{Biblia latina cum glossa} 1:204a (Ex. 37:4): “Vectes quoque. Isid. Quia fortes perseuerantesque doctores velut imputribilia ligna quaerendi sunt, qui instructioni sacrorum uoluminum semper inhaerentes ecclesiae vnitatem denuntient, & quasi intromissis circulis arcum portent, qui auero quoque iubentur operiri, vt cum sermone aliis insonant, ipsi etiam vite splendorem fulgescant.” These words are not Isidore’s but appear in Gregory the Great, \textit{Regula pastoralis} 2.11, p. 254.

\textsuperscript{185} Cf. Gregory the Great, \textit{Homilieae in Ezechielem} 1.11.22, p. 179: “Sed quis nostrum, rogo, et ad haec sufficiat, ut non solum peccatores studiose corripiant, sed etiam iustis inuiigilat ne cadant... Vnde praedicator egregius dicebat: Sapientibus et insipien-tibus debitor sum.”
iustis ne cadant, pro peccatoribus ut surgant; in Prouerbiis: «Diligenter nosce faciem peccoris tuus»; Iheronimus: «Et tu sacerdos cum uideris populum delinquemem cane tuba amuntians eis delicta corum et sta in confractione ante deum ut auertatur furor eis ab eis».

L 114b  
<i>12</i> De timore


M 6b  
<i>13</i> De auaritia

Sequitur de auaritia, que est ydolorum seruitus: qui enim pecuniam prefert deo, eius deus nummus est et immolat dyabolo; non enim potest

12: L

13: LM 2–3 pecuniam prefert deo M: prefert deo pecuniam L 3 eius... est L: nummus eius deus est M enim L: similiter M

186 In fact Bruno of Würzburg, <i>Expositio psalmorum</i> 105:23, PL 142:386D.
187 Matt. 10:28; Defensor, <i>Liber scintillarum</i> 12.1, p. 60.
188 1 Pet. 1:17; Defensor, <i>Liber scintillarum</i> 12.2, p. 60.
189 Eccle. 12:13.
190 1 Pet. 1:17; Defensor, <i>Liber scintillarum</i> 12.3, p. 60.
191 1 Pet. 3:2; Defensor, <i>Liber scintillarum</i> 12.4, p. 61.
192 In fact Prov. 14:26–27; Defensor, <i>Liber scintillarum</i> 12.10, p. 61.
193 In fact <i>Testimonia divinae scripturae (et patrum)</i>, test. patrum 5.47, p. 106; attributed to Jerome in Defensor, <i>Liber scintillarum</i> 12.42, p. 64.
194 Gregory the Great, <i>In evangelia homiliae</i> 2.34.6, 1249B; Defensor, <i>Liber scintillarum</i> 12.44, p. 64.
195 Isidore of Sevilla, <i>Synonyma</i> 2.26, 851B; Defensor, <i>Liber scintillarum</i> 12.46, p. 64.
196 Cf. Gregory the Great, <i>Moralia in Iob</i> 7.5.5, CCSL 143:337.
197 Iob 6:4.
198 Gregory the Great, <i>Moralia in Iob</i> 7.6.6, CCSL 143:338.
199 Cf. Peter the Chanter, <i>Verbum abbreviatum</i> 21, 75C: “Sicut enim idolatra latriam et servitutem, quae Deo debetur, exhibet idolo; ita avarus, serviens potius pecuniae quam Deo, cultum Deo debitur exhibet pecuniae et nummo” (cf. <i>textus conflatus</i> 1.15, p. 122).
simul «seruire deo et mammone», unde Augustinus. Auaritiam recte simul «seruire deo et mammone», 200 unde Augustinus.201 Auaritiam recte y dolatrie comparat apostolus, utraque enim nititur auferre deo quod suum est: hoc gloriam dei ne solus habeat, illa res dei ut solus habeat que deus omnibus fecit. Hec «radix omnium malorum»,202 ex hac pullulant usura, rapina, furta, symonia, periuria, falsa testimonia, fraudes, homicidia.203 Postremo non est aliquid uitium quod non incurrant auari uel ut non habita adquirant, uel ne habita amittant, per fas et nefas.204 «Si possunt | recte, si non quocumque modo».205

Qui enim festinat ditari non erit innocens, teste Salomone:206 «Nichil enim auaro scelestius, qui etiam animam suam uenalem habet»; quema-modum autem qui febricitat nunc calet nunc alget, sic auarus nunc calet inhiando acquirendis, nunc friget et remit acquisita retinendo et ne amittat timendo: in acquirendo, trepidat retinendo, languet in amittendo; diuitie enim labore acquiruntur, timore possidentur, dolore amittuntur, et ita undique anxietas, unde apostolus:207 «Qui uult diues fieri» etc. Est autem


202 1 Tim. 6:10; cf. Peter the Chanter, Verbum abbreviatum 20, 72C (cf. textus confatus 1.15, p. 116).
203 Cf. John Cassian, Collationes 5.16, p. 142; Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob 31.43.88, CCSL 143B:1610; Alcuin, De vitis et virtutibus 30, 634B; Burchard of Worms, Decreta 20.6, PL 140:977B; Peter the Chanter, Verbum abbreviatum 20, 72D (cf. textus confatus 1.15, p. 116); Alan of Lille, De virtutibus et de vitis 2.1, p. 72. All have different arrangements. See also above, ch. 1 and 5.
204 Cf. Peter the Chanter, Verbum abbreviatum 21, 75A (cf. textus confatus 1.15, p. 121).
205 Horace, Ep. 1.1.66, p. 253; see also John of Salisbury, Metalogicon 1.4, p. 19; Peter the Chanter, Verbum abbreviatum 21, 75A (cf. textus confatus 1.15, p. 121).
206 Eccli. 10:9–10.
207 1 Tim. 6:9: “Nam qui volunt divites fieri, incidunt in temptationem, et in laqueum diabolici, et desideria multa inutilia, et nociva, qui mergunt homines in interitum, et perditionem.”
insatiabilis hec pestis sicut scriptura testatur: in Ecclesiastico v: 208 «Auarus non implebitur pecunia et qui amat diuitias fructus non capiet ex eis»; cor enim auarius maius est toto mundo: illud enim recipit quod totus mundus capere non potest, unde omnibus mundanis impleri non potest; quanto enim plura diuitiarum ligna congeruntur in igne cupiditatis, tanto magis incenditur us ardores, unde Ysa.33:11: «Concipietis ardorem et parietis stipulam; spiritus uester tamquam ignis deuorabit uos»; quanto autem plures spine et stipule tanto maior ignis: hic ignis est quasi ignis infernalis qui non potest extingui; cor enim auarius quasi infernus et mors: numquam implebitur, unde Salomon:209 «Sanguissuge due sunt filile | que semper clamant: Affer affer», libido et cupiditas. Quid est enim auarus nisi bursa principum, cela-rium latronum, rixa parentum, sibilus omnium. Cum enim moritur, caro 30 uermibus, anima demonibus, diuitie principibus et quandoque hystrionibus relinquentur et «nimici hominis domestici eius».210 Perit enim memoria eius cum sonitu qui fit quando terra operitur corpus et ita transit infelix ab ardore auaritie | gehenne, et qui prius gelu auaritie con-stringebatur, tunc infernali glacie sine fine crucietur. De dolore igitur ruit in doleorem, de inopia in inopiam; semper enim egenus fuit in uita,quia semper auarus eget: «diuites eguerunt et esurierunt»211 nec possunt satiari,
sicut nec ydropicus.\textsuperscript{212} Gedeon contempsit eos qui flexis genibus aquam pleno ore biberunt tamquam inutilis ad pugnandum:\textsuperscript{213} tantum enim biberunt quod se sua misera ebrietate perdiderunt, unde bene figurantur per porcos, qui semper os habent in luto. Quid enim diues auarus nisi dyaboli porcus, qui nutritur ad uictimam? Abacuc\textsuperscript{26} enim dicit: «Veh illi qui congregat non sua» etc.

Avari etiam assimilatur talpe,\textsuperscript{214} que terram fodiens terra opprimit se, ceca lucem fugit, et terra efficitur avari, unde dyabolos dictum est:\textsuperscript{215} «Terram comedes omnibus diebus ute tue»: nam dyabolus tales deuorat qui terra sunt e non nisi de terra locuntur.\textsuperscript{216} Comparatur etiam avari mari, quod omnia in se flumina recipit et non redundat, et aquas reddit amaras.\textsuperscript{217} Iob\textsuperscript{31:23}: Timebam dominum tamquam fluctus eminentes super me. «Si enim ad naturam uiuas, numquam eris pauper, si ad opinionem hominum, numquam eris diues. Exiguum natura desiderat, unde: Modico

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\textsuperscript{213} Cf. Iudic. 7:5.

\textsuperscript{214} Cf. Thomas of Chobham, \textit{Summa de commendatione virtutum} 5.4, p. 224: “Tales (seil. auari) etiam talpe assimilantur, qua sicut talpa fodit terram ut se ipsam quasi sepeliat sub cumulo terre quam fodit, ita diuites se ipsos sepeliant in diuitiis suis, et diuite eorum sunt quasi sepulcra illorum in eternum.” This work cannot be considered a source for the \textit{Conflictus}; it is rather a witness of a more ancient source, which anyway remains unknown.

\textsuperscript{215} Gen. 3:14.

\textsuperscript{216} Cf. Ioh. 3:31: “Qui est de terra, de terra est et de terra loquitur.”

\textsuperscript{217} Cf. Ex. 15:22; Apoc. 8:11.
natura fouetur, opinio immensum desiderat». Angusta est porta paradysi, si uis intrare oportet te gibbum deponere; «Quid enim prodest tibi si uniuersum mundum luceris, anime tamen tue detrimentum patiaris?».

Si enim haberes sapientiam Salomonis, fortitudinem Sansonis, pulchritudinem Absalonis, longeuitatem Enoch, diuitias Cresi, potestatem Octauiani, quid prodest tibi, si tandem caro uermibus et anima demonibus foret cruciata sine fine cum diuitez epulante splendide, nec a Lazaro guttam aque ualentem impetrare. Eleganter autem comparantur luto diuitez, quia lutum fit ex terra et aqua mixta: ita diuitez orientur ex cupiditate terrenorum; ingressus in lutum facilis, egressus uero difficilis, quia lutum tenax est: similiter diuitez facile amantur et difficile ab amore eorum euellitur. Abacuc, viii: «Quomodo uinum potenter»: uinum quamdiu bibitur delectat et exhilarat potenter, sed tandem inebriat et ecclit causa ruine; ita diuitez mentem inebriant et a spirituis alienant, inaditatem delectant et sic in mortem precipitant, de quibus Iohel i° capitulo: «Expergiscimini ebrii» etc.; Iheronimus in prologo bibliothecae: «Auaro
CONFLICTUS VITIORUM ET VIRTUUM


De paupertate

In evangeliō: «Beati pauperes spiritu, quoniam ipsorum est regnum celorum». Augustinus: Omnia contempsit homo deus, ut contemnenda monstraret terrena, et omnia terrena aduersa sustinuit, ut sustinenda doceret, ut nec in illis quereretur felicitas. Si rex indueret se grossiori et uiliori panno, et aliquem militem eodem panno uestiret: probabile signum esset illum esse cariorem et familiarem regi. Sic est de paupere et de Christo: ipse enim
partitur eisdem uestibus cum Christo, scilicet paupertate; mortem Christi secuta est gloriosa resurrectio: ita tibi erit si paupertatem sustineas patiens…

<15> De castrimargia

Sequitur de castrimargia et dicitur castrimargia eo quod in castris venitrus omnia mergantur, quod uitium magis perniciosum et minus uitabile, quia sumit initium quasi ab humana necessitate, unde Gregorius: Omnes uitius suis fauent, et quo ob carnis uoluptatem faciunt ad necessitatis referunt actiones et sub infirmitatis uelamine uitium uoluptatis exercent: quando enim iocunditas uoluptatis irrepererit, gaudet infelix anima ut sub optentu salutis obumbret negotium uoluptatis. Fit autem sex modis hoc uitium testante beato Gregorio. Primo quando preuenitur hora comedendi, unde «Veh terre cuius rex puer est et principes mane comedunt»; item: «Veh qui consurgitis mane ad sectandam ebrietatem» etc., unde Petrus: «Non sunt hii ebrii cum sit hora dici tertia»: | non enim ante tertiam horam

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242 Ioh. 16:33.
243 Ps. 9:35 (iuxta Gr.).
244 Ps. 71:12.
245 Ps. 71:14 (iuxta Gr.).
248 Spurious. John Cassian, *Collationes* 5.11, p. 131 distinguishes three sorts of *gastrimargia*: “primum quod ad refectionem perurget monachum ante horam statutam ac legitimam festinare, secundum quod expiteione uentris et quarrulibet escarum uoracitate laetatur, tertium quod accuratiores ac delicatissimos desiderat cibos.”
249 Eccle. 10:16.
250 Is. 5:11.
251 Act. 2:15.
debemus manducare nisi cogente infirmitate. Secundo fit quando nimis frequenter comedest aliiquis: semel enim comedere est quasi uita angelorum; bis in die uita hominum; ter uel plures uita brutorum, «quorum deus uenter est»; \(^{252}\) «Qui seminant in carne, de carne et metent corruptionem», \(^{253}\) sicut si aliiquis seminet in luto, non potest colligere nisi uermes. Tertio modo fit quando aliiquis nimis auide sumit cibaria, sicut Esau qui pro edulio lamentu- cule uendidit primogenita, \(^{254}\) unde Augustinus; \(^{255}\) Malo comedere pisces cum Christo quam lenticulam cum Esau; non enim substantia cibi sed ausitas supendi in culpa est, unde apostolus; \(^{256}\) «Carnis curam ne feceritis in desideriis». Quarto modo quando nimis delicata uel delicata preparata sumuntur cibaria, unde Seneca: \(^{257}\) «Palatum tuum fames excitet non saporos»; diuex enim qui nimis delicata et splendide epulabatur «sepultus est in inferno»; \(^{258}\) Salomon: \(^{259}\) «Qui delicate nutrit sermon suum a pueritia in filium suum convertit»; «Qui diligit epulas in egestate erit, qui amat uinum et pinguia non dabitur». \(^{260}\) Quinto modo quando nimis sumptuosa cibaria sumuntur et emuntur, unde \(^{261}\) «Omnis labor corum in ore ipsorum»; de hiis dicit Amos: \(^{262}\) «Veh qui lasciuitis in stratis uestris und dormitis in lectis eburneis, qui coquit agnum de grege et vitulum de armento»; de hiis ait beatus Iheronimus: \(^{260}\) «Tauri paucorum iugerum pascuis aluntur, unica silua...»

\(^{252}\) Phil. 3:19.

\(^{253}\) Gal. 6:8.

\(^{254}\) Cf. Gen. 25:33.


\(^{256}\) Rom. 13:14.

\(^{257}\) In fact Martin of Braga, Formula honestae vitae 4, in Martini episcopi Bracarensis opera omnia, ed. Claude W. Barlow (New Haven, 1950), 242.

\(^{258}\) Luc. 16:22.

\(^{259}\) Prov. 29:21.

\(^{260}\) Prov. 21:17.

\(^{261}\) Eccle. 6:7.

\(^{262}\) In fact Seneca, Ep. 60.2, ed. Otto Hense (Leipzig, 1914), 193; also in Peter the Chanter, Verbem abbreviatum 135, 330C (cf. textus conflatus 2.43, p. 763, attributed to a philosophus).
pluribus elephantibus sufficit, homo uero terra pascitur et mari». Sexto modo in nimia quantitate quandoque sumuntur cibaria, siue caro siue ulia; Iheronimus de talibus dicit: «Infelices uos qui maiorem intelligitis famem habere quam uentrem»; et dominus in euangelio: «Attendite ne graeven- tur corda uestra in crapula et ebrietate»; Augustinus: «Si nature debitum immoderantia tue uoracitatis excedis et uiolentia te ingurgites, quantaslibet laudes lingua tua resonet, uita blasphemat».

Patet ergo quo modis pestis gulosotatis nos infestet, quot instrumentis Nabuzardan destruit muros Ierusalem, idest <quot modis> princeps coquorum, quoquus uermium, scilicet uenter, destruat uirtutes anime: uenter enim, cui coquorum multitudo servit, edificia uirtutum ad solum redigit. Per hoc uium Adam paradysum amisit; Esau primogenita perditid; Noe femora denudauit; Loth, quem Sodoma non uicit; majoris fratris conuiuio filios Iob Sathan obruit; Sanson Phylisteos inter epulas | prostrauit; Balthasar abutens epulis et uasis domini hanc uocem terribilem audiuit.


256 In fact Seneca, Efp. 89.22, p. 382.
265 Augustine, Enarrationes in psalmos 146.2, CCSL 40:2122.
266 Cf. 4 Reg. 25:8–10 = Ier. 52:12–14; Peter the Chanter, Verbum abbreviatum 135, 329C (cf. textus conflatus 2.43, p. 760).
267 Cf. Lotharius of Segni (Innocent III), De miseria humane conditionis 3.18, ed. Michele Maccarrone (Lugano, 1955), 53: “Nabuzardan princeps cocorum templum incendit et Ierusalem totam evertit.”
273 Cf. Iob 1:18–19; Peter the Chanter, Verbum abbreviatum 135, 332A (cf. textus conflatus 2.43, p. 768): “Gregorius: In majoris fratris conuiuio filios Job Satan obruit, non quod illi ventri vacabant, sed tamen quia inter convivia intentio mentis bona minus fervet et minus providet.”
274 Cf. Iudic. 16:25–30; Peter the Chanter, Verbum abbreviatum 135, 332A (cf. textus conflatus 2.43, p. 768).
275 Cf. Dan. 5:1–4; Peter the Chanter, Verbum abbreviatum 135, 332A (cf. textus conflatus 2.43, p. 768).
276 Cf. Dan. 5:25; Hans Walther, Initia carminum ac versuum mediæ aevi posterioris lati-
«Mane techel phares» memori si mente notares
rapta resinares et meliora dares.

50 Hoc uitio Iudith abscidit caput Holophernis post uina et epulas.277
Quid enim est gula nisi rationis sepulchrum, acerusu strectorum, origo
immunditie, mater gnausee, hostis castitatis, seminarium libidinis?278 Sicut
scriptum est,279 «Sedit populus manducare et bibere et surrexit ludere»: de
saturitae enim uenter distenditur, aculei libidinum excitantur, quia uicina
sunt uenter et inguen,280 unde Iheremia5:7: «Saturauit eos et mecati sunt et
in domibus meretricum luxuriabuntur». Peccati autem Sodomorum causa
fuit otium et habundantia panis et uini.281 Attendee miser, cuius omnis usus
uel in uentre uel sub uentre, quia non debes uiuere ut manduces, sed eon-
trario, unde dictum est:282 Non uiuamus ut comedamus, sed comedamus ut
uiuamus. Augustinus,283 «Sumenda sunt alimenta sicut medicamenta, que si
extra mensuram capiantur, non sanitas sed mors acquiritur». Non enim
curandum est ex quibus cibariis stercora concinctur,284 quia «uentres
escis et escas uentri: deus et hos et has destruet», 285 et te similiter qui

48–49 memor i... dares L: mane: numerauit; techel: appensum est in statera et in-
uentum est minus habens; phares: diuisum est regnum tuum a te etc. M 50 Hoc
immunditie M: immunditiam erugo L 52 gnausee L: nausie M 55 surrexit
L: -erunt M 54 enim L: om. M distenditur M: extenditur L 55 inguen
et M quia M: sed L 58–59 econtrario L: manducare ut uiuas M 59–60
M 62–63 uentres... destruet L: esca uentri et uenter escis: deus autem hunc et
has destruet M [cum Vulg.]
«sterilem pascis et uidue non benefacis», 286 «qui potens es ad bibendum uinum», 287 etc. Glosa super Mathem: 288 «In pugna Christi prius agitur contra gulaem ieiunando, per quam uictus est primus homo; gula libidinem infiammat, concupiscientiam carnis nutrit; hec nisi prius refrenetur frustra contra alias laboratur». In Ecclesiastic: 289 «In principio pompis arborum et oleribus herbarum uiuebant antiqui et dominus primis parentibus tunicas pelliceas fecit». Iher: 290 «Sufficiat tibi quod habes ne superflue queras quod habere non uales». Glosa super Ecclesiasticum: 291 «Vinum immoderate sumptum insanire facit et a deo disiungi»; item: 292 «<Somnus> sanitatis cum homine parco; dormiet usque mane» etc. In multis enim escis est infirmitas et auditis approxinquantibus usque ad coleram. Augustinus: 293 «Ad hoc incertum gaudent infelix anima», scilicet quod nescimus ponere metam comedendi; Augustinus: 294 Vt mortificem luxuriam mortice uentrem; Ysaias: 295 «Qui a cibis abstinent

<16> De abstinentia

Iheronimus: 286 ait: «Ieiunia moderata debent esse, ne nimis stomachum debilitent, quia modicus et temperatus cibus carni et anime est utilis»; «Pinguis uenter non cognitet sensum tenuem»; 297 «Melius est stomachum dolere quam mentem»; 298 «Tantum tibi impone ieiunium quantum ferre potes»; 299 «Nichil contra abstinentiam faciunt qui uinum non pro ebrietate sed tantum pro corporis salutem suscipiunt»; 300 Ysidorus: 301 «Quia a cibis abstinent

65 etc. L: et fortis ad miscendam ebrietatem, qui macula es in epulis tuis conuiuans sine timore, sicut dicit Iudas, apostolus; Quia uocem actoris non soluim audis set etiam incitas et preuenis M, qui reliqua usque ad finem capituli omittit 73 Somnus sanitatis scripsa cum Vulg.: sanctitatis L (om. M)

16: L

286 Iob 24:21.
287 Is. 5:22.
288 Biblia latina cum glossa 4:13b (Matt. 4:1).
289 Ibid. 2:775a (Eccli. 29:28).
290 Ibid. (Eccli. 29:30).
291 Ibid. 2:776b (Eccli. 31:22).
292 Eccli. 31:24.
293 Cf. Alan of Lille, De arte praedicatoria 4, 120A.
294 Augustine, Confessiones 10.31.44, p. 178; cf. above, n. 247.
299 Ibid. 10.21, p. 49.
300 Ibid. 10.31, p. 50, from Testimonia divinae scripturae (et patrum) test. patrum 5.34, p. 104.
301 Isidore of Sevilla, Sententiae 2.4.4.8, 652A; Defensor, Liber scintillarum 10.39, p. 50.
et praeagnt demones imitantur», quibus non est esca carnalis et nequitia spiritualis semper inest; «Ieiunia fortia et la sunt aduersus temptamenta demoniorum: cito enim per abstinentiam uincuntur. Immundi enim spiri-tus se ingerrunt magis ubi plus uiderint escam et potum»; 

«Spernitor iei-num quod in uespere repletionem ciborum reficitur»; 

«Nimia debilitas corporis etiam uires anime frangit, mentisque ingenium facit marcescere»; 

«Quicquid nimis et ultra modum est perniciosum est, studiumque suum in contrarium uertit»; 

unde Paulus ad Romanos 12:1: «Rationabile sit obsequium uestrum, ne quid nimis uel parum; 

«Sicut omnes carnales cupiditates abstinentia resecantur, ita omnes anime uirtutes edacitatis uitiou destruuntur»; 

«Basilius: Non possumus bene uigilare cum uenter dapibus fuerit honeratus»; 

«Talem te exhibe cum uolueris ieiunare ut, cum a cibis abstines, abstine linguam ab illicitis uerbis»; 

«Cesarius: Quid prodest si carnem nostram maceramus ieiuniis et uigiliamus et mentem nostram non emendemus autque interiora sunt non curemus?»; 

abstinentia corpus macerat sed cor impinguescit, carnem debilitat sed animam con-fortat: Apostolus ad Thimotheum 5:23: «Noli aquam bibere»; 

Augustinus: «Vult sibi deus prudenter serviri, ut non in nimietate abstinentie debiles sint, et post medicorum suffragia requirant»; 

Augustinus: «Non debemus ita persequi hostem—idest dyabolum—ut interficiamus ciuem—idest carmem»; 

Iher.: «Corpus et anima sunt nobis a deo depu-tata, ideo utrumque sustinendum».

M 7th

Sequitur de luxuria per quam nos efficacius tamquam per hostem familiarem impugnat inimicus, quia sicut dicit Iob 40:11 «Virtus Vehemot in lumbis eius»; «dormit enim—ut idem 40:16 testatur—in locis humidis», idest in umbilico uentris eius. luxuria sedem habet in lumbis uiorum et in umbilico mulierum. 


302 Defensor, Liber scintillarum 10.43, p. 51. 

303 Ibid. 10.46, p. 51. 

304 Ibid. 10.49, pp. 51–52. 

305 Ibid. 10.50, p. 52. 

306 Biblia latina cum glossa 4:299b (Rom. 12:1, interl. ad “rationabile”). 

307 Defensor, Liber scintillarum 10.52, p. 52. 

308 Ibid. 10.54, p. 52. 

309 Ibid. 10.57, p. 52. 

310 Ibid. 10.61, p. 53. 

311 In fact Ambrosiaster, In epistolas Pauli ad Timotheum 5:23, PL 17:480B; Peter Lombard, Collectanea, 356B (attributed to Ambrose). 

312 In fact Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermo de diversis 40.7, in Sancti Bernardi opera 6.1:241: “Discretio autem in hac districetone tenenda est, ne dum nimis flagellare cupimus, salutem perdamus et, dum hostem subigere quierimus, cive occidamus.” 

313 Not found. 

314 Cf. Boethius, Philosophiae consolatio 3.5.14, p. 45: “Quae uero pestis efficacior ad nocendum quam familiaris inimicus?”
luxuriosis, qui tamquam aqua effunduntur, unde de Ruben: \(^{315}\) «Effusus es sicut aqua» etc. | In uase enim electionis \(^{316}\) duo sunt circuli, inferior et superior, unde Ezechiel uidit hominem cinctum circa lumbos; \(^{317}\) Johannes <<<circumpectus;>> rumpitur quandoque circulus circa pectus et effluuit uas per malas cogitationes; quandoque dissoluitur circulus inferior et effunditur humor luxurie; hic est humor pessimus, cuius fetor ascendit ad deum; \(^{319}\) hec sunt ulcer a que dominus immisit Egyptis. \(^{320}\) hoc est sterquilinium de quo dicit Ioehel:\(^{17}\) «Computruerunt iumenta in stercore suo»; uere iumenta, hoc enim uitiio totus homo absorbetur a carne et efficitur | caro, unde ad comparationem aliorum peccatorum dicit apostolus: \(^{321}\) «Quodcumque peccatum fecerit homo extra corpus est; qui autem fornicatur in corpus suum peccato; absorbetur enim tota ratio et efficitur homo totus animalis amittens imaginem diuinam; sicut homo ualde leprosus amittit hominis et proicitur de ciuitatibus, ita iste leprosus proicitur a ciuitate dei et tandem tugurium eius, idest corpus in quo habitat, comburetur igne iehennali, sicut solet fieri de domibus leprosorum quando moriuntur. Isti leprosi significati sunt in lege per uiros semine fluentes qui eieebantur extra castra. \(^{322}\) Hic est ignis cuius sulphur est materia, fumus infamia, scintilla desidia, cinis immundicia. Habet autem familiarium cum iehenna similitudinem: \(^{323}\) in iehenna tria sunt, ignis, fetor et uermis; luxuria ardet per concupiscentiam, «Cuius appetitus plenus est anxietate, satietas plena penitentie»; luxurias

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\(^{315}\) Gen. 49:4: “Effusus es sicut aqua.”


\(^{317}\) Cf. Ez. 9:2 (or rather Dan. 10:5).


\(^{319}\) Cf. Is. 34:3, Ioel 2:20.

\(^{320}\) Cf. Ex. 9:9.

\(^{321}\) 1 Cor. 6: 18.

\(^{322}\) Cf. Lev. 15:1–12 (perhaps confounded with 13:46).

\(^{323}\) Cf. Adam Scotus, De tripartito tabernaculo 3.165, PL 198:770C; Alan of Lille, De arte praedicatoria 5, 122A; id., Sententiae 34, 249B.

\(^{324}\) Boethius, Philosophiae consolationis 3.7.1, p. 47.
namque futura excruciat, presens non satiat, preterita non delectat. Voluptas namque insatiabilis est, famem sui patitur, unde Osee 4:10: «Fornicati sunt et non cessauerunt». Hec est musca perdens suauitatem unguenti, que ex sterquilinio nascitur et in loco immundus pascitur et locum cui insidet infict et unguentum castitatis perdit.


Primo per morosam dilectionem, quando scilicet homo neglectit alldidere paruulos suos ad petram:331 si enim dilectionis consentiat, dummodo non

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325 1 Cor. 3:17.
327 Rom. 1:28.
328 Rom. 1:26–27.
329 Ps. 10:7 (iuxta Gr.).
330 Not found.
331 Cf. Ps. 136:9: “Beatus qui tenebit et adlidet paruulos suos ad petram.”
consentiat operi, iam peccat mortaliter; iam enim «uulpceule demoliuntur uineas».  

Secundo fit quando consentit operi nec stat per eum si haberet facultatem, unde dominus: «Qui uiderit mulierem ad concupiscendum eam» etc.; Salomon: «Ne circonspectias speciem mulieris alienam» etc.; in usu enim et tactu, in osculando et colloquendo contingit peccare mortaliter, unde Ecclesiasticus: «Ne des fornicaris animam tuam», et propter hoc choree prohibentur, unde Augustinus: Melius est in die dominica arare quam choreas ducere.

Per operationem fit quinque modis, qui sunt fornicatio, adulterium, stuprum, incestus, uitium contra naturam.

Simplex fornicatio est soluti cum soluta, quod est mortale, quia dictum est in lege: «Non fornicaberis».

Adulterium est alieni thori violatio et hoc est gravior quia fidem transgreditur adulter, inuadit ius alienum tamquam raptor, maculat sacramentum matrimonii quantum in se est: unus enim unius debet esse, sicut Christus ecclesie: et ita tria simul incurrit mortalia. Quandoque etiam per hoc frater contrahit cum sorore, quando adulter filament suum tradit illi quae putatur esse filia uii sui.

Incestus est consanguineorum uel affiniim.

Stuprum propric est uirginum.

Peccatum contra naturam est in similis sexu, uel in dissimili extra ordinatum modum uel locum, unde in Leuitico 18:22: «Non commisceberis cum masculo femineo coitu quia abhominatio et nefas et ignominia est».

Luxuriosus comparatur porco qui delectatur in luto nec sentit fetorem,
quia proprium est hominis talis putrescere nec suum nec alienum sentire pudorem. Comparatur etiam lupo qui quotcumque potest strangulat oves licet una possit sufficere: ita luxuriosus peccatum suum multiplicat cum pluribus, licet una sufficeret; deus autem animas omnium ab eo requirit. Comparatur etiam coruo qui allectus cadaueri ad archam non reditum.538 Comparatur etiam gutte:539 mala enim uxor cum stillicidio et fumo eicit hominem a domo,530 idest carnalis concupiscencia cum fumo infame et stillicidio suggestionis eicit hominem a domo sancte ecclesie; hec gutta quandoque canat lapidem, idest fortium corda emol|lit. Quis enim fortior Sansone, sapienter Salomone,241 sanctior Dauid, qui tamen hoc uitio superati sunt? Hoc uitium filium prodigum por|cos pascere fecit et coegit,532 diluuuium inundare fecit: hanc enim causam assignat Moyzes,543 quod filii dei commixti sunt filiabus hominum. Illum etiam qui uxorem duxit a cena dominica exclusit, qui nec excusauit se, cum aliis dicerent: «Habe me excusatum».544 Amon pro incestu gladium sensit Absalonis,545 Iezabel pro meretricio sensit mortis ruinam,546 senes Babylonis exarserunt in Susannam,547 Lamech hoc uitio introduxit bigamiam,548 Zambri intrans ad scortum gladio.


340 Cf. Prov. 27:15: “Tecta persstillantia in die frigoris et litigiosa mulier comparatur.”
341 See above, n. 221–222.
342 Cf. Luc. 15:5.
345 Cf. 2 Reg. 13; for this and the following example, cf. Alan of Lille, De arte praedicatoria 5, 123A.
346 Cf. 4 Reg. 9:30–37.
348 Cf. Gen. 4:19.
Phyneec amisit uitam, filii etiam Israel hoc uitio cum alienigenis mixti incurrerunt dei indignationem. Longum esset numerare quot homines hoc monstrum necauit, quot miseris lutum hoc submersit: uere lutum, quia fetet, inquinat, detinet, absorbet, unde: «Infíxus sum in limo profundi». Quodlibet autem peccatum lutum est predicta ratione; ubi autem maius lutum, ubi plures porci—ìdest demones—congregantur.

Maximum autem sterquilinium ex viièm predictis efficitur: quid enim criminalia nisi stercora? Fit autem hoc sterquilinium ex predictis stercoribus septem uolucrum, sicilicet pauonis, nicticoracis, cornicis, strutionis, monedula, uulturis et passeris.

Pauo superbiam significat, cuius hec est natura, quod gaudet quando laudatur, gloriatur ostendendo 105 diutias suas; tamen pauo quando respicit pennas suas gaudet et superbiscit, sed cum respicit pedes suas, quia turpes sunt, tunc pennas suas recolligit et desinit gloriarì; ita qui superbit si frequenter rependerit ornitum et finem suum quandocumque humiliabitur.

Nicticorax uolat de nocte | et abscondit se de die, per quod significatur inuidus, qui in aduersitate exultat aliorm quasi attollendo alas, cum diem non possit sustinere prosperitatis proximorum.

Cornix est avis litigiosa diligens rixam et ideo bene significat iram. Strutio, qui non potest attolli à terra, bene designat accidiam.

Monedula dicitur quia monetam abscondit in terra, unde significat auaritiam.

350 Cf. 1 Esd. 9–10.
351 Ps. 68:3.
353 Cf. Isidore of Sevilla, Etymologiae 12.7.20.
354 Cf. ibid. 12.7.35.
Vultur, propter oracitatem cadaveribus inhians,\textsuperscript{355} designat castrigmam.

120 Passer autem propter usum libidinis luxuriam significat.

Peccatori autem in hoc sterquilinio inulotum comminatur dominus per prophetam\textsuperscript{356} dicens «Scrutabor Ierusalem in lucernis» etc. Super illud de filio prodigo\textsuperscript{357} «Cepit egere», Glosa\textsuperscript{358} de hoc uiitio dicit: «Nil satis est prodige ululantui quia uluptas semper patitur famem su». Augustinus:\textsuperscript{359} «Ve illi qui tunc habet terminum quando et uite». Idem:\textsuperscript{360} «Nitens cutis sordidum ostendit animum et in sericis pannis libido dominatur, nec regis purpuram contemptit nec mendicantium squalorem». «Noe nudatus»,\textsuperscript{361} Glosa:\textsuperscript{362} «Nudatio femoris sequitur ebrietatem sicut satietatem libido». Item: Omnia ornamenta tabernaculi erant de bysso retorta.\textsuperscript{363} Byssus autem primo eruitur de terra, deinde marcescit, postea siccatur, deinde detunditur, tandem peruenit ad candorem: sic qui caste uult uiuere, primo oportet eum erui ab amore terreorum, deinde concupiscientiam exsiccati postea marcescere, ut non remaneat uior uoluptatis, deinde uarriis et multis tribulationibus contundi, et ita ueniet ad candorem castitatis.\textsuperscript{364}

\textsuperscript{355} Cf. ibid. 12.7.12.
\textsuperscript{356} Soph. 1:12.
\textsuperscript{357} Luc. 15:14.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{358} \textit{Biblia latina cum glossa} 4:196a (ad loc.).
\item \textsuperscript{359} In fact Defensor, \textit{Liber scintillarum} 21.16, p. 96 (attributed to Jerome); Alan of Lille, \textit{De arte praedicatoria} 5, 121C (idem).
\item \textsuperscript{360} Jerome, \textit{Ep.} 117.6, CSEL 55:429; Defensor, \textit{Liber scintillarum} 21.19, p. 97.
\item \textsuperscript{361} Gen. 19:21.
\item \textsuperscript{362} Cf. \textit{Biblia latina cum glossa} 1:41a (Gen. 9:21).
\item \textsuperscript{363} Cf. Ex. 26–28, 36, 38–39.
\item \textsuperscript{364} Cf. Stephen Langton, \textit{Summa de diversis} 36; de bonis prelatis (ed. Quinto, “The Influence,” 72): “In ueste sacerdotali erat byssus retorta, per quam continentia intelligitur: retorta, quia in corpore et mente habenda. Nota quod byssus est genus lini; linum uero in aqua mittitur ut putriat et ibi aliquantulum moratur, ut ita loquar; extrahitur et reficitur et postea multis torsionibus et laboribus dealbatur. Per linum intelligitur mortificatio carnis, que inmergitur aqua uoluptatis, scilicet concupiscientie per eprobrationem, cum scilicet illud fetet homini ex recordatione uoluptatis prerenite.”
\end{itemize}
De ira


Ira est gladius dyaboli,372 cui uix potest resisti, «quia spiritum ad irascendum facile quis poterit sustinere?»373 Hoc gladio armatus interfecit Lamech puerum suum,374 Absalon fratrem proprium, tyranni chorum martyrum,
amicus non parcit amico, uxor marito nec filius patri nec frater fratri. Cum furorem iste uenit, hinc bella, hinc homicidia, hinc iurga, sicut scriptum est:376 «Vir iracundus suscitat rixas, patiens autem mitigat suscitatas». Hinc blasphemia in deum, hinc revelatio secretorum, unde Salomon:377 «Fatuus statim indicat iram suam».

Quam execrabile sit hoc uitium ostendit dominus in euangelio378 dicens: «Qui irascitur fratri suo reus est iudicio. Qui fratri suo dixerit racha reus est concilio», idest grauius iudicio, quod fit cum deliberatio<ne>; ‘racha’ enim pertinet ad generales contumeliae: grauius enim est peccatum quando ira prorumpit in uerba. «Qui dixerit fatue—idest prorumpit ad speciales contumeliae—reus est iheehenna»;379 quasi dicat “iam iudicatus est”, unde Ecclesiastes.380 «Homo homini seruat iram, et a deo querit medelam?» Et beatus Iacobus3:5. 8–10: «Lingua est modicum membrum, set ueneno mortis plenum; in ipsa deum benedicimus, in ipsa homines maledicimus». Ira autem cum inueterata | fuerit odium dicitur,381 et tunc grauius est peccatum, unde apostolus;382 «Sol non occidat super iracundiam uestram». «Qui enim odit fratrem suum homicida est»,383 et non tantum homicida, immo imputatur ei omnia que dimiserat ei dominus usque ad ultimum quadrantem. Talis homo frustra dicit dominicam orationem, immo quando dicit384 «et dimitte nobis debita nostra» etc. contra se dicit. Prohibetur etiam offerre ad altare nisi prius reconciliatus sit fratri.385

376 Prov. 15:18.
377 Prov. 12:16.
378 Matt. 5:22.
379 Ibid.
380 In fact Eccli. 28:3.
381 Cicero, Tusculanae disputationes 4.9.21, ed. Maximilianus H. Pohlenz, M. Tulli Ciceronis scripta quae manserunt omnia, 44 (Leipzig, 1918), 371; frequently with Augustine, e.g., De sermone domini in monte 2.19.63, p. 159; Enarrationes in psalmos 54.7, CCSL 39:661.
382 Eph. 4:26.
383 1 Ioh. 3:15.
384 Matt. 6:12.
THE VIRTUES OF “RA BBI MOYES”

George R. Wilkes

In the many studies of the influence of Maimonides’ *Guide of the Perplexed* on Christian theology and biblical exegesis, ethics has received little focused attention. The present essay seeks to open up the field, first reviewing the distinctive accommodations between Greek ethics, Islamic thought and Jewish tradition advanced by Maimonides, and then re-examining the Christian reception of the *Guide* in the light of those of its ethical teachings that were adapted by influential scholastics.

Maimonides’ approach to ethics reflected a Jewish and Islamic discourse which differed substantially from the main Christian Scholastic approaches to virtue ethics. Nevertheless, “Rabbi Moyses,” as the author of the *Guide* came to be known in Scholastic circles, offered a number of strategies for relating biblical revelation, law and natural ethics which were used in a series of thirteenth- and fourteenth-century scholastic works. That a Jewish source of ethical philosophy was acknowledged even as the Inquisition was censoring and burning his books may too easily be passed over. The *Guide* was introduced amid heated scholastic debates over the extent to which ethical philosophy was a universalistic enterprise. If glowing references to Rabbi Moyses were increasingly coloured by hints at the ethical heights to which an individual might freely raise him- or herself, the pace of its adoption also reflected the swiftly developing debate over the place occupied by morality and ethics in contemporary Christian teaching about Jews and Judaism.

*Maimonides: Biographical Background*

Moshe ben Maimon (1135–1204) was the son of the chief religious judge (*dayan*) in the Jewish community in Cordoba, in Muslim Spain.\(^1\)

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\(^1\) I am grateful for generous comments from Daniel Davies, Hannah Holtschneider and Riccardo Quinto.

\(^1\) For introductory discussions of his life and work, see *A Maimonides Reader*, ed.
Like many other Jews and Muslims, his family fled soon after the Almohad invasion of 1148, Jews being forced to choose between conversion to Islam, flight or death. Moshe’s education encompassed the broad range of religious and secular subjects studied in Spanish Jewish communities at the time, and continued during difficult times while the family continued to move from country to country. They settled in the Almohad capital, Fez, around 1160. Some commentators have argued that he must have converted to Islam in order to remain there. We know, at least, that here he wrote a tract arguing that an enforced nominal conversion was not prohibited, though flight was preferable. Maimonides’ education also equipped him to engage with a range of heterodox Islamic communities, bolstered by Spanish immigrés, which thrived in Fez at the time.

After briefly moving to Acre in 1165, the family very soon left for Fatimid Egypt, settling in Fustat (Old Cairo). Here, Maimonides made his name, as a scholar and authority in matters of Jewish law, and as physician to the Vizier of Salah al-Din from 1185, after the fall of the Fatimids. The practical demands of Jewish life in the Islamic world motivated much of Maimonides’ philosophical output, largely aimed at an intellectual elite struggling to maintain their religious faith in competition with the trend towards philosophical naturalism, with the attractions of conversion to Islam, and with the ongoing struggle with the Karaite opponents of rabbinic tradition.

Ethics in the Works Written by Maimonides Prior to the Guide

The Guide of the Perplexed, written in the 1190s, was the last of a series of major works through which Maimonides reshaped Jewish philosophy, each of which discussed different dimensions of the role of ethics in Jewish faith and practice.

The conflicting teachings of the series of works written before the Guide, unavailable to most scholastics, have fed an ongoing debate over the nature of Maimonides’ approach to ethics in the Guide itself. While some scholars have suggested the differences are largely explained

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2 The Epistle on Martyrdom, also known as The Epistle on Conversion, transl. Abraham Halkin, Crisis and Leadership: The Epistles of Maimonides (Philadelphia, 1985), 15–34.
by Maimonides’ attempts to relate to distinct readerships in each of his main works, others argue that the differences are shaped more by the changing focus brought by their subjects and methodologies.\(^3\) Others still have sought additional resolution of apparent conflicts between the works by identifying either a commitment to a uniquely Jewish religious morality,\(^4\) Neoplatonic idealism\(^5\) or extreme Aristotelian naturalism.\(^6\)

The first of the works in which Maimonides touched upon the role of ethics was his *Treatise on Logic*, written in Arabic in 1158 as an introduction to Aristotelian logic.\(^7\) Here, by contrast with Maimonides’ subsequent works, ethics appear only briefly, as a sub-category of political science, a position inspired by the “Middle Platonist” political philosophy of the Muslim writer Al-Farabi (870–950).\(^8\)

On completing the *Treatise*, Maimonides worked for ten years on a *Commentary on the Mishnah*, a work in Judeo-Arabic—essentially Arabic written in Hebrew characters. The *Commentary* aimed to provide cultured Jews in Arab lands with a philosophical rationalisation of each tractate of the *Mishnah*, the early third-century text which lay at the core of the Talmud. Maimonides’ commentary on the ethical aphorisms contained in the *Mishnah* tractate *Chapters of the Fathers* (**Pirkei Avot**, now popularly known as *Ethics of the Fathers*) was accompanied by a particularly lengthy philosophical introduction, soon widely circulated in its own right as *Eight Chapters*. *Eight Chapters* attempts a careful harmonisation of the axioms for good conduct of **Pirkei Avot** with the naturalistic exposition of ethical characteristics of Aristotle, whose *Nicomachean Ethics* was readily available in Arabic

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\(^7\) *Maimonides’ Arabic Treatise on Logic*, ed. transl. Israel Efros (New York, 1938).

translation. The central Aristotelian doctrine that virtue lies at the mean between two extreme character traits underwent significant changes in order to conform to biblical and rabbinic validation of apparently extreme behaviour. Maimonides remained unconvinced that the emphasis of the Mishnaic Sages on humility conflicted with Aristotle’s scorn for excessive timidity, and harmonised the two—or recast the Aristotelian terms to fit Mishnaic precedent—by insisting that humility was the ‘mean’ halfway between arrogance and self-abasement (Eight Chapters 2, 4; see also Commentary on the Mishnah, Avot 4.2, 4.4, 5.17). In addition, he extended Aristotle’s teaching that the mean need not lie exactly halfway between two extreme character traits (Nicomachean Ethics 2.6), arguing that the wise may purge themselves of one extreme character flaw by forcing themselves to behave according to its opposite (Eight Chapters 4). This does not apply to ascetic excess, a practice Maimonides ascribes to the influence of Muslim ascetics, nor to anger, which he argued was to be completely avoided (ibid.). The latter chapters treat the limits to the naturalistic, medical approach to the “cure of the soul” presented in Chapters 1–3. Maimonides asserts the primacy (following the Neoplatonists) of metaphysical understanding over ethical judgement, which, originating in the unreliable imaginative and sensational faculties, can only apply to the regulation of political or social behaviour, or the search for “peace” (Eight Chapters 4). By a process of habitual training, a man might nevertheless avoid vices and correspondingly gain ethical “excellences.” The most grave and unnatural urges might thus be wholly purged from the mind, but Maimonides argues that the Sages—unlike the Greeks—made full allowance for the natural desire of man to enjoy lesser forbidden pleasures contravening laws for which the reasons were not clear. In his subsequent works, the wisdom of the Sages is clarified by contrast with the attempts at a Jewish philosophy of law of earlier Jewish philosophers who, following Saadia Gaon (882–942), divided the law into the “rational” and the “ceremonial,” the latter being those laws obeyed because they were ordained by God and upheld by tradition. Maimonides rejected the implication

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that some laws were not rational, castigating his predecessors as being unduly influenced by the unscientific work of the Islamic *Mutakallimun (Exponents of the Word)*. Every Divine law, for Maimonides, had a reason, and these reasons were either self-evident, were not naturally known but could be discovered by careful exegesis, or, in a very few cases, were not known at all. The “statutes” (*hukkim*) whose reasons were not self-evident were those for which the Sages had acknowledged that men were tempted by their nature. Their advice was not to avoid sinful thought but to acknowledge desire and yet refuse to succumb, in the knowledge that those laws which were only known to be “true” because they were revealed brought men closer to that metaphysical “truth” (*Eight Chapters* 7). This tie between intention and deed is affirmed throughout Maimonides’ ethical works.

A slightly more pietistic inclination colours the discussions of ethics in the work Maimonides began after finishing the *Commentary*: his comprehensive recategorisation of the laws in the *Code* (also known as the *Mishneh Torah*, or *Yad Hazakah*). Completed in 1178—and accompanied by his own enumeration of the 613 commandments said by rabbinic tradition to be contained in the Torah, known as the *Book of the Commandments*—the *Code* was further amended throughout the remainder of his life. The audacity of this task, compounded by the fact that the often daring philosophical rationales provided in the *Code* for many laws and beliefs were written in a simple Hebrew so as to be accessible to as many Jews as possible, made this work the subject of far more controversy in the Jewish world than had attended Maimonides’ previous works. Maimonides argued that the dislocation faced by Jewish communities made an easily-accessible legal compendium essential, and aspired for the study of the *Code* to replace study of the Talmudic commentaries on the Mishnah among younger or lesser scholars in the community.  

The legal obligations to develop ethical traits and fulfil ethical commandments are given most sustained attention in the section *Hilkhot De’ot (Laws of Character Traits)*, but ethics resurfaced throughout the *Code*, notably where Maimonides gave ethical reasons for commandments which might hitherto have been classed simply as “ceremonial.” The novelty in Maimonides’ application of Aristotelian

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virtues to a Jewish legal context was underscored by the very title *Hilkhot De'ot*. *De'ot* had served in *Emunot ve-de'ot*—the standard Hebrew translation of Saadia’s classic synthesis of Jewish tradition with the conservative appropriation of Neoplatonism by the mainstream *Mutakallimun*—as rationally-affirmable “convictions,” contrasting with dogmatic beliefs (*emunot*). Hebrew had no accepted term for the “character traits” of Aristotle’s system of virtues and vices, so Maimonides adopted *de’ot*, thus also dissociating himself from a use of that term which suggested that certain moral laws were rational and others not.

Chapter 1 of *Hilkhot De’ot* relates the duties attached to ethical character formation in much the same terms as the account given in the first part of *Eight Chapters*, this time without explicitly acknowledging the influence of Aristotle. The second chapter, in contrast with this ethics of the “wise,” advocates an ethics of the “pious,” inclined to the extreme, not the median: to total self-effacement, against anger even where justifiable, rejoicing in affliction, preparedness to go beyond the letter of the law. In *Hilkhot Talmud Torah* (*Laws for Learning Torah*), Maimonides again made clear the confined context in which ethical imperatives were to be viewed. The purpose of “the Law” was to develop a greater intellectual appreciation of the Divine. The ethical bases for a number of categories of laws acted in the first place to organise society so that it could facilitate this intellectual life. The link between man’s greater metaphysical purpose and lesser “goods” was not, however, simply a function of God’s Will. *Hilkhot De’ot* was placed within the section of the *Code* entitled the *Book of Knowledge* (*Sefer Ma’adda*). Following Aristotle, Maimonides associated ethical knowledge with social habit and generally-accepted opinions, but, for Maimonides, ethics lay at the centre of the attempt to grasp the Divine. The key to this link between metaphysics and ethics was the relationship of the ethical virtues to the perception and imitation of God’s ways: only through the imitation of these “ways” could a man

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12 Elsewhere in the *Code*, Maimonides also uses *middot* for “qualities of character,” a term which was preferred by the Neoplatonist kabbalists of the thirteenth century since it reflected directly the term for the divine “attributes.” Maimonides’ use of *middot* in the *Code* applied to the character of the prophets. See further discussion in Weiss, *Maimonides’ Ethics*, 89–91.
know God in this life, and only through such knowledge could man imitate God. Of the virtues, those presented as archetypes of the image of God in man were not to be pursued by the middle way. The list of qualities or perfections of this nature given in *Hilkhot De’ot* is graciousness, mercy, loving-kindness, slowness to anger, justice and righteousness, perfection, power and strength. In the *Guide*, these basic virtues are narrowed to three—loving-kindness, righteousness and judgement. Unlike Christian virtues, the core perfections did not reflect God’s essence. Unlike prior Jewish presentations of virtue ethics, Maimonides’ virtues were malleable, changing in enumeration and in definition.

*The Guide of the Perplexed*

With the *Guide of the Perplexed*, completed in the early-mid 1190s, Maimonides returned to a philosophy designed for a cultured, Arabic-speaking elite. Written in Judeo-Arabic under the title *Dalalat al-Ha’irin* (literally *Guide of the Perplexed*), the *Guide* was intended to provide armour against Muslim, Karaite and Aristotelian critiques of Biblical and rabbinic theology. The stated aim of the *Guide* is the clarification of obscure Biblical passages, notably those in Genesis and Ezekiel which could be construed as ascribing corporeality to the Divine. The exposition of these texts concentrates on the language of revelation, our knowledge of God, and the Kalam arguments for the creation (Book One); on the existence of a Creator God and his relation to the world, particularly through prophetic revelation (Book Two); and the implications of knowledge of God’s actions for an understanding of Divine Providence and the purposes of the Law (Book Three). The *Guide* does not focus systematically on the psychology of ethics or the “cure of the soul.” Maimonides nevertheless makes clear key features of his approach to ethics in all three parts of the work, making explicit and deliberate reference to a mixture of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic ideas, and concluding with a typically Neoplatonic passage (3.54) underlining the central importance of the imitation of

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15 References here follow the chapter numbering of the Arabic original *Dalalat*
God’s loving-kindness, justice and righteousness to the philosophy expounded throughout the *Guide*.

The subordination of ethical judgements to metaphysical understanding lies at the core of Maimonides’ discussion of the implications of the sin of Adam in Book One (Chapter 2). Traditional Jewish exegesis relates the temptation experienced in Genesis 3—known to Christians but not Jews as the “Fall”—to the two “inclinations” or “urges” implanted in the heart of man, the “good inclination” (*yetzer tov*) and the “evil inclination” (*yetzer ha-ra*). Maimonides later equates Satan with the *yetzer ha-ra* (3.22), but the *yetzer tov* does not explicitly feature in his ethical psychology. In the Garden of Eden, Adam and Eve were able to perceive metaphysical truths; after eating the fruit of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil, they became aware of the constraints of their corporeal form and their intellectual faculty was clouded by desire and the human passions, particularly through the faculty of sense, against which, the reader is reminded, Aristotle warned so strongly. While the previously naïve and innocent couple now had a weaker perception of “truth” and “falsehood,” they also gained the ability to comprehend what was “good” and “bad” in the physical world, which Maimonides describes as the “apparent world.” In this contingent, changeable world (Aristotle’s sub-lunar world), the main form of knowledge that could be gained directly was the ethical—“ethics” being the science of “apparent truths,” subject to social prejudice and historical change. Book One (Chapters 51–60) also establishes Maimonides’ belief that “the ways of God” in this world are all that we can know of God, since in speaking of His essence, we can only truly know what God is not. The only positive predications about God that we can make are therefore based on Divine attributes of action in this world, and these are comparable to the qualities which humans describe as positive human virtues, or “excellences” through which man may fulfil the commandment to imitate God.

In Book Two, discussion of the nature of prophecy again returns to the ethical. Maimonides’ dissection of the subject, with the help of a discourse on the prophets’ courage (2.38), announces his engage-
ment with a prophecy understood by many Arabic philosophers to be “natural,” the result of the cultivation of natural virtue. The attribution of courage to the prophet was also a standard feature of classical Islam, but Maimonides’ choice to highlight this virtue, without a substantial Jewish tradition to rely upon, entailed a selective exposition of texts from the Bible. The Guide affirms that a prophet must have the moral virtues in order to gain the intellectual virtues necessary for the perception and imitation of the ways of God. Those moral virtues encompass not only such Aristotelian virtues as courage, but also imagination and intuition. While Maimonides associated these latter virtues with the rational faculty, they were also closely related to the evaluation of sensory data and were therefore subject to the imprecision of all calculations about ethical life. Maimonides excepted the special revelation of a perfect Law to Moses from this naturally-acquirable prophetic capacity (Guide 2.33), just as Muslim scholars excepted the revelation of the Qur’an. He also noted God’s ability to withhold prophecy even after the necessary virtues had been developed by a prophet, an intervention which Maimonides compared to God’s ability to effect a miracle within the natural world (Guide 2.32).

The most sustained attention paid to ethics in the Guide follows in Book Three. Man can control his passions, the subject of Chapter 8, which explains that the Sages taught “Thoughts about sin are more dangerous than the sin itself” because the thought infected the rational faculty, and not merely the emotions. Providence is defined through the proposition that for the vast majority of people a “good” life will lead to prosperity (3.19), support for which is drawn from Al-Farabi and Plato. Those philosophers who failed to recognise this had focused on the relatively few exceptions with respect to the prosperity or adversity of the extremely good and evil (3.16); they had followed the same distorted arguments which plagued Job’s friends, and which Job himself surmounted when he jettisoned a materialist interpretation of providence (also held by Aristotle, Maimonides noted) in favour of an appreciation of the intellectual goals of man and the reality of divine providence (3.22–23).

In the next discussion in the Guide, the common perplexity surrounding divine providence was tied to the philosophers’ lack of comprehension of the inherent perfection of God’s actions (3.25), and above all of the perfection of the Law (3.26). The Law might be
divided into those commandments for which the reason was self-evident (mishpatim) and those whose reason was not self-evident (hukkim). Thanks to the “infection” introduced by the thought of the Mutakallimun, Saadiah and Jewish thinkers he had influenced wrongly believed these hukkim to be without a natural rationale, solely the subject of Divine will. Every commandment of the perfect Law reflected, according to Maimonides, God’s wisdom and will, and all therefore had a reason relating to the human condition (3.26ff.). Chief among the motives for the elaboration of the laws were the objective of separating the Israelites from the prevailing idolatry of the time (3.29) and promoting the perfection of explicitly moral (“good”) virtues, from holiness and abstemiousness to politeness, or being considerate (3.27, 33). With these overarching motives in mind, Maimonides divided the reasons for each of the 613 commandments into fourteen categories (3.35–49), the same number of books into which the Code had been divided. The third class were those clearly “moral” commandments (3.35, previously covered in Hilkhot De’ot), focusing on the morality of the individual—in distinction to the civil laws (3.42) and yet with the explicit purpose of the promotion of the welfare of society. Other commandments also taught “moral” lessons relating to the community or the nation, from those festivals which recall ethical objectives through memorialising key historical events (3.43), to “ceremonial laws” instituted to distinguish and separate the Israelites from idolatrous practices, notably the Temple sacrifices (3.44, 46), to the purity laws, which Maimonides once again related to Aristotle’s critique of physical sensuality deriving from the sense of touch (3.49).

The concluding chapters of the Guide (3.53–54) focus on man’s duty to reflect the divine qualities of loving-kindness, justice and righteousness, the imitation of “God’s ways,” and the relationship between the acquisition of external possessions (described as the lowest “perfection”), and bodily, moral and intellectual perfections. External possessions are dismissed, but the latter three perfections are placed in close relationship to each other. Thus, the attainment of moral perfection rests upon the perfection of the physical organ responsible for a given temperament, or faculty. The attainment of intellectual perfection likewise presupposes both physical capability and moral perfection, without which sense impressions would continue to cloud intellectual perception—a point of divergence from the more purely intellectualist approach of Avicenna (980–1037) but
a standard feature of Neoplatonic thought. Moreover, the equation of God’s ways with divine attributes which parallel moral values in humans underlines the intrinsic ties between moral and intellectual perfection. At the same time, Maimonides distinguishes between these perfections by once more underlining that morality, directed as it is to other people, can only be contingent upon the temporal reality of the natural world and is not truly an achievement of an individual. Intellectual perfection, by contrast, represents man’s ultimate objective, the only perfection which Maimonides gauges to be truly for oneself.

Maimonides is consistently sparing with references to his sources, and particularly in discussing the literature he has read on ethics, beyond the rabbinic legal discussions and midrashim which supplement his Biblical exegesis in the Mishnah Commentary, Code and Guide. He is certainly more explicit about his preference for Aristotle and Al-Farabi than Saadiah Gaon and Bahya ibn Paquda had been in naming their Sufi and Kalam sources in their groundbreaking expositions of a philosophic Jewish ethics in the late eleventh century. The principal tool for the scholarly excavation of Maimonides’ sources has been a letter he wrote to the translator of the Guide, Samuel Ibn Tibbon (1160–80), in reply to a request for reading material which might help in his translation work. The letter is unabashedly polemical, praising a series of philosophic “realists,” whether they inclined more to Platonic (Al-Farabi) or Aristotelian thought (Ibn-Bajja), while denigrating the idealism of earlier Neoplatonists (Isaac Israeli [c. 855–c. 955], Ibn Gabirol [c. 1021–58]) and Mutakallimun. Maimonides is lukewarm about Avicenna’s work, and praises the work of Averroes (1128–98), although the commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics appeared too late to be of use in the writing of the Guide. No mention is made of the pioneering harmonisation of Aristotelianism and Judaism, Emunah Ramah, by Abraham ibn Daud, which Maimonides seems to have used in attributing reasons for the commandments. Nor does he mention the Aristotelian ethical treatise Tahdhib al-akhlaq (The Refinement of Character) of Miskawayh (c. 932/40–1030), which Steven Harvey has shown bears close resemblance to passages in the

16 See further in Lenn E. Goodman, Jewish and Islamic Philosophy: Crosspollinations in the Classical Age (Edinburgh, 1999), 11.

Eight Chapters and Guide,\textsuperscript{18} nor the influential Neoplatonic works of Alkindi (801–873), Algazali (1058/9–1111), Bahya and Ibn Tufayl (before 1110–85). Much of Maimonides’ ethical psychology may be derived from Al-Farabi’s \textit{Fusul al-Madani}.\textsuperscript{19} In recent years, scholars have also begun to examine Maimonides’ works for traces of Ismaili and other Shi‘i works, particularly with an eye to the esoteric strategies through which the \textit{Guide} was self-consciously structured.\textsuperscript{20} A sense of the comparatively critical reading through which he absorbed elements of both Aristotelian and Neoplatonist ethics can be gauged by the absence of reference in his works to the common concept of “cardinal” virtues (justice, prudence, temperance and fortitude, or courage) deriving naturally from the different bodily tempers, organs and senses. In the \textit{Guide}, as in his previous works, Maimonides did not treat virtues as if they were fixed, and adapted his treatment of specific virtues according to the topic under discussion. The scholastic interpretation of his views was, for this reason alone, not a straightforward operation.

\textit{The Scholastic Reception of Rabbi Moyses’ Ethics}

Christian interest in the ethical consequences of the exegesis and the theological and social doctrine expounded by “Rabbi Moyses” was probably one of the least foreseen consequences of the translation of the \textit{Guide} into Latin in the early thirteenth century. Maimonides’ work was initially cited as a foil for the theological reflections of the scholastics, was used, without acknowledgement, in discussion of the purposes of the Old Law, and soon came to be used in reflections on the nature and interpretation of prophecy. Though all of these areas were tied to meta-ethical considerations, not least by Maimonides


himself, the effort to preserve a Christian framework for ethics and related natural law questions militated against direct acknowledgement of points of agreement with the Guide. The Guide did not provide the extensive commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics which scholastics found in the work of Averroes and Avicenna, and as a result references are correspondingly few. Even where Maimonides did make a distinctive point which appealed to his Christian readers, its immediate source could be hidden by reference to similar ideas from a wide range of Greek, Roman and Christian texts. Nevertheless, even the most cautious literature on the question of Maimonides’ influence recalls the breadth of the Guide’s influence, and its importance for scholastics as a model for reconciling will and reason, Bible and Aristotle.\footnote{Wolfgang Kluxen, “Maimonides und die Hochscholastik”, Philosophisches Jahrbuch 63 (1955): 151; id., “Maimonides and Latin Scholasticism”, in Maimonides and Philosophy, 224; Görge K. Hasselhoff, “Maimonides in the Latin Middle Ages: An Introductory Survey,” Jewish Studies Quarterly 9 (2002): 1.} The study of parallels between the Guide and its Christian successors below is intended to give more precise insight into the nature of scholastic receptivity to Maimonides’ approach to ethics.

Within a few decades of the translation of the Guide into Latin, texts were available at the major centres of scholastic learning, both Dominican and Franciscan. References to the Guide had entered biblical commentaries and popular works in moral education,\footnote{Beryl Smalley, The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages, 3rd ed. (Oxford, 1983), 339–40, 345–46; ead., English Friars and Antiquity in the Early Fourteenth Century (Oxford, 1960), 235–36, 363.} as well as the more narrowly philosophical treatises with which the dissemination of the first manuscripts in translation was connected. A decisive feature of the early use of the Guide by scholastics in the 1230s and 1240s was reflected by the material selected. The Liber de parabolis et mandatoris was based on extracts from the Guide 3.29–30, 32–49, presenting Maimonides’ historical explanations for the commandments. The short Book 31 could easily have been omitted on the grounds that it only linked discussions of the idolatry of biblical times with detailed reasons for the commandments, though in fact it added distinctive material which was soon taken up in scholastic texts. The Liber de uno Deo benedicto, reproducing 2.1–2, gave philosophical proofs for the existence of God.\footnote{This was speedily adopted by the Latin Averroists, whose texts rarely used the Guide’s broader exegetical or historical material. On the early history of textual
unknown, though they bear the same chapter numbering as the original Arabic Guide and its more accurate, authorised Hebrew translation by Samuel ibn Tibbon, completed at the time of Maimonides’ death in 1204. By the mid-1240s, a complete Latin translation of the Guide was available in Paris, where it was known by the literal translation Dux neutrorum, its chapter numbers following the alternative Hebrew translation which Judah al-Harizi (c. 1170–1235) had been encouraged to make in Northern Spain shortly after 1204, disposing of the Arabisms which marked the Tibbon translation and thereby rendering the text less accurate than Maimonides’ Jewish rationalist disciples were willing to accept. For this reason, the selected extracts appear more likely to have originated with the more rationalist supporters of Maimonides, from Jacob Anatoli (c. 1194–1258), a son-in-law of Ibn Tibbon at the court of Frederick II, to his son, Anatolio Anatoli, to Anatolio’s pupil, Moses ben Salomon of Salerno and Hillel ben Samuel of Verona (c. 1220–c. 1295), a Maimonidean in contact with scholastics in Bologna.

The first Latin translation of the entire Dux, by contrast, is more likely to have originated in the Provencal or French Jewish communities, though it has sometimes been credited as the work of Anatoli or other translators at the court of Frederick II in Sicily. An estimate of the timing of the translation into Latin as early as the 1220s—perhaps even before this—is advanced by some scholars, at which time it might equally have been translated in Spain by scholars associated with Frederick’s circle, or in Provence. If a later date were assigned to its translation, it might also be credited as a product of the attention of Dominican inquisitors in the 1230s, drawn to Maimonides by conflicts over his work within the Jewish community. By the time of the 1240 Paris disputation, overseen by

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William of Auvergne (d. 1249), Bishop of Paris, one of the first scholastics to integrate into his writings works from Aristotle and the Arabic Aristotelians, and drawing on the expertise of Parisian scholars with an interest in the significance of post-Biblical Judaism, it is still unclear that a full translation of the Guide was available. The texts written later in the 1240s by Albert the Great, one of these scholars, appear to have drawn on more than one of the Latin translations from the Guide. By virtue of their use by Albert and other leading teachers in Paris, the Dux and its author became known to scholastics in the main centres of learning across Western Europe.25

Maimonides’ historical rationales for the Biblical laws were taken up by a series of commentaries published in Paris in the 1230s and 1240s, probably first, though this is currently the subject of debate, by Roland of Cremona,26 and most enthusiastically by William of Auvergne.27 The commentaries concerned do not refer to Maimonides explicitly, though the original text was at least known to have been written by a non-Christian, sometimes already glossed as “Moyses.” As justification of the Old Law, the relevant chapters from the Guide were of clear use in the fight against the denial of the Old Testament “Law”—and the Church institutions which they associated with it—by the Cathars and Waldensians. The fight against such “Manichean” heresies was, thus, highlighted in the discussion of the issue in the Summa universae theologicae,28 begun by the Franciscan Alexander of Hales in the 1230s, and finished by his students after his death in

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26 Hasselhoff, Dicit Rabbi Moyses, 67ff., supports the view that Roland did not have any accurate knowledge of who the author was, nor what his arguments were, and that his reference to the enumeration of the commandments given by “rabi mose” is therefore based solely on a rumour. Roland is not generally viewed as innovative in his resort to non-Christian sources, and scholars have yet to assess whether knowledge of Maimonides’ arguments was already current in the Parisian circles surrounding William of Auxerre, whom Smalley, “William of Auvergne,” 17–22, views as typical of an older exegetical school too bound to traditional anti-Judaism to adopt Maimonides’ reasons for Old Testament law.
1245. Precedents for the justification of the Old Law on the ground that weaning the Israelites away from idolatry demanded a regulated compromise went back to the church fathers.29 However, a consequence of the renewed validation of the “Old Law” was that it was now, in some sense, also credited as “good.” Maimonides’ text offered a basis for a revaluation of the moral and ethical dimensions to the Old Law, a matter also of evident contemporary interest to Church reformers at the time. William of Auvergne, thus, adopted almost the whole of the argument laid down in the Guide, noting that the Divine Law was not only good, it was perfect, designed to keep the masses within moral bounds with a measure of severity appropriate to their meagre capacity for understanding and godliness.30 The positive moral teachings which lay behind the Law could be entrusted to the philosophical elite, a trust which did not weaken the special position of Christian grace in ethical questions since William believed the leaders of the Biblical Chosen People secretly understood the theological truth of Christianity.31 The 1240 disputation reflected William’s belief that the Talmud contained both that esoteric secret and the distorted teachings, moral and otherwise, of the “perfidious” post-Biblical Jewish leaders. Where he charged Maimonides with fabrication and distortion, it was on exactly this point,32 and not in relation to the conveyance of broader moral understanding.

The approach taken by Alexander of Hales and his collaborators reflected the less elitist, theologically more traditionalist position of many Franciscans. The rationales offered in Maimonides’ text were now placed within a systematic, Franciscan theological summa, a text used by key Dominican thinkers and teachers as well. “Rabbi Moyses” was referred to by name once in the section of the Summa dealing with the forces sustaining human life as an Aristotelian foil to the


31 De legibus 15, pp. 46–47.

32 Ibid.
view of Augustine, which is accepted without discussion. The final (fourth) volume of the Summa treats the Incarnated Word, law and its precepts, and grace and virtues. The connections between law and morality receive attention in the first sections of the part on law, focusing on the eternal law and natural law, and on the nature of habit, motive, conscience and its corollary, synderesis. These sections are far outstripped in length by a lengthy discussion of the Decalogue, construed as being central to the moral precepts of Mosaic Law, designed to instil virtue by dint of nature, discipline and grace. “Virtue,” we are reminded in the name of Aristotle, “is a habit of will,” and the moral precepts are rooted in both cognitive and affective training. And, citing the distinction which “Rabbi Moyses” draws between general precepts and ceremonial laws, the “Manicheans” are dismissed with the conclusion that the Law of Moses was given for good and is only from God. Recollecting the formulation of “the Jewish expositor of the Law” that ceremonial laws were the class of laws whose reason is not self-evident but which were instituted against idolatry—the first point being the particularly distinctive qualification in the Guide—the Summa expounds at length on the reasons behind the range of ceremonial laws treated in the Guide, underlining more than once that “all that which is contained in the laws is good” and “just.” Much of the material follows from the descriptions given by William of Auvergne, but it comes originally from the Guide, complete with such Biblical references as Deut. 4:6 (Guide 3.31), “Keep therefore and do them; for this is your wisdom and your understanding in the eyes of the nations, which shall hear all these statutes [Maimonides notes that these are the ceremonial laws], and say, Surely this great nation is a wise and understanding people.” This may be coincidence, but the inclusion of the reference to Maimonides suggests that John or other Brothers may have had recourse to texts other than the Liber de parabolis, where Chapter 31 was omitted. Since law and virtue are both subject to the action of grace, the discussion

33 Summa theologiae I.1.1.4.4.5 (162), 1:242, referring to the discussion in Dux neutrorum 1.72.
34 Ibid. IV.2.3.2.1.1.1 (276), 4.2:415.
35 Ibid. IV.2.3.2.1.1.4 arg. d (279), pp. 418–19.
36 Ibid. IV.2.3.2.1.1.2 (277), pp. 416–17.
37 Ibid. IV.2.3.1.1.5.1 with ad 3 (263), p. 377. The editors locate the source as Dux neutrorum 3.26.
of the Law of Moses is crowned with its fulfilment in Christ, after which it had “ceased” to be valid—a development which both the Jews and the Ebionite “Jewish Christians” had missed. The “moral” precepts appear in the *Summa* primarily in the “Decalogue,” and the moral dimension of the mass of “ceremonial” laws is subordinate to their main role, separating the Jewish people from idolatry and preparing the ground for the coming of Christ.

A similar demarcation persisted in the work of Albert the Great, notwithstanding Albert’s increasing attention to the relationship between natural philosophy and the Divine. Albert adopted conclusions from the *Guide* and the *Liber de uno Deo benedicto* where they could be presented as the findings of a purely natural philosophy. Hence, Albert mentioned the extreme negative theology of the *Guide* only to reject it; he accepted Maimonides’ approach to prophecy but applied it only to natural prophecy, or divination, distinguishing it from the prophecy which depends upon the grace of God;38 and he follows Maimonides’ approach to Job as a philosophical document on the nature of providence and suffering, differentiating between the arguments of the four friends in like manner.39 In *Super Ethica*, Albert—assisted by Thomas Aquinas—draws on the fullness of the Christian ethical tradition, and follows broadly the somewhat Neoplatonic approach to the identification of graces and virtues set down in the *disciplina virtutis* of Hugh of Saint Victor and later in the groundbreaking ethical treatise *Summa de bono* by Philip the Chancellor (c. 1160–1236). Albert, like Maimonides, makes ethical virtues subordinate to the intellectual virtues for which they are nevertheless preconditions, a parallel which was once taken as a sign of the absorption of Maimonidean ideas in Albert’s work40 though this is a long-standing feature of Neoplatonism. “Rabbi Moyses” is referred

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to twice by name in Super Ethica, citing his view on the relationship between the intellect, contemplation and the corporeal world;\textsuperscript{41} the editors of Super Ethica suggest that two further statements relating the baleful influence of body and external senses, attributed to unnamed philosophers, refer to passages in the Guide.\textsuperscript{42} Named or not, Maimonides consistently appears to be used as a natural philosopher, a foil for a Christian philosophical exploration of doctrines relating to the knowledge of God, and his opinions consequently appear not in connection with the virtues or happiness itself—both tied to the grace of the triune God—but rather with the natural preconditions for a good life.\textsuperscript{43}

The Guide may well have been one of the most important models for the work of Aquinas in further integrating Aristotelian, naturalistic ethics, Neoplatonic idealism and other religious teachings associated with Jewish and Christian biblical interpretation, from the doctrine of free will to justification of extreme acts of faith. We have no evidence that Aquinas read or knew of the Guide during his early studies in the southern Italy of Frederick II. On the contrary, his familiarity with Maimonides seems to have derived primarily from the use of the Guide in the classes of Albert the Great, serving Aquinas, too, as a useful philosophical adversary to discuss the nature and names of God, and of the consequences of knowledge of the Divine for understanding of the purpose of life.\textsuperscript{44} In the Summa theologiae, Aquinas engaged with Maimonides’ negative theology to an extent which had yet to be seen in scholastic material. We have seen how the Guide linked the distinction between ethical and intellectual truth

\textsuperscript{41} Albert the Great, Super Ethica commentum et questiones 7.11 and 10.11, ed. Wilhelm Kübel, Alberti opera 14.2: 566, 753.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 7.5, p. 542. The attribution is far from certain, since similar material is found in other Arabic and Greek works.

\textsuperscript{43} Where Maimonides is cited in the course of a discussion of the virtues in the work of a contemporary in Oxford, Richard Fishacre, again it is in reference to broad metaphysical issues and not to virtue itself. See Richard Fishacre, In tertium librum Sententiarum, vol. 2: Dist. 23–40 33, ed. Klaus Rodler (Munich, 2003), 120; cf. also 25, p. 48, and 31, p. 109.

to the relationship of man to God through negations bridging the absolute incomparability between the two. The use of reasoning by analogy in Aquinas’ rejection of the impossibility of perceiving and describing the essence of God was achieved through arguing that at least certain human virtues are patterned on and comparable with the attributes of God. The assertion that there were fundamental differences between the goodness of God and the goodness of man enabled him to preserve important features of Maimonides’ notion of a naturalistic ethical space distinct from the purely intellectual relationship between God and man. The *Summa theologiae* follows Maimonides’ exegesis of the sin of Adam as the point at which man lost touch with metaphysical truth and falsehood, but gained knowledge of “good” and “bad” (cf. *Guide* 1.2), which Aquinas understands in Aristotelian terms as the difference between speculative and practical intellect, or, in terms closer to those employed by Maimonides, as the difference between God’s essence and His ways.

Further consequences followed from the acceptance of Maimonides’ meta-ethics in the *Summa*. Aquinas was receptive to the argument in the *Guide* that revelation was morally necessary, a position which had already been stated by Hugh of Saint Victor, and which Maimonides had developed from Plato’s political writings, already translated into Arabic when generally believed to have been unavailable in the Christian West. The *Summa* developed the argument beyond the Victorine position, arguing that the necessity of revelation encompassed naturally-known truths. Aquinas also went further than Albert the Great: he placed prophecy within the natural realm, following the stages of prophecy described in the *Guide*, and associated the call of the prophet with courage, again following either Maimonides or other Arab and Muslim writers. Aquinas does not give references to the arguments of “Rabbi Moyses” where these are not useful for his own argument or teleological scheme, and the stages of prophecy and revelation were embedded within a clear typological scheme in which all culminated in Christ. The *Summa* accorded Moses the spe-


46 See Burrell, *Knowing the Unknowable God*, 64–65.


cial position amongst prophets which Maimonides had asserted not because of the centrality of the Mosaic Law in Christian history, but rather because of the significance of the Biblical account of his encounter with God for the subsequent revelation through Christ. 49 The Guide is important once again for the rationales given for the ceremonial laws, particularly where social laws appear useful as bases for the development of contemporary canon law. Here, too, Aquinas, following John of La Rochelle, distinguished between natural and moral law and the law as given at Sinai, appropriate for the Jews in the historical circumstances, 50 as Maimonides had noted, but an encumbrance once the moral precepts behind the natural laws were recognised. In Aquinas’ evaluation of the role of historical contingency in the development of moral standards, the distinction made in the Guide between theoretical and ethical reasoning was reaffirmed, to be developed further in the ethics of the next generation of scholastics.

The analogical basis for relating divine and human qualities also confirmed a fundamental divergence on the nature of ethics between Aquinas and Maimonides. Where Maimonides sought a vague, sophisticated or pragmatic resolution of questions about the nature of human virtue and purpose, Aquinas affected a greater degree of harmony between Aristotelian, Platonic and Pauline or Augustinian Christian notions of the identification of divine and human virtue and goodness. The “theological virtues,” faith, hope and charity, anchored in the preceding Christian debates over the hierarchy of virtues in the light of divine grace, barely relate to the repeated reference in the Guide to the prophetic virtues at the heart of the imitation of God’s action, righteousness, justice and loving-kindness. With the intervention of grace in the virtuous and good life, Aquinas, in common with most of his scholastic brethren, acknowledges no interest in the work of Maimonides. There are no references to “Rabbi Moyses” or his work in the section of the Summa (I.II) on virtue and happiness. It is difficult to attribute this with certainty to Maimonides’ Jewishness, or to the associations which led Aquinas to adopt material from the Guide with reference to Biblical exegesis and the nature of revelation—here, too, often without explicit acknowledgement. 51

50 Summa theologiae I.II.108.2 ad 3, Sancti Thomae opera 7:285.
The overturning of Albert’s treatment of “Rabbi Moyses” as natural philosopher could scarcely be more striking.

The subsequent critique of the Thomist synthesis of faith and reason may have owed little to a rediscovery of the real Maimonides, though it is clear that leading exponents of a reassertion of the role of an ethics reintegrating the will and obedience—for the Franciscans, John Duns Scotus, and for the Dominicans, Meister Eckhart, a student of Aquinas in Paris—rejected the dismissal of Maimonides’ negative theology by Aquinas.52 The fragmentation of the relationship between natural law and divine will (and with it the fragmentation of the nature of ethics) is, according to Amos Funkenstein, perceptible already in the historicising of law and morality in the work of Aquinas, a function of the acceptance of contingency as taught by Aristotle and more particularly by the Guide of the Perplexed.53 The differences between the views taken by Scotus, Eckhart and their Franciscan and Dominican associates are equally instructive. The leading Franciscan theologians of the late thirteenth century began to place moral virtues in the will, not in the emotional part of the soul.54 In spite of the relative theological conservatism of much of the Franciscan school, the Guide and the Liber de uno Deo benedicto were cited by Franciscans with an eye to an increasing range of theological and exegetical questions.55 Maimonides was no longer necessarily viewed as a rigorous Aristotelian or naturalist; indeed, his views were cited approvingly, if sparingly, for his assessment of the relationship of revelation to reason.


Few medieval writers studied the *Guide* with more appreciation than Meister Eckhart—nor acknowledged their debt with more frankness. Eckhart’s Neoplatonic use of the negative theology of the *Guide* bears comparison with the views of other Jewish mystics of his day, though it is unlikely that they were in direct contact. Eckhart appears to have realised the utility of “Rabbi Moyses” on his return from Paris to Cologne, where he began to prepare a systematic treatment of his studies thus far. As a source of allegorical exegesis, the *Guide* was a model for the harmonisation of philosophical and spiritual readings of the Bible, appearing in Eckhart’s commentaries on Genesis, Exodus, the Book of Wisdom and John, and elsewhere in his Latin writings. The encounter between Moses and God was paradigmatic of the search for the unknowable God, and Eckhart, unlike Aquinas, followed the exegesis in the *Guide* closely. Moses came as close as a human could to true metaphysical knowledge of God, but the only part of that experience which could be preserved through the Bible was the knowledge of His “ways,” an observation which Eckhart noted was in harmony with that of *auctores nostri* (notably Aquinas) on the consequences of the Fall for the limits of our knowledge. The frequent condemnations of corporeality and the sense of touch in the *Guide* were more than matched by the concern of Eckhart to overcome “creaturely existence,” and the radical distinction which he drew between God and the fragmented, “particularised” sub-lunar world was echoed in a number of points of contact with the *Guide*. In his commentary on Genesis, for instance, Eckhart repeated the assertion of “Rabbi Moyses” that God did not greet the creation of the waters with the phrase “It is good” because they were a feature of the transitory, contingent world. Eckhart taught withdrawal from the world and the unification of existence in God, and his sermons demonstrate well the relationship between his thought and the text of the *Guide*. *Von abegescheidenheit* (*On Sanctification* or *On Detachment*), for instance, elucidates a passage from Luke in language almost exactly

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56 For more detailed studies, see Liebeschütz, “Meister Eckhart,” passim, and Yossef Schwartz, “Lekha dumiya . . .”: Maister Ekhart kore be-Moreh ha-nevukhim (Tel Aviv, 2002).
57 Meister Eckhart, *Expositio libri Exodi*, in *Die lateinischen Werke* 2:224–25 (on 33:18). In spite of this careful phrasing, Eckhart’s rejection of the “analogous” attributes of Aquinas was condemned by a papal bull in 1329. See Liebeschütz, “Meister Eckhart,” esp. 77.
the same as the final teaching of the *Guide* (3.54), according to which a perfection is more complete for being performed for the self, an “inward” movement; sanctification, being the most inclined “inward” towards God, is thus the highest, or purest, virtue.\(^{58}\)

Kluxen, Hasselhoff and other recent students of the scholastic reception of the *Guide* have rightly underlined the difficulties of showing influence by simple comparison of approach. This essay has sought to show that a thematic comparison, focusing on content and the use of material, is nevertheless a fruitful and even an unavoidable basis for further research. With respect to the earliest uses of the *Guide*, the problems of assessing the evidence are compounded by the reluctance of scholastics to name Maimonides as a source, as well as their lack of information about him. By the late thirteenth century, Rabbi Moyses was a widely-accepted source of ethical and metaethical reflection, but the increasing adoption of Maimonidean positions leaves enormous room for further research. Eckhart, for instance, like Maimonides, could rank the virtues in a number of ways. Nevertheless, they were always clearly identified as traditional Christian virtues, distinguished from the comparative futility of “good works,” and there was no need to cite Rabbi Moyses as an authority on the subject. Similarly, in the commentary on Exodus, Eckhart prefers Aquinas’ tripartite schematisation of the laws to that of Maimonides, unreceptive to a religiosity based on social ethics, and alert to the teleological reading of the Old Law in the *Summa theologiae*.\(^{59}\) No narrow assessment of explicit references to Maimonides could adequately treat the contentious theological, social and political dimensions of such ethical teachings. To know when and why the *Guide* proved useful or was deliberately overlooked, a comparative approach encompassing religious and philosophical ethics must be both more careful and more deliberate than the scholarship of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries allowed, but the comparative approach is also indispensable.


\(^{59}\) Id., *Expositio libri Exodi*, in *Die lateinischen Werke* 2:190–91 (20 corroll.). Liebeschütz, “Meister Eckhart,” 81–82, has pointed out that the tripartite division of the laws by Aquinas parallels (Liebeschütz says “derives originally from”) the *Guide of the Perplexed* 3.26, 31.
DIFFUSION OF MORAL THEMES
JUSTICE AND LIBERALITY: OPPOSITION TO AVARICE IN THE TWELFTH CENTURY

Richard G. Newhauser

I. Avarice and its Opponents

In the most common analysis of avarice in the Middle Ages outside the monastic tradition, greed, understood as a conceptual field defined by the nexus of a limitless desire to possess, on the one hand, and material wealth, on the other, exhibits two major characteristics: it is, first, an acquisitive itch, the sin leading someone to desire to have more riches than (s)he already possesses, and to do so to the detriment of any other possessor of wealth; and, second, it is a retentive urge, the miser’s sinful need to amass riches that both withdraws possessions from economic circulation and withholds them to the disadvantage, in particular, of the have-nots. Alan of Lille, thus, typical of many other twelfth-century moral thinkers, defines avarice as “a disease of the soul yearning greedily to acquire or retain riches.”¹ It is an indication of the wide range of significance attributed to avarice throughout the Middle Ages that the virtues opposing this vice were disparate in number and type. In explicitly ascetic environments, for example, which often added a third characteristic to the definition of the sin, namely the inability to leave those possessions and worldly ties behind that should have been relinquished at the inception of an ascetic life, the virtue opposing avarice is a thoroughgoing poverty that I have characterized elsewhere as “possessionlessness.”² In the tradition of the Psychomachia, however, Beneficence (Operatio) battles

¹ Alan of Lille, De virtutibus et de vitiiis et de donis Spiritus Sancti 2.1, ed. Odon Lottin, Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIe siècles, 6 vols. (Louvain-Gembloux, 1942–60), 6:72: “Avaritia est animi pestis cupiditati adquirendi uel retinendi diuitiis inhians.”

against *Avaritia*, though the allegorical vice also achieves some degree of success in overwhelming humanity by disguising herself as the virtue of Thrift (*Frugi*). In this case, Beneficence takes on ascetic overtones in describing herself as the desire for only the bare necessities of life. The interconnection between monastic theology and the developing “theology of the schools” of the eleventh and twelfth centuries produced many presentations of moral entities using the symmetry of vices and virtues (or related qualities, especially the gifts of the Holy Spirit) that is so typical of the moral-theological pedagogy of this period.³ In Hugh of Saint Victor’s influential *De quinque septenis*, for example, avarice is opposed by *misericordia* (mercy), a frequent counterpart to avarice in the later Middle Ages among the lists of remedial virtues designed to counter the list of the seven capital vices.⁴

Among these opponents of avarice, justice and liberality (or largesse) were seen to respond with particular specificity to the two common poles of avaricious behavior: the desire to attain more possessions than what in the history of avarice was generally left vaguely defined as “enough” was considered an affront to justice, measured on both a mythic and, especially, a social scale; and on the other hand, appeals to the virtue of liberality were deemed efficacious above all in correcting the desire not to share with others, in particular in the form of alms, from what one already possesses. These two virtues attracted more attention in the course of the developing money economy as the inequities in the distribution of liquid wealth itself attracted more attention, and appeals to what had earlier been the gift-giving prerogatives of a landed aristocracy were also recast in ethical terms. Justice and liberality were identified in the gift-economy behavior of the aristocracy when it supported religious institutions and expended charity, and eventually this behavior became an accepted complement to commercial activity when merchants modeled their behavior on that of the aristocrats.⁵

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³ On the tension of opposites as distinctively characteristic of the twelfth century, see Constance B. Bouchard, “Every Valley Shall Be Exalted:” The Discourse of Opposites in Twelfth-Century Thought (Ithaca, 2003).


II. Definitions of Justice and Liberality (Largesse)

Justice has a dual nature that emerges from the variety of some of the most common definitions of this virtue found in texts of the High Middle Ages. It is, thus, often considered a virtue allotting to each person that which is his/hers. Among medieval authors, this definition with its Platonic-Aristotelian formula of “to each his own” (suum cuique) often looks back directly or indirectly to Cicero, and it was also widely diffused through the works of Augustine of Hippo, who quoted it frequently. Justice here is indexed to social standing in that the status of the one allotting and the status of the one to whom something is being allotted can be defined in terms of their general rank in society: one apportions to people of superior rank differently than to those of equal or inferior status. But there is also something essentialist about the definition, if we follow another of Augustine’s considerations of the virtue, for example, in that the ultimate paradigm of justly apportioning to one’s superior what belongs to him/her can be identified in serving God alone.

In the background of this duality stands Cicero’s modulation between a universalist approach and one that is determined by the contours of Roman society. At one point in De legibus, Cicero notes that justice and injustice are to be defined in terms of obedience and disobedience to a supreme law which was active “during all the ages before any written law came into existence or any city-state had been established.” Insofar as all human beings are rational, all partake

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7 Augustine, De musica 6.15.50, PL 32:1189.

8 Cicero, De legibus 1.6.19, ed. Carl F.W. Müller, M. Tulli Ciceronis scripta quae
of this law. In *De officiis*, however, his definition of justice as the highest virtue depends on Roman conceptions of law and the duties of patriotism. Here, justice is the force of social peace, though here, too (and in distinction to Stoic ideas of the lack of proprietary ownership and social inequality in the natural order), justice is in harmony with natural law, but now as the virtue which keeps people from attacking each other and regulates the system of private property in use in Rome. Justice is one thing for members of the *patria*; for those outside it, one owes only a share of what has not been defined as someone’s property. For twelfth-century authors concerned with justice, the universality of the virtue in the community of the collective Church is expressed in a number of ways. In Pope Gregory VII’s focus on the internal reform of the Church which insisted, among other matters, on the eradication of simony, justice becomes a function of a collective clerical obedience supporting the *libertas* of the Church by making it less dependent on outside money. The virtue and the independence of the Church are so closely allied that in one of his many letters exhorting the clergy to obedience to the Roman see, he brings the concepts together in one phrase as the *ecclesiastica libertas atque iustitia*. When Bernard of Clairvaux draws on this definition of justice, he tailors its universality to make the virtue part of a penitential process on a monastic model. Hence, for Bernard justice is the virtue that leads a person to give obedience and reverence to a superior, and advice and aid to someone of equal rank, so that a person might teach and strengthen those who are of equivalent status. For those of inferior rank, justice mandates vigilance and discipline, so that they do not fall into sin but can be brought to the fruits of true penance.

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In a second common meaning of *justitia* in the twelfth century, the virtue’s identification with social justice is foregrounded; it does not emerge as one among many other characteristics that pertain to thinking about what is appropriate to rank, but becomes the central feature of the virtue. This attribute becomes clear in the opening words of the section on justice in the *Moralium dogma philosophorum*: “Justice is a virtue preserving human society and the life of the community.”¹² The focus here is not on each person being granted what is his/hers, but rather, taking the unequal distribution of wealth in society as a given, on the lowest levels of society being granted a portion of the possessions of the commonality.¹³ Justice understood in this way cannot be conceived merely within legal discourse or without seeing how much it overlaps with the virtue of *misericordia* (mercy). Thus, turning to Peter Lombard, who himself was excerpting Augustine, one can note that justice can also be defined simply as giving help to the unfortunate.¹⁴ On the one hand, it is clear that Peter was not thinking as a social activist in this passage since the question underlying his discussion is whether justice and the other virtues cease to exist in the future life. On the other hand, the social applicability of the passage is apparent precisely in its differentiation from a divine community. As Peter says, “But that which justice is concerned with *now* in helping the wretched, and prudence in guarding against treachery, and fortitude in bearing troubles patiently, and temperance in controlling evil pleasures, will not exist there [i.e., in heaven], where there will be no evil at all.”¹⁵ This aspect of social justice in the definition of the virtue of *justitia* was the heritage of some patristic thinkers, such as Ambrose, in whose rewriting of Cicero

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¹³ That this portion was not yet formulated in terms of “fairness,” in the sense used by John Rawls, and the social order not that of Rawls’ “social union,” may be taken as a given. See John B. Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, rev. ed. (Cambridge MA, 1999), esp. 456–64.


¹⁵ Ibid. 3.33.1.2, p. 188: “Quod vero nunc agit justitia in subveniendo miseris, quod prudentia in praecavendis insidiis, quod fortitudo in perferendis molestiis, quod temperantia in coercendis delectionibus pravis, non erit ibi omnino, ubi nihil mali erit.”
the “commonality of property becomes a commonality of conduct for mutual care.” As Ambrose says in a critique of his times:

And indeed while we desire to increase wealth, to heap up money, to occupy the lands with our property, to manifest our riches, we have stripped bare the appearance of justice, we have lost a common beneficence. For how can someone be just who makes an effort to snatch from another what he is seeking for himself? 16

Ambrose’s focus on the involuntarily poor, however, would not become the general concern of the nexus of avarice and justice again until the growth of a money economy in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.

Liberality (or largesse) is defined by Conrad of Hirsau in his Liber de fructibus carnis et spiritus as one of the virtues listed under caritas, “through which the generous mind is not constrained by any miserliness from the munificence of those with possessions.” 17 The original hierarchic appeal of the virtue is apparent in its etymology—liberalis designating the freeborn gentleman of Cicero’s Rome, as later largesse will be an often-praised virtue in courtly environments, and particularly commended by those seeking to profit from the largitas of princes. A brief poem contained in two twelfth-century manuscripts gives a view of how the miser’s anti-largesse behavior could have been motivated by fear for his unstable social position, subject at any moment to those with greater power:

Hortor auaricie uestigia tempnere dire!
Auarus curis semper torquetur amaris:
Aut furis insidias hic timet et uigilat,
Aut in mente sua crebro suspiria uersat,
Ne persona potens quam sibi uim faciat.
Uiuens non uiuit; uiite sibi gaudia demit. 18


17 Conrad of Hirsau, Liber de fructibus 18, 1005A: “Liberalitas est per quam liber animus in largitione possessorum nulla tenacitate coarctatur.”

18 Gregorius de auaricia, MS London, British Library, Add. 11418, fol. 32v (A); Versus de auaricia, MS Cambridge, St. John’s College, B.20 (42), fol. 30v (J). The text follows A. Variants (A* = glossator to A); Hortor A7 Tortor J; tempnere A7 temnere A*; crebro A J; quam sibi A1 aliquam sibi A*, quelibet J.
I urge you to shun the tracks of cruel avarice!
A miser is forever tormented by bitter cares:
Either he fears and holds a watch for the thief’s snares,
Or he sighs frequently in mental anguish
Lest a mighty personage take any power from him.
Living, he is not alive; he deprives himself of life’s joys.

Distinctions were developed in the objects of such gift-giving, as well as—in line with the developing ethics of intentionality in the twelfth century—in the manner and intention of giving. Relying on illustrative material from the classical tradition, the *Moralium dogma philosophorum*, for example, makes seven distinctions in warning the donor of potential pitfalls in munificence. Beware, it says, 1) of being hard-hearted (*durus*) and not giving enough; 2) of delaying (*dilatio*) the act of giving; 3) lest the gift be harmful to those to whom it is given or to others by, for example, encouraging them to be ambitious; 4) lest the gift be greater than what you can afford to give; 5) of a reproach (*exprobratio*) to yourself, i.e., by having the intention to give a gift so that others will remember you gave it—this is pride; 6) lest you have a malicious and sly intent to actually withhold the gift—as an *exemplum* of this distinction, Antigonus is said to have told a Cynic who was begging for a talent that this was more than was fitting for a Cynic to beg for, but to someone begging for a penny he said that a penny was less than what was fitting for a king to give; and 7) lest someone beg from you who is ungrateful. 19

Yet, the possibilities for recasting courtly uses of liberality in ethical discourse should also be kept in mind. As Kate Brett has pointed out, exhortations to almsgiving are often elucidated by reference to the seven Corporal Works of Mercy, derived from Matthew 25:34–46. Medieval moral texts concerned with largesse and avarice tend to concentrate on the first four of these, however, namely giving those who need it food, drink, clothing, and shelter, while visiting the sick and the imprisoned or burying the dead are works of mercy that receive far less attention. Giving food, drink, shelter, and clothing are activities that also belong to the courtly ethic of hospitality, 20 so that one can comprehend appeals to liberality addressed to a courtly

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19 *Moralium dogma philosophorum*, pp. 14–16.
audience as drawing on a foundation of and supported by the expectations of hospitality in common aristocratic practice. This interpenetration of a courtly ethos and moral theology is also well represented in a text by Alan of Lille, who lists courtliness as one of the manifestations of largesse in the *De planctu Naturae*. In the description of *Largitas* in chapter 16, one finds that this virtue is wearing garments with images that “damned with the shame of anathema those who are distressed by the notorious crime of avarice. On the other hand, the sons of Largesse, bestowed with a title to wide-reaching fame, obtained the favor of a blessing.” The narrator is able to interpret who this virtue is at her appearance at this point in the poem, among other characteristics, because of the “courtliness (*ciuilitas*) of her distinctive dress.”

III. Early Medieval Backgrounds:

*Justice and Acquisitive Avarice, Largesse and Retentive Avarice*

It is clear why in the centuries before the advent of a profit economy, avarice and justice would have been seen as opponents. One of greed’s most immediate and deadliest consequences in Augustine’s thought, for example, was that it destroyed justice in human beings’ relationships with each other. As has been noted, *iustitia* allotted to each member of society (insofar as it approached a perfect social order) that which was due to each and was sufficient for each according to that person’s more or less fixed social rank, but the *avarus* sought more than that, and thus the greedy person attempted to take for himself what was justly the property of another. As Cicero had done before him, Augustine, too, drew on Roman law for an image of how society reasserted the primacy of its justice by punishing the *avarus*, but now with a far different conception of com-

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munity. The civil code had established that whoever attempted to get more from a debtor than what was really owed had to forfeit altogether the amount owed. In moral terms, Augustine noted, this meant that by wanting more than enough, the avaricious person made himself liable to lose what he possessed already.  

On the other hand, if one were writing to exhort especially a rich laity to give alms, one could emphasize the way in which avaricious miserliness is corrected by a liberality in giving. Isidore of Seville did exactly that, noting in one work that “alms overcome avarice,” a thoroughly traditional idea which he supported in yet a different treatise by describing liberalitas as the virtue which should fight against avaritia. In contexts meant more clearly for an audience of religious, as well, this Isidorean variant of the Psychomachia, which was to attain some degree of popularity in the seventh and eighth centuries, was adopted to present a pairing of liberality and greed, as its opposed combatant, in a battle between vices and virtues. A similar encounter between largitas and avaritia is presented in Adalgerus’ Admonitio ad Nonsuindam reclusam.

It is of some interest that in the centuries before the development of a profit economy, the poor, as the recipients of alms, were not considered merely the socially weak who were to be helped through alms, but were themselves, as potential desirers of wealth, also potential avari. Augustine, for example, directing his words to the indigent, noted that the apostles:

24 See Augustine, Enarratio in Psalmos 118.11.6, ed. Eligius Dekkers and Johannes Fraipont, CCSL 40:1699; Confessiones 3.8.16, ed. Lucas Verheijen, CCSL 27:36. Augustine is referring to the principle of Roman civil law known as pluris petitio.
26 It is used by Taio, Sententiae 4.25, PL 80:941–42 (ca. 650), which otherwise repeats Gregory the Great on matters concerning morality; Pseudo-Isidore of Sevilla, Commonitancula 12, ed. August E. Anspach (Escorial, 1935), 79–80 (seventh century), formerly attributed to Jerome, Augustine, or Adalgerus (Anspach accepted the work as part of the Isidorean canon, but most other scholars have not followed him in this); Liber de numeris 7.5, see Robert E. McNally, “Der irische Liber de numeris: Eine Quellenanalyse des pseudo-isidorischen Liber de numeris” (diss. University of Munich, 1957), 112 (composed in the vicinity of Salzburg in the latter part of the eighth century). Cf. Rainer Jehl, “Die Geschichte des Lasterschemas und seiner Funktion: Von der Väterzeit bis zur karolingischen Erneuerung,” Franziskanische Studien 64 (1982): 322–23.
27 Adalgerus, Admonitio ad Nonsuindam reclusam (Liber de studio virtutum), PL 134:934A.
recognized that even poor men, though they had no money, were avaricious nonetheless. And so that you will know it is not money which is condemned in the rich, but avarice, listen to what I say: you see the rich person standing next to you; perhaps he has money with him and no avarice, while you have no money and yet avarice... [Lazarus] was taken by angels to the bosom of Abraham... Read the Scriptures and you will find that Abraham was rich. So that you will know that riches are not faulted, Abraham had a great deal of gold, silver, animals, servants; he was rich, and the poor person, Lazarus, was taken up in his bosom... Is it not better for both to be rich for God and poor in greed? 28

This spiritualization of avarice and poverty works by focusing on the inner life as the site of moral struggle, but at the same time it also de-emphasizes the material reality of wealth and indigence. Material concerns, however, are foregrounded in the High Middle Ages in the course of the development of a commercial (or profit) economy.

IV. Changes in the Commercial Revolution: Poverty and a Second Rise of Avarice

Social changes in connection with the spread of the profit economy in the eleventh century made it even more likely that moralists could use the corrosive sin of avarice as a model to explain the evils of the times. As Lester Little and Alexander Murray have argued, because the use of cash as an agent of exchange allowed more people to manifest the signs of wealth, and to desire to be wealthy altogether, than the limited number of the aristocracy which had had access to the immovable wealth in land in the Early Middle Ages, the complaints of moralists from the late tenth century onwards contain descriptions which once again emphasized the trope of the entire

28 Enarrationes in Psalmos 51.14, CCSL 39:634: “Viderunt etiam ipsos pauperes, etsi non habentes pecuniam, tamen habere avaritiam. Et ut noueritis non pecuniam in diuite, sed avaritiam condemnari, aduerite quod dico: respicis illum diuitem stantem iuxta te; et forte in illo est pecunia et non est avaritia, in te non est pecunia et est avaritia... ablatus est ab angelis in sinum Abraham... Lege scripturas, et inuenies diuitem Abraham. Vi noueris, quia non diuitiae culpantur, habebat Abraham multum auri, argenti, pecorum, familiae; diues erat, et in eius sinum Lazarus pauper sublatus est... an potius ambo Deo diuites, ambo a cupiditate pauperes?” Cf. Frederik van der Meer, Augustine the Bishop: The Life and Work of a Father of the Church, transl. Brian Battershaw and G.R. Lamb (London, 1961), 159.
world falling prey to greed.\textsuperscript{29} As I have attempted to demonstrate in a monograph on the early history of avarice, the focus on greed as the chief factor of immorality in the High Middle Ages was not the first time moralists had viewed this vice as the catalyst of all that was wrong with human society; in other words, among all the other renaissances that scholarship has identified as having occurred in the twelfth century, one should surely count this period as a renaissance of greed, as well. The striking example of Gerhoh of Reichersberg’s (1093–1169) \textit{De quarta vigilia noctis} may be used to illustrate the results of changes brought about by a profit economy and the way in which they were altering an older social order based on bonds of personal loyalty. In these reflections on the history of the Church and the stage of its turmoil in the twelfth century which he composed in 1167, Gerhoh drew on the language of the apocalypse to describe the conflict between imperial rule and the power of the \textit{ecclesia}, characterizing the final, apocalyptic stage of Church history, in which he himself lived, as one dominated by greedy behavior. The previous watch had been presided over by the popes, from Gregory the Great to Gregory VII, but after that:

more dangerous times began, it seems, because from that point on a new avarice arose in the city of Rome. For previously, the Roman people had the habit of voluntarily pledging loyalty to their pastor with due obedience, but after the contention arose between the priesthood and the kingdom, the citizens of Rome who were followers of the Pope did not want to struggle in such a war for nothing, but demanded a great deal of money as if it were a kind of salary owed for their military service... Thus, in this fourth watch an avarice enlarged with the greediness for gain rules the whole body of the Church from head to foot... Now, however, you would be pouring out a sermon [against this sin] in vain where there is no hearing, in the sight of men who think that gain is a form of piety...

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{30} Gerhoh of Reichersberg, \textit{De quarta vigilia noctis} 11, ed. Ernst Sackur, in \textit{Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Libelli de lite imperatorum et pontificum saeculis XI et XII conscripti}, vol. 3 (Hanover, 1897), 509–10: “... ut apparet magis periculosus tempora ceperunt, quia ex tunc cepit avaritia nova in urbe Roma. Nam antehac Romanus populus pastori suo fidelitatem gratuuitam solitus fuit servare cum debita obedientia, sed tunc oborta contentione inter sacerdotium et regnum Romani cives adherentes pontifici
\end{itemize}
As John A. Yunck demonstrated in his study of venality satire, a good deal of the kind of criticism of an unbridled desire for coin seen in Gerhoh’s work was an internal clerical discourse, leveled at the Church from within its own ranks in money satires and moral-satirical poetry, and aimed at everyone from the lowest clerics to the bishops and the pope. The number of corrupt practices that were skewered by these complaints of ecclesiastical avarice, injustice, and illiberality is very large, including simony, the charging of services and visitation taxes, gratuities for papal appointments, and other various and widespread forms of venality. The clash between the perception of a venal ecclesiastical structure and the needs of an institution to manipulate the working capital required to pay its bills led to ambiguities seen in particularly sharp relief in the political observations of John of Salisbury’s *Policraticus*. In Book Six, John recounts a conversation he had with his friend and compatriot, Pope Hadrian IV. When he is asked for his opinion of the Church’s behavior, John wonders aloud why payment for services is to be expected from an apostolic institution:

> All applaud you, you are called father and lord of everyone, and upon your head is poured all the oil of the sinner. If you are father, therefore, why do you accept presents and payments from your children? If you are lord, why do you not arouse fear in your Romans and why do you not recall them to the faith, suppressing their recklessness? Yet perhaps you wish to maintain the city for the Church by means of your presents. Did Pope Sylvester acquire it by means of such presents? You are off the path, father, and not on the path. The city is to be maintained out of the same presents by which it was acquired. What is freely given is freely accepted. Justice is the queen of the virtues and is embarrassed to be exchanged for any amount of price. If justice is to be gracious, she is to be free from charge.

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The pope can only laugh at this and thanks John for his comments, but he reminds him of the popular fable of the stomach and the disloyal members of the body. After several days of their uprising against the necessity of feeding the stomach, the bodily members had to admit that their growing infirmity was a result of their refusal to provide food for an organ which they had felt was simply lazy and gluttonous:

For the tribute to it was withdrawn by them and like a public provisioner it halted nourishment to everyone. And because no one can fight without a salary, the soldiers were disabled and weakened when they did not receive a salary. But the fault cannot be traced back to the provisioner, who could hardly disburse to others what he did not receive himself. And it would be far more advisable that he should be furnished with goods for his distribution than that all the members should go hungry while getting rid of him . . . “Such is the case, brother,” [the pope] said, “if you study the matter properly in the republic where, although the magistrates seek after a great deal, they do not accumulate for themselves but for others. For if they are dissipated, there is nothing that they are able to bestow upon the members . . . Measure neither our harshness nor that of secular princes, but attend to the utility of all.”

The contrast between principles inherent in an older system and the economic pressures that were changing it stands out as clearly here as it did in the work of Gerhoh. At the same time, the differences

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in the standards of defining justice, either in essentialist terms or indexed to notions of social justice, emerge unmistakably here, as well.

In the history of avarice, the reactions to the contrast between feudal principles and contemporary fiscal needs were twofold, and both testify to the inescapable influence of mercantile behavior on moral perceptions. It is well known, first of all, that the poverty movements of the eleventh to thirteenth centuries developed partially as a reaction to the perception of corruptibility in society and the Church. In doing so, these movements also coined for themselves and profited from what can be termed, following Pierre Bourdieu’s analysis, “symbolic capital,” since they are characterized precisely by their abstention from mercantile activities. In the midst of an economy in which value was first coming to be measured solely by financial profit, these groups engaged exclusively in the holiest of activities, which in this way were constituted as having a negating power, i.e., their power was purely symbolic.33 According to Karl Bosl, the upper echelons of society were able to participate in this power since, as he has written, the poverty movements were also at times “supported by the powerful and rich upper classes who, because the almost magical, indeed religious, effect of their power and rule had faded in the process of Christianization, felt compelled to represent themselves now to the lower classes as religious and ethical examples and models . . .”34 Thus, part of the power of the poverty movements can still be attributed to their liberating effect from the danger of wealth that is a component of Christianity’s wholly unconscious assumptions about riches. Nothing, however, was supposed to be allowed to tip the balance between the spiritual claims of the upper class, on the one hand, which attempted to buy its way into asceticism by offering material support for ascetics, and the reality of actual differences in wealth, on the other hand, which enabled one individual to flaunt the good that he could do in full view of his neighbors by his charitable giving. What made the *pauperes Christi* and pseudo-apostles into heretics was precisely the fact that, to quote

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Karl Bosl again, they “regarded poverty no longer as the virtue of living in accordance with the advice of the Gospel, but rather as the real, indispensable duty of the spiritual Church.” The demands for equality by the pseudo-monk Henricus in Le Mans in 1116 are to be interpreted in a similar manner. Calls for social justice, of course, had long been part of the moral discourse that surfaced in the critique of the avarice of the rich, and they remained a standard ingredient of orthodox complaints against the times well into the early modern period, while they also shied away from the revolutionary insistence on a leveling of all classes in society such as one finds articulated by some of the heretical poverty movements of the High Middle Ages. Orthodox critiques of the rich may frequently sound like incitement against the upper classes, but unlike heretical calls to upheaval, their often eschatological perspective urges a refraining from direct action by human beings now in favor of divine judgment of the excesses of the rich at the end of time.

It has been argued recently that voluntary poverty may be understood as a type of social compensation, that is to say, that the renunciation of prosperity is something of an act of solidarity with the involuntarily poor with the purpose of alleviating their poverty, or even more, improving their economic condition. Certainly, the orthodox poverty movements of the High Middle Ages enhanced the value of the appearance of the poor properly so-called, as Michel Mollat has named them. However, it seems clear that calls for holy poverty were predicated on a stable class system in which the relationship between the rich, as donors of alms, and the poor, as recipients, remained fixed, but even beyond that the orthodox movements

35 Id., Das Problem der Armut in der hochmittelalterlichen Gesellschaft (Vienna, 1974), 16.
of voluntary poverty did little to alleviate the economic distress of those born to indigence. By accepting donations from the rich, those who chose poverty actually wound up competing for alms with the involuntarily poor. In any case, the new money economy not only made it possible for many more people to desire to manifest the signs of wealth than had been the case before, but it also made it just as possible for a number of people to join the ranks of the actual poor by succumbing to the social turmoil and displacement set in motion by the very factors that had initiated the money economy. The rise of movements of religious poverty combined with these new urban poor to draw particular attention to the question of poverty and how to treat it.

Canonists were clear, first of all, about distinguishing between the two types of poverty. Brian Tierney cites Huguccio’s threefold division of the types of the poor in his influential commentary on the Decretum: the first category comprises those who were born poor and endure their poverty for the love of God; the second contains those who join themselves to the poor by giving up their possessions to follow Jesus. Both of these groups are designated as voluntary forms of poverty. The third kind of the poor is called necessary and involuntary, but Huguccio also characterizes its members as “voracious only with the cupiditas to possess.” Legally, then, poverty’s value remained what it had been in earlier moral thought: neither a vice nor a virtue, but a condition whose praise or blame is to be measured on how it is used within the contours of a stable class system. In the Decretum itself, Gratian considered the question of whether alms should be given to any poor person who asked for it. On the one hand, Chrysostom is quoted as counseling charity for everyone, while on the other hand Ambrose and Augustine are cited arguing for the position that a prudent liberality should guide the distribution of alms. Gratian and later canonists developed a number of principles to overcome these discrepancies, considering alms, for example, to come from a superfluity of possessions; or as something

41 See the very interesting analysis of the ironies in Franciscan poverty, in particular, in Kenneth B. Wolf, The Poverty of Riches: St. Francis of Assisi Reconsidered (Oxford, 2003), 7–36.
42 Cited in Guido de Baysio, Rosarium seu in Decretorum volumen commentaria ad 1.2.9; see Brian Tierney, Medieval Poor Law: A Sketch of Canonical Theory and Its Application in England (Berkeley, 1959), 11.
it was possible to manifest in other than a monetary form, including fraternal correction; or reasoning that even if no one is to be excluded from alms, a distinction could be made in the worthiness of the potential recipients between those who worked and those who played dice all day, or engaged in similar conduct.43

If justice demanded that the poor be supported by charity, and liberality that alms be given freely, there were still difficulties to be settled in what funds could be used for this project. Theologians and canonists who addressed the question of usury had to deal with complicated cases in which clergymen might receive donations from wealthy usurers. Usury had long been considered theft in the moral tradition and in canon law, and Huguccio explained that since the usurer did not legally possess the profits of usury, it was impossible to make a donation of these possessions as alms, and so they reverted to the victims of the usury. This principle was accepted in Paris. What, however, was to be done if the victims of usury could not be found? In his explanation of the principle by which vicarious restitution for usury might be made through the agency of the Church allocating the proceeds as alms, Robert of Courçon dealt with this question by noting that wealth received from usurers whose victims were dead and without heirs could be distributed to the poor, who would pray, not for the usurer, but for the souls of the usurer’s victims, who were the real donors of the alms.44

The second response to mercantile activity in the history of avarice in the High Middle Ages began a process by which the merchant himself was freed finally from the opprobrium of the sin of greed simply because of his profit-seeking, and commercial activity was analyzed morally as a necessary component of the welfare of the community. Among the lay groups which showed the practical consequences of avarice most clearly in late antiquity and the Early Middle Ages, merchants had been singled out with particular frequency; even


bankers were exempt from such stern reproach. This negative view of commerce admitted many nuances, as one can see in the Carolingian period in Alcuin’s defense of merchants and commercial activity, but the first step towards a full theological justification of mercantile activity can be found among the masters of the school of Laon. Though Anselm of Laon had pilloried merchants for their deceit of their customers, later masters in this school emphatically praised merchants for the benefits they provided to society, which included, in particular, their ability to provide poor relief. In the developing ethics of intentionality in the twelfth century, merchants could be seen as praiseworthy precisely because they could carry on commerce with the intent of helping the poor.

V. Justice and Liberality: From the Golden Age to an Age of Law

The consideration of justice and liberality as opponents to avarice in the literature of twelfth-century moral commentary placed these virtues in mythic and legal contexts. Reflections on a former “utopian” state of humanity and the process of its degeneration had, of course, been common in antiquity. Avarice had frequently served in such considerations as an indicator of the progress of this deterioration, though it was first in Lactantius’ thought, in particular his reception of Seneca, that the vice played a much more active role in bringing the *aurea tempora* to an end. Historically prior to the Greco-Roman pantheon was an idyllic era characterized by the worship of the one, true God. In this age, Lactantius noted, the just gave of their reserves

generously. No *avaritia* took for itself goods which had been bestowed on all by the divinity. Monotheism made largesse and, above all, justice possible among human beings. With the transition to polytheism this situation changed radically, for social relations came gradually under the influence of avarice as humanity gave no more thought to God. Those who possessed something in surfeit not only kept it for themselves, but also seized things from others for their own treasure. This select group claimed the gifts of heaven for themselves, not out of philanthropy, but in order to collect all the instruments of greed and avarice so they could enslave the rest of humanity. For this purpose they also created unjust laws in the name of a perverted justice. The moral-satiric literature of the High Middle Ages aimed at the avarice of the Church, in particular, often assumes, on the basis of classical and earlier patristic antecedents, a distinction between a Golden Age of humankind (and of the Church itself and its apostles) and the present state of corruption in the world. Peter Damian, for example, writing to Pope Gregory VI on the matter of widespread simony, exhorted him to turn his back on those selling bishoprics like money traders: “Let the golden age of the apostles be restored . . . let the guidance of the Church flower again. Let the avarice of those with an ardent desire for the symbols of episcopal dignity be suppressed.”

And elsewhere he again referred to the Church’s original era as a Golden Age in distinction to the period of monasticism of his own day in which monks retained money.

The language used by Bernard, a Cluniac monk during the abbacy of Peter the Venerable, when he reviewed the gulf between his own day and an imagined golden past evinces a near paralysis in his attempt to name all of the factors involved in this degeneration, though money heads the list:

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50 Peter Damian, *Ep.* 165 (*Apologeticum de contemptu saeculi*; dated August 1069), 4:175.
The lost ages striving after good morals were superior, but now those who seek to live without sin are without a name. The Golden Age and kisses of peace have perished... Now there remain abiding riches, pride, peace without peace, deceit, Venus, idleness and thefts which know the dark night, schisms, battles, violence, murders, surrenders, wrath, wantonness, envy, laziness, dissensions.\(^{51}\)

In the cosmological allegories of the school of Chartres, the Golden Age had a place, as well. In these texts, too, though now on a scale that measures the symmetry of human life with all physical elements in the universe, the Golden Age is used in a critique of the times. Thus, at the point in Bernard Silvestris’ *Cosmographia* at which Noys describes to Urania, Physis, and Nature what each one’s task is in the creation of humanity, this important figure in Bernard’s allegory notes that they can also foresee the development of the human species in the Table of Destiny:

Now were shown the ways of fortune... Now poverty begot misery, or overabundance led to dissipation... The sequence of the ages, introduced by the pure primal state of the Golden Age, could be seen degenerating little by little, to end at last in an age of iron.\(^{52}\)

Alan of Lille returns to Stoic ideas of a community of property during the Golden Age in the words of Nature to Largitas in the *De planctu Naturae*. When the virtue shows sadness at the wastefulness of Prodigality, her debased offspring, Nature notes that her reaction shows the way to bring the long-dead days of the Golden Age back to life because in giving generously to each other “people bind themselves together by the ties of deeply felt friendship.”\(^{53}\)

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\(^{53}\) Alan of Lille, *De planctu Naturae* 18, p. 874: “homines sese glutino amicicie precordialis astringunt.”
Avarice was not only a catalyst in the development of laws in the
corruption of a far distant Golden Age, but it was also one of the
major factors that was seen, in the revival of the study of law in
the twelfth century, as destroying the apparatus of justice in contem-
porary society. Indeed, even among canonists and civil lawyers the
definition of iustitia was noted to transcend the merely legal, to impli-
cate, in fact, God, self, and one’s neighbor. Satirists attacked lawyers
for their venality as soon as they became an important element in
twelfth-century life. In accordance with antecedents in Jewish Scripture,
attacks on the avaricious corruption of justice focused on the venal-
ity of judges who perverted their judgment for bribes. As Yunck has
noted, John of Salisbury’s invectives against the venality of judges
parallel earlier arguments against simony found in Cardinal Humbert’s
Adversus simoniaicos, namely that a judge of this kind sells what is not
his to dispose of: “One can see that [this kind of judge] is more evil
who markets his duty to his king and queen, to whom he owes
fealty, like merchandise in a doorway, and thus unfaithfully sells his
lord into slavery. For indeed every magistrate is the servant of jus-
tice.” Walter Map († 1208/10), who frequently functioned as a
king’s justice under Henry II of England, demonstrates how avarice
in a legal setting could lead not only to the perversion of justice,
but to the distortion of liberality, as well. In his discussion of judges
in England, he notes that if a guilty man “considers” (respicere) a
judge, some judges will find him innocent, and they will find an
innocent man guilty if he does not “consider” them. Drawing on
the common criticism of the papacy as avaricious, Map goes on to
observe that “to consider” in this case should be understood in its

54 See Stephan Kuttner, “The Revival of Jurisprudence,” in Renaissance and Renewal
in the Twelfth Century, ed. Robert L. Benson, Giles Constable and Carol D. Lanham
(Cambridge MA, 1982), 299–323.
55 Id., “A Forgotten De

56 John of Salisbury, Policraticus 5.11, 1:332–33: “Potest tamen uideri nequior qui
officii sui principem et reginam, cui fides famulatur, quasi mercem in foro distrahit
ac si seruus infidelis dominum uendat. Omnis etenim magistratus iustitiae famulus
est;” transl. Nederman, p. 94.
papal interpretation, namely as “to give.” By opening their purses freely, which is the imagery Map uses to describe the bribers of justice, they mimic the largesse of donors. By inversion, in other words, Map brings us back to the point at which we began this study, for here the sin of avarice attacks both justice and largesse, in much the same way that both virtues oppose the sin.

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ROYAL JUSTICE AND ROYAL VIRTUE IN WILLIAM
OF MALMESBURY’S HISTORIA NOVELLA AND
WALTER MAP’S DE NUGIS CURIALIUM

Björn Weiler

This essay uses two texts from twelfth-century England—William of Malmesbury’s Historia novella (c. 1138/43) and Walter Map’s De nugis curialium (c. 1183/91)—to explore the ethical norms by which their authors sought to define the virtuous exercise of political (predominantly royal) power. Particular emphasis will be given to the relationship between the outward action and the inner disposition (the character, personality, and intentions) of rulers.

The Historia novella has frequently been read from a perspective which judges medieval chroniclers by their historical accuracy. Malmesbury has either been praised for his supposed reliability as a reporter or condemned for his interest in the marvellous, the scurrilous and the historically irrelevant. As for De nugis, historians have largely ignored it due to its recognition as a foremost exponent of medieval Latin satire or Hofkritik. Little work has been done on Map’s view of the past or his rendering of contemporary affairs, perhaps partly because he mixed up events, invented them or simply got them wrong, having thus little to offer to scholars concerned with reliably reconstructing past events. In this essay, however, we will use De nugis and the Historia as sources for the Ideengeschichte of

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twelfth-century English kingship. More specifically, we will explore what these texts tell us about expectations of the virtuous exercise of royal lordship in general and of justice in particular.

Although Malmesbury and Map shared common principles as to what virtue and justice basically meant (or were supposed to mean), their moral views were determined by their social and intellectual milieu, which greatly differed for both men. William, librarian of the Benedictine abbey of Malmesbury, was one of the most prolific writers of the twelfth century. He composed works of exegesis as well as collections of Marian miracles, canon law, and classical and patristic texts. His works of history include a series of saints’ lives, the *Gesta regum* (the history of the kings of England from the Saxon invasions to the reign of Henry I), the *Gesta pontificum* (the deeds of the English prelates during the same period) and the *Historia novella*. His intellectual and scholarly outlook was deeply rooted in the traditions of eleventh-century monasticism, a pride in his abbey’s Anglo-Saxon heritage and an awareness of Malmesbury’s prestige, wealth and traditions. The *Historia* belongs to a classic type of medieval historical writing, a contemporary history which sought to justify a specific cause, claim or political action. Walter Map, by contrast, was a secular clerk who spent several years in the entourage of King Henry II (1154–89). Of his literary output we know very little, and even

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De nugis survives only in one fourteenth-century manuscript. His outlook was conditioned by his courtly environment and by a deeply felt hostility towards most monastic orders. De nugis is a sprawling (but by no means unstructured) collection of invective, marvel, anecdote, fiction and historical commentary, a moralising treatise in the guise of a satirical miscellany.

As Malmesbury explained in the prologue to the Historia, he wrote his work with a clear didactic purpose in mind:

For what is more to the advantage of virtue (honestatis commodum) or more conducive to justice (conducit aequitati) than recognizing the divine pleasure in the good and punishment of those who have gone astray? Further, what is more pleasant than consigning to historical record the deeds of brave men, so that following their example the others might cast off cowardice and arm themselves to defend their country?

Map made a similar point in the prologue to the fifth distichon (or book) of De nugis:

... here you will find portrayed honour in modern men with its comeliness (honestatem favoris), and baseness with its hateful crimes. This we hold up to you to be shunned for its banes (beneficis), the other to be chosen for its boons (beneficis): withdraw not your eye from either unless you have thoroughly viewed it and taken it in; for you should read and scrutinize every page you see, and not one should be disused without being perused (neclecta nisi perlecta).

Both texts were, thus, written with the intention of guiding their readers towards a virtuous life. They called upon their audience to follow the examples of brave men, emulate their honourable deeds and abandon the shameful ways of evil men, while taking delight in the punishment of the wicked. We may not be able to ascertain how successful the authors were in achieving this aim, but we can explore the moral ideas and values they sought to propagate. This will throw light not only on the historiographical tradition of twelfth-century England, but also on the engagement of authors outside the schools with questions about the nature and application of virtue.

9 Gransden, Historical Writing, 242–44.
William of Malmesbury’s *Historia novella* covers events between 1125 and 1142, but concentrates on the period from 1135, when the death of King Henry I resulted in a war of succession between his nephew, Count Stephen of Blois, and Henry’s daughter Matilda, the widow of Emperor Henry V, and hence also called the Empress.\(^{13}\) The work was commissioned by Earl Robert of Gloucester, King Henry I’s illegitimate son, and one of the stalwarts of Matilda’s cause in England. It formed part of a corpus of texts, produced by both sides in the conflict, aiming to legitimise either the kingship of Stephen, or resistance towards it.\(^{14}\) The *Historia* was, however, no straightforward piece of propaganda. In fact, neither Matilda nor her partisans receive unqualified praise, and despite the criticism made of King Stephen, Malmesbury’s condemnation was far from outright.\(^{15}\) Rather, the true heroes of the *Historia* were King Henry I (1100–1135), who had been a paragon of virtuous rule, and Earl Robert, who proved himself to be his father’s only true heir.

Because of its contemporary concerns, the *Historia* is very different from the *Gesta pontificum* and the *Gesta regum*. In accordance with his intention “to unravel the trackless maze of events and occurrences that befell England,”\(^{16}\) Malmesbury recorded history as and when it happened, and there was—perhaps even to his own surprise—no logical conclusion to his narrative.\(^{17}\) The *Historia* was above all an exercise in the practical application of abstract moral values to contemporary events. Consequently, the narrative structure of the text is less coherent than that of *De nugis*, and the moral message it sought


\(^{16}\) *HN* 3 Prol., p. 80.

\(^{17}\) It seems that the *Historia Novella* was initially to end with the vindication of Matilda’s claim to the throne in 1140/41, but that subsequent events forced William to restructure his narrative. Cf. *HN* Praef. and 3 Prol., pp. 2, 80.
to convey was presented in a more implicit and suggestive manner.

Virtue, in William’s eyes, was defined both as a set of abstract principles political actors had to abide by, and an individual’s character and disposition. The former are perhaps best illustrated by William’s version of the eulogy which Bishop Henry of Winchester gave King Henry I. During his reign:

England had been the peculiar habitation of peace, so that through the activity, spirit and vigour of that pre-eminent man not only did the natives, whatever their power or position, not venture to create any disturbance, but similarly all the neighbouring kings and princes, following his example, inclined to peace themselves and urged or forced their subjects to it.¹⁸

So peaceful had Henry’s reign been, that “many foreigners, displaced by troubles in their native land, sailed to England and lived in undisturbed peace under his wings.”¹⁹ Virtuous rule manifested itself through the maintenance of peace and justice. It is striking that none of the other virtues commonly associated with secular rule (the fight against simony, the moral purification of the realm, or its defence against foreign invaders) is given much prominence in the Historia.²⁰ The political actions William describes are evaluated purely in relation to the absence or presence of justice. This, in turn, reflected William’s main argument for the legitimacy of Robert’s rebellion, and for the illegitimacy of Stephen’s kingship.

Stephen failed because he was unable to maintain justice. His efforts to keep the peace were frantic, but ultimately fruitless.²¹ Robert, by contrast, on returning to England, quickly enforced the peace in those lands he controlled. His success was not complete, but “still, wherever he saw that it could conveniently be done, he nobly fulfilled the duty of a knight and leader.”²² He called upon the papal legate to excommunicate those who persistently violated the peace,²³ he

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¹⁸ HN 3.47, pp. 90–93.
¹⁹ Ibid., 2.36, pp. 72–73.
²¹ HN 1.21, pp. 40–41.
²² Ibid., 2.37, pp. 72–73.
²³ Ibid., 2.36, pp. 72–73.
destroyed illicit castles, and, while the king had to buy the backing of his subjects either with gifts or the grant of lands and titles, the earl was aided by those with a desire for justice. The execution of Robert FitzHubert, one of the most notorious characters of the civil war, although administered by one of the earl’s allies rather than the earl himself, may nonetheless serve to illustrate this point. Robert and his allies did not allow the loyalty due to their supporters to interfere with the pursuit of justice: FitzHubert “earned so shameful an end not from the king, to whom he was an enemy, but from those whom he seemed to favour.” While Stephen relied on unsuitable supporters (in fact, Malmesbury elaborates that, whereas Henry I had attracted peace-loving foreigners, under Stephen those “from Flanders and Brittany, who were wont to live by plunder, flew to England in the hope of great plunder”), Robert ensured that his followers would not cause the very problems which it was his duty to eradicate. There would have been no justice if he allowed them to plunder, abduct and torture peasants, monks and pilgrims. Finally, the earl was strict and rigorous in his exercise of justice. Stephen certainly tried to pacify the realm, but, lacking strength of arms and character, he was frequently forced to settle the business with more loss to himself than to his opponents. For after expending many great efforts in vain, he would win a pretence of peace from them for a time, by the gift of honours and castles.

Stephen may have been king in name, but Robert acted like the true heir of Henry I, and excelled in the very virtue which had so distinguished his father: the rigorous and uncompromising exercise of justice.

The pursuit of justice and the keeping of the peace were not a matter merely of power, however, and the ability to apprehend and punish the wicked, but also required an inner disposition and a mindset that was constant in the pursuit of its goals, and which put basic

24 Ibid., 2.37, pp. 72–73.
26 Ibid., 2.39, pp. 74–77. See also, for a more uncomplimentary picture of Robert, one of the key royalist texts: Gesta Stephani, ed. transl. K.R. Potter and R.H.C. Davis (Oxford, 1976), 50–52, 104–09.
27 HNV 1.17, 2.36, pp. 32–33, 72–73.
28 Ibid., 2.39, pp. 72–77.
29 Ibid., 1.21, pp. 40–41.
moral precepts above personal gain or political expediency. Stephen, however, lacked all of these: “though you admired his kindness in promising, still you felt his words lacked truth and his promises fulfilment.” Stephen’s fickleness and lack of constancy had been evident above all in the fact that he took the throne. For only a few years earlier, in 1127, he had struggled with Robert to be the first to confirm by oath that he would take Matilda as his future queen. Ultimately, both broke their oath, but Stephen did so to usurp the crown, while Robert acted out of necessity (Stephen’s wealth and popularity made resistance futile) and as a means to higher ends: accepting Stephen allowed him to return to England, and to convince the English magnates in person of the justice of Matilda’s cause. That is, Robert’s perjury was forced upon him, and it was a ruse which allowed him to stay true to his word. No similar mitigating circumstances existed for the king. Much of the first book of the Historia is thus concerned with highlighting this difference. It records key examples of Stephen breaking his word—his promises to protect the liberty of the Church and his assurances of good will towards Earl Robert—and it ends with the earl of Gloucester calling on Matilda to come to England. While the king was fickle and treacherous, Robert was unwavering in his pursuit of what he knew to be just and right.

Stephen’s unreliability permeated every aspect of his rule. Rather than punishing those who disturbed the peace, he took them back into his favour, however false or half-hearted their submission. In fact, many nobles played on this, and “gladly [gave] their support to a prince whom with little trouble they could influence to their own advantage, pushing their own fortunes at the expense of the people of the country.” Because the king lacked constancy and rigour, he inspired greed and strife among his subjects, and proved himself unable to protect those who could not protect themselves. Moreover,

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30 Ibid., 1.15, pp. 28–29.
31 Ibid., 1.3, pp. 8–9. This was a point repeatedly referred to by William; see 1.14, pp. 26–27; 3.61, pp. 112–13.
32 Ibid., 1.17, pp. 30–33.
33 Ibid., 1.15, pp. 28–29.
34 Ibid., 1.17, 1.20, pp. 32–33, 38–39.
35 Ibid., 1.21, pp. 40–43.
36 Ibid., 1.15, pp. 28–29.
37 Ibid., 1.18, pp. 32–33.
Stephen’s lack of constancy meant that he failed to be resolute in defending and demanding what was right, and that he was unable to differentiate between good counsel and bad.\footnote{Ibid., 2.40, pp. 76–79.} As a result, and despite his best efforts, justice disappeared from England. Moreover, his frequent setbacks forced the king to commit even greater sins. As he was unable to do justice, and as the only means he had to assure himself of the backing of his subjects was through money and gifts, new means had to be found to fill his treasury: “So everything in England was for sale, and now churches and abbeys were split up and sold not secretly but openly.”\footnote{Ibid., 2.37, pp. 74–75.} That is, Stephen violated one of a ruler’s noblest tasks: the protection of the Church and its liberties, and he did so because he was unable to do justice. He was unable to do justice, in turn, because he lacked the rigour and the constancy of mind required.

At the same time, Malmesbury did not paint the king as a one-dimensional villain. He never doubted the sincerity of Stephen’s concern for justice,\footnote{Ibid., 1.21, pp. 40–41.} and he frequently admired his energy and valour. In Malmesbury’s eyes, Stephen’s problem was not that he refused to do justice, but that he lacked the constancy of mind to do it, and because his kingship itself lacked legitimacy.\footnote{Ibid., 1.15, 2.37, pp. 28–29, 74–75.} Under these circumstances, the best Stephen could do was to win “a pretence of peace.”\footnote{Ibid., 1.21, pp. 40–41.} Equally, he praised the king for his ease of manners and urbane demeanour. The reasons for this attitude are manifold. First, Malmesbury had to explain why in 1135 so many nobles sided with Stephen, rather than Matilda, and the king’s demeanour and generosity was one way of explaining their support; secondly, he was bound by standards of plausibility and accuracy. He had to reflect the reality he was claiming to describe in the Historia. This aspect certainly reflected his self-image as a writer of history,\footnote{Thomson, William of Malmesbury, 14–39.} but it was also to some extent forced upon him. The Historia was but one of a series of treatises concerned with the civil war of Stephen’s reign, and William had to respond to the charges and arguments of those favouring Stephen. In order to be successful, he had to persuade Stephen’s
supporters as well as legitimise the actions of the king’s detractors. Royalist texts, in turn, frequently centred on a contrast between the tyrannous peace of Henry I and the fruitful peace of King Stephen, and they put particular emphasis on Stephen’s outward demeanour as a token of his inner virtue. William responded first by describing Stephen’s virtues as insufficient. This is evident, for instance, in his coverage of Stephen’s civilitas. Ease of manners combated haughtiness and arrogance in those who held power, and was thus a means to demonstrate both a virtuous disposition (by showing humility) and a willingness to do justice (by being approachable). At the same time, ease of manners had to be combined with constancy of mind and rigour of justice for a ruler to perform his functions successfully. Although his courtesy thus helped Stephen win supporters initially, he proved unable to perform his functions as king, because he was unable to do justice. He possessed some characteristics of a good and virtuous lord (valour, energy, courtesy), but he lacked those which would have allowed him to put them to good use (constancy and rigour). Second, by modelling Robert as the true embodiment of rulerly virtue, Malmesbury not only legitimised the earl’s political actions, but he also undermined the basis from which many royalist writers had argued their case.

The earl never acted for material gain, but only to aid his sister’s cause; he enforced the peace, did justice, and protected the Church. All this was combined with a gentility of manners easily surpassing that of Stephen. Robert’s various qualities are illustrated by the events surrounding the battle of Winchester in 1141. Realising that his troops were about to be defeated, Robert withdrew. However, to ensure that his sister would not be captured he sent her ahead, while he and a few companions stayed behind and were taken prisoner. It was during his period of captivity that Robert’s noble demeanour became most evident:

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44 Weiler, “Kingship, Usurpation and Propaganda,” passim.
It was widely reported and brought him much honour, that no one saw the earl of Gloucester broken in spirit or even gloomy of countenance because of that mischance. Such consciousness of his lofty rank did he breathe, that he could not be humbled by the outrage of fortune.\footnote{Ibid., 3.56, pp. 106–07. So important was this point that William repeated it a few chapters later: 3.62, pp. 114–17.}

This was in striking contrast with the king who, when taken captive, had to be put in chains, because he sought to sneak away at night.\footnote{Ibid., 3.44, pp. 86–87.} No such ignoble deed was committed by Robert, who stayed true to his promises that he would not abscond and who, consequently, was treated with due honour. Moreover, he continued to act both with constancy and justice. First, he refused to enter into negotiations about his release without involving the empress.\footnote{Ibid., 3.56, pp. 106–07.} Second, he resisted both threats and bribery, and stayed loyal to his sister, even when offered the rule of the realm as Stephen’s deputy. Furthermore, when meeting the king, Robert emphasized that he acted, “not so much from hatred for the king as regard for his oath, which they [the king’s supporters] themselves ought to perceive it was a crime to break.”\footnote{Ibid., 3.69, pp. 120–21.} Robert rejected the overtures of Stephen and his partisans calmly and reasonably, with reference to undisputed principles of law and justice. He made clear that he was driven not by personal animosity towards the king, but simply by an oath which they both had sworn, and which he felt bound to uphold. Robert was thus the embodiment of civilitas: he acted calmly, nobly and with deliberation. But he also stayed true to his principles. In this sense, the earl was everything the king was, too, but he also possessed the qualities lacking in Stephen. His virtue, in turn, was the key to explaining his success and Stephen’s failure. Robert succeeded, because he kept his word, and because he was constant and rigorous in his pursuit of justice. Virtue was not merely a matter of outward appearance, but also of inner disposition. After all, Stephen, too, tried to do justice. He had some of the characteristics and he took some of the actions of a truly virtuous king, but he lacked the frame of mind which would have allowed him to turn virtuous principle into political reality.

William presented a hierarchy of virtues, in which justice took precedence over the others. True justice could not be had without
piety, for instance, or the willingness to take counsel, \(^{51}\) while other virtues sprang from a desire for justice. It was from a desire for justice, for instance, that Robert was willing to forego personal gain and worldly honours, that he sought to pacify the country, check the ambitions of great men and protect the liberty of the Church. Moreover, virtuous conduct brought with it metaphysical as well as material rewards: Robert acted in the certain knowledge that his steadfastness and loyalty would earn him eternal rewards, \(^{52}\) but Malmesbury also painted a very detailed picture of the negative consequences the absence of justice would cause. While a just and pious ruler would have just and pious subjects, a king who failed in his functions would give those below him no reason to strive for a moral life, and they would exploit his weakness, and frequently replicate his faults. \(^{53}\) It is thus not surprising that Stephen, whose greatest failing, in William’s eyes, was his lack of constancy, trustworthiness and justice, presided over a realm in which those who had the power to do so sold justice, oppressed those who could not protect themselves, and felt no obligation to keep their word. On every level, the king’s lack of virtue harmed the welfare of his people. \(^{54}\) Ultimately, power without virtue was tyranny. Tyranny, however, need not be despotism, but could simply be ineffectiveness and failure. \(^{55}\) This, ultimately, was the reason which legitimised Robert’s resistance, and which made Stephen a usurper.

In all this it is worth noting William’s method of work. The Historia did not limit itself merely to stating that justice, valour, piety etc. were important functions of a ruler, or that a particular individual was just, brave and pious. Rather, general principles were expressed through specific examples: Stephen proved himself an unworthy successor to Henry I, because monasteries were burned, churchyards

\(^{51}\) Weiler, “William of Malmesbury.”

\(^{52}\) HN 3.60, pp. 112–13.


\(^{54}\) HN 2.37, pp. 74–75.

plundered, rich men abducted or tortured for ransom. Robert, on the other hand, was a good leader, because he had those excommunicated who ravished churches and abbeys, he saw to it that men like FitzHubert were executed, and he was prepared to risk his own safety in the service of a higher good. This method was also linked to the purpose of William’s narrative, and the audience he ultimately sought to address. After all, the Historia had been written not only to justify Robert’s resistance and to deny the legitimacy of Stephen’s kingship, but also as a moral guide. England was thrown into political turmoil exactly because Robert was such a singular example of political virtue. If everyone—and this included many of Matilda’s partisans—had acted as virtuously, Stephen would never have become king. Moreover, if they mended their ways, the peace and justice of Henry I’s reign might yet return and make England once more into “the peculiar habitation of peace.”

De nugis curialium is a very different text. Although no dedication letter survives, it was clearly conceived as a moral treatise aimed at an audience familiar with the workings of the royal court. Unlike the Historia, it was not concerned with recording the recent past, but with expounding fundamental truths relating to the environment and the social group within which the author moved. At the same time, Map aimed to go beyond the immediate context of his writing (the court of Henry II), and sought to fashion a system of moral norms and virtuous behaviour which could be universally applied. He thus painted on a much wider canvas than Malmesbury in the Historia—his illustrative materials included marvels, legends, tales and myths, but also, especially in the fifth and final part of De nugis, a series of historical characters—with a much more ambitious goal.

As in the Historia, virtue refers in De nugis to a set of abstract principles as well as to character. Furthermore, justice appears as the key virtue of rulers, and it primarily involves controlling the activities of one’s court: echoing Isidore of Seville (non autem regit, qui non corrigit), Map declared quia rectore est tenetur esse corrector. One of the

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56 HN 3.60, pp. 112–13.
57 Isidore of Sevilla, Etymologiae 9.3, ed. Lindsay. This echo has been overlooked by the modern editors of De nugis.
58 DNC 5.7, pp. 510–11.
chief evils of the court was the oppression it wreaked upon the common people. In fact, De nugis opens with a warning given by the bishop-elect of Lincoln to King Henry II, that his keepers of the royal forest exploited the poor so much that they endangered both their and the king’s salvation. Maintaining the peace thus meant reining in the greed of royal officials, but it also required that lords be aware of the plotting in their households. One of the episodes Map records to celebrate King Louis VII of France (1137–80), for instance, concerned Waleran, a knight renowned for his sharp tongue. Some courtiers claimed that he had composed mocking songs about the king, and he was forced into exile to England. He eventually returned to Paris in the entourage of the English king, but pretended to have fallen on hard times. When Louis saw him impoverished, he regretted his earlier harshness, took Waleran back into his favour and punished those who had led the intrigue against him. A king had to be ever vigilant against both the evils his courtiers would inflict upon his subjects, and the intrigues they would spin against each other. De nugis ends with a warning exhortation to all rulers:

The king in his court is like a husband who is the last to learn of the unfaithfulness of his wife. They [the courtiers] craftily urge him out of doors to sport with hounds and hawks, that he may not see what they are doing indoors.

Map is much less specific as to the exercise of the law outside the court. One of the defining virtues of King Henry I was that “he would have no man feel the want of justice or peace.” In a parallel with Malmesbury, Map pointed out that, during the king’s reign, “not only our own countrymen flock[ed] to his court to be lightened of care, but foreigners too.” Similarly, Louis VII was “the strictest of judges, and an executor . . . of justice, stiff to the proud and to the meek not unfair.” Maintaining the peace and keeping justice, raising the humble and humbling the proud, were chief among a

60 Ibid., 1.9, pp. 10–11.
61 Ibid., 5.5, pp. 446–51.
63 Ibid., pp. 472–73.
64 Ibid., 5.5, pp. 438–39.
65 Ibid., pp. 442–3.
monarch’s duties. Map did not, however, go much beyond a general statement of principle. Moreover, to Map, unlike Malmesbury, justice did not necessarily manifest itself in the summary execution of evildoers. He was more concerned with the means and mechanisms by which justice could be given at court or through the king. The key instruments for doing justice were organisation and access. Henry I, for instance, was praised, because he

arranged with great precision, and publicly gave notice of the days of his travelling and of his stay, with the number of days and the names of vills, so that everyone might know . . . the course of his living.

This was to aid those who had to finance the court’s sojourn, but it also aimed to facilitate access to royal justice. Those who suffered injustice should have ready access to the king and his justice. Among the many virtues of Henry I was thus that, “to further the ease of everyone he arranged that on vacation days he would allow access to his presence, either in a great house or in the open.” One of the key weaknesses of Henry II, by contrast, was that “he does not allow himself to be seen as honest men would have him to, but shuts himself up within, and is only accessible to those who seem unworthy of such ready access.” By excluding himself the king was unduly exposed to the wiles and intrigues of his courtiers, but Map’s complaint also reflects the principle of access to the royal person as a key means by which peace and justice could be safeguarded.

Furthermore, justice had to be tempered with mercy. Henry I, for instance was applauded for the fact that he exercised moderation in fining his nobles and for the ease with which he took them back into his favour. This certainly presented an idealised image of Henry’s reign, but what matters here is its multiple role: as a veiled

66 See also Augustine, *De civitate Dei* 12.4, ed. Bernhard Dombart and Alphons Kalb, CCSL 48:558. Walter echoes not so much Augustine’s language as the principle he espouses.

67 *DNC* 5.6, pp. 470–73.

68 Ibid., pp. 472–73.

69 Ibid., pp. 484–85.

70 Ibid., pp. 470–71.

criticism of Henry II,\textsuperscript{72} as part of an extended praise of the king’s generosity (to which we shall shortly return); and the ease with which Henry I kept the peace: because he was generous and forgiving, people flocked to his court, and justice was done. The same desire to temper the rigour of justice with mercy was evident in the episode about Waleran and Louis VII, and it also forms the core of the second anecdote Map reports about the king of France. It centres on the misdeeds of an unnamed noble, “the equal of Catiline in guile, and of Nero in crime.” He was eventually apprehended and sentenced to death. None of the usual means available to reach a peaceful settlement—submission, intercession or compensation—would weaken King Louis’ resolve.\textsuperscript{73} Louis relented (and mercifully reduced the culprit’s sentence from death to mutilation) only when the noble’s pregnant wife, who in the past had frequently set her husband’s prisoners free, beseeched the king to show mercy.\textsuperscript{74} Louis thus recognised the dividing line between the harsh but rigorous pursuit of justice and what would have become a cruel and tyrannical act.

Justice could not be viewed in isolation from other virtues. However, while Malmesbury viewed justice as the focal point of rulerly virtue, to which others either led or from which they sprang, Map portrays it as closely entwined with, and as existing alongside them. Particularly important were piety and generosity. Both Louis VII and his father, for example, were singled out for their devotion.\textsuperscript{75} At the same time, Map objected to ostentatious displays of religious fervour, and frequently lambasted those as hypocrites who gave an exaggerated display of their devotion. Much of \textit{De nugis} is thus taken up with maligning the Cistercians for their ostentatious religiosity, their arrogance, greed and desire to dominate.\textsuperscript{76} This criticism was, however, by no means limited to members of the clergy. Map thus reports


\textsuperscript{73} This episode has to be viewed in the light of the observations made by Gerd Althoff, \textit{Spielregeln der Politik im Mittelalter: Kommunikation in Frieden und Fehde} (Darmstadt, 1997), 99–125, concerning Germany; no equivalent study exists for England. See also a very similar episode in relation to Frederick Barbarossa in Otto of Freising, \textit{Gesta Frederici seu rectius Cronica} 2.3, ed. Franz-Josef Schmale, transl. Adolf Schmidt, Ausgewählte Quellen zur deutschen Geschichte des Mittelalters, 2nd ed. (Darmstadt, 1974), 286–89.

\textsuperscript{74} \textit{DNC} 5.5, pp. 442–46.

\textsuperscript{75} \textit{DNC} 5.5, pp. 452–53.

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., 1.25, pp. 85–114; see also Türk, \textit{Nugae curialium}, 158–60.
the case of an unnamed Welshman, who was famously strict in his religious observance. In fact, his praying and fasting was such that one believed that he was an angel rather than a man:

Yet if you saw how wild he was in battle, how easily provoked to bloodshed . . . how eager for the slaughter of others, how pleased when any crime or murder was done, you could not doubt that he was wholly given over to iniquity.\(^7\)

Piety had to be exercised both with moderation, and with a clear understanding that it was not merely a matter of complying with rules of outward behaviour, but that true piety also required a pious mind.

Much greater room was given to generosity. Henry I, for instance, took great care to ensure the material well-being of those who attended his court. He had a register produced which outlined the payments due to the earls and barons attending his court, and every youth this side of the Alps whom he heard of as desiring the renown of a good start in life, he enrolled in his household, and any who had a smaller yearly allowance than 100 shillings received that sum by the hand of his messenger.

Not surprisingly, therefore, “no one but an idiot was poor in those days.”\(^7\) Equally, good kings, once they recognised past mistakes responded by rewarding those harmed by their decisions—as Louis VII, for instance, had done when taking Waleran back into his service. Generosity was also a distinguishing characteristic of an otherwise unidentified King Apollonides. After a successful raid against his enemies, the king was approached by a priest who, “with an eye to profit rather than truth,” claimed that some of the cattle carted off by Appolonides’ army belonged to him. The king allowed him to retrieve his animals, and the cleric instantly took twenty of the best. Immediately, a second priest appeared, and demanded another twenty beasts, and even swore an oath that they were his. When a third cleric arrived, only demanding two animals, the king ordered him to swear that he, too, wanted twenty. When the priest refused to perjure himself, Apollonides was so impressed, that he gave him

\(^7\) _DAC_ 2.8, pp. 144–47. By way of contrast, this episode is immediately followed by an account of a truly pious hermit who even paid a thief who had stolen one of his animals: 2.9, pp. 146–47.

\(^7\) Ibid., 5.6, pp. 472–73.
By doing justice (that is, restoring goods which had been stolen, or claimed to have been stolen) Apollonides demonstrated his generosity—after all, he could have questioned the claims made by the first two priests. At the same time, had he not given in to their demands, he probably would not have encountered the one priest who really did have a just grievance. It was his generosity, in short, which enabled him to do justice, and it was his generosity which Apollonides used to do justice: by granting the one claimant with a legitimate grievance damages above and beyond what was due. This, in turn, not only underlined the king’s own virtue, but also contrasted it favourably with the corruption and greed of the begging priests. Generosity made other virtues shine more brilliantly, and was a means by which justice could be demonstrated, but it was also something without which justice could not exist.

These examples also indicate the degree to which virtue was a matter both of outward action and inner disposition. This was a recurrent theme in *De nugis*, and Map’s description of Henry II may stand in place of numerous other examples:

> There does not seem to be anyone besides him possessed of such good temper and affability. Whatever way he goes out he is seized upon by crowds . . . and, surprisingly to say, listens to each man with patience, and though assaulted by all with shouts and pullings and rough pushings, does not challenge anyone for it, nor show any appearance of anger . . . He does nothing in a proud or overbearing fashion, is sober, modest, pious, trustworthy and careful, generous and successful, and ready to honour the deserving.

This passage is worth noting for the way in which it combines outward actions (the king listened to the pleas of his subjects, he went out to meet them, and was ready to honour those worthy of his support) with forms of public demeanour (he was affable, sober, modest) and inner qualities: Henry was pious, trustworthy and careful. In a single sentence, Map summarised what made a good king truly virtuous: the unity of virtue in character, action and demeanour.

At the same time, outward appearances could be deceiving, and, in the same way that a display of piety did not necessarily go hand in hand with a life of piety, virtuous behaviour did not always indicate

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79 Ibid., 5.2, pp. 408–09.
80 Ibid., 5.6, pp. 484–87.
a virtuous character. Henry the Young King, the eldest son of King Henry II, who died in 1184 when leading a rebellion against his father, is presented as a warning example. He was richly endowed with eloquence and charm of address...a man full of grace and flavour. Rich, noble, lovable, eloquent, handsome, gallant, every way attractive, a little lower than angels.

In short, he possessed all the outward appearances of a truly good ruler. The language of Map’s description is also worth noting. This list of Young Henry’s virtues is far more limited than that of his father, and he is noted mostly for his manners and outward appearance. No inner qualities are mentioned. This was for a good reason, as Young Henry turned all these gifts...to the wrong side...he befouled the whole world with his treasons, a prodigy of unfaith and prodigal of ill, a limpid spring of wickedness, the attractive centre of villainy...81

Important as civilitas was, ease of manner on its own could be used for good and evil ends alike. This view is harsher than that espoused by Malmesbury. In the Historia, Stephen did not abuse his ease of manners. Ease of manners was a trait of character virtuous in itself, but insufficient if not accompanied by other good qualities. Map, by contrast, viewed it in morally neutral terms. With good kings, such as Henry I, Henry II or Louis VII, it helped to make their virtuous disposition shine more truly. But it also enabled evil men like Henry the Young King to pursue their plots with greater success. Virtuous action was impossible without a virtuous disposition.

Map is, furthermore, distinctive in his apparent belief that virtue could not be acquired by those of low birth. Map’s sketch of the career of Earl Godwin, one of the leading aristocratic figures of late Anglo-Saxon England, and (wrongly) described as the son of a herdsman, illustrates this point. One the one hand, Godwin is praised for a display of “affability, courtesy, liberality,” equal to that of a noble or even a king’s son. This was particularly impressive, for “who would suppose that a rustic could be pure of rusticity and distinguished by such sweet perfume of virtues?” After all, “goodness [probitas] is the daughter of nobility, and wisdom denies the highest degree of it to the ignoble.” In short, Godwin’s manners and behaviour were

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81 Ibid., 4.1, pp. 280–83; see also Türk, Nugae curialium, 165.
equal to that of the social group into which he had been raised by the king. On the other hand, this only served to underline the greatness of his achievement, as *civilitas* and virtuous demeanour were something which, by nature, belonged to those who had been born noble. Unsurprisingly, maintaining appearances of courtly behaviour thus proved a continuous struggle to Godwin:

> with these striking features of his character, the earl, good and courteous in seeming, masked the blemishes which he owed to his birth, and by main force kept down the innate militancy of his malice.

Ultimately, the display of noble manners could not hide Godwin’s rustic pedigree, which revealed itself time and time again in the ruthlessness with which he pursued his political goals.\(^\text{82}\) Ease of manners was morally neutral: it could be used for sinister ends (as Henry the Young King had done), and it could be acquired even by those of low social origin (as with Earl Godwin). That which it was supposed to symbolise, however—a virtuous character—could not.

This emphasis on social distinction reflected the conditions at the English royal court under Henry II, who drew increasingly on *hominès novi*, men of mercantile or peasant stock, to staff his expanding fiscal and judicial apparatus.\(^\text{83}\) Map repeatedly warned of the evils which would result from men of low stock holding positions of power and influence. When explaining, for example, why members of the clergy were especially prone to exploiting the king’s subjects, he declared:

> It is because the gentry [*generosi*] are too proud or too lazy to put their children to learning, whereas of right only free men [*liberi*] are allowed to learn the arts, which is why they are called liberal arts. The villains [*servi*] on the other hand . . . vie with each other in bringing up their ignoble and degenerate offspring to those arts which are forbidden to them; not that they may shed vices, but that they may gather riches; and the more skill they attain, the more ill they do.\(^\text{84}\)

Because of the hostility shown by the traditional elites, the *generosi*, towards the idea of learning, the schools were filled with men who had neither the pedigree nor the disposition to use their knowledge wisely. They, too, possessed the tools by which to symbolise virtue, but they

\(^{82}\) *DNC* 5.3, pp. 416–17.


\(^{84}\) *DNC* 1.10, pp. 12–13.
lacked the mindset and character to choose virtue over greed, ambition or envy.\textsuperscript{85} In fact, there was only one reason why rulers might extend their patronage to unfree men: “because they want to serve vices, and shun the freedom of virtues.”\textsuperscript{86} The example of King Edmund Ironside provided a stark warning as to the consequences this might have: he had made a man of low birth one of his closest confidants. However, when Edmund withheld a benefice which his favourite desired, the latter contrived to murder him, thereby not only ending the life of his master, but also delivering the realm of England into the hands of King Cnut.\textsuperscript{87}

This already points to the underlying need for the virtuous conduct of rulers. Virtuous kingship benefited the realm as a whole; in fact, Map spent much space on outlining the economic benefits of Henry I’s rule. If, on the other hand—as had been the case with Henry II—kings chose officials of low social status, or if they were reluctant to be available to their subjects, then injustice, expropriation and corruption would be the inevitable result. This need not necessarily lie in the ruler’s intention. Henry II, for instance, had been brought up to do as he did by his mother, the Empress Matilda, and had been encouraged in these ways by his wife, Eleanor of Aquitaine. For that very reason, however, rulers had to be especially vigilant.

\textit{De nugis} shared basic beliefs as to the nature and hierarchy of virtues with the \textit{Historia}—justice was all important, virtue was a matter both of outward action and inner disposition—but once Map sought to define what these virtues meant in practice, his courtly background shone through: virtue was unobtainable to those of low or peasant stock; justice defined itself through controlling the plots and schemes of one’s attendants; generosity meant ensuring the livelihood of one’s courtiers. He shared the contempt, evident in chivalrous literature, for monastic orders,\textsuperscript{88} and his narrative technique was aimed at the tastes and predilections of his audience: it contained

\textsuperscript{85} Once again, the court of King Henry I was the ideal court, as it combined a moral education with aristocratic pursuits such as hunting: ibid., 5.5, 5.6, pp. 438–39, 472–73.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 5.4, pp. 428–29.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., pp. 430–31.
tales of wondrous occurrences and legends (normally involving knights and kings, with a marked absence of priests and monks), humour, wordplay, and satire. Map aimed to write entertainment, but it was entertainment with a clear moral purpose: the court—whether royal, baronial, episcopal, clerical, etc.—was dangerous terrain to move in. If, however, lords and their attendants behaved in a virtuous manner, these dangers could be avoided and their eternal salvation would no longer be at risk.

Malmesbury’s and Map’s narratives reflect the expectations of their respective audiences, but they also echo the specific background of each author. Malmesbury was a monk and a scholar, Map a secular cleric steeped in the narrative lore of courtly society. This influenced their definition and representation of virtue in political life. Malmesbury’s conception of justice had little room for mercy (in fact, Stephen’s key weakness was that he was too easily reconciled), while he thought civilitas denoted a virtuous disposition, albeit of little use unless combined with other virtues such as constancy. Map, by contrast, believed that courtly behaviour could be good or bad, depending entirely on a person’s inner disposition. There is no villain either in the Historia or in Malmesbury’s other writings who possesses good manners, but there are many in De nugis. Furthermore, to Malmesbury virtue was a matter of individual choice, which could be acquired if a person abided by basic moral principles. Map, on the other hand, viewed virtue as something innate and given by nature only to those of noble birth. Divine grace, by contrast, played a relatively minor role. While Malmesbury certainly allowed for the divine will to intervene in human affairs (although more so in the Gesta regum than the Historia novella), he and Map seem in agreement that heavenly backing was the reward for virtuous behaviour rather than its source.

There are also some other striking similarities. Both the Historia novella and De nugis curialium see justice as the key virtue in a prince, and both, incidentally, view Henry I as an ideal to which all rulers should aspire. Justice mattered because it brought peace and tranquillity, and thereby allowed the kingdom to prosper morally and economically. It was linked to other virtues (piety and generosity) and character traits (steadfastness of mind and approachability), either

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89 Weiler, “William of Malmesbury” deals with this in more detail.
as their source or as something without which it could not be accomplished. Furthermore, Malmesbury and Map viewed a virtuous personality as an essential precondition for the successful exercise of lordship. If, like Stephen in the Historia, rulers lacked rigour and decisiveness, all their efforts would come to nought, and if they were unwilling to focus on their royal duties, as had been the case with Henry II, corruption and injustice would flourish. To some extent both echoed biblical and patristic thought on secular authority.90

Malmesbury’s and Map’s emphasis on justice as a key political virtue, and especially Malmesbury’s insistence on rigorous punishment, echo a wider phenomenon in evidence across the twelfth-century West. Gerd Althoﬀ has suggested that from about 1150 a much greater emphasis was put on the king’s personal involvement in the maintenance of justice; the type of justice chroniclers favoured was generally that espoused by Malmesbury.91 Examples from Flanders, Germany or the Norman kingdom of Sicily can be easily adduced.92

At the same time, Map’s focus on the administrative mechanisms created by Henry I foreshadows like concerns in the histories, for instance, of Roger of Hoveden, William of Newburgh or Ralph of Diss. These authors, writing from the second half of the twelfth century, put a much greater emphasis on the selection of royal officials for the judicial apparatus. While the swift punishment of evildoers

90 Map not only quoted Isidore of Seville, but also the Bible: when dealing with King Aethelred II—who was “truthful in his threats, false in his promises, and everywhere a hammer of justice”—he cited Prov. 29:3: “An unjust king has none but wicked servants” (DNC 5.4, pp. 420–23). See for an overview Weiler, “The rex renitens,” and for a broader contextualisation in an early medieval context Rosamond McKitterick, “Perceptions of Justice in Western Europe in the Ninth and Tenth Centuries,” in La giustizia nell’alto medioevo (secoli IX–XI), vol. 2 (Spoleto, 1997), 1075–1102; Janet L. Nelson, “Kings with Justice, Kings without Justice: An Early Medieval Paradox,” ibid., 797–823; Marc Reydellet, La royauté dans la littérature latine de Sidoine Apollinaire à Isidore de Séville (Rome, 1981).

91 Gerd Althoﬀ, Die Macht der Rituale: Symbolik und Herrschaft im Mittelalter (Darmstadt, 2003), 145–60.

still continued to play an important role, it was a task best accomplished by appointing suitable judges and officials, and by keeping a watchful eye on their conduct.\textsuperscript{93} Hunting down criminals was not something Map’s contemporaries deemed to be required of a king.

Malmesbury and Map were not the only Englishmen of their times to discuss royal virtue. John of Salisbury and Gerald of Wales, for instance, similarly constructed models of secular lordship and of the king’s personality in their political treatises.\textsuperscript{94} Malmesbury and Map, however, wrote fundamentally different texts. The \textit{Historia} was argumentative history, which sought to legitimise resistance towards the kingship of Stephen, while \textit{De nugis} was satirical entertainment with a moral purpose. As such, the \textit{Historia} and \textit{De nugis} may indicate the variety of contexts and methods in twelfth-century discussions of virtue and ethics.


\textsuperscript{94} For John of Salisbury, see the contribution of Cary J. Nederman to this volume. For Gerald, see István P. Bejczy, “Gerald of Wales on the Cardinal Virtues: A Reappraisal of \textit{De principis instructione},” \textit{Medium Aevum} (forthcoming).
“Ex illustribus factis (. . .) bene vivendi reperitur exemplum.” This is the way the *Karolinus* begins, a work written between 1196 and 1200, possibly in Rome, by a canon of Saint Marcel named Giles of Paris and intended for young Louis, son of Philip Augustus, when he was thirteen years old. The poem counts over two thousand verses and has survived in two manuscripts dating from the early thirteenth century, one preserved in Paris and the other in London. In 1973, a critical edition by Marvin L. Colker appeared in the review *Traditio*.

The *Karolinus* is a didactic work written in order to hold up Charlemagne’s behaviour as a glorious model to the future King Louis VIII. The poem is divided into five books: the first four describe the way the emperor had been exercising the four cardinal virtues his entire life, while the last book invites the young prince to become a new Charlemagne. The work can therefore be considered a specimen of the *speculum principis* genre that underwent a marked revival in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. The *specula* literature had become rare after the Carolingian age in which it had first flourished, but regained strength in France and England from the middle of the twelfth century, as is proven by the existence of treatises

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3 *Karolinus* II. 151–57, p. 266.
4 To these books are appended a prologue, an epilogue, several annexes and a *captatio*, which were probably written after the main text; for their (dubious) chronology, see Colker, “The Karolinus,” 203 and 217–19. The *captatio* ignores the cardinal virtues and consists of a defence of Parisian contemporary writers who, according to Giles, have been wrongly slandered.
such as John of Salisbury’s *Policraticus* (1159, for archbishop Thomas Becket), Gerald of Wales’ *De principis instructione* (1190/1217, for Henry II) and Helinand of Froidmont’s *De bono regimine principis* (1210, for Philip Augustus). The *Karolinus*, presented to Prince Louis on 3 September 1200, has its place in this new wave of handbooks of princely education and advice.

The *Karolinus* has received (still quite modest) scholarly attention only in recent times. Still, the poem displays a twofold literary originality. First, it appears to be the first mirror for a prince since the *Formula honestae vitae* of Martin of Braga (515/20–579/80) of which the entire structure is arranged according to the scheme of the four cardinal virtues. Some earlier works of princely instruction make extensive use of the scheme, as well, but never to such an exclusive extent; moreover, the four virtues themselves are described in an unusual way. Second, the *Karolinus* is constructed from beginning to end according to the portrait of Charlemagne, and again this is something new, at least in moral and educational literature. In this contribution, I intend to explore this double innovation (something quite unexpected from a second-rank author like Giles of Paris) in order to understand the poem’s political and historical goals.

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6 Notably Hrabanus Maurus’ *De anima* (855/56, dedicated to Lothar II, ruler of the Frankish Middle Kingdom), one third of which deals with the cardinal virtues; a chapter of Bruno of Segni’s *Sententiae* (c. 1100) concerned with secular government, on which see István P. Bejczy, “Kings, Bishops and Political Ethics: Bruno of Segni on the Cardinal Virtues,” *Mediaeval Studies* 64 (2002): 267–84; and Gerald of Wales’ *De principis instructione*, the first book of which seems to follow the scheme of the cardinal virtues, on which see István P. Bejczy, “Gerald of Wales on the Cardinal Virtues: A Reappraisal of *De principis instructione*”, *Medium Aevum* (forthcoming).

7 Other contemporary works are likewise built on the portrait of great figures, but rather belong to historical writing and epic: see, e.g., the *Alexandreis* of Walter of Châtillon and the *Philippide* (1220s) of William the Breton, a panegyric on Philip Augustus.

8 Giles wrote fickle, satirical and moral works, which are now lost (*Karolinus*, 236), a verse treatise *De penis inferni*, and a revision of Peter Riga’s *Aurora*. 
To start with the role of Charlemagne, it is important to note that the Emperor often figured in the contemporary literature of *chansons de geste*, the very works Giles dismisses as untruthful *mithmi* and from which he wants to separate himself as an accurate historian. Since the middle of the twelfth century, the sovereigns of the Empire, of France and even of England each laid claim to Charles the Great’s inheritance. In 1156, Charlemagne became the protector of France; in 1165, Frederick Barbarossa had him canonized; in England, Peter of Blois (ca. 1130/35–1211/12) called Henry II, whom he greatly admired, a “new Charlemagne”. William the Breton and Gerald of Wales soon likened Philip Augustus to the Emperor in the same way. As a biography of Charlemagne intended for the French royal court, the *Karolinus* fits well into this context. Furthermore, in the Paris manuscript an elaborate family tree has been added to the work, full of allusions to the Carolingian roots of the reigning dynasty: following on the Sicambri, the legendary ancestors of the Franks, the Merovingians and the Carolingians occupy the royal throne. The Capetians, though not directly akin to the Carolingians, are implicitly presented as their descendants. If Giles of Paris did not openly refer to the *reditus ad stirpem Karoli* like many other authors did, especially from the 1220s, he nevertheless meant his poem to be a work of

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9 *Karolinus* ll. 67–68, p. 230; l. 2, p. 289; ll. 23–28, p. 291; l. 413, p. 302; l. 402, p. 315; *Captatio* l. 134, ibid. p. 323. Besides, one can add that Philip Augustus mistrusted them.

10 According to a false deed of covenant to Saint Denis written in 1156, Charlemagne was supposed to have proclaimed the independence of *Francia* and the sovereignty of its king over all other powers, including the German Empire. On this deed and the popularity of Charlemagne’s feature in Capetian France, see Jacques Krynen, *L’empire du roi: Idées et croyances politiques en France XIIIe–XVe siècles* (Paris, 1993), 50–51; Robert Folz, *Le couronnement impérial de Charlemagne* (Paris, 1964), 255–57.

11 Peter of Blois, *Epistulae* 14, PL 207: 45C. Peter also wrote the *De praestigiis fortunae* (a work now lost) in praise of him; see Egbert Türk, *Nugae curialium: Le règne de Henri II Plantagenêt (1143–1185)* et l’ethique politique (Genève, 1977), 146.


13 See Lewis, “Dynastic Structures.” The beginning of the text in the London manuscript is amply inspired by the genealogy, even if it does not reproduce it.

Capetian propaganda in which he presents Philip Augustus’ son, named Karolinus on several occasions, with his imperial ancestor as a model. The young prince, indeed, is enjoined to imitate the great Emperor perfectly, notably in Charlemagne’s practice of the cardinal virtues which underlines the whole poem. Although at first sight the Karolinus appears to be a mere biography of Charlemagne, structured according to a chronological scheme, Giles again and again reasserts his intention of highlighting every detail in the life of his protagonist which can be linked to the four cardinal virtues. He first explains his design in his prologue, comparing the cardinal virtues to the four wheels of Elijah’s chariot (2 Reg. 2:11); both surviving manuscripts contain a drawing by way of illustration. Moreover, to each of the first four books he assigns one particular virtue, first announced at the beginning of the book and recalled at the end of it. In this way, Giles successively deals with Prudence, Justice, Fortitude and Temperance; showing attention to detail, he makes each book begin with the first letter of the virtue it describes.

Now, in the various sources used by Giles, starting with Eginhard’s Vita Karoli, there is no hint of the four cardinal virtues. In twelfth-century moral theology and philosophy, the cardinal virtues were obviously an important theme; they frequently recur in sermons and


15 The four wheels of the “chariot of contemplation” symbolize the four cardinal virtues discussed in the first four books. The fifth book is the ‘bodywork’, with the reader of the poem as rider and the horse as the amor bene vivendi. The same association of the cardinal virtues with the wheels of a chariot can be found, e.g., in Peter the Chanter, Verbum abbreviatum 66 and 115, PL 205: 176A, 305B (cf. textus conflatus 1.54 and 2.25, ed. Monique Boutry, CCCM 196:371, 700–01). Giles also evokes the “axis regni” (Karolinus ll. 57–58, p. 305).

16 Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, MS lat. 6191, fol. VIIv; London, British Library, MS Add. 22399, fol. 3r. The picture represents four women who symbolize the four cardinal virtues. Each one of them is holding a wheel of the chariot, inside which a definition of the corresponding virtue is written. In the middle, a fifth circle represents the fifth book of the poem. Under this set, one can see Giles of Paris offering his poem to the prince sitting on a throne. The Parisian picture has been reproduced in Henri-François Delaborde, “Note sur le Carolinus de Gilles de Paris,” in Mélanges offerts à Emile Châtelain par ses élèves et ses amis, 15 avril 1910 (Paris, 1910), s.p.; for a colour reproduction, see Roland Schaer, Tous les savoirs du monde: encyclopédies et bibliothèques de Sumer au XXIe siècle (Paris, 1996), 88, fig. 51.

17 Thus, the prologue of the first book, dedicated to Prudence, begins with “Primus” and the book itself with the word “Principis.” The last book begins with alpha (the letter A) and ends with omega (the letter O), which are the two different final vowels of the four virtues (prudentia/iustitia/temperantia—fortitudo).
in hagiography. However, Giles does not mention any moral theologians in his *captatio*. But the scheme can also be found in moral writings for the laity. In some Carolingian *specula* for princes and laymen, the virtues do occur, for instance in Alcuin’s *De vitis et virtutibus* (written for margrave Wido of Brittany) or Hrabanus Maurus’ *De anima* (for Lothar II); others ignore them, such as Jonas of Orléans’ *De institutione regia*. The same holds for the *specula* of Giles’ own century: while *De regia potestate* of Hugh of Fleury († 1118/35) and John of Salisbury’s *Policraticus* briefly mention the virtues, Bruno of Segni sets great store by them, whereas neither Peter of Blois’ *Dialogus* nor Helinand of Froidmont’s treatise refer to them at all. Gerald of Wales appears to have used the scheme of the virtues in *De principis instructione* but blunted their impact in the final redaction of the work.

In the *Moralium dogma philosophorum*, a work that may have been written about 1150 for King Henry II of England (and accordingly has been wrongly ascribed to William of Conches, Henry’s former tutor), the virtues really come to the foreground. Mainly on the basis of ancient moral philosophy, the *Moralium dogma* develops in a systematic way the rules based on the cardinal virtues which should govern the behaviour of the honest man. Finally, in 1198, closer in time to the *Karolinus*, Pope Innocent III sent four rings to Richard, the Lionheart. With them came a letter that explained their meaning as symbols of the four cardinal virtues, connected to the

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20 See above, n. 6.


22 See Bejczy, “Gerald of Wales.”

behaviour of a good king. A direct link between the court of Philip Augustus and medieval writings on the cardinal virtues on behalf of the laity exists in the form of a French translation of Martin of Braga’s *Formula honestae vitae*, composed for the King between 1200 and 1216.

Although none of the texts just mentioned is cited in the *Karolinus* or seems to have functioned as a major source of inspiration, one may reckon Giles’ work to a twelfth-century tradition of texts offering royal leaders a model of behaviour based on the four cardinal virtues. However, Giles’ dealings with the virtues differ from those of his predecessors and his contemporaries. He describes some virtues in a rather conventional manner, such as justice, a virtue *quod unicuique reddit quod suum est*—a definition which recalls Roman law and found general acceptance in twelfth-century moral thought. Some other definitions can be considered “hapax legomena,” as is the case with prudence which consists in bene disponendis sive propriis sive alienis negocis. Prudence was usually defined, following Cicero, as *rerum bonarum et*

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26 Even though Colker, “The Karolinus”, 235 n. draws a parallel between the definition of temperance as *continentia* and the *Formula honestae vitae*.


28 *Karolinus, Prudentia* 1.1, p. 234: “Prudencia est in bene disponendis sive propriis sive alienis negocis.”
malarum utrarumque scientia or discretio. Giles’ definition, apparently unprecedented in medieval writing, may have been partly inspired by the famous letter Pope Zacharias sent to Pippin the Short in 751 (mentioned by Giles in Book I). Answering Pippin’s question on the qualities of a good king, Zacharias wrote (in Giles’ paraphrase): hunc tantum regem debere vocari / qui bene se gereret resque in commune gerendas, / publica qui sciret bona dispensare. But generally, Giles is little interested in definitions of the cardinal virtues and their partes or species: he rather illustrates the virtues by giving detailed accounts of Charlemagne’s deeds.

Strangely enough, Giles seldom troubles to explain the relations between the various features of Charlemagne’s biography and the practice of any particular virtue. For example, in the third book Giles emphasizes Charlemagne’s magnanimity and generosity, but without linking these qualities to the virtue of fortitude, the third book’s main theme, although Giles qualifies Charlemagne’s patience as fortitudo animi. In one instance alone does he justify the insertion of a particular episode: the very last verses of the first book, reporting the submission of Aquitaine, reveal that Charlemagne’s clemency towards his enemy Hunold serves as an example of prudentia. Such explicit connections between the life of the Emperor and the cardinal virtues do not occur anywhere else in the poem. This leads one to wonder whether the scheme of the four virtues, brought into fashion by a good many contemporary authors, might constitute only a kind of convenient but superficial frame, without any substantial link with the poem’s content. Actually, the use of the scheme as a loose organizing principle for quadripartite writings occurred more often in the thirteenth century. As for Giles’ poem, its first four books are

31 Ibid. ll. 272, 278ff., p. 283.
32 Ibid. ll. 142, 151–52, p. 281.
33 Ibid., p. 260.
34 Thus, e.g. the Psalm commentary by Odo of Châteauroux († 1273), MS Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 12417, fols. 83r–114v (I owe this reference to István Bejczy). This work consists of four parts each named after a cardinal virtue (in the sequence justice, fortitude, prudence, temperance), but these parts do not expound the virtues: each part consists of quotations of Psalm verses followed by observations on a great variety of virtues and vices. Furthermore, the famous Breviloquium de virtutibus composed by John of Wales in the 1260s is mainly a collection of exempla
historical rather than moral, as Amaury Duval emphasized;\textsuperscript{35} indeed, they describe one by one Charlemagne’s exploits from his birth to his death, their chronological structure only occasionally interrupted by tales of Charlemagne’s ancestors and descendants. The system of the four cardinal virtues occurs only in addition to this broad chronological texture, without connoting, however, four different stages of Charlemagne’s life. In fact, the \textit{Karolinus} is organized in a way very similar to Eginhard’s \textit{Vita Karoli} which was its main source of inspiration. Still, it would be a mistake to consider Giles’ poem mere biography. In my view, a moral intent underlies the work, which may become visible when one pays attention to the liberties Giles takes in regard to his sources.

Let us first consider the second book of the \textit{Karolinus}, dedicated to justice. At first sight, the book does not contain a single description of the way Charlemagne dispensed justice; Giles actually discusses the Emperor’s judicial practice in his book on fortitude, a virtue Charlemagne displayed in supporting those who defended their legitimate rights and opposing all sorts of fraud and injustice.\textsuperscript{36} The second book rather comprises a fastidious account of the Emperor’s numberless wars. When reading carefully through the lines, however, one may notice some elements lacking in Giles’ sources, likely to be the products of his own invention.

In the first place, the wars led by Charlemagne, whether offensive or defensive, were always aimed at restoring or maintaining peace.\textsuperscript{37} In this context, Giles praises highly the \textit{placidi reges}, contrasting them with the \textit{duri tiranni} who have no other motive for warfare than their \textit{cupiditas vel amor dominandi}.\textsuperscript{38} One may infer that, according to Giles, a just king loves peace. In fact, the oath pledged by the sovereigns of the Franks on their coronation from the year 869 on closely combines peace and justice which appear as the two pillars of royal government, quite in conformity with the “political Augustinism” characteristic of the Carolingian age.\textsuperscript{39} From the middle of the twelfth century, royal

\textsuperscript{35} Amaury Duval, “Gilles de Paris,” in \textit{Histoire littéraire de la France} 17:42.
\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Karolinus}, pp. 288–89.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid. l. 113, p. 265: “de pace tenenda;” l. 185, p. 267: “spes de pace fuit;” see also l. 124, p. 263; l. 275, p. 270; l. 411, p. 274 etc.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid. ll. 151–52, p. 266; l. 140, p. 265 with n. See also l. 14, p. 261; l. 104, p. 264.
peace and justice received a new meaning, as after centuries of vanishing authority the French monarchs finally succeeded in establishing the “peace of the king” in order to replace the “peace of God.”

A second feature of righteousness, closely linked with the first, is that Charlemagne was usually prompted to war by feelings of holy wrath and always fought in the name of the faith, either against apostates (like Desiderius, King of the Lombards) or against pagans (in Spain and Saxony), thus devoting himself to the spread of Christianity.

Giles’ preoccupations with Charlemagne’s peaceful and Christian motives remind one of the reflections of jurists and canonists beginning in the twelfth century on the concept of just war. Furthermore, one may recall Philip Augustus’ dealings with the enemies of the French Kingdom (notably his conflicts with the English “tyrants,” to which Giles refers, that would reach a climax in 1214) and of the faith (significantly, some contemporary chronicles associate Philip Augustus with holy wrath in much the same way as Giles did with Charlemagne).

The growth of heresy in France itself demanded royal attention: despite urgent pleas from the papacy, the king would come only reluctantly into action against the Cathars from 1208; Giles must have heard about the concerns of the pope during his years in Rome. Moreover, the Third and Fourth Crusades also needed consideration, the more so as Charlemagne was thought from the eleventh century on to have led a crusade to Jerusalem. As Jacques de Vitry relates, Philip Augustus reluctantly took part in the Third Crusade, being worried about the fate of Christian prisoners, just as much as Charlemagne did according to Giles. Apart from presenting a biography of Prince Louis’ glorious predecessor, the Karolinus, then, contains numerous hints of the politics of Louis’ father Philip Augustus.

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41 See Karolinus l. 140, p. 265; ll. 180–81, p. 267; ll. 260–61, p. 269; ll. 277–78, 286–89, p. 270; etc. One may think of the notions of *concordia* and *religio*, usually considered as virtues related to the virtue of justice; see, e.g., Alan of Lille, *De virtutibus et vitius et de donis spiritus sancti*, ed. Odon Lottin, in *Psychologie et morale aux XII* et *XIII* siècles, vol. 6 (Gembloux, Louvain, 1960), 29.
One must bear in mind that the *Karolinus* was written between the spring of 1196 and April, 1200. According to John Baldwin, the years 1190 to 1203 can be defined as the “decisive decade” of Philip Augustus’ reign, during which a true and lasting system of royal governance took shape in France.\(^{45}\) The system met opposition from the great lords, members by right of the royal council, since they lost part of their influence to the benefit of advisers of lesser descent. Undoubtedly, Giles of Paris, a cleric of lesser rank who became a canon of Saint Marcel after studying in Paris, was not one of the great barons. Even if he was well acquainted with William the Breton, a priest in the *curia regis* who pleaded Philip Augustus’ cause when negotiating about the king’s divorce in Rome,\(^{46}\) Giles never became a tutor for Prince Louis nor a familiar of the King. But when he praises the king’s good counsellors in his *Karolinus*,\(^{47}\) there is no doubt that he counts himself among them. At times, the poem even seems to express a fear that the King might turn into a tyrant (as some aristocrats believed). Giles’ comparisons between Charlemagne and Philip Augustus, often to the prejudice of the latter, imply a criticism of the abuse of royal power. This is most obviously the case in Giles’ drastic charges against his sovereign’s matrimonial behaviour, unfavourably contrasted with Charlemagne’s marital fidelity (a point on which Giles heartily disagreed with Eginhard).\(^{48}\) The scandal of the royal divorce opposed Philip Augustus to the Church; after a series of incidents, including unjust exactions of the clergy,\(^{49}\) the royal demesne was finally placed under interdict at the beginning of the year 1200. The conflict harmed the King’s function as protector of the Church, sanctioned by his anointment at the coronation ceremony. Again, one cannot think of a greater contrast with Charlemagne, the ‘armed arm’ of the Church whose close bonds with the clergy receive consistent emphasis throughout the *Karolinus*.

Other comparisons between the two sovereigns have a more allusive or implicit character. There exists a remarkable contrast between Giles’ account of Charlemagne personally dispensing justice and thus


\(^{47}\) *Karolinus*, p. 310.

\(^{48}\) Ibid., pp. 244, 291–92, 308ff.

\(^{49}\) Ibid., pp. 244, 306 (ll. 107–09), 324.
manifesting the virtue of fortitude,\textsuperscript{50} and the evolution of the French judicial system within the \textit{curia regis} in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries: an increasing number of new familiars of the king, men of low birth, participated in the trials that opposed the great noblemen of the realm—not only as the King’s advisers, but, as \textit{juris periti}, they even gradually made their way into the body of experts who actually reached verdicts. The king, in theory the protector of the justice of the realm, no longer dispensed justice in person as he used to do with the assistance of his barons.\textsuperscript{51}

As a final example, we find a direct attack on the King in the last book of the \textit{Karolinus}, where Giles, urging Prince Louis to follow the example of Charlemagne, explicitly blames Philip Augustus for his lack of moderation, leniency and patience.\textsuperscript{52} These are precisely the virtues which protect against the abuse of power; it is no wonder that Gerald of Wales underlines these virtues in particular in his \textit{De principis instructione} as a guarantee against tyranny.\textsuperscript{53}

Giles’ criticisms of royal power earned the \textit{Karolinus} the reputation of being “la première attaque connue contre Philippe Auguste.”\textsuperscript{54} At the same time, however, Giles praises his sovereign for his capacity to extend and strengthen the realm, and considers him a much better ruler than the “tyrants” of Germany or England.\textsuperscript{55} This may be flattery in order to compensate for the charges levelled against him, but also a manifestation of the national pride which was growing in Giles’ times.\textsuperscript{56} Even if the king’s behaviour was partly reprehensible, Philip Augustus is, according to Giles, the best ruler of his time, since he is the king of France!

In any case, Philip Augustus’ son is expected to become a better king than his father, and there is a particular reason for that: Louis belongs to Charlemagne’s lineage. In my opinion, this notion of \textit{sancta soboles} supplies the final clue to understand the \textit{Karolinus} fully. Even without referring to the genealogies appended to the poem, the young prince can become a new Charlemagne because he has inherited Carolingian blood from his mother Isabel of Hainaut, and this blood

\textsuperscript{50} See above, n. 36.
\textsuperscript{51} Sivéry, \textit{Louis VIII}, 290.
\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Karolinus} ll. 75–85, pp. 305–06.
\textsuperscript{53} See Bejczy, “Gerald of Wales.”
\textsuperscript{54} Sivéry, \textit{Louis VIII}, 49.
\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Karolinus} ll. 53ff., p. 305; ll. 115–17, p. 307; ll. 420–21, p. 316.
\textsuperscript{56} See e.g. Folz, \textit{Le couronnement}, 253–60.
has predisposed him to virtue: *O puer, in regno regalis sanguinis heres,/*
*Hec tibi constituit in te michi credita virtus,/*
*Qui sancta es soboles sancte genetricis habendus/*
*Et debes prodisse bona bonus arbore fructus.*

Philip Augustus did not fulfill the requirement of Carolingian descent (Giles forgets that the king’s mother is Adele of Champagne), and that may account for his failings.

Giles’ emphasis on the moral significance of royal blood not only recalls the notion of *beata stirps* studied by André Vauchez, but also accords with the prevailing differences in contemporary English and French courtly literature as analyzed by Reto Bezzola. In English texts, the court of King Arthur and his knights reflects an ideal of royal government built on personal, man-to-man relations, in which the king is *primus inter pares*. By contrast, the French *chansons de geste* reserve the *bonus regimen* as represented by Charlemagne for the king alone because of his blood (and therefore they promote the system of hereditary kingship). We have seen, however, that Giles of Paris apparently eschewed the evolution of royal power towards authoritarian government. What prevents royal power sanctioned by blood alone from falling into tyranny? Actually, the same dilemma can be found in the *chansons de geste*.

Giles’ answer is education in virtue. In addition to being an heir to Charlemagne’s virtues by his mother, Prince Louis must devote himself to becoming a “disciple of virtue” (*virtutis emulus*): this is why his father makes him study, and it is also the general aim of the *Karolinus* which instructs the prince to imitate his ancestor’s deeds. Such apprenticeship will prevent the future king from becoming a tyrant, as will surrounding himself with good advisers at a later age. In a sense, the four cardinal virtues which are central to the *Karolinus* are inborn capacities for the young prince to be developed into political virtues at an adult age. Likewise, contemporary Porretan theologians

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57 *Karolinus* ll. 4–7, p. 303; see also l. 61, p. 244.
61 *Karolinus* ll. 31–32, p. 304: “Et quando ingenuas residere parumper ad artes / Te pater instituit, virtutis ut emulus esses...”
distinguished “natural” and “political” virtues as innate potencies and acquired habits within reach of all human beings. In the Karolinus, however, the four virtues specifically function as modalities of royal government. As such, the virtues are innate to the Carolingian dynasty only—but this does not free Charlemagne’s descendants of the duty to develop the virtues through study and exercise.

By way of conclusion, I maintain that the Karolinus of Giles of Paris, despite its appearance as a conventional biographic poem, is remarkable for its literary structure as well as for its ideological contents. To begin with, it combines two themes which had become fashionable by the end of the twelfth century: the figure of Charlemagne as an exemplary monarch and the scheme of the cardinal virtues as the prime constituents of lay morality. Further, the Karolinus reveals itself as a political treatise which is at least implicitly critical of Philip Augustus’ reshaping of the French monarchy, and which compares past and contemporary events with the objective of providing a model of behaviour and government for the future Louis VIII. Finally, the poem raises the issue of holy lineage and virtue and, being concerned with the limits of royal power, quite unexpectedly alludes to the contemporary distinction between inborn capacities and acquired virtues.

Most scholastic authors of the thirteenth century held the view that political virtues were necessarily acquired and not linked with descent—an opinion reflecting Aristotle’s opinion that virtues, far from being inborn qualities, result from constant application. Still, the discussion on the significance and “virtue” of noble blood persisted from the late thirteenth century in the debate on “true” nobility. Many

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62 See the contribution by István Bejczy to this volume.
authors devised ways to complete or even supplant the hereditary “nobility by blood” with a nobility “acquired” by the exercise of virtue. Thus, the early fifteenth-century treatise *L’imagination de vraie noblesse*, written at the Burgundian court, explains that, regardless of birth, only the man who practices the cardinal virtues is a nobleman.

To my knowledge, no other medieval *speculum principis* was written as a biography of a great monarch structured according to the scheme of the cardinal virtues, even though the four virtues occupy a prominent place in quite a few specimens of the genre. Gerald of Wales’ *De principis institutione* probably offers the closest contemporary parallel: the first book is implicitly organized according to the scheme of the four virtues; the second and third books mainly concern the life of King Henry II, which figures as a negative example of kingship; finally, the perspective of royal power degenerating into tyranny haunts Gerald at least as much as it does Giles of Paris. A more remote parallel is offered by the largely unknown *Speculum morale regium* (1384/85) of the French Dominican Robert Gervais, Bishop of Senez († 1390). The work offers a detailed account of the virtues of the French monarchs, starting with the rulers of ancient Gaul and culminating with Charlemagne; significantly, the work is dedicated to King Charles VI of France, who is hailed as *Karolus modernus* in the work’s preface. The work does not discuss the four cardinal virtues, however. As a political treatise on the cardinal virtues cast in the form of a biography, the *Karolinus* is probably unique.

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65 Contamine, *La noblesse*, 301.
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Abbreviations:
CCCM = Corpus christanorum, Continuatio mediaevalis. Turnhout: Brepols, 1966–.
CCSL = Corpus christianorum, Series latina. Turnhout: Brepols, 1953–.
CSEL = Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum. Vienna: Tempsky, 1866–.
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——. See also: Samuel Ibn Tibbon.


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